Trade Unionism and the Institutional Equilibrium in MENA States. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) Supported Study of the Arab Upheavals 2011 - 2013 in Twelve Countries by Jakob, Thomas Erich
Dissertation
Title
Trade Unionism and the Institutional Equilibrium in
MENA States
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) Supported Study of the Arab Upheavals 2011
- 2013 in Twelve Countries
Author
Thomas E. Jakob
- born on September 03 1985 in Siegen -
In order to obtain the academic degree
PhD (Dr.phil.)
Marburg, September 2020
Faculty of Social Sciences and Philosophy
(Fachbereich 03)
Philipps University Marburg
Date of Defense / Disputation: March 03, 2021
Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Rashid Ouaissa
Second Supervisor: Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dirk Berg-Schlosser
2
Special thanks go to
The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation
The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies,
University of Tel Aviv
The AUB Policy Center,
American University of Beirut
Abbreviations
AC Action de Changement Mauritania
ALBA Aluminium Bahrain
APP Alliance Populaire Progressiste Mauritania
ASU Arab Socialist Union Libya
ASU* Arab Socialist Union Egypt
ATUC Aden Trade Union Congress Yemen
BAPCO Bahrain Petroleum Company
BFLUF Bahrain Free Labour Union Federation
BICI Bahraini Independent Commission of Inquiry
BLF Bahrain Labour Federation
BNS Bahrain Nursing Society
BTA Bahrain Teachers’ Association
CCRC Commission Consultative pour la Revision Con-
stitutionelle Morocco
CDT Confédération Démocratique du Travail France
CDT* Confédération Démocratique du Travail Morocco
CEN degree of centralisation of trade union institutions
CGTT Confédération Générale des Travailleurs
Tunisiens Tunisia
CHA Comparative Historical Analysis
CLA Conceil de Lyceés d’Algérie
CLTM Confédération Libre des Travalleurs de Mauri-
tanie
CNAPEST Conseil National Algérien des Professeurs de
l’Enseignement Secondaire et Technique
CNCD Coordination Nationale pour le Changement et
la Démocratie Algeria
CNES Conseil National des Enseignants du Supérieur Al-
geria
COD Coordination de l’Opposition Démocratique Mau-
ritania
csQCA Crisp Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
ECI Economic Complexity Index of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
EDLC Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress
EFITU Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade
Unions
ETUF Egyptian Trade Union Federation
FDT Fédération Démocratique du Travail Morocco
FDTL Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les Lib-
ertés Tunisia
FFS Front des Forces Socialistes Algeria
FIS Front Islamique du Salut Algeria
FITU-J Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Jor-
dan
FLAM Forces de Libération Africaines de Mauritanie
FLN Front de Libération Nationale Algeria
FLTU Federation of Libyan Trade Unions
FNDD Front National pour la Défense de la Démocratie
fsQCA Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis
GCBW General Committee of Bahraini Workers
GFBTU General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions
GFJTU General Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions
GFOTU General Federation of Omani Trade Unions
GFTU General Federation of Trade Unions Syria
GPC General People’s Congress Libya
GTUFW General Trade Union Federation of Workers
Libya
IFLB Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
INOPP intertwinedness with oppositional forces
ITS Independent Teachers’ Syndicate Egypt
ITUC International Trade Union Confederation
JLC Joint Labour-Management Committees Bahrain
JMP Joint Meeting Parties Yemen
KAA Kuwait Accountants and Auditors Association




KEYS bargaining strength of trade unions in key sectors
of the economy
KJA Kuwait Journalist Association
KMA Kuwait Medical Association
KSE Kuwait Society of Engineers
KTS Kuwaiti Teachers’ Society
LADDH Ligue Algérienne pour la Défense des Droits de
l’Homme
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LTDH Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MNA Mouvement National Algérien
MOMP Ministry of Military Production Egypt
MP Mouvement Populaire Morocco
MSP Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix Algeria
MSSD (Most Similar System Design
MTI Movement de la Tendance Islamique Morocco
mvQCA Multivariate Qualitative Comparative Analysis
NCC National Coordination Committee for Democratic
Change Syria
NCLO National Conference for the Libyan Opposition
NCRS National Committee of Retired Servicemen Jor-
dan
NDP National Democratic Party Egypt
NFPF National Front for Progressive Force Bahrain
NFSL National Front for the Salvation Libya
NFTU National Federation of Trade Unions Libya
NUB National Unity Bloc Bahrain
NUC National Union Committee Bahrain
NUPO Nasserist Unionist People’s Organisation Yemen
OCC Oman Consultative Council
ONM Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine Algeria
PAGN Parti d’Avant-Garde Nationale Mauritania
PAGS Parti de l’Avant-Garde Socialiste Algeria
PAM Parti Authenticité et Modernité Morocco
PDP Parti Démocrate Progressiste Tunisa
PDRY People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen
PDT Progressive Democratic Tribune Yemen
PFLO Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman
PPC Political Parties Committee Egypt
PPM Parti du Peuple Mauritanie
PRDR Parti Républicain Démocratique pour le Renou-
vellement Mauritania
PRDS Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social Mauri-
tania
PSD Parti Socialiste Destourien Tunisa
PWF Professional Worker’s Federation Libya
PWP People’s Will Party Syria
RCC Revolutionary Command Council Libya
RCD Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique
Tunisia
RCT Rational Choice Theory
RFD Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques Maurita-
nia
RND Rassemblement National Démocratique Algeria
RNI Rassemblement National des Indépendants Morocco
RS Revolutionary Socialists Egypt
SATEF Syndicat Autonome des Travailleurs de
l’Education et de la Formation Algeria
SCC State Consultative Council Oman
SIPES Syndicat Indépendant des Professeurs de
l’Enseignement Secondaire Mauritania
SIT Syndicat Islamique du Travail Algeria
SMT Social Movement Theory
SNAPAP Syndicat National Autonome des Personnels
de l’Administration Publique Algeria
SNEM Syndicat National des Étudiants de Mauritanie
SNES Syndicat National d’Ensignment Secondaire Mau-
ritania
SNIM Société Nationale d’Industrielle Minière Maurita-
nia
SNJT Syndicat National des Journalistes Tunisiens
SNPSP Syndicat National des Praticiens de Santé
Publique Algeria
Abbreviations 5
SNS Syndicate National de Sonatrach Algeria
SOE State Owned Enterprise(s)
SOEC deterioration of the authoritarian bargain
TNC Transitional National Council Libya
TPMN Touche Pas à Ma Nationalité Mauritania
TRI role of tribalism concerning upward mobility
UC Union Constitutionnelle Morocco
UDC Union des Diplomés Chômeurs Tunisia
UFD Union des Forces Démocratiques-Ère Nouvelle
Mauritania
UFP Union des Forces de Progrés Mauritania
UGET Union Générale des Étudiants de Tunisie
UGSA Union General de Syndicats Algériens
UGTA Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens
UGTL Union Générale des Travailleurs Libyens
UGTM Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc
UGTM* Union Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie
UGTT Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail
UMT Union General du Travail Morocco
UNFA Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes
UNFP Union Nationale des Forces Populaires Morocco
UNJA Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne
UNPA Union Nationale des Paysans Algériens
UPD Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Mauritania
UPR Union Pour la République Mauritania
URETAE Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Employ-
ees Egypt
USFP Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires Morocco
USTA Union de Syndicat de Travailleurs Algériens
UTICA Union Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce
et de l’Artisanat
UTM Union des Travailleurs de Mauritanie
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
YAR Yemen Arab Republic
YSP Yemeni Socialist Party
YWTUF Yemeni Workers Trade Union Federation
Contents
Abbreviations 3
1 Introduction: Between Authoritarianism, Comparative Politics, and Social Move-
ment Theory 10
1.1 Why Study the "Arab Spring"? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 A Study Entering many Uncharted Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.3 Why and How this Study Uses Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) . . . . . . . 16
1.4 Outline and Course of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 QCA as Method 21
2.1 Boolean Algebra and Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 The basic Procedure of QCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.2.1 The Truth Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.2.2 Minimisation according to Quine-McCluskey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Transformations and Interpretations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.3.1 Limited Diversity and Assumptions about Remainders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.2 Designing and Redesigning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.3 Evaluating Theoretical Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 What csQCA is - and what it is not 42
3.1 Comparative Historical Analysis and Configurational Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.1.1 The Evolution of Comparative Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.1.2 Configurational Methods as Answer to the Small N Problem . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.1.3 What is Variable Oriented about QCA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.4 Systematisation as Main Innovation of QCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.5 The Central Role of Statistics in Ragin’s Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.2 QCA as Chameleon Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Addressing Some Major Criticisms of QCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3.1 Methodological and Design Related Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.3.2 Small n Research and Avoiding to Fiddle while Rome Burns . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 Applying QCA in Critical Juncture Research: The Research Design 64
4.1 Concept Application in Inter-Cultural Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 Critical Junctures and Institutional Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.1 Institutional Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2.2 Critical Junctures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.3 Critical Interference Factors and Social Movement Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2.4 Social Movement Theory and Rational Choice Models: Pitfalls and Opportuni-
ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Institutional Equilibria in the MENA Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6
CONTENTS 7
4.3.1 Regimes in MENA: A Patchwork of Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3.2 The Lowest Common Denominator: A Bargain Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.3.3 The Institutional Turn and Institutional Shielding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4 Pillars of Institutional Shieldings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.4.1 Institutionalised Violence and the State in MENA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.2 Legal Frameworks and Bureaucracies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.3 Identity and Legitimacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5 Towards a Constructivist Understanding of Trade Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5.1 Trade Unionism in the European Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5.2 The Relation between Trade Union and Naqaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.5.3 Approaching the Concept of Naqaba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.6 Trade Unions as Guardians of the Authoritarian Bargain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.6.1 Social Movements and Contentious Politics under Authoritarianism . . . . . . 95
4.6.2 The Role of Tade Unions in Authoritarian Corporatist Regimes . . . . . . . . . 98
4.7 The Final Concept: Trade Unions as Critical Interference Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.7.1 The Definition of Trade Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.7.2 Narrowing Down the Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5 The Variables and their Implications 107
5.1 Deterioration of the Authoritarian Bargain (SOEC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Intertwinedness with Opposition Forces (INOPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.3 Centralisation vs. Fragmentation (CEN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.1 Authoritarian Corporatism and State Sponsored Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.3.2 Trade Unionism in the Context of Hybridisation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.3.3 Implications and Definition of the Variable CEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.4 Degree of Tribalism (TRI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4.1 Tribalism as Part of States in MENA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4.2 Tribalism and Worker’s Solidarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.5 Bargaining Power in Key Sectors (KEYS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.5.1 Industrialisation and Union Density in OECD Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.5.2 The Problematic of Union Density and Industrialisation in MENA Countries . 127
5.5.3 Handling and Measurement of the Variable KEYS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6 Stock-Taking: Labour Unions during the Uprisings 2010 - 2012 130
6.1 Libya (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.1.1 The Equilibrium of the "Stateless State" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
6.1.2 Trade Unionism: From Fragmentation to Discrimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.1.3 2011: The Quick Escalation from Protest to Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.2 Algeria (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.2.1 The Institutional Equilibrium as Result of the Independence War . . . . . . . . 143
6.2.2 An Inherent Part of the System: Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
6.2.3 2011: Trade Unions between Socioeconomic Protest and the Fight for Recognition150
6.3 Jordan (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
6.3.1 The Institutional Equilibrium: The King, the Army, and the Tribes . . . . . . 155
6.3.2 Labour Unions: Political Activism in a Narrow Corset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
6.3.3 Trade Unions in the Protests 2011 - 2012: Active on many Frontiers . . . . . . 162
6.3.4 The Alliance between Political Reformers and Rent Seeking Protesters . . . . . 167
6.4 Morocco (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.4.1 Monarchy, Islam, and controlled Pluralism as Istitutional Equilibrium . . . . . 169
8 CONTENTS
6.4.2 The Role of Religion and Tribalism in the Political System . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.4.3 The Co-optation of the Trade Union Movement and the Anomic Threat . . . . 171
6.4.4 The Twofold Demands: Economic and Political Demands Separated . . . . . . 174
6.5 Tunisia (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
6.5.1 The Equilibrium: Police State, Corporatism, and Patrimonialism . . . . . . . . 180
6.5.2 A Horizontally Stratified Union Federation with a Vibrant History of Workers
Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.5.3 A Struggle with an Ambivalent Outcome: The 1977/1978 Upheavals . . . . . . 186
6.5.4 The Revolution: A Hesitant but Still Powerful Intervention of the UGTT . . . 189
6.5.5 The Role of the Army and Islamic Associations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
6.6 Kuwait (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
6.6.1 Institutional Equilibrium: The Semi-Democratic Experiment . . . . . . . . . . 196
6.6.2 A Palmful - yet Powerful - Unions in the Governmental Sector . . . . . . . . . 200
6.6.3 The Upwinding Conflict between the Parliament and the Ruling Family . . . . 205
6.7 Oman (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
6.7.1 The Sultan, the Mufti, and the Sheikhs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
6.7.2 Civil Society and Organised Labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
6.7.3 An Embryonic Trade Union Movement with Little Bargaining Power . . . . . . 220
6.7.4 Protests 2011: One Small Step in the Arab Spring - But one Giant Leap for Oman221
6.8 Mauritania (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
6.8.1 Tribalism, the Military, and a History of Coups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
6.8.2 The Dominance of Tribal Affiliations in the Country and Political System . . . 226
6.8.3 From the National Project to restricted Social Movement Unionism . . . . . . 231
6.8.4 Protests 2011-2013: An Alliance without Trade Unions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
6.9 Yemen (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
6.9.1 Two Countries, Tribalism, and a History of Decentralisation . . . . . . . . . . . 241
6.9.2 Trade Unions: Flashing up but Never Catching Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
6.9.3 2011: Saleh losing the Youth, the Tribes, the Parties, and the Clergy . . . . . . 249
6.9.4 Worker’s Action Without Systematic Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
6.10 Bahrain (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
6.10.1 The Equilibrium between the Tribalism and Sectarianism . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.10.2 Shi’ism as Threat and as a Technique for Power Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . 260
6.10.3 The long Fight for Trade Unionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
6.10.4 The Harmonious and Apolitical Beginning of Trade Union Institutions . . . . . 266
6.10.5 The Relative Weakness of the Union Movement concerning its Bargaining Power 268
6.10.6 From Calls for Political Freedoms to Foreign Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
6.10.7 A Fragmented Opposition with Diverging Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
6.11 Egypt (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
6.11.1 From Nasserism to Patrimonial Capitalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
6.11.2 Trade Unions: The Boiler under Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
6.11.3 Trade Unions and Regime Change: The Hesitating Change Agent . . . . . . . 287
6.12 Syria (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
6.12.1 The Equilibrium: The Party, the Army, and Mass Mobilisation . . . . . . . . . 295
6.12.2 An Authoritarian Hybridisation of the System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
6.12.3 Trade Unions as a Regime’s Pillar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
6.12.4 2011: From Protest to Civil War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
6.12.5 An Uprisings Starting in the Peripheries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
CONTENTS 9
7 Minimisation and Interpretation of the Results 306
7.1 Results for the Outcome (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
7.1.1 The Connection between Oppositional Support and Centralisation . . . . . . . 308
7.1.2 The Connection between a Broken Social Contract and Centralisation . . . . . 309
7.2 Results for the Outcome (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
7.2.1 Tribal Bonds, Violence and Hybridisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
7.2.2 The Ambivalence of Bargaining Power in Key Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
8 Concluding Remarks 316
8.1 Remarks Regarding the Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
8.2 Remarks Regarding the Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
8.3 Limitations and Prospects of Future Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Appendices 321
A Figures and Tables of the Prework 322
A.1 Indicators for the Variable SOEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
A.2 Truth Table and Distance Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
A.3 Truth Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324
A.4 Distance Matrix for the Chain of Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
B Basic Minimisations 326
B.0.1 Minimisatons for the Outcome (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
B.0.2 Minimisations for the Outcome (0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
B.1 De Morgan Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
B.1.1 De Morgan Calculation with Intial Outcome = (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329




Politics, and Social Movement
Theory
On February 10 2011, Lee and Weinthal (2011) stated in an online article of The
Guardian that perhaps "the most overlooked factor in the demise of the authoritarian
Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, and the weakening of Hosni Mubarak’s grip on state power
in Egypt, has been the trade unions in both countries." The assessment is little sur-
prising, bearing in mind that Lee is the founding editor of LabourStart, a news and
campaigning website of the international trade union movement. That does not mean
that this appraisal should be discarded in advance, as trade unions did indeed play
their roles during the Arab uprisings of 2011 - 2013. However, it is part of a dilemma
in which the news coverage of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries as well
as the discipline of Middle Eastern Studies has been stuck for some decades.
On the one hand, trade unions are mentioned - if at all - en passant, together with other
mass organisations in corporatist authoritarian arrangements, or they are often lumped
together with other civil society organisations. That attitude engenders a clear and
critical lack of scrutiny of the history, nature, and position of trade unions and trade
union movements within the structures of power in the respective countries. Against
that background, many of the writings about trade unions in MENA suffer from a
misery of indeterminacy. Literature is packed with sentences that include wordings
like trade unions did, trade unions have, trade unions were, or trade unions are, with
no clarification about which trade unions are talked about, in which sectors they were
active, who was in charge, or what were their motives. Much of the internal struggles,
fragmentations, and dynamics within these entities is neglected, and, indeed, there is
something inaccurate when Lee uses the word "overlooked", as you can only overlook
something you are actually searching for.
10
11
Especially before 2011, the bulk of journalists and scientists focused on security, ter-
rorism, authoritarianism, sectarianisation, economic issues, and betimes human rights
abuse. This attitude is somewhat understandable, as the Arab World is of particular
interest for the "Western" mainstream for reasons interconnected with the aforemen-
tioned fields. In this light, MENA is a strategically relevant neighbouring region of
Europe under constant tension. In times of globalisation and glocalisation, such ten-
sions challenge policy-makers in Europe directly on at least three levels - by voters’
opinions influenced by human right activists, by direct migration into the European
Union, and by terrorism as a transnational phenomena.
On the other hand, information about trade unionism in MENA is more than of-
ten supplied by networks and scientists who are genuinely sympathetic towards trade
unionism as such. Sometimes, it seems that they pounce on any glimpse of workers’
struggle, keeping hopes up that the workers movement might become independent from
the regimes some day. These contributions are rather focused on events than on the
very structures of trade unions within the regimes, implicitly expecting the workers of
MENA to finally develop class consciousness and to rise against the capitalist class.
This category also includes many scientific macro-analysis, especially those with a
Marxist or Neo-Marxist inclination, which already made Somers (1989, p.325) ask why
the prevailing task seems not to be "how to explain [...] what is or has been empirically
present, but rather the failure of people to behave correctly according to a [Marxian]
theoretical prediction". This epistemology of absence (Lockman, 1993; Somers, 1989)
led to much frustration and a feeling of disappointment - as many Arab trade unions
do indeed have a close relationship to the regimes. They are interstratified with regime
loyalists, co-opted into the state apparatus, and seem to have somewhat lost connec-
tion with the needs and demands of their base. While elsewhere in the world labour
unions are ascribed the potential of being a "watchdog to make elites accountable,
model democratic behaviours, act as a mediator between the elites and the citizenry
in finding solutions to social, economic and political problems" (Fick, 2009, p.250),
Middle Eastern and North African unions are often merely regarded as the "watchdog
of the regimes" (Schmidinger, 2013).
The thesis at hand aims at filling the gaps that both aforementioned currents have left.
It is based on the belief that, first, trade unions are an important factor in MENA
countries and that they do deserve more attention. This includes a comprehensive
breakdown of how they emerged, their strategies and limits in the past, and what their
relationship to the regimes was like. Second, it aims at giving an overview of the be-
haviour and stance of trade unions during the critical juncture of 2011 - 2013, when
MENA regimes came under heavy pressure. The analysis does not only focus on what
happened during that time but also aims at shedding light on the circumstances, pre-
conditions, and (inter)dependencies that led to a particular behaviour of trade unions.
Hence, the objective is to understand how and why trade unionism did - or did not - try
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to change power structures in a sample of twelve MENA countries - without resorting
to class analysis only.
This study uses recent techniques from the fields of comparative politics and com-
bines authoritarianism research with social movement theory to assess the role of trade
unionism during the critical juncture of 2011-2013. It resorts to Qualitative Compara-
tive Analysis (QCA), a method initially developed by Charles Ragin (1987) based on
Boolean logic that allows for the identification of multiple conjunctural causations.1.
The core concept and main level for comparison in this study is the institutional equi-
librium, a concept borrowed from Rational Choice Theory, of each country. By that
way, particularistic approaches to explain the power structures of single MENA coun-
tries can be included into a meta-framework, without the study becoming dependent
on their individual parameters. The superordinate research question is: “Under which
circumstances did trade unions adopt a transformative stance during the protests of
2011-2012 in the MENA Region?”. Here, transformative refers to the attempt to alter
the in 2010/2011 existing institutional equilibrium of the state.
1.1 Why Study the "Arab Spring"?
The upheavals and unrest that shook the MENA region since the beginning of 2011 is
a remarkable juncture in many aspects. The years before, Middle Eastern Studies were
so preoccupied with analysing the stability of the regimes that the mass protests and
the eventual ouster of four heads of state caught the community off-guard (Gause III,
2011). The exceptionally rapid, intense, and relatively simultaneous popular protests
generated a common identity and points of references for movements across the region
(Lynch, 2013), also setting up ties cross-cutting borders, as, for instants, cooperation
between Tunisian and Libyan youth movements shows. The surprising and quick ouster
of the long term ruler of Tunisia started a domino effect that struck other Arab states
like an external shock. The uprising in Tunisia created a kind of blueprint or master
frame for other countries. Indeed, early risers often create master frames that can
"pry open institutional barriers through which the demands of other groups can pour"
(Tarrow, 2018, p.167). In 2011, this did not only happen inside a single country - it
affected an entire region.
Among the things that had been underestimated by scholars dealing with the MENA
region before 2011 was the importance of laws and other institutions. Besides "bread
and butter" demands, protesters in 2011 and beyond made demands for a change in
the legal frameworks of MENA countries, like constitutions, electoral laws, or labour
legislation. These legal documents, which have often been considered not worth the
paper they were written on, nonetheless, shaped systems sui generis and have increas-
1For those not familiar with the approach, section 2 offers a detailed introduction about the basics
and possibilities of QCA.
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ingly been a base for political opposition. Brown (2002) had already concluded in his
comparative study about constitutionalism in the Arab world that, sooner or later,
these kind of institutions indeed do matter.
By that way, protests pushed the regimes into action. Demands reached from the fall
of the regime (isqat al-nizam) to the mere reform of the regime (islah al-nizam), but,
in any case, for a period of at least a few months, nearly every MENA regime seemed
to be skating on thin ice. Indeed, the region witnessed palpable changes caused by the
protests. Table 1.1 (taken from Razzaz and Razzaz (2013)2) gives an overview:
















Tunisia X X X X X X
Egypt X X X X X X
Libya X X X X X X
Yemen X X X X X X
Syria X X X X X
Morocco X X X X X
Jordan X X X X X
Bahrain X X X X
Algeria X X X X
Sudan X X X X
Kuwait X X X X
Oman X X X
Lebanon X X
Iraq X X
Saudi Arabia X X
UAE X
Although the overall results of the reform endeavours often did not meet the ex-
pectations of the opposition nor the international community (Brownlee et al., 2015),
the upheavals that started in 2011 can be classified as a critical juncture. Basically, a
critical juncture is a time of uncertainty in which the rules of the game in a political
system can be re-negotiated and new path dependencies may emerge. This period of
political crisis is a lacmus test for loyalties, reveals strength and strategies of political
players, and provides a - sometimes abrupt - change of opportunity structures. An
elaborate introduction of the trinity of institutional equilibrium, critical juncture, and
interference factors is given in section 4.2.
A second feature that makes the Arab upheavals a valuable period for academic re-
search is the initially intrinsic nature of the events that took place during that time
as well as their course. The events came abruptly and the international community
was widely unprepared. These circumstances made it difficult to launch theories and
hypotheses that focussed on the role of big players in international relations, as it was
2Having delivered a comprehensive overview, the authors, nonetheless, overlooked the reshuffling
of the cabinet in Oman 2011/2012. The exchange of ministers was a major demand of the protesters
in the Gulf country. Furthermore, developments after 2013, like the constitutional change in Algeria
in 2014, are not included. As the scope of the thesis at hand ends in 2013, the overview is sufficient.
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done with many domestic decisions and events in MENA before. It is this domestic
moment that renders the upheavals of 2011 particularly valuable for science, in that
it reveals the importance of local power structures, opposition forces, networks, and
also the legal framework of the countries. It is also a opportunity to correct some
assumptions and premises of authoritarianism research. As Gause III (2011), one of
the first scholars to publicly admit the shortcomings of pre-2011 MENA research puts
it: "Explaining the stability of Arab authoritarians was an important analytic task,
but it led some of us to underestimate the forces for change that were bubbling below,
and at times above, the surface of Arab politics". Among the forces bubbling below
the surface, as the course of the upheavals showed, were also trade unions and trade
union activists.
1.2 A Study Entering many Uncharted Waters
In order to answer the research question above, a long road had to be taken, as this
study delves into uncharted waters in many aspects. First, no study involving and
scrutinising the institutional equilibria of twelve Arab countries has ever been pub-
lished. The institutional equilibria, roughly explained, answers the question why these
states do not collapse or disintegrate from within.
A similar research agenda does exist. However, instead of engaging at length in detailed
country comparisons,3 the most prominent social science publications about MENA fo-
cussed on the relation between authoritarianism and the third wave of democracy, and
the authoritarian resilience in particular (Carothers, 2002; Schlumberger and Albrecht,
2004; Posusney, 2004; Anderson, 2006; Schlumberger, 2007; Murphy, 2008) 4. Much of
this literature including larger monographs and collections (Lust-Okar and Zerhouni,
2008; King, 2009; Lust, 2013), just like the study at hand, builds up on insights from
political economy (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Richards and Waterbury, 2014). Often,
also other macro-level perspectives on MENA countries that also incorporate cultural
aspects (Harik, 1990; Bill and Springborg, 2000) are included. While these studies pro-
vide valuable insights, they also still lack depth and systematisation in many aspects.
Second, no systematic and comprehensive confirmation5 about the nature and embed-
ding of trade unions into the institutional equilibrium and their positioning towards
3Numerous comparisons covering a wide range of topics and including two to three countries do
exist. However, given the twelve country sample of this thesis, it would go beyond the scope of
this introduction to introduce all existing combinations. A valuable overview can be found in the
outstanding introduction Comparative Politics of the Middle East and North Africa in Yom and
Gasiorowski (2019).
4As the patchwork of concepts that can be found in the discipline is one of the main reasons the
study at hand resorts to the concept of the institutional equilibrium, a more elaborate literature review
can be found in the section introducing the design, in particular part 4.3.1.
5A basic premise of the study at hand is that science must consist of confirmation and explanation.
For an elaborate view on this distinction see the chapter Scientific Explanation in Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science by Salmon (1999). As the part of the confirmation lags behind many conclusions
in Middle Eastern Studies, the study at hand resorts to thick descriptions in the case studies.
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the state authorities has been published yet. From a historical perspective, a collection
edited by Zachary Lockman (1993) scrutinised state-workers relations in the Ottoman
Empire, Egypt, and Iran, and three years later a collection edited by Ellis Goldberg
(1996) focussed on the history of the labour movement in Turkey, Syria, Israel, Egypt
and the Maghreb. These contributions do not claim to be comparative nor introduce
any kind of abstract level of comparison.6. Covering more recent developments, there
has been a focus on workers and workers’ movements foremost in Egypt (Beinin and
Lockman, 1988; Posusney, 1997; Shehata, 2009), especially under the premises of eco-
nomic opening and the role of the highly co-opted and monopolistic Egyptian Trade
Union Federation (ETUF). Comparative endeavours processing these results in order
to gain a more comprehensive picture of state-labour relations in MENA are still miss-
ing in Western literature. Symptomatically, although not encompassing all possible
aspects, the most comprehensive attempt to explain the weakness of trade unions in
MENA has been delivered by Yemeni Journalist Al-Sama’i (2019a,b,c) in Arab online
articles. Also written in Arabic, Salibi (2017) scrutinises trade unions in MENA after
2011, albeit devoting little space and time to the very histories of the movements and
countries. In an exceptional study of a Western scholar, Thomas Schmidinger (2004)
analysed the workers’ movement in Sudan from a historical perspective and concludes
that the trade union movement was heavily intertwined with the independence move-
ment and the history of the communist parties. The author also found similar patterns
in Egypt, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen, and Iraq. It is also Schmidinger (2013) who
gave the most comprehensive overview of trade union action during the Arab uprisings
in 2011, albeit focussing on the epicentres of trade unionism like Egypt and Tunisia
and omitting other cases worthwhile to analyse like Yemen or Kuwait.
Third, the role of trade unions and trade unionism during the Arab uprisings 2011 -
2013 has been analysed foremost with a focus on the Tunisian Union Générale Tunisi-
enne du Travail (UGTT) (Yousfi, 2013, 2015, 2017; Wilder, 2015; Bellin, 2015; Aduani
and Ben Sedrine, 2018), the newly emerged trade union movement in Egypt (El-Mahdi,
2011; Alexander and Auragh, 2014; Beinin, 2015; Abdalla, 2017), or both (Hartshorn,
2018). And while single area experts also analyse trade unions during the protest in
Morocco and Mauritania (Buehler, 2015b) or Jordan (Adely, 2011), trade unions ap-
peared mostly in small paragraphs or subclauses of publications that dealt with the
Arab Spring in a more broad perspective7 (Lynch, 2013; Kamrava, 2014b; Joffé, 2014;
Sadiki, 2015).
Fourth, as a method, QCA has barely been applied to study MENA. The approach
is almost completely new to a discipline that is used to implement qualitative meth-
ods and which is driven by the need of policy consulting to produce quick inferences
6For an elaborate overview of publications and trends concerning the history of the working class
in the Middle East and North Africa see Jones (2015).
7For a more elaborate summary of the evolution of comparative politics in MENA before and after
the uprisings of 2011 see Schwedler (2015).
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- which often do not necessarily need to be backed by strong sources. QCA, which
needs either a stable base of data or much in-depth research, has entered research
about the MENA region in the last years only. Publications using the approach in
MENA dealt with long-term monarchical survival (Bank et al., 2015), different paths
to democratisation (Alijla and Aghdam, 2017), and the analysis of Security Council
sanctions (Boogaerts and Drieskens, 2020). In 2014, methodologist and QCA expert
Priscilla Álamos-Álamos-Concha (2014) presented her QCA study Pathways to Revo-
lution at World Congress of Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES) in Ankara; beyond
these contributions, QCA remains a dark horse in Middle Eastern Studies.
1.3 Why and How this Study Uses Qualitative Com-
parative Analysis (QCA)
This study can be characterised as standing in the tradition of Comparative Historical
Analysis (CHA, Skocpol and Somers (1980);Pierson and Skocpol (2002); Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer (2003)). Against this background, the method of Qualitative Compar-
ative Analysis (QCA) is used as an amendment to, and enhancement of CHA. Using
QCA with a clear qualitative focus, as explained in section 3.2, bears the advantage of
providing a higher degree of systematisation of data and transparency of the research
process.
Qualitative Comparative Analysis is a comparative method that initially resorted to
Boolean Algebra and used the Quine-McCluskey Algorithm in order to find patterns
of similarity and difference between cases. Those cases are classified into the presence
(1) or absence (0) of a particular outcome, and turned into combinations of variables
which are also coded according to the absence (0) or presence (1) of variables. The
configurations can be minimised in order to eliminate variables that were not affecting
the particular outcome. Section 2 elaborates on the roots, methods and possibilities of
the approach.
QCA bears several advantages vis-á-vis quantitative methods such as regression anal-
ysis and pure qualitative methods. It is also particularly fruitful when the number
of available cases as well as access to large datasets is limited (Taylor et al., 2011;
Jordan et al., 2011). Given the problem of sparseness of reliable data of the MENA
region which is often exacerbated by incompleteness and fraudulence, QCA seems a
promising approach for the region and other area studies. Furthermore, QCA is able
to identify multiple pathways with different combinations of variables leading to the
same outcome. These different paths may reveal similarities and exceptions among the
cases, and the different intersections can enhance knowledge about their relationships.
Much has been written since Ragin (1987) introduced QCA for the first time. The
version that uses a clear dichotomisation is by now labelled Crisp Set Qualitative Com-
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parative Analysis (csQCA). It has been complemented with a version that allows for
a subdivision of the outcome in more than two outcomes called Multivariate Qualita-
tive Comparative Analysis (mvQCA), Cronqvist (2007), and a version that uses fuzzy
sets called Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), Ragin (2000, 2008);
Rihoux and Ragin (2009, chap.5)) where outcome and variables can be categorised
according to an interval scale of choice.
The study at hand uses csQCA in its very basic form as it was first introduced in 1987.
The utilisation of mvQCA is not advisable due to the small sample (twelve cases) of
this study. In mvQCA, just as in csQCA, the minimisation of two configurations re-
quire that only one variable differs. Given the very small n sample size, the probability
that reasonable and parsimonious outcomes are produced is comparatively low.
The decision not to resort to fsQCA was less easy to make. A more fine disaggregation
of the cases of Libya, Oman, and Yemen which all share the same configuration in the
truth table (see Appendix A.2) could probably have yielded more insights about the
strength and interplay of different variables. As the nature of almost all variables that
are tested is qualitative, and a reasonable scaling is difficult due to the devastating
data availability, a simple dichotomisation and interpretation of the data seemed more
fruitful.8.
In addition, key to this study are more pragmatic considerations. In the course of
QCA’s thirty years of history, the approach and the theoretical discussions became
increasingly formalised and mathematised. While the initial process of QCA, as in-
troduced at the end of the 1980s, could be conducted with pencil and paper, newer
versions of the approach require a proper software, and theoretical discussions are
packed with formulas. This is a bewildering and somewhat amusing paradox, keeping
in mind the history of QCA’s initially used algorithm. The Quine-McCluskey algo-
rithm is mainly based upon the works of Willard van Omen Quine, who proved the
technique on philosophical-logical grounds (Quine, 1952, 1955). It was refined by elec-
trical engineer McCluskey (1956) who acknowledged its usefulness, but regarded the
original handling as "unwieldy". His main contribution was the change of the notation.
As a philosopher, Quine had used Greek letters only for literal formulas and normal
formulas (Quine, 1952). In other words, all that McCluskey did was to declinker the
method from the encrypted language of a niche expert. This made it possible for Ragin
and Drass to adopt the algorithm, and allowed it to enter into political science. Today,
the pressure from quantitative methodologists drags QCA again into a more encrypted
direction. As useful and - from a scientific point of view - perfectly right this develop-
ment is, it bears the disadvantage of leaving much of the scientific community behind.
Whilst QCA was introduced as a middle-path between qualitative and quantitative
research, some contributions nowadays seem to only target researchers who are trained
exclusively in quantitative methods. For the field of Middle Eastern Studies, consisting
8For a more detailed view on the possible pitfalls and paradoxes of fuzzy set QCA see (Cooper and
Glaesser, 2011).
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of anthropology, cultural studies, language, political theory, or just like for any other
interdisciplinary area studies, synergistic effects may remain untapped. Years of study
have often made experts, no matter the subject, lose track of what a layperson or a
colleague from another discipline really understands about a topic or method. QCA
theorists have to be careful that they do not make the approach a patchwork of scien-
tific subfamilies that develop progressively into hermetics.
The target audience of a study is - and should be - a pivotal element of any study. If
the study is meant to be read by individuals outside the scientific community, namely
NGO activists, policy consultants, politicians, or peers from neighbouring disciplines
using different approaches, the needs of these groups should be met. From a different
angle, modern techniques and enhanced methods indeed do produce more accurate and
precise results. The balance of scientific complexity and comprehensibility for a greater
audience is a field of psychology that has barely been addressed in social sciences. If the
target audience is larger than the scientific community, it can be particularly fruitful to
depict matters with less complexity or invest in more time and space to explain difficult
concepts thoroughly. Funkhouser and Maccoby (1971) have already found that articles
written for a rather unqualified audience did not repel specialists and interested read-
ers, whereas more demanding articles repelled all but the specialists. Moreover and
more recently, Scharrer et al. (2017) have found that popularised articles addressed to
a lay audience made laypeople agree more with the knowledge contained in the claims
than scientific articles addressed to expert audiences did. Furthermore, the study could
not prove that reading popularised depictions did lead laypeople to perceive the topic
as being less complex and less controversial than reading scientific depictions.
The tensions between public understanding and scientific complexity is another reason
why this study uses csQCA. After having run a test-wise model with fsQCA I decided
that the additional insights that were yielded did not outweigh the surplus of complex-
ity. As chapter 3 argues, QCA is, by that way, regarded as an evolutionary extension
of Comparative Historical Analysis.
Concerning further methodological aspects, this study resolves contradictions of the
truth table completely. The possibility to include contradictions into the minimisa-
tion process in order to determine the consistency (Ragin, 2006) of the final terms at
the very end is a valuable possibility to deal with large n or randomised sample size.
However, the smaller the sample size is, the more time a researcher has to get deeper
into the cases and to adjust the model.9 The usage of coverage (Ragin, 2006) is also
renounced in this study; a detailed explanation is thus given in section 3.2.
9For further problems with the measurement of consistency in QCA see Haesebrouck (2015).
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1.4 Outline and Course of the Study
When Przeworski and Teune (1970) demanded from the scientific community in social
science to exchange "names for variables", their implicit assumption was that scientists
dealt with almost complete datasets. After I had decided to analyse the roles of trade
unions during the 2011 uprisings, I was astonished to which extent reliable data, em-
pirical backed inferences, and detailed descriptions of domestic interdependencies in
MENA countries are missing. This is a reason why almost 800 sources have been in-
cluded into this study in order to confirm the institutional equilibria of the twelve cases,
the history and role of trade unions within these equilibria, the course of the uprisings
of 2011 - 2013, and, also in order to set up meaningful variables. The lion’s share, still,
consists of relevant scientific literature from anthropology, sociology, history, political
science, economics, and other disciplines integrated into the field of Middle Eastern
Studies. Additionally, legislative documents in three languages10, official statements
of trade unions and state officials, surveys of the International Trade Union Confeder-
ation, as well as reports from online and analogous Newspapers (foremost Al-Jazeera
and Al-Quds al-’Arabi), have been used. Data has been taken from the databases of
the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, the International Monetary
Fund, and the Economic Complexity Index of the MIT Media Laboratory of the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology.
The second chapter of this study gives a detailed introduction of the process and
possibilities of QCA. There, the truth table, Boolean operations like the de Morgan
calculations, and the difference between conservative, theory-guided, and absolute min-
imisations will be explained. Those who are already familiar with the approach are
welcomed to skip that section; for those who break new ground dealing with QCA this
section is highly recommended.
Chapter three dives deep into the foundations of QCA. The chapter identifies QCA
as a successor of Comparative Historical Analysis and classifies it as a late impact
of the behavioural revolution on social science, and depicts systematisation as QCA’s
main innovation. Furthermore, the chapter argues that QCA can be regarded as a
chameleon approach that is qualitative or quantitative only depending on the sample
size n. Finally some major criticisms are addressed. The quintessence of the chapter
is the credo for the entire study being to hold the case studies as thick as possible and
as parsimonious as necessary, and the minimisation and interpretations as thick as
necessary and as parsimonious as possible.
Chapter four introduces the research design. The trinity of institutional equilibrium,
critical juncture, and interference factors is elaborated on. To begin with, some guide-
lines for the study in inter-cultural contexts are set up. A key conclusion is that
concepts may not be able to travel from one region of the world to another. While
this is covered by the concept of institutional equilibrium regarding the state, trade
10All translations from Arabic to English have been made by the author.
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unions in MENA have different histories, features, and meanings for the local populace
than they may have in OECD countries. First, trade unions have traditionally been
close to the state, as the history of many trade unions is heavily intertwined with anti-
colonialism and nationalism. Furthermore, their predecessor in many regions, Islamic
Guilds, were even embedded into the state administrations. Second, the Marxist turn
of organised labour as witnessed in many European countries at the end of the 19th
century did not happen in a comparable manner in MENA countries. Socialist and
communist ideologies did play a role, however, they were only one stream alongside
with other forces including the very state and state class, Arab nationalists, Islamists,
and even tribal associations. Eventually the study at hand establishes a definition of
trade union that is geared towards the concept of an Arab Naqaba.
Chapter five introduces the five variables for the QCA minimisation. These are the
deterioration of the authoritarian bargain (SOEC), intertwinedness with oppositional
forces (INOPP), centralisation vs. fragmentation of trade unions degree of centralisa-
tion of trade union institutions (CEN), role of tribalism concerning upward mobility
(TRI), bargaining strength of trade unions in key sectors of the economy (KEYS). The
chapter derives the variables from literature about trade unionism in OECD countries
and, as an anticipation, from observations taken from the case studies. Moreover, vari-
ables that were not included into the minimisation process are discussed.
Chapter six contains the twelve case studies. The sequence of the cases is determined
with the help of a distance matrix and chain of comparison in order to maximise the
differences in the configurations in the consecutive cases. By that way, the nature and
thresholds of the variables and the classifications of the cases become clearer. The case
studies follow a fixed meta-pattern: First the institutional equilibrium of the country is
introduced, followed by an analysis of the nature, history, and strategies of trade unions
inside this institutional equilibrium. A third section deals with the events during the
critical juncture that started in 2011 within the respective country and the position of
trade unions vis-á-vis inference factors.
In Chapter seven and eight the minimisations are discussed, and major findings are
summarised and interpreted. The study ends with prospects for future research projects.
Chapter 2
QCA as Method
The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) is not only located at the border be-
tween variable and case oriented research, as Ragin stresses constantly. It is moreover
located at the spot where in the philosophy of science where not only the tectonic
plates of variable oriented research and case oriented research meet, but also the plates
of induction and deduction as well as positivism and constructivism slide past each
other. The position on this particular hot spot renders the QCA approach innovative
on the one hand, and relatively difficult to map according to its foundations on the
other. By mixing different traditions, the approach overcomes many flaws, however,
many flaws are inherited as well. Therefore, the first part of this thesis deals with QCA
as a Method, followed by an outline of its theoretical foundations.
The basic features of QCA have been introduced and discussed in several publications
especially around the year 2010 (Cronqvist, 2007; Berg-Schlosser et al., 2009; Schneider
and Wagemann, 2009; Rihoux and Ragin, 2009; Grofman and Schneider, 2009; Badie
et al., 2011; Berg Schlosser and Cronqvist, 2012). The reason for dealing in detail with
the approach here is to show the roots of the approach and to lower transaction costs
for the reader who is not familiar with the approach. This is of utmost importance,
as the audience of the thesis at hand will be the scientific community on the one hand
but also, and in the long run maybe foremost, policy makers and individuals working
in fields outside academia.
A focus will also be put on the transformations and (re)interpretations of the data
in the dialogue between the data and theory. Apart from noteworthy exceptions like
Fritzsche (2014), only few authors go deep into the mechanisms and possibilities of
QCA and Boolean Algebra that can be used during that dialogue.
2.1 Boolean Algebra and Set Theory
Ragin (1987, p.85) himself states rightly that it would not be necessary to understand
Boolean Algebra in its entirety to comprehend its use in comparative social science.
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For those unfamiliar with different algebraic assumptions, set theory, or QCA, and
for those who are simply interested by nature, this section will go a little beyond the
common introduction of the system in mainstream QCA literature. Those familiar with
Boolean logic or QCA are welcomed to skip this section, although a glance on section
2.1 might be useful, as an understanding of the binary notation used throughout this
thesis helps to trace the minimisation process.
Assumptions from Aristotele to Bool to Circuits
Repeatedly the QCA literature stresses that the approach rests on Boolean algebra.
Georege Boole made important contributions to the philosophy of logic, especially by
his books "The Mathematical Analysis of Logic" (1847) and "An Investigation of the
Laws of Thought" (1854), and like Leibnitz before him, Boole attempted to describe
comprehensively mathematically operating systems that try to substitute verbal rea-
soning by a genuine symbolic calculation (Diagne, 1990, p.8). Ever since then, Boolean
logic entered different realms of science and practice, and coined the fields of proposi-
tional calculus (also called propositional logic, sentential calculus, or sentential logic) in
philosophy, probability calculus, set theory, electrical engineering, and eventually com-
puter sciences and informatics. Although the foundations are the same, the notations
of the different subfields differ. Table 2.1 gives a brief overview.
First-order logic Digital Logic Set Theory QCA
∨ OR + OR ∪ union + OR
∧ AND · AND ∩ intersection n/a AND
F FALSE 0 false S(Z) null set 0 false
T TRUE 1 true S(U) full set 1 true
¬ A NOT A Ā not A C(S) complementary set a not A
Table 2.1: Operators in Different Contexts of Boolean Algebra
The main pillars and starting points of the different realms can already be traced
back to three Axioms of Aristotle:
The law of identity (A = A) A thing is a thing and not another thing. So,
whenever a thing is labelled it is essential that this label stays the same during the
entire process of reasoning. Moreover, every law proved while resorting to the label or
symbol tied to a certain meaning remains true when the meaning - symbol connection
stays the same.
The law of non-contradiction:(¬(A ∧ ¬A)) A thing cannot be and not be at
the same time, or, be and be its opposite at the same time. Moreover, a statement
cannot be true and false at the same time. There is no possibility that A exists and
(formally: ∧) A is not (formally: ¬) A at the same moment.
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The law of excluded middle (A ∨ ¬A) There is nothing inbetween false and
true. A statement can only be false or true and a thing can be or (formally: ∨) and
there is no third option.
Boole (1854, p. 241) thought that Aristotle’s logic was not a science but a collec-
tion of scientific truths, too incomplete to form a system of itself, so he introduced
some amendments1 of which three help to understand QCA: First, Boole introduced
the (1) as universal term indicating the truthful existence of something. A square is a
square and a polygon, hence (1 = s·p). He also introduced the (0) to show nonentity:
A square that is also a circle does not exist (0 s·c). The structure of these equations
is still used as basic substructure of QCA formulas. Second, Boole introduced a way
to express tautologies: A circle and a circle is a circle (c = cc). Last but not least,
where Aristotle saw predications between common substantives to common substan-
tives Boole saw equations between class-terms. That is a reason why today2, Boolean
Algebra is often referred to as modus operandi in the algebra of classes, a subfield of
logic that is sometimes regarded as an independent discipline itself (Flegg, 1964).
According to the concept of class - which is also used in QCA - classes can be formed
out of heterogenous basic populations. Humanity can be divided into the classes “fem-
inine” and “masculine” (ignoring for the sake of parsimony some individuals claiming
not to be represented by this dichotomy), and if we set a particular threshold at a
particular height, say, 1,60m, we can divide humanity in “small” (< 1,60m) and “tall”
(>1,60m). In a nutshell, classes are collections of instanaces, objects, or sets consisting
of entities that can be unambiguously defined by a property that all its members share.
Classes can be regarded as arbitrary collections of sets, qualifying as sets if they are
also elements of some class.3.
1The following is taken mainly from Corcoran (2003)
2 The word "today" is here of importance, as Boole lived and was active before huge parts of
mathematics, like arithmetics by Gottlob Frege or set theory by Georg Cantor, were categorized,
standardised and canonized in the second half of the 19th century. Many scholars were unpleasantly
surprised to discover while reading Boole’s logical writings "how ill-constructed his theory actually
was and how confused his explanations of it is" (Dummett, 1959; Corcoran, 2003)). Maybe this is
the reason why Boole is often misinterpreted and adorned by others with borrowed plumes. Corcoran
(2003, p.282) puts it in unadorned words, stating that "Boole is one of the most misunderstood of the
major philosophers of logic. He gets criticised for things he did not do, or did not do wrong. [...] He
gets off without blame for errors and omissions he should have corrected himself. He gets credit for
things he did not do, or did not do right. He did not write the first book on pure mathematics, he
did not present a decision procedure, and he did not devise boolean algebra."
3After some cataclysms in mathematics, among other things because of the Russel-Paradox, the
definition of class and set which is underlying these statements and which will be used in this study
was introduced at the end of the 19th century. Any set is a class but not any class is a set (for a more
elaborate view see (Muller, 2001)). These definitions were also unknown to Boole.
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Standard Operations and Notation
The Boolean propositional logic allowed for calculations that are able to reveal whether
combined statements of classifications are true or false. Taking a look back on table 2.1,
one may ask why in digital logic and also QCA the plus (+) sign is used to describe OR
while the dot (·), actually known from multiplication is taken to describe AND although
this use is rather counter-intuitive. The reason can be found in the hierarchisation of
mathematical operations: In decimal algebra multiplication and division has to be
conducted first, then addition and subtraction. The signs in digital logic do not refer
any more to the operations conducted in arithmetics but to the order of operations.
By that way, hierachised operations similar to arithmetic math can be conducted, most
notably the
Cumulative Laws
A + B = B + A and A ·B = B · A (2.1)
Associative Laws
A + (B + C) = (A + B) + C and A · (B · C) = (A ·B) · C and (2.2)
Distributive Law
A · (B + C) = A ·B + A · C (2.3)
Additionally, as a variable and its complement represent 1 and 0, some calculus op-
eration have a deviant outcome compared to standard arithmetic. Variables and their
complements cancel each other out and potentialisation is ignored, as the potentialisa-
tion of 1 leads to the outcome 1 and the potentialisation of 0 leads to the outcome 0.
Additionally, according to set theory, the set A OR the intersection of the set A with
another set B (A AND B) is the same as the set A only, as the equation describes no
elements outside of A. Therefore, the following three statements are true:
(A ·B) + (A · B̄) = A (2.4)
(A + B) · (A + B̄) = A (2.5)
because BB̄ = 0 and B + B̄ = 1
AB + A = A (2.6)
With the help of these operations, de Morgan’s Law can be applied, showing what
is explicitly not part of the set. Assuming a found configuration in a QCA analysis is
the intersection of A and B, then everything what is not A and not B would be the
parts that are not covered by the first configuration. De Morgan’s Law is applied by
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turning all variables into their negatives and by changing all ANDs with ORs and vice
versa. Hence:
1 = AB 7−→ (a + b) = 0 (2.7)
Using Binary Notation in QCA
QCA uses the aforementioned methods in order to find pattern and congruence be-
tween the constructed classes and the constructed sets. As in the course of the study
a binary notation for QCA will be used for the sake of higher transparency, a short
excursus to binary notations is worthwhile.
Our decimal number system, with radix = 10 that prescribes that the tenth number
counting from zero becomes two-digit, and after ten two-digit blocs it becomes three-
digit and so forth, is accepted for most common mathematical operations. However,
endless other number systems are possible. Dealing with a system of two values being
true or false expressed the values (1) and (0) respectively can be represented by a
number system with the radix 2. Any positive integral radix r can be converted into




k; 0 ≤ ak ≤ r − 1 (2.8)
whereas q is the amount of places after the decimal point, meaning lower than zero,
and p is the amount of numerals before the decimal point, meaning higher or equal
zero4 The common ground between the binary system (r=2) and Boolean Algebra and
set theory is the common domain of the numbers 0,1, also called Boolean Domain.
Basically, the binary notation goes back to the roots of the QCA approach: It uses a
combination of two-elementary Boolean Algebra and set theory that emerged in the
context of switches and switching algebra and that was presumably first mentioned by
Ehrenfest in 1910 (Greniewski et al., 1955) but had its ultimate breakthrough due to a
contribution by Shannon in 1938 (Shannon, 1938; Flegg, 1964). A QCA notation, for
instants ABC that indicates that all three statements are true and form a conjuncture
can also be written as 111. The number 111 in the binary system equals the number 7 in
the decimal system. By that way decimal numbers can be allotted to the configurations.
This is used in the minimisation process as described in the next section.
4For instants, using r = 10 the decimal number 512 can be expressed as: 2·100+1·101+5·102 = 512
while q=0; and p=3, as there are no numerals lower than zero and three numerals above zero.In
Boolean algebra, using r=2,the same number is expressed differently: 1000000000 = 0 · 20 + 0 · 21 +
0 · 22 + 0 · 23 + 0 · 24 + 0 · 25 + 0 · 26 + 0 · 27 + 0 · 28 + 1 · 29 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 512 = 512
while q=0 and p=10, as there is again no numerals after the dot and 10 before. Every known number
of the decimal system can be expressed in binary code respectively.
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2.2 The basic Procedure of QCA
Qualitative Comparative Analysis contains a form data analysis technique, the boolean
minimisation process, to figure out similar configurational pattern between cases bear-
ing the same outcome. This "analytic moment" uses Boolean algebra and is the con-
necting part between case selection and description on the one side, and interpretation
to gain the final result at the end on the other. It is the pivotal pillar and bottleneck
of the approach; Rihoux and Lobe (2009, p.229) have shown this in graphic 2.1
Figure 2.1: Stages of QCA Studies
As the minimisation process is the heart of the approach, it will be described first
in the following section. Afterwards, concrete implications for the study in terms of
case selection and interpretation will follow. The entire minimisation process consists
of three steps which will be described in the following sections:
– First, after the determination of all cases and outcomes of interest these cases
and their features are summarised in a truth table
– Second, in a first process of minimisation so called main implicants are computed,
being simplifications of the configurations under scrutiny.
– Third, in a further minimisation some main implicants are sorted out for the sake
of a more parsimonious result.
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– Fourth, the resulting equation will be transformed with the help of Boolean al-
gebra operations and interpreted. This part will give a short insight of what is
possible to extract from the data and the produced final Boolean expressions in
QCA.
2.2.1 The Truth Table
At the beginning of a study, a set of cases and an outcome is determined. An observed,
or present outcome equals (1), a non-observed, or absent outcome equals (0). Then, a
range of variables, that is causal conditions considered to have an impact whatsoever on
the outcome under scrutiny has to be determined. Specific letters are allotted to those
causal conditions to simplify the further process. At this stage, Ragin (2008) suggests
to streamline the causal conditions as much as possible by combining conditions that
seem substitutable. Like the outcomes, the variables are dichotomized according to
observation and non-observation of that particular feature in the cases by presence (1)
and absence (0).
All the observed and collected data is summarised in a truth table. The catchy example
taken in this section to illustrate the process of QCA has already been introduced, albeit
with a lower degree of elaboration, by (Berg Schlosser and Cronqvist, 2012). Imagine a
children’s birthday party in the neighbourhood where the parents of the birthday child
only invite a couple of guests. That should be reason enough to speculate - especially
by those who were not invited - what actually caused the parents to chose only a limited
circle and what makes that limited circle so special. Investigators face the following
truth table:
Name Age (A) Boy (B) Classmate (C) Living next Door (D) Invitation (Outcome)
Sabrine(0) 0 0 0 0 0
Sandra(1) 0 0 0 1 1
Mandy(2) 0 0 1 0 1
Manuela(3) 0 0 1 1 1
Martin(4) 0 1 0 0 0
Dominik(5) 0 1 0 1 1
Patrick(6) 0 1 1 0 1
Fred(7) 0 1 1 1 1
Alexandra(9) 1 0 0 1 0
Christine(10) 1 0 1 0 1
Elena(11) 1 0 1 1 1
Rainer(13) 1 1 0 1 0
Paul(15) 1 1 1 1 0
Table 2.2: Conditions and Observations for the Outcome "Invitation"
In table 2.2 several children, their attributes, as well as their invitation or non-
invitation to the birthday party are shown. No immediate rationale for the selection is
apparent. The children are regarded as cases, and the attributes refer to the kid being
elder or not (A), being a boy or not (B), being in the class of the birthday child or
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not (C), and living next door or not (D). Note that A (age) is a quantitative variable.
As mentioned above, in dealing with quantitative variables, the researcher has to set
up a particular threshold to define absence or presence of the attribute. If the variable
would be labelled "elder kids", and if the birthday child is, say, eight years old, the
threshold would be 8, so every kid being > 8 years old would be coded (1), all other
(0).
The Boolean sum of the variables of each case or child forms a configuration. In
the next step, all observed configurations are grouped according to to the outcome
invitation (1) or non-invitation (0) rendering a boolean function connected by OR and
AND nexus. As already shown in table 2.1, in QCA functions an observed variable is
represented by a upper-case latter while a non-observed variable is represented by a
lower-case letter. The Boolean functions for the birthday-example are thus:
1 = abcD + abCd + abCD + aBcD + aBCd + aBCD + AbCD + AbCd (2.9)
and
0 = abcd + aBcd + AbcD + aBcd + ABcD + ABCD (2.10)
The particular combination of each child can be found in these equations. They are
separated by a logical OR (+) as every child had the same outcome, so different paths
for that outcome are possible. For instance, first configuration of the function that
renders a positive outcome belongs to Sandra. She is neither elder than the birthday
child (a), nor a boy (b), nor a classmate (c), but she lives next door (D). The first con-
figuration with negative outcome represents Paul, who has not been invited (outcome
= 0), who is elder than the birthday child (A), who is a boy (B), who is a classmate of
the birthday child (C) and who lives next door (D). The All other configurations can
be assigned to the children in the truth table analogously.
2.2.2 Minimisation according to Quine-McCluskey
The underlying assumption of the QCA minimisation process is that there are causal
conditions that can be eliminated as they do not have an impact on the outcome. If
for instance only one condition differs in two configurations while all other variables
are equal and both configurations render the same output, the differing variable can
be regarded as irrelevant. In the words of (Ragin, 1987, p.93):
"...if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the
same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions
can be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined
expression."
Such a minimisation can be achieved by different algorithms. Ragin and Drass re-
sorted in their first QCA programme to the Quine-McCluskey algorithm that had been
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actually used to minimise electric circuits in electrical engineering.5 The key focus here
is placed on the mechanisms and steps of the minimisation process to achieve a better
understanding.
To illustrate the basic procedure, the upper-case and lower-case letters are changed to
(1) for presence and (0) for absence of a variable and the terms are arranged according








 two 1 7 0111 aBCD10 1010 AbCd11 1011 ABcD
 three 1
The Quine-McCluskey algorithm is mainly based upon the works of Willard van
Omen Quine who proved the technique on logical grounds (Quine, 1952, 1955). The
procedure is transparent and involves a minimal loss of data. The approach as been
refined by McCluskey (1956) who acknowledged the usefulness for many variables, how-
ever calling the original Quine handling "unwieldy". His main contribution is the change
of the notation. Quine, being a philosopher, had used Greek letters only for literal
formulas, and normal formulas (Quine, 1952). McCluskey discarded the expressions
involving literals and using the binary characters. Furthermore, he proposed dashes to
show that a variable has been eliminated. The minimisation process is conducted until
no further minimisation is possible. It is of the essence that only one number differs
between two terms, while dashes are not regarded as numbers, in McCluskey (1956,
p.1422) words:
If two binary characters are identical in all positions except one, and if neither
character has a dash in the position in which they differ, then the two characters
can be replaced by a single character which has a dash in the position in which
the original characters differ and which is identical with the original characters
in all other positions.
The difference between Ragin’s statement above and the quotation of McCluskey
lies in the method of the latter making a minimisation of multiple stages is possible.
Applying this technique to the example of the birthday party, the following expressions
are generated:
5There has been a discussion about the nature, advantages, and disadvantages of different kinds of
algorithms for QCA starting about 2008. Indeed, there are several ways to minimise electrical circuits
(for further evaluation see for instants (Dusa, 2010) or more recent (Baumgartner and Thiem, 2017)).
In sum, other algorithms than the Quine-McCluskey algorithm have resembling outputs, however do
use less computer resources and memory, and are thus faster. This feature has become until now
(2019) and will become in the future, due to technical progress, less important - and so will the entire
discussion as well.
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1; 3 00-1 abD
1; 5 0-01 acD
2; 3 001- abC
2; 6 0-10 aCd
3; 7 0-11 aCD
5; 7 01-1 aBC
11; 3 -011 aBC
11; 10 101- AbC
(still minimisable)





1; 3; 5; 7 0--1 aD
1; 5; 3; 7 0--1 aD
1; 3; 6; 7 0-1- aC
2; 6; 3; 7 0-1- aC
2; 3; 11; 10 -01- bC
2; 10 -010 bCd

prime implicants
According to the very right column, the new, minimised expression is:
1 = aD + aC + bC + bCd (2.11)
The terms found in equation 2.11 are called prime implicants. Any logical expres-
sion X implicates another logical expression Y if Y is a part of X. Any logical expression
X is implied by any case Z if X is part of the combination Z (Cronqvist, 2007, p.359).
In the example, attribute (B) is implicated by any male child. On the next level, main
implicants are parts of longer expressions, implicating these expressions. For instance,
the main implicant aD found in the minimisation process implicates the cases of Sandra
(abcD), Manuela (abCD), Dominik (aBcD), and Fred (aBCD). The essential feature of
main implicants is that an implicant X becomes a main implicant if no other implicant
implies X. It is the expression involving as few statements or attributes as possible.
Thus, it cannot be minimised any further by the procedure applied in the birthday
example so far.
Prime Implicant Chart
However, this has not been the end, as equation 2.11 can be simplified to a higher
extent. To that end, a prime implicant chart is set up to find the essential main
implicants.
Some configurations are only implied by one of the eight main implicants, some by
more. In a nutshell, the essential prime implicants are those main implicants, that
are essential to cover all cases. Table 2.3 presents the data of the birthday example
in such a prime implicant chart. The top row contains all cases according to their
original decimal label and the very right column contains the prime implicants found
in the minimisation process so far. When a prime implicant implies a particular case,
the case is marked with a cross in the prime implicant’s row. Sticking to the example
given above, the prime implicant aD implies Sandra (abcD; binary: 0001; decimal: 1),
Manuela (abCD; binary: 0011; decimal:3), Dominik (aBcD; binary: 0101; decimal: 5),
and Fred (aBCD; binary: 0111; decimal: 7), so the respective columns are marked with
an x.
If a particular case is implied by a single prime implicant only, the respective field is
marked with a bold upper-case X.
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Case (dec.) 1 2 3 5 6 7 10 11 Expression
X x X x aD
x x X x aC
x x X X bC
x bCD
Case (conf.) abcD abCd abCD aBcD aBCd aBCD AbCd AbCD
Table 2.3: Prime Implicant Table for the Outcome "Invitation"
The sum of the marked prime implicants form the essential prime implicants. In
the birthday example we thus face:
1 = aC + aD + bC (2.12)
The term bCD has been eliminated. According to the laws of Boolean Algebra,
specifically the one described above in equation 2.6, this could have been forecast after
the first minimisation, as
bC + bCD = bC (2.13)
2.3 Transformations and Interpretations
At this point the researcher can start to interpret the results, draw conclusions, and
also change the parameters of the model. Equation 2.12 shows that the children that
were invited are either younger classmates OR younger neighbours OR girls attending
the same class. Thus,it can be deduced that no elder boys were invited. To be able to
make more statements, it is possible to transform the equation according to the laws
described in equation 2.4 and 2.5:
1 = aC + aD + bC = a(C + D) + bC (2.14)
and
1 = aC + aD + bC = C(a + b) + aD (2.15)
The equations give a useful structure to make statements about the pattern of con-
ditions for the outcome "invitation" (1). Equation 2.14 shows that those children that
have been invited were younger and classmates or living next door OR girls from school.
From another point of view, shown in equation 2.15, the invitees were attending the
same class while being younger or girls OR younger children from the neighbourhood.
Quite some interpretive statements can be drawn from these insights. Besides the fact
that no elder boys were invited it can be read that all elder girls asked to come attend
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the same class as the birthday child. A researcher’s task would now be to build theories
explaining this outcome. It could be that the birthday child does not like elder boys
as she is in an age where boys are of less interest and elder boys, in turn, are not
interested in young girls. Going deeper into the case a researcher could search for past
occurrences of bullying by elder children. If that were the case, it seems to only be a
problem of the neighbourhood, as equation 2.15 shows that elder girls from class have
indeed been invited.
A complementary step to verify the established theories is to check whether the as-
sumptions are backed by the complete data set. Maybe elder girls or elder boys do
simply not belong to the data as such cases could not be observed. Alexandra and is
an elder girl living next door (configuration AbCD) and has indeed not been invited.
Paul and Rainer are elder boys (having the configuration ABxy), both live next door
and Paul is even a classmate too. Both have not been invited either. This means, first,
cases of elder boys living in the neighbourhood or being classmates have been observed.
Second, and this is another step of interpretation, maybe Paul has a huge impact on
the result, as he might be a bully in school and in the neighbourhood. Or the birthday
child simply does not like him. All these questions have been risen by the conducted
minimisation process and have to be answered qualitatively by the researcher.
2.3.1 Limited Diversity and Assumptions about Remainders
This section aims at sensitising the reader for the importance of logical remainders
in the research design. Best practice would be to find a really existing case for every
possible configuration. As in social science such a demand is rather utopian, fix out-
comes can be ascribed to exploit the approach, and, consequently, to render the final
expression more parsimoniously. At best, pre-knowledge and theoretically grounded
assumptions are used to eliminate unknown outcomes and to complete the data set by
that way.
What might have struck the reader already regarding the birthday party example is
the fact that not all possible combinations of the four variables can be found in the
data set. In general, the quantity of possible configuration is determined by the kind of
splitting of the variables. In this case it is a dichotomization (0 and 1) so the base has
a radix r=2 6. As the truth table involves four variables, 16 combinations are possible
in this example.7 Indeed, table 2.2 consists of 13 combinations only, so three cases
are missing. The higher the number of variables is, the higher also is the number of
possible configurations. As the number of possible configurations grows exponentially,
the likelihood of unobserved data inside the data set increases the more variables are
6The radix 2 is the base for csQCA; the calculation differs in other techniques of the QCA family,
for instants in mvQCA
7Setting the value of k to 4, the formal calculation is∏k
i=1 ri =
∏4
i=1 2 = 24 = 2 · 2 · 2 · 2 = 16
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tested.
This is an unfavourable aggravation for any study as it bears the aura of being some-
what incomplete. Additionally, the lack of these configurations may lead to difficulties
within the minimisation process, as it might be difficult to find configurations that
differ in one variable only (Ragin, 1987, p.10). Therefore, like in statistical analysis,
simplifying assumptions are made in QCA whereby these assumptions still allow a
maximum of causal complexity. These assumptions, in combination with particular
Boolean techniques, range from conservative statements to simple causal statements.
The underlying ratio is simple: the greater the variety of combinations taken into ac-
count, the smaller the number of prime implicants in the final expression.
To render a more parsimonious result, Ragin proposes different procedures to handle
the the unobserved configurations. First, the limitations of the expression gained by
the minimisation process have to be determined. Then, different possible values of the
logical remainders can be run through whereat three variations can be distinguished,
labelled here "theory guided remainder assumptions", "complete negative remainder
assumption", and "complete positive remainder assumption".
To determine the limits of the study, the table can be augmented by all possible com-
binations of the variables and a further column is introduced coding all expressions
according to their absence (0) or presence (1) in the real world.
Observed (R) Name (A) (B) (C) (D) Outcome (I) Config. Dec.
1 Sabrine 0 0 0 0 0 abcd 0
1 Sandra 0 0 0 1 1 abcD 1
1 Mandy 0 0 1 0 1 abCd 2
1 Manuela 0 0 1 1 1 abCD 3
1 Martin 0 1 0 0 0 aBcd 4
1 Dominik 0 1 0 1 1 aBcD 5
1 Patrick 0 1 1 0 1 aBCd 6
1 Fred 0 1 1 1 1 aBCD 7
1 Alexandra 1 0 0 1 0 AbcD 9
1 Christine 1 0 1 0 1 AbCd 10
1 Elena 1 0 1 1 1 AbCD 11
1 Rainer 1 1 0 1 0 ABcD 13
1 Paul 1 1 1 1 0 ABCD 15
0 Log. Remainder 1 0 0 0 - Abcd 8
0 Log. Remainder 1 1 0 0 - ABcd 12
0 Log. Remainder 1 1 1 0 - ABCd 14
(A) (B) (C) (D) Invitation (Outcome) Configuration Dec.
Table 2.4: Conditions and observations for the outcome "Invitation"
Adding Theoretical Assumptions
It would absolutely be justifiable for any researcher to stop at this stage and begin
with individual, case focussed, and theoretically guided interpretations. Nevertheless,
theoretical knowledge can be used to make further steps in the direction of a more
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parsimonious expression. If the researcher had strong evidence that the birthday child
does not like elder boys indeed - maybe because she once said so in the presence of the
researcher etc. - it is valid to change the outcome of the logical remainders that imply
elder boys from (-) to (0). Such a proceeding shall be labelled here "theory guided
remainder assumption" as the logical remainders are manipulated and included into
the minimisation process on theoretical grounds. Conducting the minimisation process
of the configurations with negative outcome incorporating the logical remainders that
include (AB) for "elder boys" would yield the following expression:
AB + AcD + acd (2.16)
Not surprising, as this has been the theoretical assumption, being an elder boy (AB)
is a reason to be excluded from the party. Additionally, being elder in general, living
next door, but not being a classmate (AcD), or being younger in combination with not
being a close neighbour (acd) are reasons for exclusion. The equation differs from the
minimisation of the observed negative configurations only in the term (AB) - as a min-
imisation of the uninvited cases in table 2.2 and 2.4, would simply render AcD + acd.
It would be a comprehensible way to extend the expression, yet it does not make the
final expression more parsimonious. If the theory guided outcome assumption would
have had produced more terms, they would have had to be checked back theoretically.
Applying de Morgan’s Law
An inconsistency appears when De Morgan’s law is applied to the original expression
gained in the minimisation process without any outcome assumptions for the logical
remainders (aC + aD + bC):
1 = aC + aD + bC 7−→ (A + c) · (A + d) · (B + c) = 0
(A + Ad + Ac + cd) · (B + c) = 0
AB + Ac + cd = 0
(2.17)
It rightly shows that among the observed positive outcomes, there are no elder boys,
no elder classmates and no one who is neither classmate nor living next door. Taking
into account the insight that in a conservative reading it would not be permissible to
make statements about elder boys in general as elder boys outside the neighbourhood
have not been observed, the researcher finds herself in a dilemma only to be solved on
theoretical grounds. Working with and interpreting equation B.1.2 is always somewhat
adulterated as long as the data set is incomplete. This becomes even more clear when
applying the law to equation 2.3.1, which derives from the theory guided outcome
assumption that the birthday child does not like elder boys. The result is slightly
2.3. TRANSFORMATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS 35
padded:
0 = AB + AcD + acd 7−→ (a + b) · (a + C + d) · (A + C + D) = 1
(a + aC + ad + ab + bC + bd) · (A + C + D) = 1
aA + aC + aD + aAC + aC + aCD + aAd+
aCd + adD + aAb + abC + abD + AbC + bC+
bCD + Abd + bCd + bdD = 1
0 + aC + aD + 0 + aC + aCD + 0 + aCd + 0 + 0+
abC + abD + AbC + bC + bCD + Abd + bCd + 0 = 1
aC + aD + bC + Abd = 1
(2.18)
Compared to the original equation without additional assumptions (aC+aD+bC) a
new term has appeared: Abd. True, Christine, decimal number 10 and the logical re-
mainder with the decimal number 8 are covered by that expression, however Christine
is covered by bC already, so the only reason for the existence of Abd seems to be the
case with the decimal number 8. As it is, as mentioned, a logical remainder, the use-
fulness of the term Abd is questionable.
Differences in the Calculations and the Constant Need for Interpretation
Ragin suggests to code all logical remainders across the board negative (0). He argues
that unobserved cases might be unobserved as they simply might not exist and mentions
a protestant Latin American state as example simply not found in the real world (Ragin,
1987, p.109). True, in the birthday example, it could indeed be the case that elder
children of remote neighbourhoods or elder children not being classmates simply do not
belong to the circle of acquaintances of the birthday child - or put more simple: She
does not know anyone having these attributes so they are out of question to be invited.
This suggestion should be taken with a pinch of salt, as it is in fact a pre-assumption
in theory that should be tested with foresight.
The same is true for the suggestion to assume that all logical remainders would yield a
positive outcome if they existed. Coding all unobserved cases (1) and conducting the
minimisation process with the observed positive outcomes would yield the equation
Ad + aD + bC = 1 (2.19)
which is different from equation (aC + aD + bC) obtained by minimising only the
observed positive outcomes. Instead of being a younger classmate (aC), the expression
alleges that being elder and from remote neighbourhoods (Ad) would be a sufficient
condition to be invited. Again, the configuration with the decimal number 10 (Chris-
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tine) is implied by that new term, still being covered by bC too. Except for Christine,
only logical remainders are implied. Like in the absolute negative outcome assumption,
the result is questionable, and such an expression should be checked by the researcher
with regard to theoretical meaningfulness. On the one hand, the term Ad includes el-
der boys from remote neighbourhoods and as shown by the aforementioned restrictions
of the study due to non-observance of such cases the term should be limited or even
discarded. The same is true if there is strong evidence that the birthday child does not
like elder boys at all, also introduced as theory guided outcome assumption. Hence,
referring to term aD, new insights seem slender. On the other hand, focussing on the
elimination of the term aC the question rises whether being a younger classmate really
is a sufficient condition to be invited.
The techniques described here as "theory guided remainder assumption", "absolute
negative remainder assumption", and "absolute positive remainder assumption" often
differ according to their length or quality or both. Together with the application of
De Morgan’s law, the researcher has various expressions to check. Table 2.5 gives an
overview:
(I)=1 De Morgan (I)=1 (I)=0 De Morgan (I)=0
Assumption ⇓
None aC+aD+bC AB+Ac+cd AcD+acd aD+Ad+C
Theory Guided aC+aD+bC AB+Ac+cd AB+AcD+acd aC+aD+bC+Abd
Negative Outcome aC+aD+bC AB+Ac+cd ABC+AcD+cd aC+aD+bC
Positive Outcome Ad+aD+bC aBd+acd+ABD+AcD AcD+acd aD+Ad+C
Table 2.5: Types of final expressions according to assumptions about logical remainders
While recommending the absolute negative outcome assumption, Ragin (1987,
p.115) acknowledges subsequently that both, the negative and the positive outcome
assumption, are possible avenues for resolving the contradiction problem seems a little
indecisive and bewildering. The researcher is left alone at this point and has to evalu-
ate, assess, decide and assert the route taken in her particular research. Acknowledging
the vast differences between the different assumptions, in this study, the different equa-
tions produced by the assumptions will be openly compared.8
2.3.2 Designing and Redesigning
From the very moment when the variables and the truth table are set up, the iterative
process of QCA gathers momentum. The approach systematises the steps that can be
taken in order to gain insights and results. The picture of Rihoux and Lobe (2009)
shows these steps. Adjustments of the design can be achieved by redesigning the
8By that way I don’t follow completely the recommendations and views of e.g. Olsen (2007) -
who dehorts from using absolute assumptions about logical remainders at all - nor his counterpart
Baumgartner and Thiem (2017). My decision to resort to a qualitative evaluation derives from issues
connected with case sensitivity in QCA as shown here and also discussed later in section 3.3.
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Figure 2.2: Stages of QCA Studies - detailed
set of countries, the set of variables, or the classification of the latter9 . An obstacle
towards a straightforward QCA process is the phenomenon of contradictory rows. A
possible result of a range of observations and hence of the produced truth table may
be that two or more exactly identical combination of circumstances lead to different
outcomes being positive (1) in one or some cases and negative (0) in others at the same
time.10 Turning to the birthday example, this would mean that two children share the
same attributes according to the variables but one is invited and the other is not.
At that point of the study, there are several possibilities to proceed. The first is to
assume that there has to be an additional circumstance that had not been taken into
account which explains the different outcome. For instance, the truth table may entail
the following rows:
ABCD = 1 and ABCD = 0 (2.20)
A researcher has to return to the cases and search until she finds a differing, omitted
variable. She might find out that the birthday child is interested in horses or even a
member in an equestrian club, just like some other children she knows. Including the
9For the distinction between sets and classes see part 2.1 especially the reference in footnote 3.
10Even if two configurations with the same combination of variables render the same outcome, a
researcher should consider to intervene, as these combinations are useless for the minimisation process.
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new variable E (sharing the same hobby) or e (not sharing the same hobby) might
solve the problem of contradiction, so the equations would turn
ABCDE = 1 and ABCDe = 0 (2.21)
The new variable E/e has to be added to all cases of the truth table and has
to be included into the minimisation process. This would be a redesign of the set of
variables. These steps might lead to an effusive use of new variables that may hamper
a parsimonious outcome of the minimisation. Another possibility would be to take one
case out of the overall sample. This redesign of the set of cases should be avoided as
it might give the impression of arbitrariness and should - if this step becomes evidently
necessary - be justified on logical grounds. A valuable approach would be to alter the
definition of the outcome.
Another way of dealing with contradictions would be to redesign the classifications
of variables. If there are many contradictory rows, the contradiction may be caused
by a single variable or by a combination of variables. If the variable is quantitative, the
threshold can be changed to repeat the entire minimisation process afterwards. For
instance, if the threshold for age had been established as "elder than 8" (A > 8) it
could be set at "elder or equal 8" (A ≥ 8) meaning that (a ≤ 8) in the first case and
(a < 8) in the latter. By switching the threshold, some configurations might change
when the respective variable is affected by the alteration . Abcd might turn to abcd
and so forth.
Transferring this way of dealing with thresholds to the field of social research opens up
even more possibilities depending on the dispersion of the data. A popular threshold is
the mean of a data set, however, other positions could make sense too, like the median,
if there are many runaway values and the number of cases is not odd-numbered. Often,
it is more useful to identify two clusters, one located at the the top and the other at the
bottom of the scaled data and set the threshold in between. Generally, the positioning
of the threshold and by that way altering the classification of variables is one of the
many freedoms that the QCA approach grants the researcher. To avoid abuse of this
freedom and for the sake of transparent scientific work, the positioning should be
comprehensible and, at best, theoretically grounded.
Second, when facing qualitative variables causing contradictions, the efforts that have
to be undertaken are more substantial. The easiest way would be to leave and ignore the
problem causing variables for the rest of the study. However, by that way important
information will get lost. A better possibility poses the rearrangement of variables.
A means to do so can be found in the "ladder of abstraction" by Satori (1970) that
derives from the assumption that terms and concepts can be hierachised according to
their level of abstraction. Any variable causing contradictions can be replaced by a
subordinate or superordinate term or concept, best expressed by relations of subsets
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and supersets. In general, X is a subset of a set Y, or equivalently Y is a superset
of X, if X is "contained" inside Y. That is, all elements of X are also elements of Y.
Assuming the variable "classmate" (C) causes contradictions, it could be tested whether
it is maybe not enough that a kid is a classmate; maybe it has to be a bench mate to
be invited. In this case we climbed down the ladder of abstraction, as the new variable
(M) for bench mate is clearly a smaller subset of (C), formally M ⊂ C.
Against this background, a method to render the final equation more parsimoniously is
to climb up the ladder of abstraction. Maybe it has not been important for the birthday
child whether a kid is a classmate, maybe it would be sufficient that the kid was in the
same grade or even the same school. In this case, the new variables (G) for grade and
(S) for school are supersets of (C), formally: S ⊃ G ⊃ C. Again, every movement on
the ladder of abstraction should be backed by reasonable theoretical assumptions to
avoid abuse.
Another possibility to deal with contradiction causing qualitative variables consists
of questioning the meaning of certain names of variables hermeneutically, referring to
hermeneutics as critical methodology for analysing texts and statements in general.
Beginning such a hermeneutical process and taking the term "living next door" (D) in
the birthday-party example, it becomes obvious that "next door" is an elastic term.
We can assume that all children living in the same house or street to be living "next
door", but what about the block? Or if the birthday child dwells in a small village
in the countryside, does that mean that all kids living in the same village are living
"next door" too? And if it is a village remote from the next urban center, should the
neighbouring villages be included into the concept "next door" as well? A key feature
of hermeneutic reasoning and questioning consists of finding out what the research
subject, third parties, or the researcher might mean by the term under scrutiny, in this
case "next door". A breakdown of possible interpretations would be:
same house ⇄ same street ⇄ same village/block ⇄ same residential
cluster 11
The researcher has to elaborately determine which interpretation is the most likely to
fit. For this, further research has to be conducted to, at best, reveal the particular
interpretation being meaningful for and influencing the decision of the birthday child.
In the course of that process, it is not important to stick to the term "next door" if
encountering another term that fits better. What is important, however, is that the
researcher gives a clear definition of what she means.
2.3.3 Evaluating Theoretical Arguments
As shown, the QCA approach does not only use Boolean techniques to answer a research
question but also draws right from the beginning on theoretical arguments. It also bears
the possibility of a comparison of theoretical arguments with the expressions gained
11cluster having approximately the same distance to a particular center
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through Boolean minimisation. Such a proceeding gives insights to evaluate theoretical
pre-assumptions. In social science, these assumptions are already scribed by existing
theories of the field, found prominently in area studies, or existing theories of social
sciences and its close parallel sciences in general. Returning to our oversimplified
birthday example, a researcher could assume that the birthday child invites girls from
class and from the neighbourhood. Hence, the theoretically assumed final expression
would be
It = bD + bC (2.22)
Now it is possible to make statements about the accuracy of the assumed final expres-
sion by multiplying it with the final expression obtained after having minimised the
positive, really observed cases shown in equation 2.9:
(I) · (It) = (bD + bC) · (aC + aD + bC)
= abCD + abD + bCD + abC + abCD + bC
= abD + bC
(2.23)
As speculated, the assumption that being a girl from class (bC) would be a suffi-
cient condition could be confirmed; it is part of the final expression of the minimisation
of all positive and observed outcomes anyway. The assumption that being a girl from
the neighbourhood would be a sufficient condition could only by confirmed with limi-
tations. It is a reasonable statement, yet only true for younger girls. Taking a look at
the truth table 2.2 reveals that the cases of Sandra(1) and Manuela(3) are implied by
that expression and that both have indeed been invited while there is no observation
of non-invitation with that expression. The expression abD simply does not appear
in the final equation as it has been minimised with the help of the configurations of
Dominic (decimal:5), Patrick (decimal:6), and Fred (decimal:7). Hence, it is a sufficient
condition, however, it is not the most parsimonious one.
In the example of equation 2.3.3, the final expression without any assumptions about
the logical remainders has been taken and multiplied out. Theory testing using a final
expression gained by theoretical pre-assumptions would render the result of theory test-
ing different. Taking, for instance, the final expression obtained applying an absolute
positive outcome assumption, the operation would produce the following calculation
steps:
(Ip) · (It) = (bD + bC) · (Ad + aD + bC)
= 0 + AbD + bCD + AbCd + abCD + bC
= AbD + bC
(2.24)
The expression AbD + bC differs in the very first letter from the expression obtained
after using the conservative statement for theory testing (abD + bC ), however that very
letter changes the entire meaning: The conservative expression implies all younger girls
from next door, the expression using the absolute positive outcome assumption implies
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all elder girls from neighbourhood. Comparing the two expressions, and against the
background of all what has been described and explained so far, three conclusions can
be made.
First, manipulating logical remainders is a deeper intervention than it seems at first
glance, especially when using and benefiting from QCA in a comprehensive and ex-
haustive manner. The researcher will encounter contradictions, some of them riddling
and puzzling, and thus time and resource consuming. The entire line of argument and
reasoning becomes more feeble and attackable if the steps undertaken are not docu-
mented and well grounded.
Second, exactly that flexibility gives the researcher a vast amount of freedom. If the
decisions undertaken by the researcher in the course of the study are well-grounded,
nearly every variable - and even combinations of variables, as shown - can be tested.
The assumptions made, of course, shape the results. However this, as will be discussed
in the next section, is to a certain extent impossible to avoid in social sciences.
Third, the outlined flexibility is a temptation at the same time. Manipulation of thresh-
olds, variables, logical remainders etc. can be used to achieve the result the researcher
expects or even wishes for. Therefore, transparency is of the essence. This involves
clear definitions of variables and the documentation of steps taken.
Chapter 3
What csQCA is - and what it is not
3.1 Comparative Historical Analysis and Configu-
rational Methods
When Ragin (1987) introduced the distinction between variable oriented research and
case oriented research, he referred to the latter as something that goes without statis-
tical tests. Concretely, he put case oriented research in line with comparative studies:
comparativists would seek to identify historical explanation for particular historical
outcomes and the goals of these studies are historically interpretive and causally ana-
lytic (p.35). Thus, case-oriented studies include history, interpretation, and causal
inference. By their help, patterns of invariance can be inducted from small N studies
using a palmful of variables.
Taking a look at the history of methods in science, especially focussing on history,
interpretation, causal inference, pattern of invariance, configurations of variables, and
small N studies, it can be argued that what Ragin actually refers to when describing
"case oriented research" is basically what (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003) would
label Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA).1 The following features distinguish com-
parative historical research from other scientific endeavours in social science (Pierson
and Skocpol, 2002; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Mahoney and Villegas, 2009):
Identification of causal configurations: Comparative historical inquiry fo-
cuses on the explanation and identification of causal configurations that produce major
outcomes of interest. In comparative historical research, the question of why a certain
outcome occurred is of the essence. Propositions being supposed to be a possible cause
are carefully selected and tested according to their correlation and non-correlation
across the cases.
1This subfield of connecting history with past and contemporary political issues has also been la-
belled differently like "comparative historical research", "comparative historical analysis", or "historical
institutionalism" (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Tilly, 1989).
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Scope on processes over time: Comparative historical researchers analyse his-
torical sequences over time and pay tribute to the dynamics of processes over time.
They are concerned with the dimensions of time, including issues of timing and se-
quencing. History matters in the long run because temporal context matters (Abbott,
2001; Pierson, 2004).
Systematic analysis of similar and contrasting cases: Practitioners of com-
parative historical inquiry use similar and contrasting cases for comparison referring
to the outcomes of interest.
Deep knowledge of the cases under scrutiny: Comparative historical re-
searchers attempt to gain a deep understanding of their cases. Within-case analy-
sis becomes a central mode of causal inference and the scholar becomes an expert
of each case for a better understanding of similarities and contrasts (Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer, 2003; Collier et al., 2004).
Restricted knowledge: The result of a study is not universally applicable knowl-
edge. However, it represents a bargain in which significant advantages are gained. A
dialogue between theory and evidence of an intensity that is rare in quantitative social
research is made possible which highlights similarities and particularities at the same
time.
All these features are essential parts of QCA as it has been introduced in the previ-
ous section. The approach uses configurations, contrasts cases with different outcomes
((1) and (0)), takes process tracing over time into account when setting up variables,
demands for deep knowledge of the cases, and includes a sophisticated system for a
dialogue between theory and evidence. So, what is new about QCA and where do these
new features derive from?
3.1.1 The Evolution of Comparative Research
A crucial issue that QCA aims to tackle is the problem of unsystematised and loose
data. Especially in very small n and small n research designs, data seems often rather
unformalised, hence the scientific quality of case studies is often questioned (Gerring,
2017, p.221-223;Rihoux and Lobe, 2009). The allegation of unsystematised and in-
transparent research designs accompanies scientific research since its very beginnings.
What Ragin labels case oriented research and what refers rather to historical com-
parative analysis has always been in the center of that critique. It has been uttered
and been formalised most prominently in an era between the 1950s and 1960s that has
been labelled loosely "the behavioural revolution". To understand this development, its
benefits, and flaws, it is fruitful to trace some scientific developments of social science
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during that time.
Historical Comparative Analysis and Political Science are two different streams that
overlap, interact and cross-fertilize each other, however, they have to be differentiated.
Especially in Germany a branch of study emerged after the Napoleonic Wars focussing
on the art of ruling and administrating a people. The Policeywissenschaft or later
Staatswissenschaft included public law, the early political economy, public health con-
cerns, urbanism and urban planning. It was rather an administrative science and was
often meant to prepare the student to become a public officer in the Prussian admin-
istration. As the name Staatswissenschaft (science of the state) already implies, the
focus was much in line with German thinking at that time, regarding the state as most
prominent feature shaping and coining human behaviour, and being the pivotal point of
power relations (Munck, 2007). Furthermore, when speaking of Wissenschaft (science)
at that time, people mostly meant the accumulation of knowledge for a greater good
in form of ideographic institutionalism and description of institutions. Much of that
thought was exported in the following years by German migrants or foreign scholars
trained in Germany, who migrated into scientific landscape of the United States.
Opinions differ whether Francis Lieber was the first officially named Professor of polit-
ical science in 1857 (Farr, 1988) or if the term political science was first coined in 1880
by Herbert Baxter Adams at John Hopkins University, in any case, by the introduc-
tion of this very term a loose space was opened. And the German Staatswissenschaft
diffused into that space opened up by the first use of this term and filled it. So, clearly,
scholars using comparative historical research, as outlined above, at the turn of the
century would not label themselves "political scientists". The new stream "political
science", on the other side, lacked the aim to explain outcomes and was far too much
micro level focussed to welcome comparative historical research as an scientific fellow
or even integrate it into its own realm.
At another frontier, scholars tried to demarcate the new discipline "political science"
in relation to history as all compassing discipline which in many cases also addressed
the state. The founders and early adopters sought to differentiate their new field by
restricting research to the relative present. Stating that "history is past politics and
politics is present history", political scientists would focus on contemporary history
and leave the field of the past to historians. Consequently, political scientists avoided
or ignored all issues that might have led to the status quo from the past and focussed
on more delimited questions of the formal political institutions associated with state
bureaucracies and governments (Munck, 2007). The logical result is a neglect of com-
parative historical analysis in political science until the second half of the 20th century.
What would play a major role in future struggles and discussions in science was the
circumstance that neither comparative historical research nor the new subject of legal-
institutional political science featured coherent theory or methods. Comparative histor-
ical research consisted mainly of unsystematically collected data, information and case
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studies. By means of logic, hermeneutics, more or less untested Marxian assumptions,
and ad hoc deductions and inductions, hypothesis and correlations were postulated and
poured into essays and monographs. The formal-legal approach, on the other hand,
was largely devoid of theory as well and mostly did not yield general testable hypoth-
esis at all. Moreover, it seemed to be a rather non-critical style of science and rather
corroborating current structures of legitimation. Munck (2007, p.37) writes:
"Political scientists [...] presented arguments, that largely reflected the prevailing
consensus about the merits of limed democracy, on the institutional questions
of the day, such as the reforms adopted in the US after the Civil War and the
constitutional changes in Europe in the late 19th and 20th centuries"
Both research paradigms got heavily under pressure from the 1920s on and espe-
cially in the 1960s by a more broad development in the field. Today often labelled as
"the behavioural revolution"or "the behavioural approach" it definitely constituted a
kind of new "mood" (Dahl, 1961), a movement stressing "the behavioural persuasion in
politics" (Eulau, 1963), or a "conceptual revolution" remaking the meaning of theory
in the field (Easton, 1965)2.
Being one of the most prominent advocate of the conceptual changes, it is worthwhile
to take a closer look at the writings of George E. Catlin, especially his The Science
and Method of Politics (1927) and his chief work The Function of Political Science
(1956). Catlins oeuvre endorses the very beginnings and the peak of the movement.
Four aspects help to clarify the Zeitgeist of that time:
First, he defines politics, from the side of the subject matter, as a field where all be-
haviour results in the control of collaboration of one will over or with another (p.122).
As critics remark, this would cover the entire range of human behaviour, growing out
of the desire for power over one’s fellows (Hanford, 1927) and thus being too close to
sociology. Indeed, Catlin claims that political Science and Sociology are inseparable
and in fact these are two sides of the same coin (Catlin, 1956).
Second, Catlin suggests to dilate the scope of research agendas with regard to insti-
tutions. He states that politics is not limited to the study of national and sovereign
states. Political science is rather the study of structure of social controls - of which
there are many other forms than states and administrations - such as churches and
their ecclesiastical polity, unions, cities, international organizations, even family au-
thority. These are all no less "political" or worthy of examination than municipal or
state government (Catlin, 1956, p.819).
Third, and this part describes what the "behavioural revolution" has been widely be-
come known for at its best, Catlin encourages his fellows to take economics as example,
2The critique of methodological inconsistency had twinkeled already at the beginning of the cen-
tury in the scientific community. It can be traced back to the year 1908 in which Graham Wallas
published Human Nature in Politics and Arthur Bentleys published The Process of Government. Both
scholars were inclined to lay greater emphasis on the informal processes of politics and less on political
institutions in isolation. Later on, in 1925, Charles Merriam as well criticised contemporary political
science for its lack of scientific rigor in his "New Aspects of Politics".
46 CHAPTER 3. WHAT CSQCA IS - AND WHAT IT IS NOT
in which scientists began to develop methods capable of conditional predictions. He
thus calls for a separation of political science from cognate subjects and the building
of a system of thought. Beneath the structure, he states, there may be detected func-
tions, common to the whole field, resting on the natural laws of human nature, and
determinant of the shape which even the broadest structures take (Catlin, 1956, p.819).
Fourth, while the former techniques of inference were often rather macro-descriptive
in nature, revealing the mechanisms of groups, institutions and laws over time, the
new approach took the personal decision of the single individual into account. Catlin,
as well as David Easton later on, tired of unsystematic macro level postulations, de-
manded more research about micro units and to recommend to young students to stop
talking about ’Capitalism’ and ’Socialism,’ ’Sovereignity’ and ’Authority’ and to "go
and look at what actually happens" (Catlin, 1956, p.819).
Subsequently, until the 1960, new approaches in the field became, indeed, more em-
pirically grounded, focussing on, and using probability survey samples, panels of infor-
mants, metric techniques such as scalograms and factor analysis, and the analysis of po-
litical group behaviour by other statistical means (Eulau, 1963, p.33). Former research
consisting of predominantly historical, legalistic, and institutional case studies with a
traditionally intuitive-descriptive approach were thus replaced by the introduction of
more empirical methods, borrowed mostly from the field of economics, psychology, and
natural sciences. All in all, David Easton (1965,p.7) pinpointed the new "behavioral
credo” in eight assumptions:
- the search for regularities or patterns in political behaviour
- the use of a verification principle such as hypothesis testing
- an emphasis on methodological technique
- quantification by precision in the recording of data
- the separation of values from facts in an analytic fashion
- the systematization of both theory and practice
- pure science in the sense that theory precedes application, and
- integration in the sense that political behaviour research is interdisciplinary
Turning back to QCA, we can claim that the approach fulfils all the requirements
for scientific research demanded by Easton. However, different from many streams that
adopted statistical methods as suggested by the early Behaviourists, QCA resorts to
another technique that has been labelled amongst others by Lijphart (1971) as "the
comparative method". Under the influence of the new rigour concerning methodological
accuracy of the 1950s and 1960s, the question arose how to deal with studies with a low
number of observations or instances. This included the will to systematise, precise, and
enhance the quality of comparative historical analysis that got heavily under pressure,
for the sake of higher transparency and replicability.
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3.1.2 Configurational Methods as Answer to the Small N Prob-
lem
Ragin refers to case-oriented methods as classic comparative methods (p.53) tying
the term case-oriented close to John Stuard Mill’s canons of experimental logic in A
System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive (1843). He does so for good reason when
dealing with case oriented studies, however, it might be puzzling for beginners that the
epistemological and historical foundation of QCA itself are sometimes allegedly related
to David Hume and John Stuard Mill. Ragin mentions Mill a couple of times in his
basic QCA introduction from 1987 and devotes entire subsections to the Method of
Agreement and the Method of Difference. But this is only to refer to "rough guidelines
for the conduct of comparative inquiry" (p.44).
The fact that the recurrence on Mill is only a door opener becomes clear when taking
a closer look at Mill’s canons. The Method of Agreement is a method for eliminating
unimportant causes in a configuration and identifying a common, single cause:
If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have only one
circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree
is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon (Mill, 1872)
This method does not account for intersections or conjunctural causation. True,
Mill mentions the possibility of "chemical causation", however in his methods he refers
to one cause only. Consequently, Ragin himself only guesses that Mill would "probably
allow for the possibility that this single cause might be a recurrent combination of
conditions" (p. 36). A few pages hereafter he even acknowledges that Mills methods
are incapable at all of handling multiple or conjunctural causation (p.42). The relation
between QCA and Mill’s methods is thus restricted to three basic features:
First, the method of agreement is a method to identify pattern of invariance,
meaning it is a tool to search variables that are constant across a wide range of cases
and thus do not vary whenever the particular outcome is observed. Second, it analyses
configurations that consist of several variables or causes. And third, these configu-
rations may consist of few variables and the research design includes only few cases,
hence being appropriate for small N studies.
Against that background, QCA can be regarded as a Comparative Configurational
Method (CCM) (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009). The concept of configurational methods,
including Mills methods, also includes a number of methodological approaches, all of
which seek to gain new insights by analysing configurations of cases. A configuration is
a particular combination of factors that are called conditions and may include stimuli,
causal variables, ingredients, determinants and so forth. The combination builds a case
or, vice versa, a case renders a particular combination of variables that produces an
outcome of interest.
The use of configurational methods beyond Mill’s canons is not new to social science.
Just like many other research traditions, during the behavioural revolution, the incon-
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Approach Mills Method of Agreement Most Diffrent System Design Qualitative Comparative Analysis
1. Case ABCD = 1 ABcd = 1 ABCD = 1
2. Case abcD = 1 abcd = 1 ABCd = 1
Inference D = 1 cd = 1 ABC = 1
Table 3.1: Comparison of different traditions of comparison
sistent use of methods and approaches in the comparative literature of political science
was criticised (one of the first being Macridis (1955)) which resulted in a range of pub-
lications trying to sharpen the methodological awareness of the scientific community
(amongst others (Eckstein and Apter, 1963; Kalleberg, 1966; Przeworski and Teune,
1970; Satori, 1970)). Arendt Lijpharts essay on "Comparative Politics and the Com-
parative Method" (1971), describing the comparative method as scientific approach
alongside with the experimental and the statistical method, was very influential. He
seizes on a suggestion already made by sociologist Smelser(1965) to apply the compar-
ative method in the scientific niche of small N studies.
Notably, "The Logic of Comparative Inquiry" (1970) by Przworski and Teune draws on
a similar logic like Mill in their (Most Similar System Design (MSSD)/MSSD designs,
although there is not a single reference to his canons. The method is rather inductive
and starts with two cases with the same outcome and tries to find common variables
in a stepwise manner. As the names indicate, MSSD is a design where cases are chosen
that are most similar with respect to the nature of their configurations while the cases
render a different outcome. By that way, the part of the configuration that differs is
very likely to cause the differences in the outcomes. The Most Different System Design
eliminates variables that probably do not explain the outcome and resembles roughly
Mill’s Method of Agreement: Variables should be as different as possible and the out-
come should be the same. Table 3.1 compares three approaches of comparison:3
Against this background, it can be stated that csQCA follows the basic logic of its
predecessors and develops the approach further. Also the dialogue between data and
theory which is central to QCA is already intrinsic to the frameworks of Przworski &
Teune. Basically, they start from the very microlevel with only few cases and a single
independent variable to check whether the latter holds sway across systems. If it does
not, the systemic level or the variable is altered. If it does, more independent variables
can be added. Although not using the term, by that way they also allow for multiple
3The notation of MDSD is a simplification to make the process more comparable. Prezeworski and
Tuene (1970, p.84) actually state D = I1, I2, ...S(k + 1) · I3 ·Nj while the dependent phenomenon D
depends upon I1 and I2 regardless of systems and upon I3 depending on the characteristic S1. The
term N refers to residual factors, similar to the term ϵ in regression analysis.
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causational conjuctions (Przeworski and Teune, 1970, esp. p.76-87). Simlar to QCA,
a "ladder of abstraction" can be used to find the best results for the comparison. If the
established canon of theories is not capable of explaining an outcome in a satisfying
manner, the researcher is allowed to modify existing theories (p.84).
However, as table 3.1 shows, it seems that QCA is the less parsimonious approach
and the other look somewhat inferior. But here comes a basic strength of QCA into
play: By using the minimisation process, the configurational analysis can be repeated,
while it is meant to be conducted only once in the concepts of Mill. This stepwise
and iterative procedure allows for greater complexity by considering carefully possible
conjunctions, as has been shown in chapter 2. QCA is, without doubt, a result of an
evolution of comparative methods that started in the 19th century and that got its
probably biggest push during the behavioural revolution.
3.1.3 What is Variable Oriented about QCA?
Against that background, the aim of Ragin’s QCA goes beyond the formalisation of
comparative social research according to the behavioural credo. His basic interest in
variable-oriented4 research derives from the attempt to import quantitative techniques
from mainstream social science to test theory (Ragin, 1987, p.54). The publishing year
of any publication often mirrors intentions, backgrounds, or connections to the under-
lying scientific episteme of that time. So does 1987, the publishing year of the initial
book of QCA. The positivism dispute and its aftermaths had abated and opened space
for a generation of scientists that increasingly showed interest for "mixed methods".
The positivism dispute of the late 1960s and early 1970s had arisen around issues of
explanation and understanding in social sciences and disembogued into a polarization
between so called "qualitative" and "quantitative" methods5. Ragin choses the terms
"variable oriented" and "case oriented" to describe two streams in science.
3.1.4 Systematisation as Main Innovation of QCA
The very basic idea behind social research is that every social unit, such as a nation-
state, has interacting structural features. Interacting means that the change in one
feature cause changes in other features which, again, might produce changes in others
and so forth. Data on social units provide snapshots of instances of these structrual
4I define a variable as any entity that can take on different values and that can, at least theoretically,
be observed and/or measured. It is located in an ontological field that is characterised by a level of
abstraction which is capable of including several observations, rendering them comparable.
5The great figures of the behavioural revolution do not mention "quantitative" or "qualitative" in
their benchmarking works at all. The wording is different, such as the "behavioural approach" and
the "traditional approach" (Easton, 1957), "contemplative sience" and "empirical political science"
(Easton, 1969, p.1052), or as "behavioural methods" or "modern behavioural technology" against
"classical writers" (Eulau, 1963, p.31). The terms quantitative and qualitative enter the scientific
stage in the 1980s.
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processes and can thus be represented in terms of variables and intercorrelations (Ra-
gin, 1987, p.55). To reveal, assess, and categorise these intercorrelations further, as a
first step, a range of theories about the connections has to be identified. These theories
can be well-known from literature while competing with each other, or can be a blunt
but somewhat educated guess of the researcher. This is what Ragin means when he
writes that variable-oriented research is theory centred (Ragin, 1987, p.53) and draws
heavily on already existing theories.
Taking a closer look at the aims and design features shown in table 3.2 reveals that case
oriented research can mimic variable oriented research in most of the categories. Espe-
cially as all three streams are able to adopt variables, the distinction blurs, however,
in "variable oriented" research variables are necessary. Concerning the process, Ragin
identifies four steps that are necessary to conduct a variable-oriented study (Ragin,
1987, pp. 57-58):
1. The theory to be tested must be specified in terms of variables and expected
interrelations
2. Competing explanations must be identified and formulated in terms of variables
and interrelations as well
3. The variables have to be expressed in appropriate measures that have to be
checked according to their validity and reliability
4. Statistical tests like regression and correlation tests provide comparable values
to rank the theories of structural causation
Aware of and striving for a reliable and scientific research design, Ragin devotes an
entire point to scientific accuracy and rigour. However, no matter if case or variable
oriented, every researcher who deals with interrelations of historical, social, or economic
phenomena is responsible for a proper research design, including6:
Identification of reliable sources. Part of what Ragin calls "appropriate mea-
sures that have to be checked according to their validity and reliability" refers to reliable
data sources and propper collection of data. On the one hand, there are several sources
that might be biased by the way data collection of the data or by interest guided ma-
nipulation. For instance, the data published by official Arab state institutions should
be used with care, as well as the membership stats of national trade union associations.
On the other hand, own data aquisition in hughe populations by the researcher herself
6Much of what Ragin labelles "prework" should actually not be something related to variable
oriented research but to good science in general. Nonetheless, Ragin anticipates thoughts that have
been maybe best expressed and elaborated later in Brady and Collier (2004)’s Rethinking Social
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards who recur heavily on King et al. (1994)’s seminal work
Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. From this perspective, Ragin
was ahead of the times with his ideas of shared standards in social science.
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no, theory building is







question is "is there
a relationship", not,
"why is there a rela-
tionship"
yes no no, deviant cases are
put under scrutiny
Table 3.2: Ontologies and premisses of csQCA retated to case oriented and variable oriented
research according to Ragin (1987) and Della Porta (2008)
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is only possible in samples, as full surveys are simply unfeasable. To avoid a selection
bias, the collection is usually randomized. Randomization means a method based on
chance alone by which data units are assigned to a treatment group. While the re-
search on a macrosocial and macrosystemical level like a group or area of nation states
does not require sampling, the macrodata used for the dependent variables should be
checked, especially in extra-european contexts.
Avoidance of nonsense correlations. A nonsense correlation is a correlation
supported by data but having no basis in reality. A famous example is the correlation
between the amount of storks in a region and the human birthrate. Indeed, there is
often a correlation, however, this correlation does not derive from the amount of storks
but from the fact that young families tend to move to the countryside. A researcher
should check the reasonability of the estimated connections and search for possible
reasons for correlations that seem not to have a scientific meaning. When working
theory guided, the danger of nonsense correlations is minimized, however, other pitfalls
remain distorting the results.
Avoidance of confoundings. Knowing the aforementioned connection between
storks, birthrates and countrysides, it becomes clear that the birthrate is a confounding
variable that stands actually for the countryside and the actual reasonable statement
would be that there are many storks in the countryside. The circumstance that a third
variable z influences x and y can be assessed with statistical methods like conditional
logistic regression analysis; in the prework phase of the study a researcher should search
for such already conducted studies in her field or resort to qualitative literature hinting
at such a correlation and include it into the research design.
Avoidance of nuisance variables. With the same caution a researcher should
watch out for unaccounted variables that influence the outcome of y while having
no effect on or any connection to x. This is often tied to the issue of sampling, as
in non-randomized sampling there is a acute danger of choosing special cases only
unconsciously or due to lacking alternatives (the polls and experiments conducted by
students at institutes of psychology are, for instance, mostly biased by education level
as the participants are mostly students). So, especially in studies without the possibility
of randomisation a researcher has to be careful.
Introduction of reasonable proxy-variables. A confounding variable like de-
scribed above should no be confused with a proxy variable. A proxy variable is some-
times used intentionally to include unobservable or immeasurable variables into the
study. GDP can be used as proxy for high standard of living, satellite images of ocean
surface color might be use as proxy for depth that light penetrates into the ocean
over large areas and so forth. The assumed correlation between the a variable and
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the proxy variable might be somewhat imperfect. Nonetheless, the underlying credo is
that including an imperfect proxy of a hard-to-measure variable is often better than
not including an important variable at all.
The main difference consists in the explicitness. During the process of research, a
case oriented scholar might come across nonsense correlations, confoundings, or nui-
sance variables. Furthermore, the use of proxy variables case oriented research designs
is also possible. These steps and techniques, including the testing of theories, are ac-
tually not new to configurational comparative analysis, nor to comparative historical
research, nor to single case studies (concerning the latter see especially Ulriksen and
Dadalauri (2016)). Moreover, these features do not have much to do with variable or
case oriented research as such; rather they touch the question of positivism and induc-
tivism, as prominent positivist were known to have argued strongly that enquiries could
only proceed if the researcher’s effort to observe relevant facts was guided either by
clear theoretical expectations or, at a minimum, by some kind of "explanatory hunch"
(Hempel, 1966, p.11-12). In case oriented research designs, however, many of these
steps usually happen in a stage before writing and many of these ditched thoughts will
never enter the publication. The main difference and also the major strength of QCA
is that it forces the researcher to systematise the data to a higher extent, leading to
a higher degree of transparency (see also: de Meur and Rihoux, 2002Berg-Schlosser
et al., 2009), however, at the expense of a certain freedom in design.
3.1.5 The Central Role of Statistics in Ragin’s Thoughts
To understand the perception held by Ragin about what he labels "variable-oriented
research" it is important to bear in mind that he views the latter through the lenses of
someone who "...was trained, as most American social scientists today, to use multivari-
ate 7 statistical techniques whenever possible" (Ragin, 1987, p.vii). Indeed, throughout
his 1987 book, whenever he refers to variable-oriented research techniques or quan-
titative research, he mostly refers to multiple statistical methods, and, in nearly all
examples, to multiple regression and correlation analysis respectively.
Statistical methods depend on large n samples. Consequently, the credo of variable
oriented research is to widen the population to be tested as much as possible (Ragin,
1987, p.55):
Typically, a variable-oriented study begins by specifying the hypothesis to be
tested and then delineating the widest possible population of relevant observa-
tions. The wider this population, the better. Not only does a wide population
7The use of "multivariate" and "multiple" statistical techniques seems a little tangled throughout
the book. Technically speaking, multivariate statistical techniques are techniques that consider several
independent, but may as well take several dependent variables into account. The examples examined
by Ragin are, without exception, studies and models that account for one dependent variable only. In
the following text, only the term multiple will be used to make that difference more clear.
54 CHAPTER 3. WHAT CSQCA IS - AND WHAT IT IS NOT
provide a basis for a more exacting test, but it also gives the investigator the
opportunity to demonstrate the breadth of an argument.
This is made to render the results more representable and to achieve conclusions
with a high degree of generalization. The introduction of some basic measures of a
simple multiple regression analysis already highlights some points important in com-
parison with QCA. Multivariate statistical methods use means of data and probability
to predict unmeasured outcomes. To assert the quality of the prediction, distances
in the scatterplot are taken into account. Also nearly all statistical tests require the
same basic assumptions. In a nutshell, as shown above, these are
- The use of means as most important building block
- The use of distances in a scatterplot
- Expression of quality of estimations in measures of probability
- Prediction of unobserved data
- Prediction without necessarily accounting for causality
- Need for large n to gain representability and a high degree of generalisation
Summarizing the findings about the pre-work and core features of variable oriented
research, it becomes evident that QCA does not use the same techniques and does
not presuppose the same assumptions. Means may be used to set the threshold to
dichotomise variables, however, they do not play a role in the minimisation process.
Distances, probability, and prediction are no core features either. Furthermore, csQCA
should not be taken to make predictions; Generalisations should not go far beyond the
sample of examined cases. Nonetheless, QCA has also its roots in the credo of the
behavioural revolution, even when it takes a different path than mainstream social
science in which statistics became the main method.
3.2 QCA as Chameleon Approach
As has been argued so far, csQCA is an iterative process that enhances comparative
historical research by introducing a higher degree of parsimony on the one hand and
a higher degree of explicitness, transparency, and replicability on the other. At the
same time, it does not resort to statistical methods with its means, probabilities, and
matrice driven modes of analysis.
Twenty-five years after the publishing of Ragin’s "The Comparative Method", Ri-
houx and Marx (2013) took the opportunity to trace how Ragin’s seminal statements
have been adopted and reframed in the literature of the field so far. Among other things,
they reach the conclusion that Ragin’s statement that QCA would represent a sort of
middle way between case-oriented and variable oriented strategies, or broader, qualita-
tive and quantitative research, has not been adopted or debated any further. However,
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the question whether the dichotomisation of scientific endeavours brings benefits at
all was still going on. Many authors denied, stating that both approaches should be
considered to be based on critical realism (Lund, 2005), and some even argued that the
dichotomy might hamper the education of young students as these trench wars hamper
the development of science as such (Prakash et al., 2007). And although a wide range
of literature inside and outside the QCA canon encourages "bridging the quantitative-
qualitative gap" can be found in various disciplines of social science (Tarrow, 1995,
2004; Lieberman, 2010; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010; Lüdeke, 2013), there seems to be a
disaccord about what quantitative or qualitative actually is. Brady and Collier (2004,
p.244-247) determine four theoretical fields in which quantitative research and quali-
tative research differ. They admit that there is no clear distinction within each field,
however, drawing together all four criteria would render it possible to label a study
qualitative or quantitative. In their dichotomy, the comparative method is subsumed
under qualitative methods, together with case studies, small-N analysis, concept anal-
ysis, the comparative-historical method, the ethnographic tradition of field research,
interpretive and constructivism (p.4 fn1)8. The following table gives an overview and
puts the statements into relation to csQCA:
8For a more elaborate discussion about the nature of qualitative and quantitative research with
more references see Gerring (2017, p.153–192).
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QUALITATIVE QUANTITATIVE Comment csQCA
Level of Mea-
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tio level of measure-
ment
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nominal level of mea-
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The level of quanti-
tative measurement is
"higher" e.g. more pre-
cise. Order, units of
measurement, and zero
points are a weakness
in this context.
Both possible
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The availability of data






tests in reaching its
conclusions
Does almost never em-
ploy statistical tests
Many relevant assump-








The knowledge of each













Table 3.3: Quantitative and qualitative research according to Brady and Collier (2004) related
to csQCA
Some features are intuitive: The level of measurement in the data used by QCA
initially might be interval, ordinal, or ratio scaled, however, the constitutive and sem-
inal step of QCA is to dichotomize data in order to turn any interval scaled measures
into Boolean algebra variables. What remains is the weakness of levels of measurement
and zero points in form of thresholds of the dichotomization. This problem is related
to many research built upon variables. Furthermore, as shown above, QCA does not
necessarily use statistical tests. The Boolean operations do not include probability.
True, the initial data might have been statistical features like the mean or average of
macro-data or opinion polls taken from different countries and turned into the (1 - 0)
dichotomy. But the main operations that use boolean algebra, do use implicitly the
comparative method.
When it comes to the matter of thick descriptions, the classification of QCA turns to
be a little complicated. There are three stages where detailed case knowledge enters
the stage in a QCA study.
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First, when determining the variables, there has to be a basic knowledge about in-
terconnectivity of phenomenon and variables on the one hand, and a basic knowledge
about the nature of the systems under scrutiny on the other, in order to be able to
establish a reasonable hypothesis.
Second, after the establishment of the variables and some first minimizations, the di-
alogue between the data and the theories begins which needs and deepens the case
knowledge of the researcher. Third, the final interpretation of the result, e.g. the final
Boolean equation has to be justified and consolidated by case knowledge again.
The basic orientation of QCA is rather qualitative and that is why Ragin chose the
name Qualitative Comparative Analysis. However, it is worthwhile to steer attention
to the points of table 3.3 which include the notion of being theoretically possible. In a
scientific comparison, there is always a trade off between the number of cases and the
time a researcher is able to spend on every single instance, and also QCA does not fully
escape that logic (Rihoux and Lobe, 2009, p.231). Every researcher faces a limitation
of time and resources. Variable oriented research, just as quantitative research rather
tends to account for generality at the expense of complexity while the case oriented
studies, say, qualitative research focusses on quite the opposite. Variable oriented re-
search does not require an in-depth familiarity with the cases like case-oriented research
does. However, it renders the check of many cases and variables possible on a perhaps
more superficial level. The advantage of variable oriented research according to Ra-
gin is that theories can be evaluated and rank on the ground of statistical operating
figures without getting deeply into the cases. The sources for the assumptions made
and tested by the researcher are thus mostly secondary literature; there is no need to
be an area specialist, as aggregated data from the particular cases under scrutiny -
in comparative social science mostly nation-states - is available at cross-national data
banks accessible for all investigators (Ragin, 1987, p.58).
The difference between depth and breadth becomes especially visible when it comes to
theory testing. Multivariate statistical methods allow for the test of many competing
theories, while a common reproach considering case oriented studies is the lack, neglect,
or even ignorance of such an endeavour. This is especially true if the case-oriented in-
vestigation is foremost interpretive in nature (Skocpol and Somers, 1980, Ragin, 1987,
p.57). Figure 3.1 shows roughly the interpretation between the number of cases and
time that can be spent for in-depth analysis.
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Figure 3.1: The relation between depth and breadth of a scientific study
The node (1|1) represents a single case study where the resource time is completely
spent on one case, while all points of the domain (n < 1) represent policy analysis
that focus on parts of a political or societal system. The simplicity of this graph is its
strength and shows at least three things:
- especially in very small n the loss of time that comes up with each added case is
palpable, the larger the size of n, the lower the loss of time to engage in in-depth
research.
- the larger the sample size n becomes, the more difficult are in in-depth stud-
ies. Statistical, deductive, and research drawing on already existing theories is
necessary.
- in turn, the smaller the sample size is, the more time a researcher has to focus
on idiosyncrasies and theory building, and the less cases are included, the more
time and freedom a researcher has to examine the cases (see also: Mahoney and
Rueschemeyer (2003, p.10)).
- The loss of freedom that comes with the more narrow corset of variable oriented
research that affects the process of QCA still allows for creativity when it comes
to theory building and the establishment of new variables. This is only and only
maximised in small and very small n.
As the approach is iterative and resorts to a dialogue between the data and the-
ories, the greater amount of time can be used to do both, theory building out of the
observations of case studies, theory building with the help of already existing theories,
and eventually the testing of these theories using the comparative method. Hence, the
trade-off between breadth and depth can be read as chance. The more cases involved,
the more shallow the theory building part of QCA becomes. The more cases are ex-
amined, the less time is left for each to engage in deep case studies. The less cases are
involved, the more time can be spent for the development of new ideas and theories.
Turning back to table 3.3, it becomes clear that the nature of csQCA, say, whether
it is more qualitative or quantitative, or more or less theory driven, or case oriented
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depends on the sample size n. Besides theory building on the ground of deep case
knowledge, the surplus on time can also be spent to experiment with the variables,
like changing thresholds, joining variables, or climbing up and down on the ladder of
abstraction. The techniques introduced in section 2.3 come to the fore.
Additionally, some features of QCA can be neglected, especially the coverage of the
cases. The coverage of a final configuration applied to very small n has almost no
explanatory power. If a researcher finds that two or three positive cases out of eight
are covered by a final expression, the coverage would be 37.5 per cent and 50 per cent
respectively. While these numbers may have an impressive effect on some individuals,
there is little additional value, given the small size of that subsample. In very small
n, it is rather valuable to use the surplus of time to work out elaborate qualitative
explanations for the respective countries. This requires a broad case knowledge which
is - at best - introduced and explicated in the case studies.
Against this background, it is of importance to document and render the underlying
lines of thoughts more easy to follow. This supports the idea of rich descriptions in
order to disclose the knowledge base of the researcher on the one hand and the included
theories on the other. It simply makes the research more transparent and replicable.
Moreover, even information mentioned in the case studies and that are not processed
further to generate variables, but which help to get a better impression of the case in
the sense of verstehen, may be beneficial for students and scholars who read the study.
Acknowledging the fact that the task of science is also to maintain knowledge future
research is rendered more easyly. This consideration also derives from the devastating
state of the source material in Middle Eastern Studies which will be addressed in sec-
tion 4.3.1.
Having said all this, some statements can be made about QCA and the way it is used
in this study. First, QCA is neither qualitative nor quantitative, and it is neither truly
variable oriented nor case oriented. The depth of the study is determined by the sample
size n. More resources can be used to scrutinise the cases in small n, which renders
complex descriptions possible. These deep descriptions enhance the transparency of
the study and make the eventual minimisation process more traceable. In this light,
QCA is predestined to be used as a enhancement of CHA, and both parts of science -
confirmation and explanation - can easily be included.
3.3 Addressing Some Major Criticisms of QCA
Ever since the number of QCA studies constantly rose beginning from the 1990s, also
criticism about the approach did not abate. Debates emerged mainly around topics like
case sensitivity (Goldthorpe, 1997), distortions through omitted variables (Seawright,
2005; Achen, 2005), the temptation of manipulating the data set (Lieberson, 1994,
2004) , measurement errors (Markoff, 1990; Hug, 2013; Seawright, 2014) determinism
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and probability (Clark et al., 2006; Tanner, 2014), and eventually how, if, why, and
why not QCA would resort to Mill’s methods (Hug, 2013). Much of these criticisms
have been addressed elsewhere (Goldstone, 1997; de Meur et al., 2009; Maggetti and
Levi-Faur, 2013; Thiem, 2014). This section aims at retracing the discussions under
the special aspects of very small n studies as outlined in the previous sections.
3.3.1 Methodological and Design Related Issues
Before starting with the main criticism, a very basic statement has to be made: csQCA
in very small n shouldn’t and maybe even mustn’t be taken for generalisations that go
beyond the very cases under scrutiny. The aim is not to make general laws but to draw
conclusions for the cases, as outlined in the tables 3.2 and 3.3. Especially macro-units
like entire countries should be considered as unique (Skocpol and Somers, 1980) and
generalisations may only be transferred to other cases or sets of cases with much care
(Della Porta, 2008, p.206). Against that background, the determinism reproach, often
uttered by critics, should be regarded in a different light. Results of csQCA equations
are not universal and as each results needs a (re)interpretation of the data, the aim to
scrutinise on single cases becomes clear. The result is never a statement in the form
of "in all systems/cases of the set n and beyond does the combination of the variables
ABC render the outcome x". It is foremost a statement in the form of "under the
(asymmetric) information we could gather in this study, the best explanation for the
outcome x is the combination of ABC for the case z". No comparativist will say that
her result is a strict and inviolable if...then...else condition (Goldstone, 1997).
Probabilistic approaches, in turn, do have some setbacks as well, and depending on
the research, there is often little difference in value of highly probable outcomes and
outcomes with a statistical lower probability. This has already been acknowledged by
Jeffrey (1969), arguing that an explanation of a low probability event is not necessarily
weaker than an explanation of a high probability event (Salmon, 1999, p.93-100).
What has to be acknowledged, though, is that theories that are set up only by the
help of observations taken from the "black box" of a single case often elude from more
stringent empirical critique (Goldthorpe, 1997). Customised explanations can be read
as an advantage, as events that happen without underlying a general law can be traced
and explained9, however true, if a researcher does attempt to identify an abstract hy-
pothesis that might explain multiple cases, the final QCA result might become just an
accumulation of idiosyncrasies. By using the ladder of abstraction and configurating
the sets and classes of the research design with care and reasonable justification, this
should be avoided. Moreover, in the dialogue between the data and theory there should
9This is also an important feature of science as such. Salmon (1999, p.17) give the example of an
ink stain on the carpet: Some clumsy movement of an employee in the office might have caused an
ink pot to fall from the table. This is a sufficient explanation, however, it does not underlay a general
law.
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and must be some deductive theories included.10
In a similar vein, also the critique that csQCA would be prone to be manipulated in
order to produce results that fit into the ideological world-view of the researcher has
been uttered repeatedly (Lieberson, 1991; Goldthorpe, 1997; Lieberson, 2004). The
problem may arise that, if facts appear to refute the theory, the theory is not recon-
structed but simply limited in its scope and that much uncontrolled subjectivism is
included into the study (Burawoy, 1989). It is an important objection and already the
behaviouralists demanded ideology-free science for a good reason. Even if subjectivity
and consciously or unconsciously manipulated data is by no means a problem of QCA
only and also affects large n statistical methods (Flyvbjerg, 2006), especially dichoto-
mous data sets can be very tempting to be manipulated.
In this context, Seawright (2005) also concludes that knowledge of cases is neither
unique to nor inherent in QCA especially as the identification of all missing variables
required a perfect knowledge of the underlying causal processes. If a particular cause
was mistakenly believed to have no impact on the outcome, or if it was yet unmeasured
or even undiscovered, researchers would omit the relevant variable. He even states that,
against that background, QCA would be a step backwards from the problems regression
analysis tried to solve:
[...] ordinary regression fails whenever omitted variables are correlated with the
included variables, but it can succeed if omitted variables are uncorrelated with
included variables. By contrast, Boolean-algebraic QCA always fails when there
are omitted variables of any sort. (Seawright, 2005, p.19)
Also measurement errors would have a high impact on QCA results and distort the
entire result (Lieberson, 1994; Hug, 2013). These are all serious objections. However,
as shown in figure 3.1, the researcher has much more time to get knowledge of the cases
in order to avoid the pitfalls that emerge when working with variables as outlined in
section 3.1.4 on page 52. The dialogue between theory and the data and the system-
atisation of the process that has been identified in section 3.1.4 as core innovation of
QCA helps to get systematically deeper into the cases. Still, the share of responsibility
of each researcher applying QCA is probably much higher than in regression analysis
and caution and circumspection have to be the most important guidelines. Therefore,
a research design in very small n csQCA should, for the sake of transparency and repli-
cability, hold the case studies as thick as possible and as parsimonious as necessary
while the results should be held as thick as necessary and as parsimonious as possible.
10For a apt and well-designed example of the use of the theory between the theory and data see
(Fritzsche, 2014).
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3.3.2 Small n Research and Avoiding to Fiddle while Rome
Burns
The fact that it is more difficult to design a clean and flawless research design with
QCA, however, does not mean that the approach should be discarded as a whole,
as suggested by some authors (Seawright, 2014; Tanner, 2014; Clark et al., 2006).
Following the assessment of Satori (1970) and Lijphart (1971), the comparative method
is of importance in small n settings, and, by fact, much of worldwide cutting edge
topics and important fields for policy making are located in that realm. Studies of
small samples are clearly also a part of to go looking "what actually happens" (Catlin
(1956, p.819), as introduced in 3.1.1 above on page 46). Authors discarding small and
very small n studies because of their potentially erroneous results, sticking exclusively
to large n "quantitative" designs with clear and unambiguously measurable data fall
into the same trap as the generation of the behavioural revolution - which started to
bring statistics into social science. Already in 1967 the American Political Science
Association (APSA) denominated the pure behavioural approach in political science
as of "no relevance" due to its tendency to focus on readily observable phenomena -such
as electoral behaviour- rather than more subtle and deeper analysis (Sanders, 2010).
Indeed, especially in the post war period, being a time of immanent change in societal
and moral structures, results of political research based on behaviouristic paradigms
seemed rather disappointing, especially at a time of intense social conflict and rapid
social change, including the Vietnam war, the civil rights movement, the woman’s
movement, the sexual revolution, and the 1968s counter-culture. These developments
cried out for empirical, but also for detailed qualitative analysis. The behaviouralist
research agenda failed to address any of these topics in a satisfying manner (Smith,
2004, p.72) which encouraged Leo Strauss to rail against political science of that time,
stating (Strauss, 1962, p.327):
Only a great fool would call the new political science diabolic: it has no attributes
peculiar to fallen angels. It is not even Machiavellian, for Machiavelli’s teaching
was graceful, subtle, and colorful. Nor is it Neronian. Nevertheless, one may say
of it that it fiddles while Rome burns. It is excused by two facts: it does not
know that it fiddles, and it does not know that Rome burns.
Against this background, it is of importance to remind and warn critics of QCA not
to fall into the trap of naivety as many of their behavioural predecessors did. There
is a need for research under asymmetric information and using small sample sizes,
especially given the interconnectedness of the globalised world today. New emerging
questions arise at high speed and urge for answers and it is also the duty of science to do
its best to serve society by bringing systematised, transparent, and replicable results,
as far as possible. As has been argued before, csQCA gives a good framework to
tackle these questions, being a tool of systematisation of comparative research that is a
step forward in the line of the evolution of comparative methods. Statistical methods
- even if we agreed with Lijphart (1971) who clearly acknowledges their superiority
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vis-á-vis the comparative method - did not find yet a way to deal with small and
very small n in a satisfying manner. On the contrary, as Kittel (1999) concludes, a
sensitive interpretation of the findings obtained by advanced statistical methodology
in comparative political economy is still dependent on small-N comparative analysis.
In an intercultural research context, a careful interpretation of inputs and outputs is of
the essence. As political science studies seek to understand interpretively constituted
environments, there is no reason why its methods should not be interpretive as well.
Nevertheless, behaviouralist barely ask the question what a writer really meant when
using a certain term or how maybe a test person understands a certain term or question
in an inquiry. The course is rather to be clear and (possibly) wrong than to be so
impenetrable that other writers have to debate the "meaning" of what has been written
(Sanders, 2010, p.62). Constructivism, with its attention to the role of interpretation in
human action, offers valuable insights when it comes to the interpretation of phenomena
across cultural borders. Just as it is not possible to understand changing domestic
policies and institutions without attention to the introduction of ideas (Hall, 1989;
Sikkink, 1991; Berman, 1998; Blyth, 2002), it is impossible to understand phenomena in
a different cultural context without questioning own assumptions, terms, and concepts.
QCA seems an appropriate approach, as by fact, it does not only allow a dialogue
between theory and cases: it even enforces it (Fritzsche, 2014). Keeping that in mind
the design of the study at hand is introduced in the next chapter.
Chapter 4
Applying QCA in Critical Juncture
Research: The Research Design
For the application of any approach, the main unit, sample size, observations, and the
direction of influence have to be determined in advance. This section aims at delimiting
and justify these features with respect to research questions that take aim at the role of
trade unions throughout the course of the Arab Spring protests of 2010 - 2012. Three
basic concepts will be used to specify the research approach. This section deals with
the basic question of how the outcome, according to QCA, should be determined. As
the superordinate research question is “Under which circumstances did trade unions
adopt a transformative stance during the protests of 2011-2012 in the MENA Region?”,
the following four questions have to be answered in this chapter:
- How is the determination of the QCA outcome (0 /1) conceptualised?
- Which concepts can be applied in an inter-cultural research framework?
- How is the main unit "labour union" defined and where are the boundaries of the
concept?
- What is the scope of the study and which countries are included?
This chapter introduces the concept of an institutional equilibrium, which has the
advantage of being able to make use of varying concepts of authoritarianism. In this
way, a patchwork of concepts can be applied to analyse the cases in which these con-
cepts as such do not necessarily need to be entirely comparable. What the concepts
have to be comparable in is that they 1) describe the stability of the regime in a ap-
propriate manner, 2) show vulnerabilities that have been, or might have been attacked
during the uprisings of 2011-2012, and 3) are able to identify players that have or might
have conducted such an attack. The basic assumption for the institutional equilibria
is the rise and fall of authoritarian bargain, described as the exchange of political par-
ticipation for welfare and social security.
Following the institutional turn in authoritarianism research, this section also intro-
duces the concept of institutional shielding. It is defined as institutions, set up by
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the regimes notably after the beginning erosion of the authoritarian bargain to shield
themselves against blows targeting their legitimacy. A range of pillars of institutional
shieldings within cases in the MENA region will also be introduced and categorised
into violence, legitimacy, and legal framework. This serves as the basis for the case
studies in the next chapter. The term "trade union" will subsequently be scrutinised
to determine the transferability of the concept into in the MENA region and eventu-
ally to conceptualise it as a research object in the environment of the the institutional
equilibria of the cases.
4.1 Concept Application in Inter-Cultural Studies
Middle Eastern Studies as a discipline and its predecessor, Oriental Studies, have come
under attack with respect to their aim, scope, and methods. Similar to CHA, the
field that initially focused on the study of the history, culture, politics, economies, and
geography of the region has suffered from a reputation of being descriptive, theory-
free, often focussed on single cases, as well as being reluctant to adopt interdisciplinary
approaches (Bill, 1996, p.502). Additionally, regarding the production of knowledge
in the time of colonialism and beyond, a 1970s generation of scholars imputed an
"Orientalist" view (Said, 1978), calling the subject a system of representations serving to
preserve the West’s authority and supremacy over the region, having helped to "define
Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience" (p.1-
2). Edward Said’s critique transcends the political and also attacks the way Western
scholars approach other cultures and societies. In the essay The World, The Text and
the Critic (1984), he gave the example of a scholar who had been told that some Indians
believed that the world rested atop an elephant. The scholar interviewed an Indian and
asked him what he - the scientist – considered of the critical question, "What does the
elephant stand on?". He replied, "a tortoise". Said tells the story to outline the naivety
and practical limitations of asking the wrong sort of questions (Brown, 1999, p.565).
As soon as two years earlier, Binder (1976) complained that Middle East studies have
been "beset by subjective projections, displacements of affect, ideological distortion,
romantic mystification, and religious bias, as well as by a great deal of incompetent
scholarship".
The application of theories, models, and approaches that have been developed and
tested in western countries, however, can be difficult to apply to a culturally, societally,
and historically different region of the world. As the premises of the scientific concepts
may differ, the researcher runs the risk of producing nonsense correlations. Different
interpretations of signifier and signified (de Saussure, 1916; Lacan, 1956) say that a
sound image and its meaning as a concept, may produce different forms of discourses
(Foucault, 1982, 1994). Discourses can be summarized as what is done or not done
in a particular realm of time and space, forming the "rules of the game" to which
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the subject is subjected to due to its throwness (Heidegger, 1962) into existence in a
particular culture, status, or body. As a researcher may be restricted due to her own
discourse, it is useful to apply Foucault’s Archology of Knowledge to determine the
meanings of significations, symbols, and signs inherent in the discourse of the research
objects. Acknowledging that it is impossible to determine the signified of a significant
completely and comprehensively (Derrida, 1982), the task of understanding the world
and to produce meaningful and correct inferences - which is a main task of science as
such - becomes particularly difficult in fields that bear features differing from the pool
of experiences of the researcher. Hence, there is something in what Gibb (1963, p.129-
130) - who has been branded as "Orientalist" by Said (1978) - states, when writing that
a crucial task of a researcher (in this context the "Orientalist")
is to furnish that core out of his knowledge and understanding of the invisibles
- the values, attitudes and mental processes characteristic of the "great culture"
that underlie the application even today of the social and economic data - to
explain the why, rather than the what and the how, and this precisely because
he is or should be able to see the data not simply as isolated facts, explicable
in and by themselves, but in the broad context and long perspective of cultural
habit and tradition.
The tradition of the "old Orientalists" (most prominent Massignion, Lane, and
Lewis), however, turned a blind eye to the impact of industrialisation, modernisation,
and the sheer interaction with other cultures and discourses on the Arab and Islamic
world. Lockman (2016, p.130-134) provides numerous examples in which Orientalist
thought and analysis remained entrapped in the interpretation of Islamic medieval texts
and dogmas to explain the behaviour of modern states and societies during the Cold
War. What is striking though, is a surprising accuracy of the analysis of Orientalists
in hindsight. Albeit using some questionable assumptions, stereotypes, and a picture
of a "great culture" based on few and selective sources, Lewis (1954, p.12) writes in an
essay about "Communism and Islam"
[t]he present revolt of the Muslims against the immorality and opportunist of
their own and of some Western leaders may temporarily favour the Communists,
with their appearance of selfless devotion to an ideal, but will work against
Communism when Muslims come to see the realities behind the propaganda.
He does not only forecast part of the the developments in Iran that happened 25
years later, or Oman during the Dhofar crisis, but also the developments in many Arab
countries in which Islamism has superseded Communism as largest opposition move-
ment already before 1990. This analysis, however, is not valid for all Arab countries,
as indicated in the example of South Yemen. Nor is it valid in other Muslim states
like Indonesia, which developed an idiosyncratic version of Islam (Geertz, 1971). No
matter whether the analysis of Lewis was a mere coincidence or not1, it seems fruitful
to bear the particularities of the Arab and Muslim world in mind and also to include
1For a critical answer of Said see Said (1979, 1980) A more analytical approach is offered by Ma
(2012).
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them into theory building and testing in research about Middle East and North Africa.
Indeed, it can be assumed that the relationship between structure and agency is di-
alectical when acknowledging that societies form the individual, who, again, create and
alter societies in a continuous loop (Berger and Luckman, 1978). Every study should
therefore consider the role of dispositives, defined as the remainder of past discourses
that still influence the present, when engaging in inter-cultural research.
The difficulty of such a task is exacerbated because every deliberate action has an
external effect as well as an internal intention. Internal relates here to thoughts and
and intentions, whereas external is understood as the form of observable bodies and
environments in social science that also bear the danger of misinterpretation of the ob-
served actions. Collingwood (1946) gave a famous example to illustrate this dilemma:
A man cutting another man with a knife. The description of this event as a single
utterance does not provide the information we need to classify the action precisely.
On the one hand, we could have witnessed a cruel act of murder. On the other hand,
it could have been a surgery in an operating theatre and a physician acting in mu-
tual consent with a patient. Science, aiming at making the world understood, thus
becomes hampered in two ways: To study the environment by observing and writing
down structures, anatomies, phenotypes, movements, or events becomes a source of
possible errors and misinterpretations. Second, science aims to establish a system of
interrelations between these observations, finding causal connections and effects. Sci-
ence tries to explain, and the challenge of identifying, assessing, and eliminating rival
explanations2 is the fundamental concern in social research (Brady and Collier, 2004).
Nonetheless, every researcher faces the impossibility of an unambiguous and definite
confirmation of a postulated relationship. David Hume (1748) already argued that
whenever we make inferences from observed facts to the unobserved we are clearly
reasoning ampliatively – that is, the content of the conclusion goes beyond the content
of the premises (Salmon, 1999).
Having said this, every researcher of the MENA region faces the dilemma that she
has to ponder if the proposed concept and conception that underlies her approach to
the region could be a romanticised and possibly prejudiced notion of Orientalism to
purposely construct otherness. The researcher also has to acknowledge that language,
concepts, internal intentions, as well as external, visible effects may significantly dif-
fer from what she harbours in her particular pool of experience, and is thus prone
to misinterpretation. Both approaches produced extra-scientific outgrows (Halliday,
2003, p.14-15): The historical particularism that produced Orientalism was welcomed
by colonial powers to justify their rule. The analytic universalism that followed the
behavioural revolution became a main pillar of modernization theory, which has been
discarded by mainstream social science due to observations in developing countries
2An explanations shall be defined here as "an attempt to render understandable or intelligible some
particular event [. . . ] or some general fact by appealing to other particular and/or general facts drawn
from one ore more branches of empirical science" (Salmon et al., 1992).
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that rebutted a straightforward linearity of economic and democratic development.
The question of which concepts are able to "travel" (Zemni, 2004, p.300), and in which
incidents the inner-system logic of language, socialisation, and perceptions coin the
outcomes of the region is a pivotal part of any research. In the words of Said (1983,
p.226):
Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel from person to
person, from situation to situation, from one period to another. Cultural and
intellectual life are usually nourished and often sustained by this circulation of
ideas, and whether it takes the form of acknowledged or unconscious influence,
creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation, the movement of ideas and the-
ories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling
condition of intellectual activity. Having said that, however, one should go on
to specify the kinds of movement that are possible, in order to ask whether by
virtue of having moved from one place and time to another an idea or a theory
gains or loses in strength, and whether a theory in one historical period and
national culture becomes altogether different for another period or situation.
In the following sections the concepts applied in this research will be introduced
and discussed whether and to which extent they are able to travel.
4.2 Critical Junctures and Institutional Equilibria
As the aim of this study is to determine whether trade unions in the MENA region
tried to alter the power structures of their countries in 2011-2012, the first question
to resolve is how to describe and conceptualise these power structures. The concept
of institutional equilibrium offers a solution that bridges the gaps that comparativists
have left unfilled when dealing with the MENA region. Indeed, cross-country analysis
is scarce and the applied theories differ from country to country and from scholar to
scholar.
4.2.1 Institutional Equilibria
Among the things that can be observed unambiguously is change. There is, for the
most part, widespread agreement among observers about the fact that change has hap-
pened, even if they may disagree about what they have observed and the extent and
impact on a research object. In experiments in (natural) sciences, the ex-ante situ-
ation is compared with the ex-post situation, whereas in social sciences and history
this procedure is done by comparing different periods of time. From around 2000 on-
wards, when the enthusiasm and hopes for The End of History (Fukuyama, 1992) that
was expected to lead to a sustainable and comprehensive Third Wave of Democracy
(Huntington, 1993) had paled away, scholars looked with some astonishment at Arab
countries. By then, a widespread perception among them was that these regimes had
not witnessed any transition whatsoever from authoritarian rule to democracy. This
questioned the hopes that had been refuelled by the developments in Latin America
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and South Europe (O’Donnell et al., 1986) as well as the fall of the Soviet Bloc. The
seemingly exceptional developments in the Arab world eventually led to the procla-
mation of the end of the "Transition Paradigm" (Carothers, 2002). Attention turned
away from questions of when democratisation might ultimately occur or what Arab
countries actually lack, and rather focused on how political rule in Arab countries re-
mained stable. Apparently, the "democratisation paradigm" as a concept was not able
to "travel", whereas research about stability seemed to be a more promising approach.
The stability in the institutional set of MENA countries that prevent large-scale change
can be conceptualised as an institutional equilibrium. Theory about institutions can be
traced back to Durkheim ([1895] 1950), who viewed institutions as beliefs and modes
of conduct shared in a collectivity, and the bulk of what has been introduced in Chap-
ter 3.1 as Comparative Historical Analysis deals with institutions. They can be seen
as "human-made, nonphysical elements, norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules, ex-
ogenous to each individual whose behaviour it influences that generates behavioural
regularities (Grief and Laitin, 2004, p.635). In this study, the very broad definition
of North (1991, p.97) will be used, who defines institutions as "humanly devised con-
straints that structure political, economic and social interaction", consisting of "both
informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct),
and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)". It uses the underlying assump-
tion that the development of a particular organizational form is the result of an effort
to reduce the transaction costs of undertaking the same activity without such an insti-
tution (North and Thomas, 1976; Williamson, 1987). Their level of analysis in social
sciences can be more fine, or more coarsely granular, and it may include behaviour as
well as institutional bodies. Units may range from "a single organization (for exam-
ple, a political party, a union, or a corporation), to the structured interaction between
organizations (for example, a party system or relationships between branches of gov-
ernment), to public policies, to a political regime as a whole" (Capoccia and Keleman,
2007; Ball, 2004, p.249).
Already applied to a state by Weber (1972, p.657), the study of institutional equilib-
ria has a long-lasting history in post-WWII economics (Gluckmann, 1968; Ullmann-
Margalit, 1977; Schotter, 1981)). In a conceptualisation that derives from game theory,
there are many kinds of possible equilibria. An equilibrium shall be defined here, ac-
cording to John F. Nash, as a solution within a non-cooperative game where players,
knowing the playing strategies of their opponents, do not have incentives to change
their strategy. A change of strategy in a Nash equilibrium will ultimately leave the
player worse off. The nature of the game forces the players either into action or pas-
sivity because a self-enforcing institution is one in which each player’s behaviour is the
best response, according to his or her own assessment of the possible costs and benefits
of actions.3
3This last trailer refers to a broader version of Rational Choice Theory in which subjectivity is the
main pillar of human behaviour, see for instants Boudon (1996), Esser (1999), and Hedstrom (2005).
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Such approaches have already been used by Przeworski (1991) and Geddes (1994) for
analysis of the transformation and non-transformation of authoritarian regimes in Latin
America and Eastern Europe.
4.2.2 Critical Junctures
The second concept used for the conceptualisation of the QCA analysis refers to criti-
cal junctures, which, too, are closely tied to the observation of change, and which will
subsequently be applied to conceptualise the Arab uprisings between 2011 and 2013.
Under this concept, existing institutions or a set of institutions may come under attack
due to external shocks, changing results, internal emancipation, or the possibility of
individuals starting to formulate desires for change. This negative feedback can lead
to - or can already be part of - critical junctures in which new institutions are created
(Collier1991; Katznelson1997; Thelen1999). Critical junctures shall be defined as pe-
riods of time in which change is possible at lower costs, in the words of Capoccia and
Keleman (2007, 348-351):
Critical junctures are characterized by a situation in which the structural (that is,
economic, cultural, ideological, organizational) influences on political action are
significantly relaxed for a relatively short period, with two main consequences:
the range of plausible choices open to powerful political actors expands sub-
stantially and the consequences of their decisions for the outcome of interest
are potentially much more momentous. Contingency, in other words, becomes
paramount.
However, the period under scrutiny does not necessarily produce revolution-like,
profound changes. The concept of a critical juncture refers rather to a window of op-
portunity, allowing for the change of the predominant rules of the political game. It is
not related to factual change nor a certain degree of change that actually took place,
but a time of uncertainty that allows for different paths. They are "moments of relative
structural indeterminism when actors shape outcomes in a more voluntaristic fashion
than normal circumstances permit" (Mahoney, 2001, 347). Moreover, critical junctures
are "relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened
probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest" (Capoccia and Kele-
man, 2007, p.348). "Relatively short periods of time,” means that the juncture itself
must be brief relative to the period the institutions or set of institutions to be changed
already exist. "Substantially heightened probability,” means that the probability of the
factual change of the outcome of interest due to an agents’ choices is higher during the
period of the juncture relative to its probability before and after.
Critical Junctures are no anonymous procedures. There have to be players inside the
equilibrium that believe that a change in the rules of the game, say, the set of institu-
tions, would be beneficial at least for their own group. These players will be labelled
For a discussion of the typologies of RCT see Opp (1999)
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here as Critical Interference Factors. They attempt to change the institutional equilib-
rium by either aiming to produce a critical juncture and/or conducting attacks on the
institutional equilibrium within a critical juncture. Many of these critical interference
factors are organised in parties, interest groups, or social movements.
4.2.3 Critical Interference Factors and Social Movement The-
ory
Research putting groundbreaking events or short times of turmoil under scrutiny has
often dealt with revolutions and rebellions, as many historical works indicate (Gurr
(1970); Tilly (1978); Skocpol (1979) to name a few, much of the CHA literature can be
included). Out of the research agenda of revolution studies emerged another scope of
research that dealt with social movements and contentious politics. Contentious politics
can be defined as "what happens when collective actors join forces in confrontation with
elites, authorities, and opponents around their claims or the claims of those they claim
to represent" (Tarrow, 2018, p.4). In his seminal work From Mobilization to Revolution
Charles Tilly (1978) laid the cornerstone for what became known as "Social Movement
Theory" (SMT), a scientific current in social science that seeks to explain why social
mobilization occurs, the forms under which it manifests, as well as potential social,
cultural, and political consequences.
Among the factors that facilitate social movement action are opportunity and threat
(Eisinger, 1973). Opportunities refer to the extent to which other groups, including
governments, are vulnerable to new claims of domestic groups. Opportunities include
the policy of security forces between repression and tolerance, the centralisation of
political institutions, the cultural acceptance of the movement’s goals in society, and
the possible alliances with other civil society groups or parties within the political arena
(Della Porta, 1999, pp.197-221). A threat is competition in the sense of "the extent to
which other groups are threatening to make claims which would, if successful, reduce
the contender’s realization of its interests" (Tilly, 1978, p.133).
The political opportunity structure shapes activists’ perception of the likelihood of
success of different strategies to effectuate social change. A triggering event may lead
to a critical juncture and alter the opportunity structure, giving rise to hopes that the
agenda of a movement can be implemented. In this case, collective action is possible as
a means to change the status quo. Repression can enhance or diminish opportunities
for social mobilisation (Honari, 2018; Moss, 2014). On the one hand, the likelihood of
success can be perceived as too low and direct confrontation as too dangerous. On the
other hand it can give rise to moral incentives (Kenney, 2001), de-legitimise the state
(Chang P.Y., 2007), or increase ideological commitments (Postigo, 2010).
Having said all of this the following definitions shall be applied for this research:
- An Institutional Equilibrium is a stable set of institutions that counterbalance
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each other. Opportunity structures prevent a change of institutional equilibria
and are actively influenced by regimes to secure power.
- During a Critical Juncture, the Opportunity Structures inside a country changes,
opening a window of opportunity for a change of the institutional equilibrium.
- Those agents within a country that actively attempt to change institutional equi-
libria are labelled Critical Interference Factors.
4.2.4 Social Movement Theory and Rational Choice Models:
Pitfalls and Opportunities
The conceptualisation of MENA regimes as institutional equilibria is promising for a
study about institutional change using QCA for three reasons. First, the game theo-
retical perspective scrutinises the relationship between institution and behaviour and
allows to explain "why existing institutions continue to exist" (Hall and Taylor, 1996,
p. 950). This aspect helps to understand vulnerabilities of regimes and the position-
ing of players in the set of institutions. Second, taking an existing equilibrium that
slides into a critical juncture provides comparability among states that were confronted
with the Arab uprisings of 2011-2013. It also constitutes a technique to either include
or exclude cases in the study. Third, conceptualising trade unions as possible criti-
cal inference factors that aim or do not aim at altering the institutional equilibrium
help to dichotomise their actions into equilibrium-threatening (1) and non-equilibrium-
threatening (0). This is also a pre-condition for a successful csQCA analysis. As the
stability providing equilibrium is defined qualitatively for every case, a framework bal-
ancing analytic universalism and historical particularism is set up, seeking to avoid the
pitfalls of inter-cultural research.
Social Movement Theory (SMT) and and Rational Choice assumptions have been re-
garded as "strange bedfellows" (Foweraker, 1997, p.50) for a long time, especially when
authors focus on their most radical peculiarities. However, Rational Choice has influ-
enced Social Movement Theory from the 1970s onwards, when the resource mobilisation
approach complemented the mass psychology driven traditional approach (McCarthy
and Zald, 1977, p.1216-1217). Indeed, there are a number of similarities between the
game theoretic perspective of critical juncture research and SMT. Independent from
the Nash equilibrium, SMT also departs from the notion of an equilibrium ever since
it became an inherent part of the study of contentious politics after WWII. During
this time, the emergence of social movements was explained by a modernity-driven
disruption of old orders that caused panic, anxiety, shame, guilt, and depression, and
ultimately led to collective action (Smelser, 1962; Tilly, 1978; Della Porta, 1999). Rel-
ative deprivation and structural restraints were at the center of these concepts. The
basic idea of an equilibrium was upheld implicitly, and eventually became part of the
framework of social movement studies in general sociology (Della Porta, 1999, p.8).
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A major criticism launched by Social Movement Theorists against Rational Choice
Models refers to the narrow conceptualisation of the motives for action. Starting
from the canon of Weber’s rational-purposeful action (Zweckrationalität), value ratio-
nal action (Wertrationalität), affective and traditional action (Weber, 2013)4, Rational
Choice models were alleged to focus on the instrumental-rational purpose oriented
Zweckrationalität only. However, Esser (1993) and Kroneberg (2005) have shown pos-
sibilities to expand on Rational Choice models by modelling "choice" in a given situation
as being framed by actions beyond the instrumental-rational paradigm. This is possible
due to a broader view of value-expectancy theory (VET) in which the expected value
of an action transcends direct measurable economic or material benefits (Opp, 2013,
1-2). By including systems of beliefs and different kinds of generated knowledge into
the analysis of Rational Choice, theorists moved towards SMT, albeit keeping an indi-
vidualistic micro-approach, which now allowed for greater theoretical flexibility. Fur-
thermore, the conceptualisation of social movements as players that offer different and
competing frames for interpretation of the perceived reality (Denzau and Nort, 2008,
p.24), enriched Social Movement Theory. Simultaneously, Social Movement scholars
increasingly advocated the inclusion of Rational Choice conceptions into their research
(Eyerman and Jamison, 1991; Ostrom, 1998). Today, scholars openly write about a
reconciliation between SMT and Rational Choice Theory (RCT), in which identity is
accepted as a question both of original cultural materials and of individual organisation
and strategy. Consequently, collective action by social movements is seen as having
a kind of "dual logic" (Cohen and Arato, 1992, p.580) as they are both expressive (of
identity) and instrumental (Foweraker, 1997, p.51)5
A second battlefield of the two approaches to collective action was the ontological pre-
sumptions regarding the emergence of social movements. A narrow version of Rational
Choice scholarship views institutions as self enforcing equilibria in which behaviour is
generated endogenously (Weingast, 2002). Changes of an institutional equilibrium or
the emergence of a critical juncture were explained in hindsight as some kind of exter-
nal shock, neglecting the manifold possibilities of emancipation and learning processes
over time (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p.3-4). Grief and Laitin (2004) showed that these
gaps can be bridged by bringing in quasi-parameters and repeated game theory. In
games that require a long-term strategy because they are played several (up to infi-
nite) times, particular parameters (in this case: fixed rules of the game) can become
negotiable if players come to the conclusion that the institutional framework renders
suboptimal results. A possible emerging competition between players willing to change
the rules on the one side, and status-quo agents on the other may eventually result
4For a detailed discussion of these forms of actions, their underlying rationalities, and a more finely
graduated interpretation of Weber’s writing see Kalberg (1980); Swidler (1973); Wallace (1990) and
perhaps with a more critical view Levine (1981).
5For an elaborated mixed framework see, for instance, the study of Zhou and Wang (2018) about
the role of rationality in motivating participation in social movements applied on the case of anti-
Japanese demonstrations in China.
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either in gradual convergence to a new equilibrium, the persistent dominance of the
existing equilibrium, or utmost chaos (Aoki, 2008, p.125). In a similar vein, DellaPosta
et al. (2016) additionally integrate the power of new ideas and innovations observed in
other institutional configurations such as foreign states.
These modifications allow the inclusion of time into the research design as well as his-
torical particularities. These particularities are institutional arrangements that derive
from a past juncture or gradual change and can be robust and inertial, even if the
environment of the game has already changed.
4.3 Institutional Equilibria in the MENA Region
The trinity of institutional equilibrium, critical juncture, and critical interference fac-
tors set up a broad framework for analysis that allows for the inclusion to different
sub-theories. This includes more nomothetic and general theories, as well as theories
that have been developed with special regard to the MENA region or single countries.
The following section gives an overview of approaches that have been used to approach
political systems of the region. It will trace the developments and turns of authori-
tarianism studies, and outline the basic concepts that will also be applied in the case
studies, and which ultimately help to determine the institutional equilibrium.
4.3.1 Regimes in MENA: A Patchwork of Concepts
Especially after the change of paradigms from the democratisation paradigm to the
stability paradigm, scholars paid attention to the robustness of authoritarianism. Just
like the years before, many scholars dealing with the MENA approached the region
applying, testing, and generating new concepts and theories. The concept of authori-
tarianism, first developed by Linz (1971) for Spain under the rule of Francisco Franco
and later elaborated inductively as metaframework in Linz (2000) became a catch-
word, however, it lacked elaboration and systematic inquiry of the different sub-types
of authoritarian regimes (Geddes, 1999, p.121). Studies after WWII focussed on the
new emergence of a mixture of corporatist structures, socialist rhetoric, and capitalism
that could be observed in an extreme form in Egypt of Gamal ’Abd Al-Nasser and to
different extents in Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and to a lesser degree in Syria and Iraq
(Richards and Waterbury, 2014, p.17-22). This form of State Capitalism gave rise to a
state bourgeoisie that controlled, however, did not own the major means of production
it gave rise to and to a process of accumulation. Different from the classical Marxian
view of the relations between owners of the means of production and the proletariat,
state bourgeoisie members in Arab countries do not have any legal, hereditary title to
their offices, as Richards and Waterbury (2014) notes:
...[t]he survival of the members of this class is dependent upon three factors: (1)
their ability to move from position to position within the state hierarchy, (2)
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their technical competency, making them marketable in any milieu, and (3) their
ability to build nest eggs (farms, businesses, investments, foreign bank accounts)
outside the state sector. Seen in this light, the state bourgeoisie is a strange class
indeed. Property is not the source of its power; it has no juridical claim to the
positions that are the source of its power; and it cannot and may not even want
to reproduce itself as a state class.
Access and position inside this particular kind of State Class (Elsenhans, 1997) are
determined by cultural capital (education, religion, language, ideology), social capital
(family, clientelist relationships), or symbolic capital (e.g. participation in anti-colonial
wars) (Ouaissa, 2005, p.203-204).
The observed lack of upward mobility, the establishment and consolidation of a re-
stricted circle of individuals that possessed the power inside the country, and the co-
option of the population into a large public sector bears resemblance to what (Schmit-
ter, 1974) labels State Corporatism. Under this concept, the ruling elite organises so-
cial members pre-emptively into exclusive associations, which were advocated as their
sole legitimate representative, while parallel or overlapping organisations are severely
discriminated against. These mechanisms were eased by inherited highly centralised
colonial administrative systems that were initially designed to enable an elite to sub-
jugate a majority (Murphy, 1999, p.18). The successors of the colonial rulers often
adopted the abandoned institutions and included them into an own, particular in-
stitutional equilibrium to consolidate power. The emergence of mass mobilising and
centralised organisations especially in Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Syria, or Iraq
strongly indicate similarities to the corporatist systems that initially derive from fas-
cist backgrounds. Elites of the Gulf countries that mostly experienced a form of "state
building by accident" (Anderson, 1991), in contrast, found other ways to secure power
that relied on a mixture of kinship and modern political state institutions and admin-
istration (Herb, 1999).
Against that background, much research focussed on the behaviour of elites and their
survival strategies inside the higher echelons of power. The question arose, how elites
could survive and consolidate their power in authoritarian systems, in which formal
rules and the legal institutional frameworks are weak and flexible yet the outcomes of
the political processes are predictable with high certainty and reliability (Przeworski,
1991, p.10-14). A key feature was found in the patrimonial and neopatrimonial struc-
tures of MENA states that focussed on personalism and informality (Eisenstadt, 1973;
Pawelka, 2002; Lust, 2009). Neopatrimonialism is (Banks and Richter, 2010, p.2):
...a system of rule in which a top figure within the state hierarchy governs mainly
through a network of personal and informal relations [...] These dyads function
through the exchange of loyalty to the patron and the granting of political and/or
material influence to the client. In this understanding, all members of the politi-
cal elite are directly dependent on the leader, and they are recruited to politically
relevant circles primarily due to their loyalty to the central figure and only sec-
ondarily on the basis of other criteria such as performance or competence.
Concepts like the Political Relevant Elites (PRE) (Perthes, 2004) combined the in-
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sights from State Capitalism and Neopatrimonialism while offering a broad scientific
access to the political structures of the region, by including "all those who yield po-
litical influence and power" and who "contributed to the definitions of political norms
and values" (p.5). Despite this broad approach that allowed for a qualitative analysis
of different cases, the underlying social and cultural pattern of the clientelist relations,
especially when it comes to kinship, remained unexplored for a long time. This is as-
tonishing as there are clear evidences for the dominance of family bonds even in many
formally republican systems such as the Takriti clan in Iraq until 2003, the Oudja clan
in Algeria, or the Alawite sect in Syria and so forth (Murphy, 1999, p.19). Research
remained scarce for a long time, as tribalism, and especially the term Tribal Soci-
ety was a long time used to describe any sort of pre-industrial and hence somewhat
backward society (c.f. Gluckman (1965, p.81) for a critique: Kraus (2004, p.37-39)).
Especially after the critique of Orientalist thought in Western science, the research
field remained fallow in comparative politics about the MENA region, only until it was
rediscovered during the revival of ethnicity as a concept from the 1990s onwards. Back
then, analysis approached the state and state formation in the region under the aspect
of tribalism (Khoury and Kostine, 1991; Uzi, 2016) and also comprised extreme voices
that attested a "simultaneity of the unsimultaneous" (Tibi, 1991) of tribe and nation
state claiming that the "imposed nation states" never managed to control or suppress
the tribal mechanisms of decision making in the region.
Much of the literature that dealt with tribalism and the state also resorted to the
Muqadamma of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and in particular to his concept of ’Asabiyya)
which might be best translated as group loyalty, social cohesion, or solidarity. Although
some scholars equalise the term with tribal bonds, Ibn Khaldun himself simply stated
that kinship is something that facilitates ’Asabiyya the best, leaving space for other
kinds of feelings that might generate entities making claims to power on another base
of solidarity as well. Although still criticised for being misused and mobilized for par-
ticular colonial and post-colonial projects and for being sign of "implacable monolithic
Eurocentric hegemony over Islam" (Salama, 2011), the concept of the competition of
different ’Asabiyyas that generates a circle of rise and fall of dynasties has witnessed
a limited revival among social scientists in the West and elsewhere (Hinnebusch and
Schmidt 2008; Goldsmith 2011; Zaidi 2011; Alatas 2014 for anthropology: Ahmad
2005)
Having said that, all the introduced concepts and frameworks face a mutual problem:
They were mostly tested in a limited sample of countries and, hence, there can be made
only a limited assessment about their "travelability" across the region. The concept of
authoritarianism as such has only been elaborated little since its emergence (Albrecht,
2012), and scholars have repeatedly argued that Schmitter’s regime-level definition of
State Corporatism is too holistic to be operational in empirical studies (Wilson, 1983).
The PRE concept of Perthes (2004) has been applied in his 2004 volume in a fruitful
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manner in nine Arab states and Palestine however, it has been criticised for omitting
the dynamics between the populace and the elites that constitute an important pillar
of the logic of power in the region (Schwanitz 2005 Asseburg and Wimmen 2015, p.7-8).
The concept of Neopatrimonialism has also been used to a limited extent only (Banks
and Richter, 2010) and also, most traditional attempts to define the concept of the
tribe in ways that were applicable beyond a single empirical situation never succeeded
in comparative perspective (Kraus, 2004, p.38).
Besides the sheer observation of a limited application in comparative perspective of
many concepts, another circumstance hints at a limited travability of most concepts
that have been developed to analyse the MENA region. Although Schlumberger (2008),
just as his colleague Albrecht, complains about the lack of differentiation and sub-
conceptualisation of authoritarianism, his own model of Patrimonial Capitalism seems
pretty tailored to fit Egypt, and the concept has barely been applied to other MENA
countries, although it might have yielded fruitful insights in comparative perspective6.
Indeed, many concepts that might have been fruitful for application in comparative
perspective underwent their process of theory building in Egypt and got stuck on their
way to other countries (Moore (1974); Pawelka (1985); Kassem (2004) to name a few).
Indeed, comparativists until the 1980s were preoccupied especially with Egypt, Syria
and Iraq (Pripstein Posusney, 2004), building up material scholars that followed could
easily build upon. Other underlying reasons are straightforward and understandable:
Research endeavours in these countries benefited from their advanced infrastructure
compared to other MENA countries, high education rates and language knowledge
that made communication with the indigenous more easy, and a political interest fos-
tered by the growing economic power of these countries. Furthermore, as much of the
literature indicates, Western strategic interests in states with crucial natural resources
(such as Saudi Arabia), or vital security ties (such as Afghanistan), trump studies of
transition especially in a broader comparative perspective (Levitsky and Way 2002,
p.41 Carothers 2003 Diamond 2009 Girod and Walters 2012, p.182). Consequently,
countries such as Mauritania’s civil movement after the coup of 2008 or Kuwait’s semi-
democratic experiment get less attention and are rarely compared to the "big players"
of the region.
The travelability of concepts can be questioned as the structure of the big players in
the MENA region differs significantly from other countries: Egypt due to the role of
the Army, and Iraq and Syria due to their violence driven form or totalitarian rule.
There are also clear differences in power structures and legitimacy between republics
and monarchies (Anderson, 1991; Demmelhuber, 2015). Indeed, MENA countries do
have different institutional equilibria inside the political exchange domain that consists
of governmental, private, and cultural actors. The concept of the institutional equilib-
rium, however, is capable of conceptualising this variety. As Aoki (2008, p.120) puts
6For an application in historical perspective in Algeria and Tunisia see Charrad and Jaster (2015),
although the authors do not only draw on Schlumberger’s work.
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it:
The government protects/transgresses the rights of private actors (property rights,
the right to live and so on) in exchange for certain returns (taxes, prestige, etc.).
The private actors respond by support- ing/resisting/submitting to the govern-
ment’s choice with/without mutual coordination among themselves. Even in this
simple game structure a variety of different equilibria can arise, depending on the
ways in which coalitions between the government and particular private actors,
as well as those among the private actors, are formed. These equilibria can be
identified as institutions of the state.
For each country, the different state and private institutions form an unique set of
institutions that remains in a particular equilibrium.
4.3.2 The Lowest Common Denominator: A Bargain Rule
Although acknowledging that there is a variety of institutional equilibria in the MENA
region, some basic assumptions can be made that do apply in all countries of the
sample of the present study. The central starting point for understanding the societal
dynamics is the assumption of the existence of a social contract as a tacit, unwritten
agreement among the members of a group, community, state or nation that limits
individual behaviour on the one hand, and sets individual responsibilities and rights
on the other. Such an implicit contract coins the nature of living together in every
society and the concept can be traced back to Socrates, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.
Against this background, the type of social contract found in Middle East and North
Africa differs from the one alleged to development, democratic countries in terms of
the role performed by the state. It is often less dependent on tax revenues and rather
a distributor of wealth, in the words of Krauthammer (1991):
Normally a state needs some kind of tacit social contract with the civil society
because ultimately the state must rely on society to support it with taxes. The oil
states are in an anomalous position: they do not need a social contract because
national wealth comes from oil and oil is wholly controlled by the state. Oil states
are peculiarly distributive states. Government distributes goods to society rather
than the other way around. It is therefore the source not only of power but of
wealth. This makes possible an extraordinary degree of social control exercised
by a powerful, often repressive state apparatus.
However, the structure of the social contract has more sweeping features in the
MENA region than redistribution and repression only, and, moreover, features can-
not be found only in oil states of the region. The clear expectation towards the state
to provide welfare in terms of social security and labour, and the de-politicisation of
the population in exchange for these benefits play a crucial role. The relinquishing
of political participation by the populace can be explained by a heady excitement of
Arab nationalism which was accompanied by the wish for international recognition
(Ibrahim, 1993), demands towards the new elites that promised an enhancement of
socio-economic circumstances after independence, and the wish for physical security.
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This Authoritarian Bargain comprised agrarian reforms combined with the national-
ization of industry, banking, insurance, and trade, the adoption of import substitution
and the protection of local industry, a central role for the state in the provision of wel-
fare and social services, and, concerning participation, a vision of the political arena,
as fundamentally noncompetitive and organic (Amin et al., 2012, p.32-33). In sum,
this implicit contract in the MENA region that emerged between the 1940s and 1970s,
is characterized by the following features (Yousef, 2004)
- A preference for redistribution and equity in economic and social policy
- A preference for states over markets in managing national economies
- The adoption of import substitution industrialization and the protection of local
markets from global competition
- Reliance on state planning in determining economic priorities
- An encompassing vision of the role of the state in the provision of welfare and
social services
- A vision of the political arena as an expression of the “organic unity of the nation,”
rather than as a site of political contestation or the aggregation of conflicting
preferences
In this bargain, citizens were required to "surrender their political and social rights
to participatory government" and "expected to accept the legitimacy of the ruling
regime, however grudgingly, and are rewarded with a variety of goods and services in
return, most of them tangible but some also intangible, as well as socio-economic ben-
efits" (Kamrava, 2014a, p.2). These benefits consist most prominently of subsidies for
food and fuels, job opportunities, and social welfare services like free access to medical
healthcare. Therefore, Bellin (2004) attests Middle Eastern and North African coun-
tries an unwillingness to democratic reforms, stating that the "masses do not prioritize
it, and the elite has reason to be frightened by it. The champions of democracy are
few and far between" (p.141).
4.3.3 The Institutional Turn and Institutional Shielding
The authoritarian bargain, however, got under stress from the 1970s onwards. The
strategy of import substitution reached a peak by the early 1970s, and until 1990 food
imports rose steadily from $2 billion to $20 billion annually. Arab external debt rose
about 40 times from less than $5 billion in 1970 to about $200 billion. The abil-
ity of most Arab states to subsidize food, provide services, or generate enough jobs
was steadily diminished due to debts and disproportional population growth. Gains
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achieved after independence and the symbolic capital of revolutionary individuals,
groups and regimes had bottomed out by the 1980 (Ibrahim, 1993, p.33).
These developments that were accelerated by the decline of the oil price are particu-
larly interesting from an analytic view. As the state could not meet the expectations
tied to the social contract of the authoritarian bargain, discontent spread all over the
region and the elites had to adapt. In this situation, institutions can stay robust and
inertial for a while even if the environment of the game is continually changing to a
certain extent (Aoki, 2008, p.124), however, in the long run the state had to make
concessions. First, as the pressure to implement economic reforms and economic open-
ing exerted by donors like the World Bank and the IMF increased especially after the
Washington consensus, the massive welfare state was targeted, leading to cut backs in
subsidies, fringe benefits, and public employment. This caused, in a first wave start-
ing in the late 1970s, mass protests among the population of which the most palpable
ones gained fame as food riots, or Bread Riots as described by Thompson (1971). The
protests in Morocco (1981, 1984), Algeria (1988), Tunisia (1978, 1984), Egypt (1977,
1984), Tunisia (1978, 1984), Jordan (1989) were an outgrow of the diminished capabil-
ity of the state to provide welfare, however, in the early stage protesters did not aim
at exchanging the regime or the authoritarian bargain as a mode of rule, but simply
demanded socio-economic enhancement or the revocation of cut backs.
This attitude changed from the mid 1980s onwards. While regimes and also some schol-
ars had argued before that economic liberalisation should precede political liberalisation
for the sake of stability (Posusney, 1997, p.7), the atmosphere of democratisation that
coined the years before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 also influenced the MENA
region. Limited democratic openings occurred in nearly all countries of the MENA re-
gion, often accompanied by the establishment of civil society organisations and political
parties. A self-concious middle class, often geared to Islamic ideology7. and especially
consisting of those segments that did not directly form a part of the political relevant
elites, pushed for liberalisation of the political system and a higher degree of participa-
tion. In this atmosphere, however, the state elites managed to remain in control of the
neuralgic points of power while claiming to conduct political and economic opening.
Observers of this strategy soon labelled many of MENA countries Electoral Autoritar-
ianism (Schedler, 2006), Hybrid Regimes (Diamond, 2002), or Semi-Authoritarianism
(Smith, 2005). Following the logic that single-party regimes expand political rights
during times of crisis in order to secure their hold on power (Geddes, 2003, p.69), this
regime type sets up facades of democracy, including multiparty elections for the chief
7It would go beyond this study to discuss and assess the ontology of Islam as a political force,
especially if the impulse to induce change is rooted in the ideology of Islam itself (c.f. Voll (2013)) or
in the socio-economic background while Islam is, especially in its violent interpretation, simply used
as an interchangeable justification for action (c.f. Ansari (1984)). A discussion can be found in Hafez
and Wiktorowicz (2004). What can be assumed safely is that Islam can arguably be presented to
be about justice and, hence, it is more easily possible to be invoked as common ground to encounter
perceived injustice, like the authoritarian regimes (ibd.)
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executive and the national legislative assembly, in order co conceal and reproduce the
reality of authoritarianism (Schedler, 2006, p.1). Especially single party entered a fine
line between political opening and holding on to power, trying to give the party rule a
legitimate colouring by elections. A complicated situation emerged, well described by
Murphy (1999, p.25):
The state cannot afford simply to ditch the party, not only because the party
represents the ideological source of regime legitimacy, but because the party has
provided the route for co-opting society through its position as intermediary be-
tween state and corporate groups. Equally, the party cannot simply disassociate
itself from the state. To do so would be to lose its access to power and, since the
state is the product of the party in ideological and personnel terms, the party
would be undermining its own credibility.
Consequently, liberal-democratic principles of fairness and freedom are violated so
profoundly that they become instruments of authoritarian rule rather than instruments
of democracy. The techniques of this form of authoritarianism comprised election fraud,
intimidation, but also the design of the legal framework that discriminated against
particular parties or individuals by using gerrymandering or setting the thresholds for
electoral competition unattainably high. Also co-optation of political parties into gov-
ernment coalitions as junior partners became a strategy to enhance legitimacy while
the old unity parties and their networks managed to still hold the reins of power. In
a broader sense, co-optation can be defined as a bargain between community leaders
on the one side and the state administration that is responsible for the distribution of
resources on the other. Community leaders receive legitimacy among their community
as moderators between the state and their subgroup, being able to distribute a share
of the public wealth among their peers. The regime, in turn, gains control over, and
acceptance from that particular subgroup. Consequently, co-optation has been iden-
tified as a main contribution to the resilience of Arab authoritarian regimes (Gandhi,
2010; Buehler, 2015a, p.367).
Also the new democratic institutions that emerged during the hybridisation of the
systems like parliaments, political parties, or civil society organisations, hence, soon
became a part of the regime. Researchers that became aware of the role of basically
"democratic" institutions which, in contrast to widespread beliefs, did not undermine
authoritarian rule but rather formed a part of it, soon heralded the "institutional turn
in comparative authoritarianism" (Pepinsky, 2013).
What has been happening inside the MENA region, after the authoritarian bargain
got under pressure, can be described as a constant fight for the maintenance of an in-
stitutional set meanwhile the environment that initially produced that set had already
altered. It is a fight to protect anachronistic or simply dysfunctional modes of rule
that suffered from a loss of legitimacy and credibility among its subjects. To analyse
the stability, in the sense of the capacity of the regimes to deal effectively with the
problems confronting them and to adjust flexibly to changing circumstances (Lijphart,
1968, p.8), one has to determine the shielding that causes the resilience in a changing
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environment. To clarify this point it is useful to take a look into equilibrium theory
in a broader sense. Meteorologist Timmerman (1981, p.32) writes about the difference
and relation of resilience and reliability:
If we are vulnerable [...] then there are, at least, two strategies of defence which
do not involve active offense. We can rely on being able to shield ourselves from
the blow; or we can rely on being able to absorb the blow. The first shielding,
concentrates on a continuous, reliable defence - reliability. The second much less
popular (for obvious reasons), relies on being able to bounce back from being
battered or wounded - resilience. What is interesting to note is that failure of
the first type of defence is catastrophic in a way unmatched by the second; since
failure of the shield reveals a lack of absorptive capacity underneath.
According to this reading, authoritarian regimes are not resilient, they are rather
reliable. This does not contradict Przworski’s (1991) classical definition of authori-
tarianism in which the outcomes of the political processes are predictable with high
certainty and reliability. However, because of the possible misleading character of the
term, it shall be replaced in this context with institutional shielding. A regime thus
has a core or basic legitimacy that can be ascribed a resilience to new ideas or regime
change. Additionally, and especially when this core legitimacy crumbles, authoritarian
regimes set up a range of institutions and mechanisms to hamper and impede possible
attacks on its nature - for the sake self protection. The higher the vulnerability of the
system’s narrative, and the more the legitimacy of the core elites erodes, the stronger
is the necessity for a strong institutional shielding. If a unity party can be sure about
winning an election, the uncertainty of the electoral results can be absorbed in the
sense of resilience. However, when the party cannot be sure about victory, or a weak
result would undermine its absolute claim to power, the elites set up institutions and
frameworks that facilitate the wished outcome.
The following section describes possible pillars of institutional equilibria including their
institutional shielding and divides them into the categories violence, legal frameworks,
and core legitimacy.
4.4 Pillars of Institutional Shieldings
Acknowledging that the Bargain Rule can be found as a core element in any Arab
country, the particular peculiarities of the systems differ. Institutional equilibria and
their particular institutional shielding are unique and there is no blueprint that could
be applied to a multitude of countries. Each country requires a case study to determine
the very nature of the political institutional equilibrium, its pivotal pillars, and how
and by whom these pillars were jeopardized during the critical juncture 2011-2013.
These institutions derive from a very broad pool and their importance for the respective
systems has to be explicated. Nonetheless, this section will exemplify the most common
mechanisms of institutional shielding.
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4.4.1 Institutionalised Violence and the State in MENA
There is no possibility to understand the equilibria of Middle East and North Africa
without addressing violence. Violence is not only a feature of the collective memory
of the population that was inscripted due to a long-lasting history of colonisation,
repression, and competition between violent political currents (Silverstein and Mak-
disi, 2006). Violence is not only a feature of non-state actors, violence is a conscious
technique of governance in the states of Middle East and North Africa (Ismail, 2019;
Hinnebusch, 2006). Repression by physical force became possible due to a security
sector, which generated jobs at the same time, including secret service structures that
penetrate opposition and the population to monitor any kind of dissent. In countries
that adopted a mass-mobilising one party republican system such as Syria or Libya, the
surveillance and the draconian punishments for dissent produce a form of omnipresent
terror (Arendt, 1951) that characterise totalitarian systems. Dissent becomes a matter
of cost-benefit calculations as institutions that openly use violence embody something
like a Nash equilibrium. Individuals obey by adhering to particular patterns of be-
haviour as deviation will make the individual worse off than will adherence (Calvert,
1995, p.216-266). The deterrent effect of imprisonment, torture, executions, discrimi-
nation from access to public service and job opportunities create common knowledge
about the costs of dissent. This common knowledge is part of an educational process
which is impressed powerfully and unforgettably upon the consciousness of the individ-
ual, generating institutionalisation in the sense of Berger and Luckman (1978, p.87).
Repression is used to show the state’s power and determination to protect the current
institutional equilibrium (Davenport, 1995) and follows the logic of the authoritarian
bargain, in which citizens are denied the right to challenge the state.
As the hybridisation of regimes develops at different paces depending on nature, eco-
nomic well-being, or credibility of the legitimacy narrative, also the degree of state
violence differs across regimes. In their fQCA cross-country analysis, Schneider and
Maer (2017) identify two stable types of electoral authoritarianism, of which one is
more flexible in applying specific, performance orientated legitimation strategies while
relying less on repression, and a second one that relies on hard repression and diffuse
sources of legitimation. A trade-off between institutionalised violence and other forms
of institutional shielding can be assumed, whereby violence seems to be the last resort
when other forms of institutionalisations fail to protect the institutional equilibrium.
The institutionalisation of violence in MENA has contributed to what the Lebanese
Journalist Samir Samir Kassir (2013) called ’Ajz, an Arabic term denoting impotence
or helplessness. (Kassab, 2009, p.357) summarises the dilemma as follows:
Time and again the scope of devastation caused by state repression on all levels
is deplored. The ever-recurring term used to describe the situation is incapaci-
tation or impotence (’ajz) resulting from this devastation — a sort of endemic
bankruptcy, collective despair, and pervasive depression, hence the attractiveness
of fascist promises, salvational doctrines, and charismatic leaders. The disman-
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tlement and fragmentation of society are particularly alarming. The subjugation
of society by state terror and the never-ending states of emergency have made
it impossible for society’s constituting communities to forge an empowered body
politic that is eager to engage in public matters and capable of doing so.
If institutionalised violence is a part of the institutional shielding of Arab author-
itarian regimes, the question that arises for researchers who try to determine critical
interference factors is how institutionalised violence can be attacked. A key aspect is
the open demand for transparency and accountability. By identifying those who com-
mit violence and demanding to bring them to justice, players can enhance the cost of
the use of violence by the state. Indeed, the MENA region has witnessed the emergence
of different human rights groups at least since the 1980s that address issues of repres-
sion in public - and consequently often became the target of repression themselves.
Furthermore, as the example of the case of Libya will show, it was a group of relatives
and other interested individuals demanding an investigation of the 1996 Abu Salim
Prision massacre who initially sparked the large wave of protests in 2011. In Tunisia,
the humiliation of street vendor Bouaziz by a policewoman caused violent protests on
a large scale spreading from his home region, and eventually the police lost control of
small regions in the country. These are examples of cases in which institutionalised
violence was targeted first peacefully and later violently by different groups of the coun-
tries. These events confirm the notion of Scott (1992, p.196) stating that a "hidden
transcript is continually pressing against the limit of what is permitted on stage, much
as a body of water might press against a dam". If an act of insubordination - which
may comprise the demand of accountability of the ruling elites or individuals acting
on their behalves - is not rebuked or punished, then a small success might encourage
others to follow the example until the dam breaks8. This logic explains the quick es-
calation of violence that could be witnessed in Syria and Libya in 2011, especially as
the hybridisation of the regime was comparatively underdeveloped, with the regime
heavily relying on totalitarian techniques of institutionalised violence.
4.4.2 Legal Frameworks and Bureaucracies
Among the most important part of institutional shielding are bureaucracies and their
patronage networks that hamper participation in a broader sense. The bureaucracy,
say, the administrative machinery, is an organisational structure that can be found in
every MENA country and that often builds a part of the political relevant elites. Due
to networks of patronage in which the patron keeps his client - often being a local leader
- sequacious and loyal by stick and carrots, the entire procedures are characterised by
rampant corruption and a neglect of the rule of law. The favouritism for those who
have connections into the state bureaucracy, and also the connections between the po-
litical relevant elites which build an important pillar of their factual power, may be best
8Tilly (2012, p.188) label this phenomenon also "de Toqueville effect"
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described by the Arabic term Wasta. Wasta, literally meaning "middle" or "medium"
refers to connections and networks that help to get jobs and obtain government ser-
vices, licenses, or degrees that would otherwise be out of reach or would take a long
time or effort to be obtained (Ramady, 2015, p.vii). This "hidden force of Middle East"
(Cunningham and Sarayrah, 1993) is fostered and reinforced by a canon of administra-
tive procedures that help to keep those out who do not have the right connections, and
at the same time setting the value for the services that are provided by Wasta like in a
market. It corresponds to the more colloquial use of the word bureaucracy, involving
"unnecessary rules and procedures", and "the stifling of all initiatives by using these
rules and procedures actually to block them" (Page, 1992, p.6-7) for the sake of culling
those demands that do not harm the institutional equilibrium of the country. This
strategy makes use of restrictions to set up private businesses (Djakov et al., 2002),
selective licensing of civil society organisations (Jakob, 2019), or the legal constraints
for the establishment of political parties (Karvonen, 2007). Concerning the latter, the
geographical design of the electoral law also protects the status quo of power distri-
bution by allowing or excluding particular parties or individuals from participating in
elections, or the design of electoral constituencies in a manner that benefits a (ruling)
party, known as gerrymandering.
The governmental bodies and institutions as well as the mass mobilising groups in
a corporatist system may also be protected by a legislative framework defining their
powers. This holds especially true for the interplay between the executive, legislative,
and judicative branches of government as well as for the laws regulating the relation-
ship between the civil administrative body and the army. The most straightforward
institutional shielding for a country leader would be the codified election for lifetime,
preventing external shocks caused by elections. Further competencies of the leader
may include the right to dissolve the parliament, the right to rule by decree, influence
in staffing policies concerning the cabinet of ministers, or unrestricted power over the
security forces.
Another aspect of the legal framework refers to the laws that justify violence exerted
by security forces. This comprises restrictions of demonstrations and strikes and also
limitations of the freedom of speech. Especially the press, but also civil society ac-
tivists can be easier brought to trial when the penalty code defines criminal acts like
publishing and disseminating false news with intent to disturb public order, insulting
the ruler and / or his family, insulting the judiciary, inciting the population to overrule
laws, or spreading panic among the population.
All the features of the legal framework, in their administrative, political-procedual, or
criminalising nature, can be justified by a state of emergency. Although widespreadly
used by authoritarian regimes before 2001, it can be safely assumed that the entrance
of the term "fight against terrorism" after September 11, 2001 into international politics
has been embraced and welcomed as a carte blanche for repression and restriction of
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human rights, as the case of Yemen will strikingly illustrate. Anti-Terror laws have
functioned as justification for violence against opposition groups that threatened the
stability of the regimes.
An attack on the legal framework for the sake of altering the institutional equilib-
rium could be witnessed in Jordan and Kuwait where particular parties demanded a
reform of the electoral code. Also the demands for constitutional reforms like seen in
Tunisia and Egypt fall into the same category. The allegation of corruption as wit-
nessed throughout the MENA region especially since the beginning of the 2000s is more
difficult to categorise. If it is a general reproach that does not necessarily target par-
ticular institutions, or when only particular, interchangeable individuals are pilloried,
the institutional equilibrium of the country is not necessarily targeted. The demand,
however, to exclude Ben Ali and his entire family from obtaining state positions in the
future as demanded in Tunisia, or to exchange a vast part of the government in Oman
targeted the institutional equilibrium.
4.4.3 Identity and Legitimacy
Legitimacy refers to the populace’s acceptance of a ruler that is often culturally and
historically in-scripted, or at least justified by tradition, and hence difficult to contest.
Legitimacy can derive from deliberative processes as well as from mutually accepted
hierarchies and authorities. In the Muslim world, power is often claimed by religious
figures, having enjoyed a religious education, or even tracing their own descent from
the holy prophet Muhammad (Sayyids) (Lee and Shitrit, 2013). These claims often
compete with the primordial family bonds on which tribal Sheikhs resort to justify
their claims of power on the one hand, while Arab history has also witnessed a unique
and powerful symbiosis of Islam and tribes on the other (Khoury and Kostine, 1991).
The monarchy of Morocco, for instance, resorts to their leading role in religion and
to tribal alliances at the same time. Most North African states also often resort to a
founding myth which is connected to a historical event like the anti-colonial struggle
or the revolution of a great leader. These events are re-invoked in propaganda and
framing of history inside and outside the country.
Continuity is an important justification for control, and as claims about beginnings are
claims to power (Foucault, 1966). These myths are used to justify the prevailing order
of institutions. This is true for monarchies that can point to a long-lasting history of
dynastic rule, unity parties that were part of the anti-imperialistic fight for indepen-
dence, or charismatic leadership. Measures of expropriation have also been justified
with regard to a socialistic ideology, even if the term "socialistic" is rightly contested
in analysis about the Pan-Arab, Ba’athist, or Nasserist Ideologies (Moore, 1974) that
prevailed during the first years after the independence of many MENA states. Founders
Aflaq and Al-Bitar declared already in 1942 freedom (hurriyah) from foreign control,
the unity (wahdah) of all Arabs in a single state and later socialism (ishtirakiyah) as
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the leading motives of Ba’athism. The slogans "Unity, Freedom, Socialism" and "One
Arab Nation with an Immortal Mission" appeared on party publications. This rhetoric
has been used also during the time of liberalisation after the authoritarian bargain got
under pressure since the 1980s. As Murphy (1999, p.22) notes:
The ability to disguise its own class interests, and to prevent the articulation
of competing class interests, enabled regimes to continue to use the language
and rhetoric of socialism even though their strategy was less a retreat from cap-
italism than a combination of etatism and welfarism. Middle East ’socialist’
regimes came to power not by revolution but by military and palace coups. New
ruling elites were not vanguards of mobilized masses but applied top-down in-
terpretations of socialist structures and ideological concepts tailored to eliminate
opposing power-bases rather than genuinely to transform society.
Matters of identity also play their role when it comes to ethnicity and nationality.
As seen in the case of Jordan, a particular part of the institutional equilibrium is the
positioning in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well as the treatment of minorities in-
side their own country. Jordan’s marginalisation of Palestinians from joining public
service can be read as a strategy to limit the access to power. The cases from the Gulf
show how guest workers are kept out of the political decision-making process, and how
the inclusion and exclusion from political rights of segments of society by granting or
denying citizenship is used as a tool to shield the institutional equilibrium.
Legitimacy can, at best, be attacked by a counter-narrative that questions the hege-
monial discourse of the ruling elites. Back in the 1960s and 1970s, Communist Parties
tried to offer an alternative to Pan-Arab Socialism and to monarchies. After the decline
of Communist Parties in the region, Islamist groups and parties often emerged as new
counterparts of the ruling elites. The Muslim Brotherhood, different Salfi groups, or
the Shirazi movement took that role, as will be seen in the cases of Jordan, Bahrain,
or Yemen.
4.5 Towards a Constructivist Understanding of Trade
Unions
In this section, the research subject - trade unions - will be conceptualised. The
underlying assumption is that the concept "trade union", as it is used in research in
liberal democracies, is applicable for MENA countries to a limited extend only. To
underpin this reasoning, a short comparison between trade unionism in Europe and
MENA will be made. A special focus is set on the Marxian Turn that workplace
organisation underwent in Western society and science, as well as the relationship
between organised labour in MENA and historical Islamic Guilds. By applying a
constructivist approach and focussing on the term Naqaba, some difficulties related to
the intransferability of the concept "trade union" can be solved.
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4.5.1 Trade Unionism in the European Context
Workplace or craft organisation has a history that dates back at least to the 14th
century in Europe (Reid, 2004), and to the 9th century in Middle East (Massignon,
1920). Trade union like associations emerged already in the 18th century in Britain,
focussing more on the low skilled worker than on specialised craftsmen. These organ-
isations, that were often influenced by journeymen, copied the structures and rituals
of guilds and developed strategies to pressure masters or the state to receive higher
wages or fringe benefits (Reid (2004, pp.9-14), for a historical comparative perspective
in Europe see Crouch (1993, esp. pp.70-72)). In the 19th century, and with an increas-
ing degree of industrialisation, organised labour experienced a Marxist Turn. In The
Capital, Karl Marx describes trade unions as an association where "workers combine
in order to achieve equality with the capitalist in their contract concerning the sale
of their labour" being an "insurance formed by the workers themselves" (Marx, 1969,
p.1070). Some paragraphs before, he defines the aim of trade unions as to prevent the
price of labour-power falling below its value inside the production process. Elsewhere
Marx (1969) and also Engels (1881) uttered more concrete, political ideas, stating that
there would be
two points which the organised Trades would do well to consider, firstly, that the
time is rapidly approaching when the working class of this country will claim,
with a voice not to be mistaken, its full share of representation in Parliament.
Secondly, that the time also is rapidly approaching when the working class will
have understood that the struggle for high wages and short hours, and the whole
action of Trades Unions as now carried on, is not an end in itself, but a means,
a very necessary and effective means’ but only one of several means towards a
higher end: the abolition of the wages system altogether.
Tracing the history of Europe reveals that trade unions did not enter parliaments
directly, however, labour parties were founded, having ties with the unions and pe-
rusing sometimes more, sometimes less the same agenda and supporting each other in
different campaigns. Labour unions and labour parties are labelled "organized labour"
and coined the history of the continent. Nonetheless, with the view of bargaining as
a possibility to prevent enrichment of the burgeois class, Marx - just like John Stuart
Mill in 1869 - also denied the Wage-Fund Theory in which gains by one section of
the workers could only be obtained at the expense of other sections. Both follow a
basic reasoning based on Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and elaborated by the early
economist McCulloch (1854), who attested workers a disadvantage when it comes to
negotiations with capitalists. According to this view, it was only when workers acted
in "a simultaneous manner which is equivalent to a combination [...] that it becomes
the immediate interest of the masters to comply with their demand." Without that
combination, workmen would "not be able to obtain a rise of wages by their own exer-
tion, but would be left to depend on the competition of their masters"9.
9For a more elaborate summary and criticism see Hutt (1980, 22-24)
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In the post-WWII era, two trajectories emerged, and fierce fights between these two
were fought among workers, among politicians, and also among scientists. The "social
polarisation thesis" followed the Marxian reading and advocated confrontative strate-
gies against the ratcheting down of working conditions and wages in order to set limits
to a rampant bourgeois class that tried to exploit state institutions for personal gain.
The second trajectory, the "regional thesis" advocated a social compromise and part-
nerships for production on the micro level, thus rather accepting than challenging the
logic of capitalist competition (Western, 1997; Hyman, 2001b).
Against the background of the experience of devastating mass unemployment, crisis and
war, mainstream unionism after WWII became more co-operative, as employees and
also employers appreciated the benefits of industrial peace and long-term predictability
of labour costs (Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p.34). After a phase of labour militancy
in many European countries in the late 1960s and 1970s, collective bargaining and sys-
tems of institutionalised labour representation that included the state emerged (Regini,
1992, p.2-7), fostering cooperation between state, employers, and employee represen-
tatives. The regional thesis was also supported by an atmosphere of anti-communist
resentments during the McCarthy era and was spurred by the cold war as such.
From an economic perspective, in the 1950s, for instance Hutt (1980) criticised the
disadvantage-of-labour thesis and claimed that trade unions tend to push the wage
over a market equilibrium, thereby causing unemployment, as the higher wages would
lock up resources that could otherwise be used to employ more workers. This view re-
mained predominant among Western economists and was only challenged in the 1980s
by Freeman and Medoff asking in a rather unconventional manner What Do Unions
Do? (1984). By pointing at external effects of unionisation like higher motivation and
output of workers, or more effective communication between rank and file and manage-
ment, the authors argued that organised labour would in sum produce more benefits
than costs.
Eventually, the further decline of the social polarisation thesis during the heydays of
neo-liberal politics in 1980s, Europe gave way for a the dominant Western understand-
ing of the role of trade unions until the early 2000s. The recent trade union devel-
opment programs of the ITUC in 2018, for instance, clearly aim at empowering trade
unions worldwide to become rather a social partner, and also to play a role beyond
economic activities (ITUC 2018). Development effectiveness means in their context
that sustainable trade unions
- improve the working and living conditions of male and female workers
- advance respect for human and trade union rights,
- thereby contributing to decent work, social justice and democratic processes.
- Trade unions are both: A social partner in the tripartite relations with employers,
governments and workers and also part of the civil society
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The role of trade unions inside civil society varies from country to country and
from time to time. Basically, they have an inherent political function apart from their
socio-economic endeavours (Streeck and Hassel, 2003), and that political function grew
in importance in times of neo-liberalism and globalisation when trade unions tried to
form broader international and domestic alliances (Hyman, 1997b; Munck, 2008). With
the decline of Marxism as an ideology and societal adoption to capitalism, states pro-
duced divisions among the workers and created mechanisms - such as protectionism or
nationalism - that integrated workers into capitalist democracies (Tarrow, 2018, p.18).
In developed countries, the type of revolutionary trade union, trying to enforce the
dictatorship of the proletariat and the abolishment of the wage system, suffered almost
complete extinction.
Stronger ties to other civil society groups could be witnessed as the result of the forging
of new alliances, and human rights activists soon discovered the mobilisation power of
trade unions. Unionism already played a role in struggles of people of color in the
United States during the Civil Rights Movement’s time (Korstad, 2003). Trade unions
also became agents of democratisation in developing countries, most visible in COSA-
TUS remarkable fight against apartheid in South Africa, as well as in developments of
trade unionism in India, Brazil, or the Philippines of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Sei-
dman, 2011). This Social Movement Unionism clearly blurred the boundaries between
political and economic players and is the result of a more broad agenda of worker’s
organisations beyond collective bargaining and shop floors. This broad concepts of
trade unionism complicated a definition of the boundaries of trade unions worldwide.
4.5.2 The Relation between Trade Union and Naqaba
Many (Western) authors suggest that trade unions are an imported concept that spread
over middle east with the help of European workers that migrated to Middle East
and North Africa. According to this reading, workers dominated by "foreign" capital
organised, leading to a close cooperation and intertwining between these workers and
the nationalist movements (Kassalov, 1963). In times of anti-colonial struggle, many
political leaders of the independence movement stressed the importance of building
a mutual front against the colonial oppressor in order to achieve the dream of an
independent national project. The situation of quasi-opposition brought the union
movement and the first parties together and became a fruitful environment for party-
union bonds also observed by Valenzuela (1989, p.11) in Latin American countries.
But there is also a vibrant history of Ottoman Guilds that coined the relations of
professional groups and structures of the state, foremost inside the Islamic city (Lewis,
1937). Guilds lost their power at the end of the 19th century, however, some remainders
could be found at least in Damascus and Beirut of the late 1920s, existing together
with communist unions, business unions and a wide range of hybrids (Jakob, 2019).
4.5. THE UNDERSTANDING OF TRADE UNIONS 91
Although there are some evidences for linear developments between guild and unions
in the Levant (Allouni, 1959), the grade of influence of old guild structures on modern
trade union formation is contested (Baer, 1970), which might be due to an astonishing
lack of interest about the topic by Western scholars; as Quataert (2001, p.95) clearly
states still in 2001, it is "difficult to analyse the role of guild organizations in the later
formation of labor unions, labour dispute, and strikes in the early twentieth century
because we do not understand the nature of the guilds themselves".
The history in Lebanon and also in Egypt (Ried, 1974, p.37) indicates, that continuing
tensions remained between the view of the syndicate as a tool of the government or
clan networks and the view of it as representative of the membership. This struggle
was already fought under the Ottoman empire, between state authorities and union
members, as well as between members themselves. In the Gulf, when the ruling elite
started to harass and prohibit organised labour especially to protect the tribal dynastic
institutional equilibrium against Panarab and Socialist ideas, these ideas spread with
the help of tribal and kinship networks. The result was a mix of clan patronage and
socialism, showing how ideas form the "West" were somewhat adopted, however, the
emerging concepts often kept their "traditional flavour" (Ried, 1974, p.37). As the
break between guild culture and traditional industrial relations came quite abruptly,
many workers were still used to employer-employee pattern of the Ottoman Empire.
As Allouni (1959, p.67), mirroring the stance and allegations of many progressive leftist
of his generation against the workers, puts it for the case of Syria:
[...] in most countries where craft and industrial undertakings were largely fam-
ily affairs, the head of the business, or perhaps the chief of the guild embracing
a number of small family businesses, was a person of considerable power and
authority in his restricted community. This had been the pattern for genera-
tions and it could hardly be expected that things would change overnight. The
workman, the laborer, the apprentice, did not see his hard lot as the result of
oppression, nor was it, for many of the old master-craftsmen were the kindliest
of men; employees did not resent the long hours of work, for their forefathers
had labored thus for many generations and, like their forebears they were above
all things stubbornly traditionalist.
A more striking continuity between Islamic Guilds can be found in linguistics. Even
if we cannot determine the true connection, we can observe that a term for "Guild"
(naqaba) is nowadays used as a term for "trade union" in modern standard Arabic and
almost all dialects. Guilds in the MENA region were among the first organisations
that had a written code of conduct labelled "Dustur" (Farsi: Permission), a word that
is today used as "constitution" in Arab Systems (Lewis, 1937, p.30). The master of
ceremony was called Naqib, whereas the root of the word is not completely clear: na-
qa-ba is located in a broad linguistic field comprising the words "penetrate", "drill",
"excavate", "ransack", "seek", or "quest".
Khira (2014) relativises in his study of the legal framework of trade unions in Algeria
the notion of a leading role of trade unions for the working class, as the term bears
something religious. He does so by deducing "naqaba" from the person "Naqib", who
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he describes as "elected, honourable person to take care about the interests of a cat-
egory or group of persons". True, in many Arab armies a Naqib is also a captain or
platoon leader, however, a more suitable word would be "representation" or "agency"
(Arab original: niaba) (Khira, 2014, p.16). Sura (5:12) of the Quran already refers to
Naqib as leaders of the twelve tribes of Israel while the term might be best translated
as chieftains, supervisor, or censor. Naqib continued to be a moral leader during the
Abassiyd empire and Al-Mawardi (2000) speaks in Chapter eight of his seminal The
Ordinances of Government of Niqba tribunals to "protect people of noble lineage from
being subjected to the authority of those whose nobility and lineage are not equal to
theirs" (p.144). It is heavily tied to purity and leadership, and the Naqib in a classi-
cal Guild, or "most esteemed" Naqib (Naqib al-Ashraf) often claimed decent from the
Prophet Muhammad, however, he was subordinate to the leaders or elders of the Guild
(the Shaykh, pl.: Shuyukh).
Among the first organisations that labelled themselves Naqaba was the Egyptian
Lawyers Syndicate of 1912. Reid (1974, p.38) retells the genesis of the name as follows:
An official suggested to Minister of Justice Sa’d Zaghlul calling the ruling council
of the lawyers’ body Majlis Naqabat [sic] al-Muhamin (Council of the Syndicate
of Lawyers) rather than simply Majlis al-Muhamin (Council of Lawyers), and
calling its head naqib rather than ra’is (president). Zaghlul protested, wondering
if the official wanted to remind people of the lowly porters and coal dealers,
who also had a naqib. When the official suggested the parallel with the highly
respected naqib al-ashraf, Zaghlul agreed to the change.
This quote indicates that porters and coal dealers also had a kind of Naqib, how-
ever, research about that topic is scarce. In general, the study of guilds in political
history, and especially the transition form Guilds to trade unions, including the ques-
tion whether an underlying dispositive may have influenced the way workers in the
MENA region perceive, assess, and run trade unions, stopped by the end of the 1970s.
It coincides with the emergence of the Orientalism-Debate, which led to a crisis in Area
Studies, as comparisons between the West and the non-West came systematically un-
der suspicion of bearing deep-seated academic conceptions of "us" and "them", shaping
in a patronising way how non-Western regions and their inhabitants were supposed to
be perceived and understood (Basedau and Köllner, 2007, p.107).
4.5.3 Approaching the Concept of Naqaba
We simply cannot pin down all the differences between the concept "trade union"
in the "West" and the concept trade union in MENA countries especially regarding
possible path dependencies. We can capture three facts that there has been continuous
struggle about the nature of the Guild, and in particular if it should be an independent
pressure group or form part of the government. This discussion in MENA is way
older than Marxism and the resulting disputes about the roles of trade unions in
Sovjet style socialism. However, to understand the effect and agency of an institution
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embedded into a particular systemic, cultural, and linguistic context, it is also possible
and worthwhile taking a look at the use of the term under scrutiny inside that particular
region. Qandil (1995, p.28) for instants, describes trade unions or Naqabat in his
seminal work about professional associations as
organizations consisting of persons working in a single profession or professions
being close to each other, or an industry or a craft being connected to each
other, aiming to enhance the working and material conditions of its members,
performing as united and elucidating professional organization striving for the
protection of the honour and interests of its members.
Although being an Arab scholar, Quandils’ definition comes quite close to a classical
French one, describing a trade union or syndicat as association
constituée par les membres d’une même profession, de professions similaires ou
connexes, ou de professions différentes relevant de la même branche d’activité,
en vue d’étudier et de défendre les droits, les intérêts matériels et moraux com-
muns à cette profession, à cette branche d’activité (relations au sein du travail,
représentation auprès des pouvoirs publics, etc.) (Birou, 1966)
Webbs’ (1894) classic definition of a trade union as "a continuous association of
wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their em-
ployment" remains even more vague. However, these basic definitions give some im-
portant insights. First, none of the definitions expresses a particular relation to the
state. Independence in general, whether from the state, business, or clan structures is
not mentioned. The Arab definition of Naqaba above bears special mandates. When
referring to elucidating or enlightening (Arabic original: "tua’wi"), information and
knowledge transfer on the members seems to implicate a clear duty or task. Moreover,
the protection of the honour (Arabic original: "shirf") constitutes a particular task of
the unions towards the environment it is embedded into. In the Western world, this
is something that actually is rather ascribed to white-collar professional associations
and qualifying associations and less for trade unions (Millerson, 1960, p.47). Even if
these thoughts are only indicators, we can see again a lack of a clear and necessary
class based policies and aims in a Marxian sense.
The excursion into the etymological field is a piece in the puzzle to explain why Western
scholars seem to be disappointed with the performance of trade unions in Middle East.
The research field of trade unions in extra-European contexts has become a realm in
which predominantly scholars who avow themselves to some kind of Marxist tradition
prevail, and indeed, many of the working place organisations in MENA did not follow
the trajectory of class struggle or put the working class on the forefront of the fight
for a utopian future. In this sense, most Arab workers organisations of the 19th and
20th century have - according to this Marxist reading - mostly been "yellow" instead
of truly "red" 10.
10Yellow Unions are in the communist terminology of the 1920s those non-radical workers move-
ments that do not aim at social revolution, do not recognize the dictatorship of the proletariat as an
immediate contingency, and do not follow the Communist International (Pasvolsky, 1922)
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The influence of foreign, European workers, the well organised Communists Parties,
and eventually the regimes of MENA states altered that basic structure and tradition
in the course of time. In Western countries, the government favoured rather business,
say "yellow" unions: Already Perlman (1979), had condemned the interventions of both
revolutionary and reformist socialists in his famous Theory of the Labor Movement of
1928, and he openly questioned the "maturity of a trade union mentality". In many
MENA countries, in contrast, the nationalist elite, successful businessmen, and later
the state tried to incorporate and use the emerging trade unions to achieve goals at
the national macro-level. Hence, the seeds for a close state-trade union relationship
was present even before the independence of many MENA states, and it sprouted and
bloomed under the new elites after independence. A welcomed justification for the
domestication of trade unionism was also borrowed from a non-MENA region: At the
10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party in 1921, Lenin managed to put through
his vision of trade unions as educational organizations and schools of administration,
economic management, and communism, arguing that the revolution had been success-
ful and the political role of trade unions had thus come to an end. As shown in the
case studies, this decision influenced also the view of leaders on trade unions especially
in the republics of Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Leaders there also argued that their model
of Arab Socialism posed the end of a historical path, which trade unions do not need
to change any more.
As the term "trade union" and its organisation still differ to an in-explorable extent,
between the western and the Arabic concept, a basic assumption of this thesis is that
the concept of trade unionism and the body of theories about them as known in West-
ern societies cannot travel to the MENA region without causing heavy distortions
and inaccuracies. Therefore this study focusses on those organisations that are la-
belled by the national legal framework Naqaba, or those who label themselves Naqaba.
This approach includes professional associations (Naqabat Mihniya) as well as workers
unions (Naqabat ’Umaliya) and comprises also any other names of workplace related
organisation in literature such as labour unions, trade unions, syndicates, professional
syndicates and so forth.
4.6 Trade Unions as Guardians of the Authoritar-
ian Bargain
Middle East and North Africa has traditionally been consigned at the margins of social
movement studies (Pourmokhtari, 2017). Due to the weakness and rarity of successful
and visible social movements in the region, and a canon of theories that derive from
research about liberal democracies, several scholars posed the question whether these
theories are able to account for the complexities of social movements in contemporary
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MENA societies at all (Bayat, 2009; Buechler, 1995, p.4). The question to which extend
the concept of trade unions as such can travel has barely been asked, maybe because
the concept is contested among scholars and also among members and leaders of the
unions themselves. As Hyman (2001a, p.211) puts it:
[...] within any union can be found conflicting views of its underlying purpose, its
priority, objectives, the appropriate forms of action, and the desirable patterns
of internal relations. Such ambiguities are compounded when we attempt cross-
national analysis: the questions what is a trade union? or what does it mean
to be a trade union member? will receive very different answers according to
national context. There can be no innocent definition of trade union identity.
Additionally, political process models describing the very interactions between so-
cial movements, societies, and states were lodged in the democratic West for a long
time and this started to change at the beginning of the 1990s (Tarrow, 2018, p.28)
only. Scholars have shown some interest in opposition movements, and particularly
in the mobilisation potential of Islamist groups (c.f. Wiktorowicz (2004); Hafez and
Wiktorowicz (2004)). The relationship of Western academia with the topic labour
movements is, however, particularly special. The starting conditions for organised
labour differed significantly between western and non-western countries, as organised
and public sector labour in MENA has always been somewhat an elite class whose
privileges came at the expense of unorganised workers, the rural poor, and the infor-
mal sector (Posusney 1997, p.6Richards and Waterbury 2014, p.235. As shown in the
section, social movements and especially trade unions in MENA elude from much of
the logic home to western-liberal democracies. The environment of authoritarianism,
state corporatism and also hybrid regimes sets constraints on collective action that are
essential to analyse to understand contentious politics in the region.
4.6.1 Social Movements and Contentious Politics under Au-
thoritarianism
The development of social movements in the MENA region altered in nature after the
liberalisation and hybridisation of the regimes. In the decades before, after indepen-
dence, most countries adopted a corporatist model, in which interests were negotiated
and incorporated into the state’s decision-making structures through internal mech-
anisms rather than through external challenge. The state created organisations to
represent functional groups within society such as agricultural producers, industrial
producers, blue and white collar workers, women, and initially also the military to
harmonise their demands. In the atmosphere of nationalism soaked with the rhetoric
of socialism, any attempt to struggle for interests outside the state-corporatist system
was suppressed by the regime, which labelled these activities "an attack on the national
consensus" (Ehteshami and Murphy, 1996, p.755). Especially in single party systems,
the legislative framework allows the ruling elite to control bargaining on the one hand,
and help reveal the preferences of various factions on whose support the regime relies
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(Gandhi, 2010, p.78-81) on the other. Especially in the earlier phase, as mass mobilis-
ing organisations provided job opportunities, they were welcomed by the lower middle
classes as a chance for upward mobility (Murphy, 1999, p.15). At the same time, mass
organisations fulfilled the tasks of providing feedback to the state, whereas this feed-
back was soon less given on a deliberative basis by its members but rather collected by
the authorities via observation and control.
Consequently, Schmitter (1979) distinguishes between societal, i.e. liberal corpo-
ratism, and state, i.e. authoritarian corporatism. In the latter system, the regime seeks
to co-opt labour in order to organise and mobilise it, especially to prevent a class-based
challenge (Murphy, 1999, p.15). This is the kind of corporatism found in MENA coun-
tries. The system of state corporatism tried to solve a dilemma faced by authoritarian
regimes: The violent suppression of popular resistance might be the most promising
and straightforward way to achieve regime-survival, however, reliance on repression
damages the regime’s legitimacy and makes it less sensitive to popular demands (Tilly,
2012, p.179-194). Repression in the name of national coherence, socialist solidarity, or
other kinds of legitimacy claims make it more difficult for social movements to openly
attack the institutional equilibrium of the country. Grass root mobilisation becomes
barely possible, given the penetration of everyday life by the security forces and regime
ideology. In this situation, the logic of collective action changes. Different from the
theory of collective action (Olson, 1982), in which individuals have strong incentives to
become active in rather smaller groups, small interest groups face severe difficulties in
organising under authoritarian rule. In smaller groups, the likelihood of being a target
of repression is higher than in a larger group, as the hazard and probability of being
identified personally is higher. If large organisations grow to a critical mass, however,
the likelihood of a successful attack on the regime is higher (Schnabel, 2006). Hence,
authoritarian corporatist regimes always tried to balance repression and concession to
avoid the emergence of a critical mass. From a game theoretic perspective, as Marks
(1992) has shown, there are two possible equilibria: Either everyone in the political
opposition will protest or no one will.
When hybridisation of the authoritarian regimes in the MENA region started, the
thresholds for the establishment of civil society organisations apparently fell. However,
the legal framework as part of the institutional shielding contained the civil society
and culled the movements according to the regime’s discretion. Consequently, social
movements and civil society organisations became more an instrument of state social
control than a mechanism of collective empowerment, leading rather to further de-
politicization than encouraging resistance (Asseburg and Wimmen, 2015). The use of
institutionalised violence helped to keep the process of culling under control. At the
same time, the government sets incentives to set up civil society organisations that
correspond with the ideology of the regime. Already Tilly (1978, p.106) states:
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The repressiveness of a government is never a simple matter of more or less.
It is always selective, and always consists of some combination of repression,
toleration, and facilitation. Governments respond selectively to different sorts of
groups, and to different sorts of actions. [...] Governments which repress also
facilitate. While raising the costs of some kinds of collective action to some kinds
of groups, they lower the costs of other kinds of collective action to other kinds of
groups. They do so in two different ways: (a) by simply diminishing the difficulty
of specific varieties of mobilization and/or collective action, and (b) by providing
positive incentives for specific varieties of mobilization and/or collective action.
Tilly (1978, p.106) also distinguishes between repression, toleration, facilitation,
and coercion. The more the group and the action are accepted by the state, the more
open it will be to tolerate or even facilitate social movements. If the movements are
part of the ideology and propaganda of the state, membership can become compulsory.
Figure 4.1 taken from Tilly systematises state attitudes towards social movements.
Figure 4.1: State Responses to Social Movements under Authoritarianism
As open contentious politics is severely hampered, groups began to form in a more
clandestine or subtle way. This includes "passive networks" or "non-movements" es-
pecially comprising young citizens who met rather casually in schools, colleges, urban
public spaces, parks, cafés, and sports centres and who shared commonalities by similar
hairstyles, blue jeans, hang- out places, food, fashions, or the pursuit of public fun.
They lack a clear leadership and a space like an office or fixed gathering point and
are thus less vulnerable to surveillance and repression (Bayat, 2009, p.18-22). Under
repression, personal connections become of utmost importance (McAdam and Paulsen,
1993), and hence, social networks that extend beyond kinship, ethnicity, or neighbour-
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hood also become largely casual, unstructured, and paternalistic.
4.6.2 The Role of Tade Unions in Authoritarian Corporatist
Regimes
Among the civil society organisations organised labour plays a crucial role in the inner
system logic of most authoritarian MENA regimes. Bajo (2013) states that calling
trade unions civil society movements poses a simplification that limits the understand-
ing of different forms of collective actions: Trade unions are set up by workers only,
they are often mass organisations, have a history that is often heavily intertwined
with the history of their home country, and they are mostly subject to own legislation
(p.111). However, I would argue that trade unions are a special case of civil society
and of social movements, as social movements "consist of groups and organizations,
with various levels of formalization, linked in patterns of interaction which run from
the fairly centralised to the totally decentralized, from the cooperative to the explicitly
hostile" (Diani, 2003, p.1). True, unions are workers’ organisations, however, they do
not necessarily act as mass organisations. In highly fragmented union landscapes as
found in Lebanon, Morocco, or Mauritania, unions may also be interest groups for
particular segments of society. Even in countries where the trade union system is cen-
tralised under the umbrella of a single federation, single unions may act successfully
as interest groups. This success is based, following Olson’s theory of collective action,
on their small size, their control of small but important sectors of economy, and their
ability to influence the government - like the trade unions in the oil sectors of Kuwait
or Iraq. And even if the history of the union movement is indeed intertwined with the
history of the country and the regime, they are still prone to splits, new foundations,
and inter- and intra-leadership struggles caused by external shocks and developments
of the Zeitgeist. They pose examples of social movements which mostly are also forged
by a common aim. Similar to other civil society organisations, they can be defined as
an interest group that first emerged outside the state framework, however ,as soon as
a higher level of organisation and professionalism was reached they became subject to
special laws: The laws of associations for civil society organisations, and the labour law
concerning trade unions. Indeed, many organisations in the MENA region that label
themselves trade unions, and also fulfil the same tasks as a trade union, are subject to
NGO laws.
The existence of organised labour outside its corporatist framework is particularly
threatening, as workers discontent jeopardises the legitimacy of the regime, especially
when this legitimacy is based on a socialist narrative. Furthermore, as Communist
ideas competed with the more market oriented Panarab ideologies in the years after
independence, and workers were quite susceptible for these ideas, single party mass
mobilising corporatist regimes were quick to co-opt trade union organisations and to
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establish state controlled frameworks to control the workers movement. Against that
background it is the term "state capitalism" that describes the basic dynamic at best,
as state enterprises and ostensible public ownership did not involve any major revision
of the relations of workers and managers to the means of production. The profit motive
remained and the workers did not gain control of the surplus value of their own labour
(Richards and Waterbury, 2014, p.206) - which led to disappointment and discontent
among many leftists. In Gulf countries, in contrast, the leftist threat to primordial,
patrimonial and dynastic rule was encountered with harsh repression of workers move-
ment and a prohibition of trade unions in all countries until at least 2002.
In this atmosphere, the emergence of independent trade unionism became nearly im-
possible due to a rigid organisational structure of unionism in general, which bears
features of bureaucratisation, and, second, due to an explicit vulnerability of its mem-
bers. Union activists can be located easily, as they are tied to a particular workplace.
Although clandestine union networks did appear, as the case or the Iraqi WFTDU in
Kurdistan indicates, the special nature and traceability make trade unions a special
case under civil society organisations. Moreover, this from of collective action is too
important for governments to remain passive especially as they may breed militancy;
control of trade unions is too crucial, too big too fail, as (Tilly, 1978, p.74) already
observes in 19th century Europe:
When it escaped the union-busting of employers and governments, the trade
union greatly increased the capacity of workers to act together: to strike, to
boycott, to make collective demands. This preparatory mobilization often began
defensively, in the course of a losing battle with employers or in the face of a
threat of firings, wage reductions, or cutbacks in privileges. It normally required
risky organising efforts by local leaders who were willing to get hurt.
Given that importance, and given the fact that institutionalised violence is a crucial
pillar of the institutional equilibrium in every MENA country, the violent repression of
organised labour reaches a level in which repression does not bear the possibility of be-
ing an opportunity, as some SMT theorist rightly argue in other cases. The observation
of Marks (2014, p.14) in his comparison of trade unions in Britain, Germany, and the
United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries, stating that "repression politicized
unions because it compelled them to try to change the rules of the game" does not hold
true for the MENA region. The apparatus of coercion hampers politicisation to an
extraordinary extent, and if mass protest occur, it occurs mostly inside the boundaries
of the social contract of the authoritarian bargain, demanding for the promised share
for political quietness. By fact, even the Tunisian UGTT, which has played an utmost
progressive role during the critical juncture of 2011-2012, has not touched the nature
and pillars of the institutional equilibrium in the decades before. The bread riots that
shook the region since the erosion of the authoritarian bargain and liberalisation pol-
itics did neither target the nature of the regimes and the social contract; they were
rather reinforcements of the latter, aiming at protecting the socio-economic status or
even squeezing more benefits out the state.
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The fact that coercion and repression has been used by the regimes does not mean
that the regimes do not respond to workers demands. Even the trade union associa-
tions that were co-opted to a high extent, such as the Algerian UGTA, the Egyptian
ETUF, or the Jordanian GFJTU fulfilled the role of advocating worker’s protection
and workers rights inside a limited manoevering space. They were part of tripatite
consultations, recorded workers demands and complaints consulted the government in
issues like the minimum wage, fringe benefits, and job creation and also provided a
possibility of upward mobility. For generations trade unions have played that role in
the MENA region, and such a role can, especially regarding a feeling of ’Adjz, become
accepted and institutionalised over time. As (Berger and Luckman, 1978) put it:
Roles appear as soon as a common stock of knowledge containing reciprocal
typifications of conduct is in process of formation, a process that, as we have
seen, is endemic to social interaction and prior to institutionalization proper. The
question as to which roles become institutionalized is identical with the question
as to which areas of conduct are affected by institutionalization, and may be
answered the same way. All institutionalized conduct involves roles. Thus roles
share in the controlling character of institutionalization. As soon as actors are
typified as role performers, their conduct is ipso facto susceptible to enforcement.
Compliance and non-compliance with socially defined role standards ceases to be
optional, though, of course, the severity of sanctions may vary from case to case.
The roles represent the institutional order.
In a similar vein, Hyman (1994) writes about "union identities" which may be viewed
as inherited traditions which shape current choices and reinforce and confirm identi-
ties. As a consequence, unions in different countries have different identities shaping
their nature and behaviour. Against this backdrop we can define labour unions in most
countries of the MENA region as guardians of the authoritarian bargain. Their role
is to address the erosion of this particular social contract, demand the workers share
for their quiescence, and hamper privatisation, economic opening, and everything that
might impede the function of the very job creation machine they expect he state to be.
These statements lead back to the basic question that has been put in the beginning:
Is what a western socialised researcher regards as a trade union a concept that can
be applied offhand in MENA states? The history of the genesis of established unions
is different, the environment they emerged in is different, and the driving forces that
fostered their foundation differ as well.
4.7 The Final Concept: Trade Unions as Critical
Interference Factors
4.7.1 The Definition of Trade Union
The conceptualisation of trade unions as Naqabat helps to identify the research object,
however, some points should be clarified. The inclusion of professional associations, for
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instance, is a result of the use of the term Naqabat as basic concept. This might be
bewildering for observers who are used to the socio-economic environments of OECD
countries or other regions. An engineers union would barely be mentioned together
with a miners union, or a medical association together with a carpenters’ union. Three
aspects may dispel doubts: First, teachers, engineers, or medical staff is mostly state
employed or dependent on state activity. They become wage-earners just like blue
collar workers, especially in corporatist, state driven regimes with a low degree of
hybridisation and privatisation. Second, also in western societies the boundaries be-
tween white-collar/middle-class versus blue-collars/working class and proletariat versus
lumpenproletariat have diminished, as both share a similar subjectivity and relational
positions within the economic system, especially in opposition to the new ruling elite of
technocrats and business-owners. These systems have, hence, also undergone a "prole-
tarianisation of the white-collars" (El-Mahdi, 2011; Hall, 1997; Marshall, 1997). Third,
and somehow interwoven with the second point, especially the emergence of Social
Movement Unionism has eroded the general rejection of direct political action, such as
strikes (which form part of (blue collar) "trade union principles" according to Millerson
(1960, p.219)) among professional and qualifying associations.
The crucial question is how these entities are able to push through their demands.
Strikes and work stoppages are part of the repertoire workers can resort to, and these
form cornerstones in the "incessant struggle between capital and labour" in which the
capitalist constantly strives to reduce wages to their physical minimum and to extend
the working day to their physical maximum, while the worker constantly pushes in the
opposite direction (Marx, 1969). Indeed, as Silver (2003) demonstrates in his work
Forces of Labor: Workers’ Movements and Globalization Since 1870, the power of the
workers’ movement is tied to its ability to launch and organise labour actions, includ-
ing general strikes, local strikes, riots, disputes, demonstrations, and lockouts. The
most straightforward power, thus, derives from a collective decision not to work, or to
withhold labour through various means (Holmes, 2015, p.106). This power is used or
threatened in collective bargaining and poses an asset when it comes to negotiations
about the enhancement of working conditions. Hence, the definition of trade union
used in this QCA analysis is not tied to wage dependency but to the theoretical ability
to collectively push for demands by threatening to refrain or indeed refraining to work.
The political background of the organisations does not play a role. Consequently, the
following definition will be used in the further course of this thesis:
Trade unionism is collective and frequent action that is institutionalised in a -
at least officially - democratic-participatory framework in which the leadership
is elected. The mutual basis of trade union members is the necessity to sell
their labour power or to use their human capital in order to make a living at
a common workplace or in a common profession. Their aim is to protect and
improve their living standards11 by influencing enterprise and state decisions via
11By that way, also Journalists Unions and Bar Associations that fight against human rights abuses
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collective bargaining or consulting whereas work stoppage is at least theoretically
a permanent implicit or explicit option12.
As a last point to clarify, the terms labour unions and trade unions will be used in-
terchangeably in this study. A trade is, according to the dictionary of middle English, a
"trodden path", and in modern English it refers to a profession or manpower-demanding
section or the economic system.
The term syndicate, however, has a different historical meaning and could be mis-
leading. According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language,
Syndicalism is
A radical political movement that advocates bringing industry and government
under the control of federations of labor unions by the use of direct action, such
as general strikes and sabotage. [French syndicalisme, from (chambre) syndicale,
trade union, feminine of syndical, of a labor union, from syndic, delegate [...]]
In this reading, a syndicate’s agenda is specifically tied to a political program
of anarcho-syndicalism, while trade unionism is a broader concept. Unfortunately,
the translators of the term Niqaba, especially in French and Spanish, is Syndicate
or Sindicato and these terms are also used in English literature in an unquestioned
manner. Although the term syndicate may have emancipated from its initial meaning,
I will use the term in citations only, in order to avoid misunderstandings.
The Three Stages of Trade Union Activity
In order to determine whether a trade union acted as critical interference factor at-
tacking the institutional equilibrium of a state, the intrinsic intention of the labour
action, negotiation, or statement has to be put under scrutiny. It is not enough, if
a trade union committed some kind of action. Roughly there can be three stages of
labour action distinguished: socio-economic on the enterprise level, socio-economic on
the national macro-level, and political on the national macro-level.
The first stage is local and demands are addressed to the direct superior, supervisors
and the shop or enterprise management. Claims focus on plant level issues like par-
ticular wages or benefits, working conditions including health and security issues, or
other plant-specific regulations.
Second, trade unions can also engage in the struggle involving interpretations of socio-
economic macro-conditions. This struggle transcends the simple worker-company con-
flict and enters the local or national political arena. Trade unions may aim at influenc-
ing economic policies of the state regarding wages and working conditions by proposing
alterations of the legal framework inside an existing regime. These alterations do not
touch the nature of the institutional equilibrium as such, however, may cause conflicts
of their members are included. Put in blunt words, not being harassed while working and not being
imprisoned and / or dying because of the work done is a kind of protection of living standards
12Due to a lack of data, however, agricultural associations will be excluded from this study even if
they are made up of employees working for great land owners or betimes for the state in the many
Arab countries.
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of interests with the ruling elite. Possible demands include the call for higher pensions,
higher wages including the minimum wage, better access to health services, or job cre-
ation in the public sector.
A third stage of engagement refers to actions that aim at changes beyond economic
polices and that target directly the distribution of power inside a country. It is a char-
acteristic of Social Movement Unionism but can also appear as a trade union goal as
such. In the latter case, the leadership and / or the workers do not see any other way
to achieve their goals than by deep changes within the power structure of the country.
But also claims and demands that target the distribution of power by influencing the
pivotal institutions of an institutional equilibrium as mentioned above count as politi-
cal interference, such as demands for a more powerful role of the parliament (Bahrain),
demands for changes in the electoral law to alter the distribution of seats in the leg-
islature (Jordan, Kuwait), campaigning in or calls for boycotting elections (Kuwait),
or the removal of pivotal persons like long-term leaders of a county and their networks
(Tunisia, Egypt).
For this study, only the third stage, say, the attempted alteration of the political
equilibrium will be coded (1) according to the QCA dichotomisation, while protests
for socio-economic enhancement of the workers, whether on the plant-level or on the
national macro-level, will be coded (0). This results of the characterisation of trade
unions in MENA as guardians of the authoritarian bargain as outlined in section 4.6.
According to that logic, socio-economic protests that do not touch the balance of power
in the country are not attacks on the institutional equilibrium but rather a part of the
latter.
4.7.2 Narrowing Down the Sample
Scope and Limitations of the Study
By dealing with a particular region of a world, a scientist - willingly or unwillingly -
enters the realm of Area Studies. The definition of an area is necessarily theory guided
and the boundaries of an area may fluctuate from research to research, and there is
a wide range of definitions of Area Studies and Areas as such. They may include
common political administrative units, culturally determined ethnic enclaves, linguis-
tic communities, or economic zones of production and exchange (Rafael, 1999, p.1208).
Approaches and methodologies are heterogeneous. Sticking to a definition by (Szanton,
2002) "Area Studies" is best understood as a family of interconnected academic fields
and measures unified by a common commitment to intensive language study, in-depth
field research in the local language(s), close attention to local histories, viewpoints,
materials, and interpretations, testing, elaborating, criticizing, or developing grounded
theory against detailed observation, and multi-disciplinary conversations often cross-
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ing the boundaries of the social sciences and humanities (Basedau and Köllner, 2007,
p.109).
Area studies deal deliberatively with contiguous regions of the world like Western or
Eastern Europe, the Americas, East Asia or Middle East and North Africa. Defining
countries of these regions as main unit N13 bears some advantages. First, some vari-
ables can be hold constant. If a study is conducted about democratization in Latin
America - theoretically - language, religion and colonial history are predominantly the
same. They might have the same impact on the dependent variable across all countries
and form for instance in regression analysis a part of the error term ϵ. Second, as the
countries often have an intertwined history, area experts emerge, that are able to focus
first on a certain country and expand their studies to a neighbouring one due to similar
cultural or economical features. The marginal costs decrease for each study of another
country in that particular region. A third advantage is related to the latter: With the
emergence of area experts, deep and elaborated knowledge about that region can be
produced about few cases when statistical tests would fail due to the small amount of
cases - this is referred to as the small-n problem in social science.
A disadvantage, however, concerns the fact that non-random selection bears the dan-
ger of producing endogeinity, which means that the independent variable is somewhat
correlated with the error term ϵ. Simply put, there could be a relation between the
outcome and one of all conditions that were not taken into account. Thus, this study
about trade unionism in MENA countries, as it is designed here, cannot account ex-
plicitly for possible conjunctions between conditions that have been held constant and
conditions included explicitly into the minimisation process. As outlined in section
3.3, omitted variables pose a problem for QCA as approach compared with statistical
methods that build upon probability and interval scales. These hidden variables can
only be revealed in inter-regional comparisons. This study is, against that backdrop, a
step forward to understanding the region better and generating knowledge for future
research, but by no means a comprehensive and omni-explanatory result.
Narrowing Down the Sample
A second problem arises concerning the boundaries of the areas to be studied. In a
globalised world, facing regional integration, cross-regional exchange of cultures, con-
cepts, and ideas, any region, once defined, witnesses a deterioration in the course of
time. Identities become more fluid and more difficult to access, to evaluate, or to cate-
gorise in a meaningful way in order to conduct scientific inference. The delimitation of
13Capital N is the main unit or basic population. It includes all possible instances, cases, individuals
or any other research object inside a population. All countries of the world would be N if the unit of
analysis was countries. A minor n refers to samples of the basic population N. All countries of the
Middle East could be n of the main unit N if N is defined as all countries of the world.
4.7. THE FINAL CONCEPT: TRADE UNIONS AS CRITICAL INTERFERENCE FACTORS105
an area should be well deliberated and substantiated, and even if, there is always the
danger that the defined main unit N is actually a sample part n of a more reasonable,
superordinate main unit N.
For this study, five complex features are decisive for the inclusion of cases into the sam-
ple. First, the country has to have a comparatively low democratic performance while
a particular institutional equilibrium of which the authoritarian bargain is an essential
part has to be stable for a comparatively long period of time. This excludes countries
that have witnessed constant instability or major changes of their power structures in
recent time such as Iraq since 2003 (US-led invasion, continuous instability), Lebanon
at least since 2005 (Cedar Revolution)14, Sudan 1983-2005 (civil war and secession),
and Somalia.15.
A second common feature of the sample countries refers to the Arab language. This is
less due to lingo-cultural parallels than due to the acceleration of communication and
information exchange between the countries. Indeed, concerning the waves of protests,
the fall of the regime in Tunisia caused a "domino effect" (Schraeder, 2012), and youth
groups of the entire region imitated organisational structures from Tunisia and Egypt
in order to conduct own protests, even if they led in most MENA countries to "modest
transformations" (Bellin, 2012) only.
Third, the protests that emerged have to be comparatively large concerning the his-
tory of protests of the particular country. This means that Tunisia is included, where
palpable protests have taken place from 2006-2008 in the south, however, the protests
of 2011 mobilised several hundred thousand across the country, and also Oman is in-
cluded, where the maximum of protesters at one spot in 2011 was 2,000, however, given
that there was no culture of protest at all in the country in the decades before, the
jump in numbers is significant. Consequently, in Arab countries that did not experience
a wave of protests, like Qatar,or the United Arab Emirates, the question why trade
unions did not participate in the protest would be a subset of the question why there
were no or only negligible protests at all; this would be a different research question.
Fourth, trade unions as defined in section 4.7.1 have to be existent in the country. By
focussing on the organisational structure of a Naqaba, the workers committees of the
Gulf in Qatar and Saudi Arabia are excluded from the study, as well as the United
Arab Emirates, where Penal Code (Law No. 3 of 1987, as amended) makes it a criminal
offence for anyone to found, join or participate in a trade union or to participate in
a labour strike. The question why unions did not participate in the protests in those
counties where trade unions are illegal is a subset of the question why trade unions
are actually illegal in these countries at all; this would, aain, be a different research
14For a historical overview of the Lebanese and Iraqi trade union movement see Jakob (2019, 2016)
respectively.
15Mauritania seems to be an exception of this rule at first glance, as the country experienced a
coup in 2008. As the case study outlines, however, the logic of the institutional equilibrium has barely
changed, as the coup was a "correction" of domestic politics by the old elites and the military after a
brief period of democratic opening
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question.
Fifth, the concrete outcome of the protests is not of the essence. In critical juncture
research, even those countries that did not witness major changes should be included
into a study, as a critical juncture does not mean that indeed there have been changes.
Capoccia and Keleman (2007, p.353) note that
[...]ignoring the near misses of history would actually deprive scholars of impor-
tant and interesting negative cases with regard to the outcomes they seek to
explain: in other words, it would introduce selection bias into their comparative
analyses and consequently arrive at weaker (and possibly flawed) findings.
The research design is summarised by table 4.1:
Concept Design
Main unit N Arab countries facing a critical juncture 2010 - 2013
Institutional equilibrium Different occurrence of "Bargain Rule"
Critical interference factor Labour unions as Naqabat
Scope of time Pre- and mid-Juncture
Positive Sample n1 Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, Kuwait
Negative Sample n0 Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Oman
Table 4.1: Summary of the research design
Chapter 5
The Variables and their
Implications
Trade unionism is diverse and indicators for its strength are numerous, including insti-
tutional differences, identity differences, and differences in employer, political party, or
state strategies (Frege and Kelly, 2003, p.12). Cross-national variation and historical
contingency change according to the cleavage structure of countries, and the timing
of industrialisation and democratisation often shaped trade unions’ opportunity struc-
tures (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Centralization, political unity, organizational con-
centration, access to government, legal protection, and patterns of worker militancy
are further factors to be considered depending on the cases (Ebbinghaus and Visser,
2000, p.52). All these factors are not necessarily found in every country and attempts
of parsimonious explanations for union strength should be handled with care. Indeed,
even literature about industrial relations in developed countries is "littered with gen-
eralizations which are assumed to be universal, but which are in fact conditioned by
the circumstances of time and space" (Hyman, 2001a, p.204).
Concerning developing countries, democratisation research additionally expanded pos-
sible readings and interpretations of the role and strength of trade unions, and also
regional particularities play their decisive role. In MENA they include the role of trade
unions as guardians of the authoritarian bargain, tribalism, or neopatrimonialism -
which are all barely addressed in Western literature dealing with the regions’ trade
unions.
The following section introduces five variables used for the minimisation. They are
rooted in research about OECD countries, democratisation research, and studies of
authoritarianism as well as observations from the case studies.
In addition, different concepts are discussed and assessed according to their value for
the MENA region. Based on this discussion, the variables are defined and eventually
the states of the sample will be classified and coded either as (0) or (1). Table 5 gives
an overview of the handling of variables in the remainder of this study.
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Decreased standard of living in
combination with a loss of trust in
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Excluded as standalone vari-
able. Union density does not
necessarily lead to higher mili-
tancy. Implied by KEYS as an
impact can only be assumed if
industrial sectors are also key
sectors of the economy.
Rentier State Pattern Rentier states tend to suppress
unions in order to protect key sec-
tors. The systematic repression







Excluded as standalone vari-
able. Implied by KEYS.
High Share of Guest
Workers in the Labour
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A high share of guest workers leads
states to cut trade union rights in
order to prevent unrest and to pro-
tect the institutional equilibrium.
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Trade unions benefit in a symbi-
otic way from strong ties to leftist




Excluded as standalone vari-
able. The term leftist is not
transferable to the MENA re-
gion and other currents such as
welfare oriented Islamism have
to be considered as well. Im-
plied by INOPP.
Table 5.1: Handling of Variables to explain trade union agitation against the institutional
equilibrium in MENA countries
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5.1 Deterioration of the Authoritarian Bargain (SOEC)
Following the conclusion of Gurr (1970), the deterioration of living standards is a main
reason why men rebel. These findings also coincide with results from democratisation
studies, as democratizations in the 1980s have all occurred, with the possible exception
of Korea, in crisis economies (Valenzuela, 1992, p.453). In this reading, a break of the
authoritarian bargain could result in people attacking the institutional equilibrium of
the state. If the state is no longer able or willing to fulfil its part of the authoritarian
bargain, discontent may emerge questioning the competence and legitimacy of the rul-
ing elite or the entire system as such.
Scenario I: Official and Institutionalised Trade Unions Turn Against the
State
In such a situation, also existing or new trade union structures may be used to turn
against the institutional equilibrium of the state. As has been shown, especially in
section 4.6.2, the role of trade unions in MENA countries is heavily tied to the compli-
ance of the authoritarian bargain. Theoretically, a centralised and even co-opted trade
union federation can get into rows with a ruling regime that pursues liberalisation pol-
itics that include cut-backs in welfare and job creation. There have, for instance, been
historical periods of tensions between the Algerian UGTA (especially in the 1970s and
1980s), the Egyptian ETUF (1990s), or the Tunisian UGGT (especially 1978-1984) and
their respective governments because of liberalisation and privatisation politics. The
role of trade unions can be considered as the watchdog of the authoritarian bargain
(not necessarily only of the regime as such, as argued by Schmidinger (2013)), and
union representatives need legitimacy with regard to their clientèle. As a result, such
struggles were frequently the result of implemented or announced liberalisation politics
that threatened the social contract. Real or feared deterioration of living standards
undermined trust in the regime, and if a threshold of acceptance is reached, unions
may turn against the state.
Collective action targeting the institutional equilibrium can also be regarded with a
focus on the willingness of survival of a trade union body as institution. Golden (1997)
has shown that strikes in situations of mass workforce reductions are not triggered by
the threat of job loss per se but instead by a possible threat to the union organization.
Scenario II: Workers Form New, Independent Trade Unions and Turn against
the State
Apart from institutionalised union structures, the workers themselves may also turn
their back to the corporatist unions and start to organise outside of the union frame-
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work provided by the regime. Within the inner logic of authoritarian MENA regimes,
and from the viewpoint of the regimes, the trade unions’ right of existence is tied to
their capability of surveilling the workforce and giving feedback to the regime on how to
adjust their policies of sticks and carrots. From the workers’ perspective, unions stand
for job creation, welfare, and fringe benefits that compensate for the lack of political
freedom. If unions can no longer fulfil this role, they lose their right of existence and if
the opportunity structures allow, new independent unions may emerge. These unions,
as can be traced in the case studies, do not necessarily have a progressive, democratic
or even a downright political agenda. They often simply try to accomplish what the
official trade union bodies did not manage to achieve: the defence of the authoritarian
bargain.
Policies of economic opening in times of globalisation also trigger some other changes
in strategies between workers and the state. On the one side, workers start to organise
more frequently when feel the state is failing to comply with the social contract. On
the other side, the state becomes more reluctant to use coercion against protesting
workers due to the imperative of attracting private capital as the modus operandi of
neoliberal privatisation (El-Mahdi, 2011, p.394). Under these conditions, both sides
veer away from the nationalist project and founding myths of the state. In this sce-
nario of Corporatist Collapse (Hartshorn, 2018, esp. p.4) a space of new opportunity
structures opens up in which more frequent protest as well as the institutionalisation
of new labour unions becomes possible.
Scenario III: Trade Unions Struggle for Benefits while Leaving the Institu-
tional Equilibrium Untouched
While this scenario seems reasonable for MENA countries, the business cycle theory,
which is well established in research about OECD countries, suggests - in contrast -
that union growth is pro-cyclical. According to this reading, employment growth as
well as increased living standards enhance membership growth in the short term, and
vice versa, unemployment and economic crisis decrease union density (Schnabel, 2013,
p.258). Unions with low membership are - at least without significant allies in the
political arena - less likely to reach a critical mass. Hence, the deterioration of living
standards caused by a possible breach of the social contract would decrease the like-
lihood of union activity due to the fear of repression and a perceived low probability
of success. This atmosphere can, however, create a despair that might lead to regime
change, as mentioned by (Valenzuela, 1992, p.453).
On the other side, economic stability may trigger workers’ protest in order to enhance
their own socio-economic situation. When the country is economically stable and / or
regaining strength after a crisis, workers and trade unions may try to increase their
material benefits without questioning the very structure of the state. These patterns
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could be witnessed in the cases like Algeria or Morocco in 2011. Socio-economic driven
protests can be - against the background of the authoritarian bargain - something that
does not necessarily challenge the institutional equilibrium but in fact enforces and
uses it. Especially in times of critical junctures caused by external shocks, like caused
by the pictures of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, these tactics make sense: the
uncertainty of the situation, and the insecurity of rulers on how to react provides a
higher bargaining power to those who utter demands in that very moment. Put in
other words: Not every socio-economic upheaval is a part of a larger revolutionary
endeavour that aims at toppling the institutional equilibrium.
Just like Latin America, MENA countries experienced in the second half of the 20th
century what Karl Polanyi (1947) had labelled "double movement". On one side, forces
promoting economic liberalism, disembedding of the economy, and commodification of
all strata of life face, on the other side, forces that struggle for social protection. Labour
movements play a key role inside the latter camp, forming part of a reactionary counter-
movement that aims to resist the "uprooting" of the economy from society. Transferred
to MENA countries, the restricted economic opening and privatisation policies that
started in many MENA countries after the abatement of the oil boom in the late 1970s
resemble such a push of economic liberalisation. Much of the "bread riots" like in Mo-
rocco (1981, 1984), Algeria (1988), Egypt (1977, 1984), Tunisia (1978, 1984), or Jordan
(1989) can be regarded as representation of a countermovement.
Especially on the eve of privatisation politics and economic opening, the internal al-
liances inside many regimes had changed. Had the regimes and official trade unions
acted in many countries in concert before, cracks started to appear in the plaster that
held both together. The struggle between cadres of the trade union institutions fight-
ing privatisation and cuts of subsidies on the one side, and a network of state officials
and a new emerging business elite on the other side has impressively been shown for
countries like Egypt (Posusney, 1997), Morocco (Catusse, 2001), or Tunisia (Ennaceur,
2000). During these struggles, however, the nature of the regime, and in particular the
authoritarian bargain, remained untackled by unionists. Different from the notions of
Zemni (2004), Abdelrahman (2012), Wilson (2013), or other authors who recur on Rosa
Luxemburg (1906)’s Mass Strike, it is definitely possible in MENA to pursue economic
aims while not having a political transformative stance. Not for nothing, Polanyi1
labels those forces that fight for social security as reactionary, and not progressive.
Indicators and their Implications for the Variable SOEC
The following indicators were taken as approach for a dichotomisation of the Variable
SOEC (for a summarizing overview see table A.1 in the Appendix):
1The relationship between Polanyi and Marxism has been the issue of many debates. For an
elaborate overview see Selwyn and Miyamura (2014)
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Total Unemployment Rate If unemployment rises in general, unionists might
fear losing their job in the future and decide to take collective action. A decline of
the unemployment rate, in turn, could also hamper motivation to protest, strike, or
attempt to change the institutional equilibrium. Following the theories that suggest
that union activity increases in a pro-cyclical manner, declining unemployment rates
might encourage unionists to take action in order to increase their share of economic
revenue. Using a regression of the unemployment statistics from 2000 to 2010, the
gradient βUnem shows the trend that might have affected workers’ perceptions about
the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian bargain on the part of the state.
Inflation Rate Following the same logic as suggested for the unemployment rate,
we may assume that increasing inflation and devaluation of the currency enhances
the cost of living and pushes workers to take action against a country’s institutional
equilibrium. Again, stable currencies and low inflation rates may be taken by workers
as a sign for increased prosperity and/or security and encourage them to demand
a greater share of revenues. These renegotiations are part of the very logic of the
authoritarian bargain. In extreme cases and after failed negotiations, workers might
nevertheless attack the institutional equilibrium of a state. Using a regression of the
inflation statistics from 2000 to 2010, the gradient βInfl shows the trend that might have
affected workers’ perceptions about the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian
bargain on the part of the state.
Corruption Perception Transparency International defines corruption as the
abuse of entrusted power for private gain. In the perception of workers this may mean
that resources that should actually be used to uphold the authoritarian bargain are
channelled into the pockets of an elite that enriches itself at the expense of the simple
citizen. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) measures the trust of citizens in their
administrative elite. Low or falling CPI indices may lead to a perceived necessity to
change the institutional equilibrium in order to re-channel resources and enhance their
own economic well-being. Using a regression of the CPI indices from 2000 to 2010, the
gradient βTransp shows the trend that might have affected workers’ perceptions about
the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian bargain on the part of the state.
Health Expenditure out of Pocket Increasing health expenditure may set
workers under pressure, may rise discontent, and may eventually lead to demands of
systemic change. HEP data can be used as a proxy for the condition, betterment, or
deterioration of social systems in general. Unlike data that focusses on medical infras-
tructure, HEP is more suitable to mirror the real expenses and financial stress workers
face as customers in the healthcare sector. Using a regression of the HEP indices from
2000 to 2010, the gradient βHealt shows the trend that might have affected workers’
perceptions about the breach of or adherence to the authoritarian bargain on the part
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of the state.
Increase in Purchasing Power of the Minimum Wage 2001 - 2010 The
purchasing power of the minimum wage increased in almost all countries of the sample,
albeit to a different extent. Two features make this indicator difficult to interpret: First,
the numbers (taken from ILOSTAT) are not available for all countries for that period of
time. Second, there is little information about how large the informal sector - in which
workers do not benefit from the minimum wage - actually is. Extreme cases like Yemen
or Libya, where the ppp of the minimum decreased over time show, nonetheless, that
existing numbers are a meaningful support for the assessment of the variable SOEC.
The Importance of Qualitative Research and the very Perception inside the
Countries
Sheer numbers can be regarded as a basis for discontent, but they do not necessar-
ily trigger revolutionary socio-economic uprisings, as has been shown in the seminal
work of Gurr (1970). Other circumstances influence the willingness for systemic change
against the backdrop of socio-economic deterioration. The important factor is the very
perception of the populace which eventually leads to uprisings aiming to change the
institutional equilibrium. Shantayanan and Ianchovichina (2018) argue convincingly
that while income inequality measures in the MENA region displayed comparatively
low numbers of inequality and poverty compared to other developing regions, subjec-
tive well-being measures decreased sharply, especially for the middle class, and most
particularly in the countries with the most intense uprisings.
According to the Arab Barometer poll of 2012-2014, some 63.55 per cent of the re-
spondents stated that they consider the wish for the betterment of their own economic
situation as main reason for the Arab uprisings. A driving force of the protest was the
unemployed youth who could no longer benefit from the authoritarian bargain as, due
to austerity measures, the state had cut back public employment and could no longer
absorb the cohorts that entered the labour market after education. In the private sec-
tor, state owned firms with high market power were able to set prices and bar start ups
and small enterprises from gaining a foothold in the branch. While this is a more than
acceptable explanation for the mass protests, it is insufficient to explain trade union
mobilisation. Defining trade unions as groups consisting of employed workers, the pos-
sibility of losing one’s job due to protests and strikes leads to a different cost-benefit
calculation among unionists.
In comparative perspective, economic indicators can support the assumption that an
uprising had socio-economic root; however, they cannot be taken as the sole and suf-
ficient conditions. What is regarded in one country and / or cultural context as un-
bearable and unacceptable may be tolerated in another. Therefore, the determination
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of the dichotomisation has to be done in a qualitative manner for each country. The
definition of SOEC shall be:
If socio-economic indicators hint at a deterioration of standards of living to an
extent that trade unions come to the conclusion that in the existing institutional
equilibrium the authoritarian bargain can not be accomplished by the state, the
variable SOEC is set to (1). In case trade unions protest for higher benefits
without questioning the institutional equilibrium, the variable SOEC is set to
(0), as the authoritarian bargain is still regarded as intact, and these protests are
part of the negotiation procedures within the logic of the institutional equilibrium.
Against that background, the interconnectedness between political stability and the
wish for enhancement of socio-economic conditions is essential. If socio-economic well
being does not meet expectations of the populace, political activists have to choose
whether they want to struggle for better conditions of living within the system, say,
within the rules of the game, or if they attempt to change the rules of the game as such.
The latter option involves an increased degree of uncertainty. The question is, hence,
whether activists are ready to jeopardise political stability by attacking the existing
institutional equilibrium in order to enhance their living conditions. Such strategical
considerations play their role, as will be shown, in cases like Algeria or Mauritania, in
which the collective memory had been shaped by a history of recent instability.
5.2 Intertwinedness with Opposition Forces (IN-
OPP)
Since the emergence of Social Movement Unionism it became a widespread strategy of
unions to establish ties to other civil society organisations, and to participate in cam-
paigns that go beyond classical issues of workplace conditions. Unions bonded with
the movement of altermondialists, environmental groups, human rights activists, or
anti-fascist currents to form broad fronts addressing the current matters and disputes
in society. By that way, unions could acquire access to key individuals and networks
within specific communities, enhance their reputation, and eventually increase their
appeal to poorly represented strata of society (Hyman, 1997a; Frege and Kelly, 2003,
p.9). Unions may also be historically tied to particular groups of society including po-
litical parties that have initially fostered their emergence, or also those that managed
to gain positions inside the union movement and bureaucracy. Holding these positions,
these individuals and their respective groups may increasingly exert influence on the
stances and strategies of the unions.
Outside of the European context, strategical alliances between unions and political
parties could also be observed in Latin America and South Asia: The unions’ wish for
changes in legislation or for the implementation of particular policies affecting their
members are complemented by the parties’ wish to capture the political allegiance of
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unionists who might become voters in national elections or might form a valuable net-
work of militants and demonstrators (Valenzuela, 1989, p.9-13).
Having said all of this, the variable INOPP aims at testing whether the closeness, par-
tial amalgamation, of mutual coordination, or close cooperation between trade unions
and leading opposition parties affected the eagerness of trade unions to change the
institutional equilibrium. The respective opposition party has to be a critical interfer-
ence factor itself and has to push for the same or similar aims as the trade unions. The
variable does not assess any direction of dependence and may thus include unionists
affecting party politics and vice versa.
If the majority of the institutionalised trade unions in a country cooperated closely
either with a political opposition party, a social movement, or any other kind of
political group that attempted to challenge the institutional equilibrium in 2011,
the variable INOPP is set to (1) for that country. If trade unions were not
embedded at all in the aforementioned networks, if there is credible proof for a
relatively unbiased independence of the unions, or if they cooperated, however,
the partner was not a critical interference factor in 2011, the variable INOPP is
set to (0).
Workers and Ideologies in MENA
Especially in times of crisis, unions change their strategies to include the redefinition
of interests, new systems of internal relations, to broaden or narrow their agenda, and
altered power tactics (Hyman, 1994, p.132). This also holds true for the working force
which may accept representation on a different ideological base than the official union
bodies’ orientation. Trade unionists and unions in MENA did not remain untroubled
by these kind of reorientations. Historically, three major changes in the discourses of
the region can be identified that also affected workers and activists:
First, in the "pluralist era" before and shortly after the independence of MENA states,
as Halpern (1963, 335-336) argues, local and small organised unities rarely succeeded
to alter working conditions significantly in Middle East. Therefore a political strategy
was necessary to achieve success on the macro level. Alliances between national par-
ties and other anti-colonial and unions became an important part of the anti-colonial
struggle. After the achievement of the nationalist project, unions had to re-orient and
were often co-opted into the new state systems - to the detriment of many old and new
opposition parties.
Second, between the late 1960s and 1970s, parts of the political strata swung to the
left. Such groups included foremost political forces that were dissatisfied with the way
"Arab Socialism" developed, blaming the defeat of 1967 on a half-hearted modernisa-
tion and the inconsequent implementation of socialist ideas inside the traditionalistic
environment of MENA countries (Ajami, 1981, p.34-48).2. Remainders of this strata
2For a reckoning with the Arab regimes after 1967 from an Arab-leftist perspective see Self Criticism
after the Defeat by Al-Azm (2011). Against that background, and for the impact of the European
youth movements of 1968 on the Arab leftism after 1967 see Di-Capua (2018)
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inside the trade union movement can still be found in Egypt or Bahrain, as will be
shown in the case studies.
Third, at the beginning of the second half of the 20th century another force also entered
the political landscape: Political Islam became the most powerful opposition movement
in MENA countries and managed to out-crowd almost everywhere Arab Nationalist or
Panarab rhetoric as main ideological basis for critic of the regimes. At the latest since
the ouster of their Communist allies after the Iranian revolution 1979 it became obvi-
ous that Islamist groups have particular organisational advantages. They often have
access to rich social networks in religious, educational, and charitable circles and due
to their position as religious and political actors they can elude from state repression as
many Arab regimes try to maintain a semblance of Islamic legitimacy (Mecham, 2014,
p.202). Yet, these movements were also increasingly vulnerable as the possible threat
of violent Islamism had been used frequently for crackdowns on political parties.
Nonetheless, due to a wide range of resources, political groups with Islamic inclina-
tion are often better equipped for social mobilization than their non-religious rivals
(Mecham, 2014, p.202). Furthermore, as self-proclaimed last great ideology encounter-
ing colonialism, capitalism, and often Western decadence, political Islam has managed
to become an umbrella and collection pit for discontent individuals and regime critics.
Excurse: Political Islam and Trade Unions
Being the most recent development and clearly affecting MENA’s political landscape,
it is worthwhile focussing on Political Islam and its relationship to trade unions, espe-
cially as this combination may seem bewildering and counter-intuitive for many readers.
Trade unionism and religion have an ambivalent history and relation.3
The Al-Faruqi - Al-Banna Controversy
From an early Marxian view, religion is viewed as opium for the people that disguises
class conflict, and consequently, red unions repudiated any religious interference on
a practical as well as on a theoretical level. Nonetheless, in Europe at the turn of
the 19th century also anti-socialist confessional unions, mostly Catholic in nature,
3Scholars who focussed on union-party ties in OECD countries (Allern, 2017; Ludlam et al., 2002;
Coates, 1999; Ebbinghaus, 1995) mostly focussed on the relationship between unions and social-
democratic, socialist, communist parties, or other political groups "left of the center". Besides some
notable exception like Biesca (2018) who scrutinises on "trade unionism against socialist moderni-
sation" in post-Franco Spain of the 1980s, still, the concept "trade union" remains among Europe
citizens and scholars a "leftist" phenomenon. This focus appears quite narrow when it comes to the
roles and stances outside the European and anglophone world. Besides the still underexplored rela-
tion between Islamists and labour movements, also cases like the Malaysian labour movement which
displayed union formation along ethnic lines (Rowley and Bhopal, 2006), or rightist, often nationalist
and ethnic-oriented trade unions in India (Mahmood, 2016) show that workplace organisations can
be politically more diverse.
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emerged. Eventually this trajectory merged with the social democrat currents due to a
mutual basis of capitalism-scepticism and an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary
approach to systemic change (Hyman, 2001b, p.2-3). For the MENA region, the book
Towards Islamic Labour & Unionism published in 1985 displays two divergent views
on the role that Islam should -or could - play in industrial relations. On the one side,
the American-Palestinian intellectual Ismail Al-Faruqi stresses that Islam repudiates
social stratification of people based on employment or occupation. He condemns a
materialistic classifications into working and ruling classes.4
On the other side, Gamal Al-Banna, brother of the notorious founder and leader of the
Muslim Brotherhood Hassan Al-Banna, and an active trade unionist himself, expresses
a different view. Indeed, he agrees, just like Al-Faruqi, on the the necessity for fair
labour conditions and wages, however, as he puts "justice" instead of "egalitarianism" in
the center of his thoughts, he concludes that organised labour is consistent with Islamic
law (Al-Faruqi and Al-Banna, 1984; Syed, 2008). A central pillar of this reasoning is
the claim that asymmetric power relations between employers and employees may se-
duce the former to dictate terms in violation of the Islamic principles of justice and
equality. By resorting to this reasoning, Al-Banna takes the same road as Adam Smith
(1776), McCulloch (1854), and John Stuard Mill (1869) who perceived a "disadvantage
of labour" when it comes to employer-employee negotiations and whose views became
the basic justification for European trade unionism in the 19th and early 20th century.
Although G. Al-Banna’s lifetime project of an international Islamic trade union feder-
ation failed, and he remained an outsider in the circles of the Muslim Brotherhood, his
views and writings show that trade unionism and Islam are not mutually exclusive.
State Provided Welfare as a Core Demand of Political Islam
Indeed, from a more practical and grass-root driven point of view, there are clear inter-
sections between trade unionism in the MENA region and political Islam. Although the
degree of involvement of state structures into welfare and charity is a contested matter
among Muslim scholars (for a discussion see Dean and Khan (1997)), there is a broad
consensus that the Islamic community should create instruments to avoid deprivation
and relief the poor. Some interpretations of the Quran even induce a right to work for
all members of society, as work is desirable. Moreover, different passages of the Quran
4He mainly relies on a Hadith of Al-Bukhari and also Al-Muslim where Prophet Muhammad is
supposed to have said "Your slaves are brothers of yours. Allah has placed them in your hand, and
he who has his brother under him, he should feed him with what he eats, and dress him with what
he dresses himself, and do not burden them beyond their capacities, and if you burden them, (beyond
their capacities), then help them." Also the Kuranic verse "God loveth those who are kind” (5:13)
and a Hadith by Tirmidhi stating that the Prophet said "One who mistreats those under him will
not enter paradise" are read as an imperative for the employer who, if he is a faithful Muslim, does
not exploit his subordinates (Syed, 2008). Additonally, the Hadith "No harm, no foul" passed by Ibn
Samura in which Prophet Muhammad judges in favour of property rights is widespreadly read as a
prohibition to strike against employers.
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stress the importance of a "good life" (hayat tayyibah), "welfare" (falah), provision of
ease and alleviation of hardship, and prosperity. All organisations, including the state,
should reflect that character and to ensure freedom from moral corruption, hunger, fear
and mental tensions (for an elaborated version of this interpretation see c.f. Chapra
(1979)). Responsibility is delegated by God - who is the most merciful - to the faithful
community forming what Abul A’la Maududi labels "popular vicegerency" (Maududi,
1955, p.183)5 In a similar vein, Al-Banna argues that trade unions contribute to two
of the above mentioned basic needs: food against hunger and security against fear
(Al-Faruqi and Al-Banna, 1984, p.69).
As peoples of the MENA region have gnashingly accepted the paternal and patronising
role of the state in exchange for their rights to participate, and as they have perceived
trade unions in the course of time and history as watchdogs of the authoritarian bar-
gain, it stands to reason that trade unionism became also a promising way to enhance
the base of mobilisation for the political opposition that aligned itself to this kind of
welfare-oriented political Islam. The Islamic trade unions that emerged after 1989 in
Algeria and that had close ties to the FIS, as well as the workers organisation in the
early 1980s in Syria that were often steered and mobilised by the Muslim Brotherhood
were also anti-reform movements to protect the authoritarian bargain. The traditional,
"leftist" trade unions were co-opted or crashed by the regimes and with them also an
entire repertoire of socialist rhetoric usually used by workers against oppressive regimes
became useless for opposition purposes. Islam, as argued some of its leaders, was suit-
able to fill that gap.
Political Islam Competing about the Middle Classes
The mobilisation of workers was a difficult task for political Islam, though. Belal (2005,
p.9) cites Tunisian Al-Nahda leader Al-Ghannoushi complaining:
This group (the workers) came to represent a huge problem for many capitalist
regimes and even socialist ones [...] and yet the Islamists have failed to mobilize
it [...] The reason behind the weakness of Islamist influence in this sector goes
back to their (Islamists) ignorance and insensitivity regarding political and social
problems of the working class.
In the 1980s, Ghannoushi seemed to be an exception among his peers. As Al-Banna
(1982) argued, besides the widespread belief that it was actually the employer’s and
not necessarily the workers duty to guarantee good working conditions, also the per-
ception of trade unions as imperialist and Marxist (and hence atheist) organisations
5Although stressing the importance of welfare and a limited degree of participation, in the same
book Maududi also shows clear tendencies towards totalitarianism when writing that the Islamic state
" seeks to mould every aspect of life and activity in consonance with its moral norm and programmes
of social reform. In such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private.
Considered from this point of view the Islamic State bears a kind of resemblance to the Fascist and
Communist states." For a discussion see Bale (2009).
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hampered the willingness of Islamic organisations and individuals to engage in trade
unions. Since the 1990s, this ideological gap seems to narrow, and at least since the
2000s Islamic activists do play a role inside MENA’s trade union movement, as the
cases of the Al-Nahda in Tunisia (from the point when Ghannoushi encouraged Is-
lamists to join trade unions), the ties between al-Wefaq and the GFBTU in Bahrain,
the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan’s professional associations, or
the participation of candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s trade union
elections since 2001 indicate.
An important factor to understand the dynamics of trade unionism as alternative to the
state-steered frameworks is the role of the middle classes. The classical two-class struc-
ture that emerged after WWII with landlords, military officers, bureaucrats, most of
the rich traders and some of the intelligentsia on top and highly segmented agglomera-
tions of peasants, workers, and most of the intelligentsia on the bottom (Halpern, 1969,
p.98-99) changed over time. The inability of populist regimes to include or suppress
emerging lower-middle and middle classes led to a diversity of civil-society institutions
at least since the 1980s. Turning their backs to the old Panarab and Arab nationalist
ideologies, the middle classes bore intellectual, organisational, and mobilising capital
many of the ideologically coined political groups were competing about.
The establishment of civil-society institutions was often also encouraged by the state in
order to disencumber the regimes - which were often not able to meet the demands of
these classes anymore (Bayat, 2002, p.2). Although this brought a notable shift from
class based organisation to organisation in communities and loose NGO’s, especial pro-
fessional white-collar associations became a platform for the middle classes. Middle
classes may, but do not necessarily bond with political Islam or become a part of the
Islamist spectre (Beinin, 2005, p.113), however, this alliance proved to be powerful in
the past. The successful organisations and parties affiliated with the Muslim Broth-
erhood (Al-Nahda in Tunisia, Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Islah Party in Yemen
and so forth) are evidences for their success, while all of them started to mingle into
professional organisations since the early 1990s, especially into the engineers, teachers,
and medical staff unions.
The emergence of NGO’s was also fostered by humanistic-liberal groups that stressed
secularity and the importance of Human rights. The Tunisian Ligue Tunisienne des
Droits de l’Homme (LTDH) or the Yemen Center for Human Rights (YCHR) are ex-
amples of middle class driven and politically active human rights organisations, that
also often held close ties to Journalists Unions and Bar Associations.
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5.3 Centralisation vs. Fragmentation (CEN)
The case studies in this thesis display a wide range of institutional frameworks and
factual manoeuvring space for trade unionism reaching from relative openness and
freedom to organise strict co-optation into a rigid framework of state-corporatism.
Following Griffin et al. (1980), the degree of centralisation is tied to the influence of
the central labour organisation on rank and file unionists as well as the bargaining
strength of these central organisations confronting the state on the one hand, and
private employers on the other. The handling of the variable CEN is as follows:
If a trade union framework inside a country is characterised by an institution-
alised hierarchy that gives the central trade union federations a clear and practi-
cally undisputed predominance in negotiations with the state and enterprises as
well as a monopoly or quasi-monopoly on union membership, the variable CEN
is set to (1). If the country is characterised by trade union pluralism with sev-
eral trade union federations that display roughly equal membership numbers and
bargaining power, the variable CEN is set to (0).
5.3.1 Authoritarian Corporatism and State Sponsored Union-
ism
To understand the nature of centralisation of trade unions in MENA, it is worthwhile
taking a look at the literature about corporatism that eventually leads to state spon-
sored trade unionism. Indeed, central features of corporatism are macro-management,
coordination, systematisation, and harmonisation of bargaining over working condi-
tions.
In Western countries, a trade union mobilising corporatist system became likely to
emerge when trade unions formed in times of class formation. This explains the high
degree of centralisation of Swiss, Austrian, German, and Nordic trade unions in con-
trast to their more decentralised French or US counterparts (Therborn, 1992, p.28).
Now, similar to Europe (Linz, 2000), MENA corporatist authoritarianism emerged as
compromise between welfare-oriented, authoritarian socialist currents, counter-revolutionary
conservatism, and anti-etatist, liberal, and rather state-sceptical elements during the
struggle of independence against European powers. Having a mutual project, these
forces closed ranks to an even higher extent than many of their European counter-
parts: As many MENA labour movements formed part of the nationalist movement,
their ties to the new ruling elites were often strong and included overlapping party and
trade union leadership. Those countries that resorted to a Pan-Arab nationalist and/or
socialist anti-colonial ideology were even more prone to include the worker’s movement
into the nationalist front. How uncompromising the national leadership could be about
the role of trade unions could be witnessed in many countries struggling for indepen-
dence, inside and outside the Arab World. A quote of Tanzanian anti-colonial activist,
politician, and political theorist Julius Nyerere (1922-1999) shows that impressively:
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[...] either the trade unions and the political organisations are prongs, or ’legs’ of
the same nationalist movement, or they are not. If they are, then the question of
whether they should or should not cooperate in getting the country from point
A to point B does not arise. They must cooperate. Otherwise a nationalist
movement, or the socialist movement, or whatever you may like to call it, cannot
move forward at all. It is bound to break up."
After independence, the integration of monopolistic mass organisations and the re-
liance on these organisations for mobilisation and monitoring the population became
a main pillar of the country’s power structure. This coincides with the observation
of Crouch (1993, p.8) who stated that the discipline of corporatist arrangements, that
somewhat bore the veiled implication of fascism or at least conveyed some kind of an-
tiliberalism, was a key factor to understand strong centralisation of union movements
in the history of Europe. Additionally, centralised union structures bear advantages
for the business elite of a country: Studies from OECD countries indicate that local
managements are more relaxed about centralised unions as they interfere less in work-
place management and local wage-setting and may nonetheless solve the latent conflict
between capital and labour (Schnabel, 2013, p.266).
Especially the countries of the sample that became officially Republics after indepen-
dence tended to attempt to include trade unionism into the new state apparatus in
order to control it (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Yemen)6. Thus, in these
countries a state-union relation emerged that is labelled "state sponsored unionism" by
Valenzuela (1992). The worker’s organisations in these countries are characterised by
official financing, compulsory membership, and strict boundaries to the sectors they
cover. The leadership is designated by state officials or elected by workers whereas
in the latter case state authorities screen and possibly exclude candidates in advance
(Valenzuela, 1992, p.448). State sponsored trade unionism may also include systems
like Algeria or Tunisia, in which trade union pluralism is theoretically allowed by law,
but the centralised hegemonic unions or union federations were favoured by the regime.
The emergence of new labour organisations was hampered due to discrimination by
state authorities and also by the high transaction costs every new union has when it
attempts to rise in a sector where already a big player exists (Millerson, 1960, p.49).
5.3.2 Trade Unionism in the Context of Hybridisation Strate-
gies
Other examples of centralisation follow a similar logic, however, the initial motivation
of state authorities for the introduction of a centralised trade union framework differs.
Bahrain and Oman undertook some reforms affecting overall participation of the popu-
lace at the beginning of the 2000s. This reform driven trade unionism is a balancing act
of the regimes between pleasing the international community in order to improve in-
6Although not being a Republic, also Jordan belongs to this category. Authorities copied much of
their union legislation in the 1970s from Syria and Iraq.
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ternational relations and to spur cooperation and investment, pleasing reform oriented
forces inside the country who painfully point out that the ruling class lacks legitimacy,
and the wish to still control the workers movements in order to preserve the hegemonic
position of that ruling elite.
In this environment, which can be found foremost in the Gulf countries, the creation of
official representation for workers is made stepwise: First a system of workers commit-
tees, which resembles a state controlled and a-political system of councils, is introduced.
Besides Oman and Bahrain such systems could also be found in Qatar and Saudi Ara-
bia. In a further step, this system is turned into a proper trade union framework, as
seen in Bahrain (2002) and Oman (2006). These legal reforms can be regarded as test
balloons released by the regime in order to fathom how much self-determination can
be given to workers without the regime losing its influence. During this process, the
regime takes care that the trade union bodies first, remain ideology-free, second, are
staffed with a leadership that is loyal to the regime and that supports its (industrial)
politics, and third, that these new organisations remain somewhat financially depen-
dent on the state.
A more relaxed strategy to neutralise the threat that can derive from trade unions
can be found in Morocco and Mauritania. Trade union pluralism was allowed at an
early stage, which led to a highly fragmented trade union landscape. This type resem-
bles what Valenzuela (1992) labels "contestatory unionism", however, different from
his classification, it occurs under an authoritarian pretext. A wide range of different
political ideologies and parties produced several different trade unions and trade union
federations that compete with each other. These parties and ideologies, however, are
not system challenging. They are part of the institutional equilibrium in the sense
of providing the state elite legitimacy by mimicking a democratic opposition. These
groups compete about the access to state resources and use trade union mobilisation
as a trump to enhance their bargaining position. Consequently, in these cases of con-
trolled pluralism and deepened liberalisation, unions tend to split according party lines
(Hinnebusch, 2005, p.351-352) and keep each other in check.
5.3.3 Implications and Definition of the Variable CEN
In the case of a critical juncture, it is thinkable that a centralised or decentralised
structure has an impact on trade union behaviour. A possibility would be that the
centralisation and integration into the state apparatus and the closeness to the regime
bar trade unions to join those voices who demand a change of the institutional equi-
librium of the country. A possible explanation could be an extraordinary degree of
violence used by the regime to keep its corporatist arrangement up. This can be seen
in Syria and Libya. An incorporated, say, co-opted trade union system is a strategy of
self defence of the regime, especially if violence is an inherent part of the institutional
equilibrium. The more authoritarian and intolerant a system, the more important civil
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societies and mass organisations become for mobilisation and the utterance of demands,
and, consequently, the more dangerous it is for ruling elites (Valenzuela, 1989, p.16).
If the grip of the regime on the trade union movement is so strong that no unionist will
challenge the state, a final QCA equation including CEN and a trade union movement
that is passive or even pro-regime (Outcome = 0) is probable.
A centralised union system, on the other side, also decreases transaction costs and
provides an efficient framework for communication. Whenever a workers’ movement
that is organised in a strict corporatist structure turns against the ruling elite, the
centralisation is an organisational asset, as could be witnessed in the case of Sudan
in the 1980s or Tunisia in 1978. The penetration of the workforce, that often reaches
the shop floors and offices of small economical or political workplaces, leads to a broad
pool for mobilisation. If the national trade union leadership gets into rows with the
state leadership, this potential pool may give self confidence to the union federation to
start a mass strike. High workplace penetration and mobilisation capacity could thus
be an explanation for the presence of (CEN) in a final equation rendering the outcome
(1).
A counterargument states that encompassing unions or confederations will always hurt
one of their constituencies and will hence more likely refrain from action (Hege and
Visser, 1993; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p.46). This possible lethargy may also be
reinforced by strategic behaviour connected with Olsen’s (1982, 1985) Theory of Col-
lective Action in which individuals in large organisations have less incentives to pursue
their goals as too many free riders would diminish the eventual reward of the activists.
Indeed most authors of the corporatist tradition explain the union decline since 1980s
using these pattern as explanation for weakened centralised wage bargaining institu-
tions (Lee, 2005, p.72). This, again, could be explanations for a final QCA equation
including CEN and rendering the outcome (0), as it is not completely clear if political
changes might not decrease the power of the union.
Adding another dimension, in a highly decentralised system in which collective bar-
gaining is decentralised completely, free competition between unions may fragment and
weaken unions as bargaining agents to a maximum extent (Valenzuela, 1992, p.448).
This may lead to a complete de-politicisation, as the local labour leaders and rank-
and-file workers do not assume that their mobilisation will affect the macro-economic
or political situation beyond their workplace of craft (Valenzuela, 1992, p.455). Hibbs
(1978) argue that the decentralisation of trade unions goes along with a predominance
of (yellow) business unions that pursue non-political goals like in the industrial relation
system of the United States and to a lesser extent in Great Britain. Such a weakening
fragmentation could be an explanation for a final QCA equation including (cen) and
rendering the outcome (0). On the other side, Frege and Kelly (2003, p.19) argue
that political action in divided union movements is still possible as long as there is a
certain degree of inter-confederal unity, as in Spain in the mid-1990s, in Italy the early
124 CHAPTER 5. THE VARIABLES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
1990s, and in Morocco in the 1980s and early 1990s. In this case, a fragmented union
landscape can still be a decisive change agent.
5.4 Degree of Tribalism (TRI)
In his pointed essay about the weaknesses of the trade union movement in Yemen,
Al-Sama’i (2019b) points at the hampering role of tribalism and the centrality of fam-
ily bonds. Especially in countries with a strong rural character, but also in strong
patrimonial systems, tribal and clan connections are of the essence to making a living
and/or for upward mobility in general. Consequently, the variable TRI is handled as
follows:
If in a country upward mobility and economic well being is heavily coined to
tribal or family connections, and tribalism poses an indispensable part of the
institutional equilibrium, the variable TRI is set to (1). If the state bureaucracy,
mass organisations, or economic activity provide chances for upward mobility
that are relatively independent from primordial decent, the variable TRI is set to
(0). The latter case, however, does not mean that family bonds do not play a
role; they just play a minor role in comparison to the cases coded (1).
5.4.1 Tribalism as Part of States in MENA
The scientific dealing with tribalism often triggered some criticism stating that an "ide-
ology of tribalism" (Mafeje, 1971) has helped to construct the "other" while concealing
inner-African realities. For the MENA region, however, we can assume a strong role of
tribal identities, especially as individuals and groups referred historically to themselves
as tribes (banu / qabai’l / ’asha’ir) pointing at a common ancestry and generating a
feeling of solidarity among their members. This origin can be transmitted by folklore
and a collective memory - which might, without doubt, also be constructed - and is
betimes even reinforced by the prevailing historical narrative of the state. Indeed, the
classification of tribalism and tribes does not necessarily follow a biological-ethnological
tradition, but should rather be regarded as mutual concepts and personal attitudes.
This view can also be found in Ibn Khaldun’s concept of Asabiyya which resembles
a kind of a social force or mutual feeling of solidarity which can be built on blood
and kinship but also on faith, trust, and a resulting strong cohesion in a group. Ibn
Khaldun himself saw such a pronounced Asabiyya especially among Bedouin tribes and
families, as these were due to the geographical conditions and their lifestyle extremely
dependent on mutual support.
Today, as the example of Kuwait shows vividly, this kind of solidarity can be found
among urban tribal associations that form quasi-parties in the political system of some
MENA countries. Historically, colonial powers and leaders of new emerging nation
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states depended on tribal systems for the sake of stability. Tribal structures, power,
and authority was used, maintained and often preserved in a dialogic way (Evans-
Pritchard, 1987; Ledger, 2010). The strength of tribal pattern is hereby not restricted
to the countryside and may also diffuse into urban and industrialised areas where trade
unions traditionally have their strongholds. This may happen due to a top-down tra-
jectory in which the regime culturally encourages the favouritism of family bonds, and
also due to migration from rural areas into cities whereby individuals preserve their
bonds to the village or family (Kassalov, 1963, p.28). Also the economic structure may
play a role, as despite some tensions between bosses and employees, especially in the
private and informal sector workers are more likely to remain loyal to their employer
than to class-based organisations consisting of their colleagues (Bayat, 2002, p.7). Rent
income and the self-dependence of many individuals, often inside the informal sector,
also blurred class lines and decreased the likelihood of class consciousness (Farsoun,
1998, p.15).
Although in many Arab states lineage pattern can indeed be regarded as the "invis-
ible skeleton of the community" (Bill and Springborg, 2000, p.73), the impact of the
geographical situation, colonisation history, industrialisation, and other historical id-
iosyncrasies have altered and influenced the power, degree and nature of tribalism in
the states of the sample. The classification of Arab states by Harik (1990) is a useful
categorisation to start, distinguish the cases, and determine the dichotomisation of the
variable TRI.
5.4.2 Tribalism and Worker’s Solidarity
The basic reasoning behind the inclusion of the variable TRI is the assumption that
a high degree of Tribalism - which might be part of, or be explicitly protected by the
institutional equilibrium - cross cuts and eventually ousts a mutual feeling of solidarity
among workers of a workplace or branch. The presumption is thus that a positive
variable TRI led to weak or passive trade unions during the critical juncture (Outcome
= 0).
According to a possible reading, the feeling of solidarity, in a Marxian reading labelled
class consciousness would lead to the perception among the workers that it was more
preferable to organise their fellow workmates to achieve socio-economic or political
aims rather than relying on other ontologic-ideological or primordial forms of organisa-
tion.In Middle East and North Africa, many family, tribal, ethnic, and religious groups
have been composed of individuals who represent two or more classes, often producing
conflicts of interest between workplace organisation and kinship, or facilitating what
Marx calls a "false consciousness". A comparably increased permeability of class lines
due to prevailing family bonds in the MENA region is a widely observed outcome of
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this group-class tension (Bill, 1972, 431)7, making the concept of class less useful for
analysis of MENA countries.
5.5 Bargaining Power in Key Sectors (KEYS)
The variable KEYS measures the relative strength of trade bargaining power of trade
unions in economic sectors that are of importance for state income. As will be argued,
this variable bears advantages vis-á-vis classical figures used in OECD countries such as
urbanisation, industrialisation, or union density. The definition of the variable KEYS
is:
If trade union organisations have since the 1990s successfully struggled for en-
hancements of their salaries or working condition in key sectors of the economy,
the variable KEYS is set to (1). If there have not been such attempts, or if strug-
gles of workers were successfully repressed by the state, the variable KEYS is set
to (0).
5.5.1 Industrialisation and Union Density in OECD Countries
A widespread argument about the strength of trade unions is connected to the de-
gree of urbanisation and industrialisation. It starts from the claim that the necessary
condition for trade unionism would be the buying and selling of labour power on a
significant scale, and particularly industrialisation would be characterised by this eco-
nomic pattern (Allen, 1969). Tracing the evolution of European trade unions, indeed,
and somewhat obvious, the more labourers left the agricultural sector and found em-
ployment in the industrial sector, the more grew the strength of organised labour - as for
instance Crouch (1993) has convincingly shown. With the development of service-based
societies at the expense of the industrial sector, union density and power declined, as
service industries are alleged to be difficult to organize (Griffin et al., 1980, p.179-180).
Indeed, in Europe, a change from large-scale blue collar workplaces to more atomised
and dispersed high-skilled working places diminished the power base of unions, as white-
collar workers and highly skilled individuals are supposed to have lower attachment to
the labour force (Schnabel, 2013; Ebbinghaus et al., 2011, p.260). Consequently, stud-
ies have found that a shift in employment from manufacturing (the traditional union
stronghold) to the service sector lowered union density (Schnabel, 2013; Blaschke, 2000,
p.258).
This form of de-industrialisation was enforced by the combination of higher outputs of
7The weakening of the solidarity between workers, however, is something that cannot only be
applied to MENA countries, also in western societies a "disaggregation of the working class" (Hy-
man, 1992) could be witnessed, and some wondered if democracy and solidarity may have become
"incompatible" (Streeck, 1988).
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the service sector and lower productivity at the same time, leading to a higher capa-
bility of absorbing the labour force (Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, 1997). Additionally
to that technology driven de-industrialisation, the industries in Europe got under pres-
sure by trade liberalisation, and labour was the first factor to be replaced in order to
maintain competitiveness, leading to trade driven de-industrialisation (Alderson, 1999;
Lee, 2005). In a unique research about industrialisation, union density, and collective
action, for the 16 OECD countries of his sample Lee (2005, p.81) clearly states:
employment in the industrial sector is the most consistent and the strongest de-
terminant for unionisation trends, regardless of any introduction of economic,
political, international variables and any change of the estimation strategies be-
tween OLS and GLS variants.
This observation goes hand in hand with the views of other scholars stating that
membership is the most important indicator of the capacity for collective action of
workers (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; Korpi, 1983; Ebbinghaus and Visser, 2000, p.59).
5.5.2 The Problematic of Union Density and Industrialisation
in MENA Countries
The connection between industrialisation, union density, and capacity to act in the
political arena can also be found in the assessment of the weakness of Yemeni trade
unions of Al-Sama’i (2019c). Nonetheless, trade union density is helpful to a limited
extent only when asking the question of willingness or even success of attempted change
of the institutional equilibrium:
First, the membership numbers of MENA trade unions are prone to manipulations,
especially concerning unions that are close to the system. As state resources are often
distributed according to membership numbers, and the state is mostly in charge of
checking the accuracy of the reported statistics, the regime has incentives to confirm
membership numbers of allied unions that go beyond their real amount of members.
Second, membership numbers are no indicator for willingness to change the structures
of power, as in many countries and branches of the MENA region trade union mem-
bership is - if not compulsory - highly recommended for workers who do not want to
attract attention of the security forces. Also social insurance is often administered by
trade unions like in the cases of Syria or Egypt, and this kind of "Ghent System" boosts
the union membership - as can be also observed in European countries like Belgium,
Sweden, or Denmark (Western, 1997; Frege and Kelly, 2003; Schnabel, 2013, p.265).
Third, political transformation as such is not necessarily tied to union density: The
cases of "redemocratisation" in Latin America and East Asia show, by world standards,
medium to low levels of union density, oscillating about 15-20 per cent (Valenzuela,
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1992, p.453).
Also low union organisation rates do not necessarily indicate a lack of collective ac-
tion. This also holds true for MENA, where many unions traditionally followed a
protectionist, almost reactionary course. Especially countries with state-sponsored in-
dustrialization where regimes offered organised labour benefits that tied it closely to
the state, workers were sensitive to the withdrawal of state support (Langohr, 2014,
p.188). Unions in Algeria or Egypt entered confrontations with the regime about pri-
vatisation and trade liberalisation, and the judgement of The World Bank (2004, p.150)
shows that this resistance played a role despite low membership rates:
Unionised workers in MENA have often hijacked the public debate and impeded
labour market reforms despite their declining share in the labor force and the
political control governments subject them to. Resistance to reform not only has
slowed progress in privatizing public enterprises, where labor retrenchment is a
concern, but also has delayed bringing the legal code into alignment with current
practices in labor markets, such as the use of temporary contracts. [...] As a
result of all these factors, labor market reforms have been absent from the policy
agenda in MENA for much of the past decade.
The question remains why unions, even when their membership numbers decline or
are low from the beginning, have the power to influence state decisions. A promising
approach seems to be the search for the existence of strong trade union activity in
key sectors of the economy. Measuring union strength by that way takes the possible
leverage into account that trade unions do have in fact vis-á-vis the state. This vari-
able resorts to the term trade union militancy, defined by to Bacon and Blyton (2002)
as strong union workplace activity and great engagement with management in solving
operational problems and long-term business strategies. Also incidents of union-led
strikes and successful negotiations about working conditions and wages between 2000
and 2010 need to be taken into account.
The degree of overall industrialisation is also not necessarily the key indicator, as small
industries like oil and gas production often contribute significantly to the state rev-
enues. Combined with a low diversification of the economy, rentier states (Beblawi and
Luciani, 1987) are often highly dependent from the export of a few goods only. Mili-
tant trade unions in these key sectors, thus, have a disproportionately high potential
of influencing state decisions8.
Another sector in which unions may have a great bargaining power are connected to
infrastructure and especially to the public goods that are necessary to uphold the
authoritarian bargain. And as the state sector is an important employer in MENA
countries, also trade unions in the public sector may be influential opponents of the
8Much of the literature argues that in countries of rentier state pattern and especially in the gulf
monarchies the regimes impede and suppress union activity by bans on strike and on unions (Cammett
and Pripstein-Posusney, 2010; Crystal, 2007). While this is true for several oil exporting rentier states
of the gulf, there is no evidence for such a pattern in the 12-country sample I use, as the strong unions
in the oil and petrochemical sectors of Kuwait, the unions in the Aluminium sector in Bahrain, and
the oil unions in Oman indicate. Only Libya may display such pattern of union suppression.
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regime. Strikes in public transport, garbage disposal, public administration, schools,
electricity and water, or among maintenance workers may - if well organised - also
have a significant impact on the state. The authoritarian bargain requires the state to
provide public goods and welfare, and a lack or retardation may chip away the state’s
legitimation.
5.5.3 Handling and Measurement of the Variable KEYS
To classify the cases according to the definition of the variable KEYS as given above,
first key sectors have to be determined, and second, incidents have to be found that
justify the coding of the variable as (1) or (0). Information about the key sectors is
taken from the CIA Factobook of 2010, the Economic Complexity Rankings (ECI)9,
OECD and World Bank statistics, and additional sources which are explicitly men-
tioned in the running text.
To assess the bargaining power of trade unions in these sectors, first it has to be deter-
mined if unions were existent in this sectors at all. For the sample of the 12 countries,
indeed, key sectors were - at least formally - present in these neuralgic points of the
economy. Second, reports of successful - or unsuccessful - strikes and labour disputes
will be taken into account. The important qualitative indicator is the degree to which
unions where able to push their demands vis-á-vis the state and / or employers.
The weakness in key sectors can also be a symptom of an overall weakness of the trade
unions or trade union federations on the macro level. A reasonable proxy is therefore
the success of trade unions and federations in tripatite negotiations about economic
policies and features like the minimum wage. If the position on the macro level is weak,
and the unions are sidelined in these negotiations, a weak bargaining position can be
assumed which may also derive from the weakness in key sectors. This claim, of course,
has to be justified qualitatively case by case.
9The Economic Complexity Index (ECI), published by the Observatory of Economic Complexity
(OEC) of the Media Lab of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), measures the relative
knowledge intensity of an economy by considering the knowledge intensity of the products it exports.
For more information see (Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2019)
Chapter 6
Stock-Taking: Labour Unions
during the Uprisings 2010 - 2012
The roles, reactions, and embedding of labour unions during the Arab uprisings differ
greatly from country to country. To make a reasonable determination of the outcome
(1) and (0) for each case every country will be put under scrutiny. The form, parts,
and content of the case studies is not entirely fixed, however, they follow a particular
structure.
First, the kind of the institutional equilibrium is introduced and described, includ-
ing the most important institutions, mechanisms, and discourses that form important
pillars of the equilibrium. They are outlined with the help of a historical analysis
of the country that describes the genesis, former junctures, and state strategies the
country has experienced since independence. Furthermore, a brief review of constitu-
tions, electoral laws, or other legal documents of concern is included in order to give
an understanding of the institutional shielding that was set up in the course of the
hybridisation of the systems. This first part also determines the dichotomisation of the
variable TRI for the case under scrutiny.
A second part introduces the genesis and history of the trade union movement of the
country. The part describes the role of the movement during the struggle of the coun-
tries against colonial powers, state-trade union relationships after independence, and
the background of how, why, and when unions were legalised. By introducing the legal
framework for trade union activity as well as the emergence of the most important
union federation(s), the dichotomisation of the variable CEN is determined. This part
also shows the history of labour unrest in the country and how trade unions reacted
to the hybridisation of the system and hence determines the dichotomisation for the
variable KEYS and INOPP.
A third part gives an overview about the critical juncture, the main interference fac-
tors, and the role trade unions played during the events. By giving an overview of the
socio-economic situation in 2010, and the perception and demands of the protesters,
the dichotomisation of the variable SOEC is determined. This last part eventually also
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SOEC INTEROPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Dec-Nr.
Mauritania 0 0 0 1 0 0 (2)
Morocco 0 0 0 1 1 0 (3)
Algeria 0 0 1 0 1 0 (5)
Syria 0 0 1 1 0 0 (6)
Oman 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Yemen 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Libya 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Tunisia 1 0 1 0 0 1 (20)
Bahrain 0 1 1 1 0 1 (14)
Kuwait 0 1 1 1 1 1 (15)
Egypt 1 0 1 0 1 1 (21)
Jordan 1 1 1 1 0 1 (30)
Table 6.1: Truth Table Showing the Eventual Determinations of the Outcomes and Variables
of the Study
gives evidences and reasoning for the dichotomisation of the very outcome that is used
during the minimisation process for the case.
Each case study begins with the introduction of the truth table row and a brief sum-
mary of the findings. The complete truth table
In order to determine a reasonable sequence of the case studies, a chain of compari-
son is used which is based on a distance matrix. A distance matrix shows the number of
variables that are different between two countries. The use of the chain of comparison
and, in particular, the use of the distance matrix is different from the use of a distance
matrix as introduced, for instance, by Berg-Schlosser (2012, chapter 7). It is not the
aim of this section to give explanations for the outcomes (1) and (0) by putting them
directly into relation with the variables. This is done at length in chapter 7 of this
study. The current chapter focusses on a reasonable and comprehensive delimitation
of the variables and justifies their coding as (1) or (0). The step is of importance as all
five variables are qualitative, and the chosen threshold for the variables of each case is
vulnerable and can easily be attacked by critics if it is not well justified. By using the
chain of comparison, the dichotomisations can explicitly and implicitly be made trans-
parent and a clarifying light is shed on grey zones. The chain of comparison does not
follow a "most similar system - different outcome" or "most different system - similar
outcome" design, but rather attempts to maximise the amount of different variables
among two consecutive cases. Based on the distance matrix (see A.4), the following
sequence for the chain of comparison has been chosen:
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Table 6.2: Chain of comparison with number and kind of differing variables
Case Direction Case Different Variables Differing Variables
Libya → Algeria 3 SOEC, TRI, KEYS
↰ ←
↱
Algeria → Jordan 4 SOEC, INOPP, TRI, KEYS
↰ ←
↱
Jordan → Morocco 4 SOEC, INOPP, CEN, KEYS
↰ ←
↱
Morocco → Tunisia 4 SOEC, CEN, TRI, KEYS
↰ ←
↱
Tunisia → Kuwait 4 SOEC, INOPP, TRI, KEYS
↰ ←
↱
Kuwait → Oman 3 SOEC, INOPP, KEYS
↰ ←
↱
Oman → Mauritania 2 SOEC, CEN
↰ ←
↱
Mauritania → Yemen 2 SOEC, CEN
↰ ←
↱
Yemen → Bahrain 2 SOEC, INOPP
↰ ←
↱
Bahrain → Egypt 4 SOEC, INOPP, TRI, KEYS
↰ ←
↱
Egypt → Syria 3 INOPP, CEN
↰ ←
↱
Syria → Libya 1 SOEC
The chain of comparison is a guideline that encourages to compare the current case
study with the preceding case. If there are particular features that would become clear
more strikingly when compared to another case of the sample, also these cases are used.
The results form the basis for the minimisations in chapter 7.
6.1 Libya (0)
Libya is a sparsely populated country that is often divided into the three provinces
of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fessan. These provinces roughly mirror but also often
cross-cut tribal influence zones. Tribes were of utmost importance under the rule of
Gaddafi although the political System of the Jamihiriya derives from genuinely repub-
lican ideas. The protests of 2011 escalated quickly and turned into a long-lasting civil
war. Trade unionism was dominated by the state and almost no civil society organi-
sations were allowed to exist outside the framework of the Jamihiriya. Consequently,
reform oriented union activity during the critical juncture was absent. The truth table
row reads as follows:
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SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal Code
1 0 1 1 0 0 LYB(22)
Table 6.3: Truth table row for the case of Libya
Given the pivotal role of tribes inside the country, on which Gaddafi was resorting
as a main pillar of power for decades - as outlined in section 6.1.1 - the variable TRI
is coded (1). The strict corporatist centralisation of trade unions inside the Jamhariya
system before 2011, as described in part 6.1.2 leads the coding of CEN as (1). The
same section also shows that the hard grip of the authorities - who did not allow any
worker’s dissent - diminished the official trade union bodies’ bargaining power in key
sectors.
Section 6.1.3 shows that, although the initial spark for the protests was the detention
of a human rights activist, the socio-economic circumstances in Libya were deteriorat-
ing in the years before, nourishing the grievances that actually led to the upheavals.
During the upheavals, trade unions lacked a progressive base inside the official union
framework and outside; there was no connection to any of the three major opposition
currents that are introduced in 6.1.3. The variable INOPP is thus coded (0).
6.1.1 The Equilibrium of the "Stateless State"
The generation of Libya’s coup of 1969 redrafted the country’s system from the scratch.
A system of councils replaced the old monarchical bureaucracy and by embedding tribal
structures into the decision making processes and into networks of distribution, Colonel
Ghadaffi and his closest allies managed to maintain a more than 40 years lasting rule.
The Jamihiriya as Basic Structure of the System
Inspired by Arab Nationalism and in admiration of Gamal ’Abd-Al-Nasr, who had
managed to implement his vision of an Arab republic in an internationally widely ob-
served and often acclaimed manner in neighbouring Egypt, a group of young officers
ousted Libya’s King Idriss in 1969 in a bloodless coup. The legitimacy of the King-
dom, based genuinely on the history of the Sanussi Sufi Brotherhood and the Sanussi
royal house, turned into ramshackle already throughout the 1960s due to the rapid and
asymmetric oil-driven modernisation in a conservative and tribal society. Questions
of distribution and corruption as well as little support outside its popular base in the
eastern province of Cyrenaica became the pitfalls of the Kingdom (Vandewalle, 2012,
p.76). The new rulers struggled to find a new sustainable system that would meet the
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concerns of the educated urban strata, the diverse tribal federations, and the Islamic
’Ulama who had mostly been associated with the Sanussi Monarchy.
The unity of the three former Ottoman provinces Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and Fes-
san was maintained. Facing a surprising political apathy for politics on the national
macro-level among most of Libya’s population, especially in rural, tribally controlled
areas, the idea of countrywide elections was dropped and a system of councils was
implemented. Mass mobilisation from the grass-root level became a pivotal element of
the logic of the new system. In 1971, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) was implemented
as a vanguard unity party to mobilize the masses for political participation and to help
to consolidate the revolution (Vandewalle, 2012, p.82). After some years, the degree of
mobilisation appeared unsatisfactory to the revolutionaries. In 1973, the charismatic
primus inter pares within the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the 30 year old
then Colonel Mu’ammar Al-Ghadaffi, came up with an entirely new system and ide-
ology. Following Ghadaffi’s "Green Book" of 1975 and its socio-political implications,
Libya became a sui-generis system of governance by the masses. Its author chose the
unique name of Jamahiriya in contrast to the Arab name for Republic Jumhuriya to
stress the difference. The basic idea was to abolish all intermediate institutions between
state and society and which targeted hierarchical bureaucratic structures inherent in
modern states and especially political associations and parties.
In 1977, the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was proclaimed. The system
was promoted as a republic based on local popular councils and communes on the very
basic local level named Basic People’s Congresses. These congresses each elected a
working committee which, again, form popular congresses for each district. The up-
per, say, national level committee was called General People’s Congress Libya (GPC),
and resembled an oversized national parliament of 2,700 representatives from the Basic
People’s Congresses. Subsequently, the latter chose the General People’s Committee,
being the equivalent of a Cabinet. Hence, a separation of power was theoretically im-
plied, whereas the General People’s Committee represents the executive branch and the
General People’s Congress represents its legislative counterpart (Paoletti, 2011, p.317).
Additionally, basic popular congresses also elected administrative people’s committees
to replace government administration on every level of the system. However, the fac-
tual competences of these bodies were severely limited. Secretaries, say, ministers were
proposed and appointed by the regime, and key functions and fields of parliamentary
autonomy such as foreign policy, discretionary power regarding the army and the po-
lice, as well as the country’s budget, and the petroleum sector could not be influenced
by the GPC. Additionally, this Jamahiriya body was complemented by the so-called
revolutionary body since 1979 which had a similar structure and consisted, analogously,
of revolutionary committees that were already introduced in 1977. The members of the
revolutionary committees who were recruited from offices, schools, businesses, and the
armed forces, were more loyal to Ghadaffi and his rhetoric, and served as watchdogs
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and corrective of the Jamahiriya bodies.
In the course of the system adoption, the RCC was formally abolished, the ASU dis-
solved and its structures and members were absorbed into the two Jamahiriya bodies.
Ghadaffi himself and loyalists from the coup retained crucial positions – Ghadaffi and
Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr remained heads of the Libyan army, Khuwaylidi al-Hamidi re-
mained commander of the police, and Mustafa al-Kharubi its chief of staff (Vandewalle,
2012, p.104). By 1980, the system transformation was completed, producing a system
that would last until the uprising of 2011.
Tribalism as Backbone of the System
The structure of the state of masses was only one of the overlapping power structures
that secured Ghadaffi’s rule. Close family members of Ghadaffi, his inner circle of
loyalists, and the tribal system also played pivotal roles (Paoletti, 2011, p.315-318).1
As he stated himself on a few occasions, Ghadaffi regarded himself as the nominal
"supreme guide" of the entire population which he considered to be a large clan itself
(Barany, 2011, p.29). Tribal traditions have also received particular attention in the
Green Book, stating that to an individual, the family is more important than the state
(p.101), with many of the book’s ideas reflecting a tribal ethos by their insistence on
egalitarianism and lack of hierarchy (Vandewalle, 2012, p.102). Consequently, tribal
leaders played a key role on the local level by resolving local conflicts, influencing the
People’s Congresses and Committees, and even implementing socio-economic develop-
ment plans. From 1993 onwards, they were regarded officially as the natural leaders of
the local system, serving on a three-year rotational basis in many organs of the system
(Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012; Paoletti, 2011, p.9).
Libya’s largest tribe, the Warfalla, were represented prominently in the higher echelons
of power, together with Ghadaffi’s own tribe, the Ghadaffa, and the tribe he married
into, the second largest tribe of Maghrara. The Warfalla, a federation of about 50
sub-tribes, especially dominated the revolutionary councils. These tribes also formed
militias which the regime’s physical power relied upon (Brahimi, 2011, p.614). The
Army, in contrast, lost influence as a decisive institution inside the country and un-
derwent cutbacks and personal reshuffling in order to prevent a possible move against
the regime. During Ghadaffi’s rule, he experienced four attempts of his fellow Army
officers to remove him from power, which can be regarded as a main reason for his
mistrust (Barany, 2011, p.30). The coup attempt in 1993, which was led by branches
of the Warfalla inside the army, showed the cracks in loyalty and caused a change of
attitude and strategy of Ghadaffi. Aware of the pivotal roles of the tribes, he resorted
to sheer violence when he demanded a statement of oath of allegiance of all tribes to
1Ghadiaffi’s children Mu’tasim and, to a much lesser extent, Khamis were influential figures inside
the security apparatus, whilst Aisha and Saif enjoyed the privilege to run civil society organisations
outside the Jamhariya bodies (Sadiki, 2012, p.301).
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assure their acceptance of his rule, threatening consequences which embraced torture,
incarceration, and execution (Sadiki, 2012, p.302).
The distribution of influence opportunities of the tribes on the national level was rather
asymmetric. The Warfalla dwell mainly in the region of Tripolitania and along the coast
region from the capital Tripoli to Benghazi, while the Maghrara derive mainly from
the province Fessan in the south-west. Consequently, the numerous and heterogeneous
tribes and tribe associations of the country’s east often felt discriminated. Also vast
parts of the Tuareg, located at the Algerian border, and the Tebu from the south-east
resented the regime. This was particularly due to the top-down appointment of local
rulers who were often Arabs, a resulting lack of upward mobility, and suppression of
their language and culture (Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012, p.9). This socio-
cultural landscape packed with inherent break points and characterised by suppressed
frustration turned out to be a tinderbox when the first protests broke out in 2011.
A Marginalised Political Opposition
Organised opposition in Libya was scarce. In 1981, the National Front for the Salva-
tion Libya (NFSL) was founded with the aim of overthrowing the regime and invoking
nostalgia of the Sanussi rule. Unlike other emerging opposition groups in the MENA
region at the same time, the inclination of the NFSL can be assessed as rather mod-
erate, as it criticised Ghadaffi for being un-islamic, yet often demanded liberal rights.
The group had already set up an entire plan for a post-Ghadaffi era in the 1980s, com-
prising a road to democracy that included constitution drafting bodies, free elections,
and a parliamentary system (Deeb, 1994, p.192-196). On May 8 1984, National Front
commandos failed in a daring assault on Gaddafi’s headquarters at the Bab al-Aziziya
barracks near Tripoli, attempting to assassinate the Libyan leader. The incident fuelled
Ghadaffi’s wrath on Islamists. Libya has not witnessed a successful and visible militant
Islamic opposition movement like Al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Front Islamique du Salut
(FIS), Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt, or the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria or Jordan.
Deeb (1994) identifies four reasons. First, the Islamic legacy of the Sanusiyya in pre-
Ghadaffi Libya which had always been a rather peaceful and reformist current, even
discarding the predominant Maliki School of law and the advice of its scholars. Second,
the highly fragmented tribal society in Libya that is balanced in a vertical and hori-
zontal manner. Third, the equal character of the country combined with the absence
of abject poverty, bridging the gap between social classes by eliminating economic dif-
ferences but paradoxically at the same time reaffirming the differences in social status.
Fourth, the careful domestication and co-option of religious rhetoric and symbols into
the state. This was a major difference to the more straightforwardly secular systems
of Egypt or Syria. The attempt to merge Libya and Egypt in 1972-73 failed, inter alia,
because the Libyan negotiators insisted on adhering to the Shari’a as the source of all
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legislation in the projected new state. Consequently, there was barely any breeding
ground for welfare oriented Islamism. The oil revenues did not cause much inequality,
due to the rentier state pattern and the rural-tribal character of the system there was
only a very small middle class, and rhetoric and symbols of Islam were used already
by the state.
At the same time, Islamic radicalism was rejected. Ghadaffi advised the population to
drop any attempt to join Islamic groups. He even declared in 1990 that "any person
who belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood or to the militant Takfir wal-Hijra or Tab-
ligh "is doomed and must be executed because his existence harms other[s]" (Deeb,
1994, p.196). Especially in the 1990s the regime had to deal with returnees from the
Afghanistan War who formed the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Its aim was
to replace the regime with what they considered to be an Islamic State. The group
launched a series of guerilla attacks in Cyrenaica that made the regime conduct mil-
itary operations for the first time since 1969 (Martinez, 2006, p.157-158). Resorting
to an international network of radical Islamists but not having a stable base inside
the country, the LIFG was defeated by 1998. In the late 2000s, Ghadaffi’s son worked
on reconciliation with the Islamists groups. Muslim Brothers and former LIFG were
freed from prison and some even included into his project ’Libya in 2025’ (Sadiki, 2012,
p.305).
6.1.2 Trade Unionism: From Fragmentation to Discrimina-
tion
Starting from the 1920s and benefiting from geographical proximity to Europe, a civil
society emerged and bloomed until the 1950s in Libya (Al-Sharif, 2010, p.53–95). Also
workplace organisation and trade unions formed part of civil society - and broke up soon
along political lines due to a lack of effective political parties (Schnabel, 2005, p.201).
By 1969, three major union federations dominated the trade union’s landscape. The
Professional Worker’s Federation Libya (PWF) and the National Federation of Trade
Unions Libya (NFTU) were located in Tripoli and close to the Monarchy (Giavanis,
1984, p.140). The Nasserist Federation of Libyan Trade Unions (FLTU) had its head-
quarters in Benghazi, basically played the role of an opposition party in the country’s
system, and consisted of many workers from the oil sector, ports and seafaring, and the
tobacco industry. After the six day war, students joined forces in 1967 with protesting
trade unionists’ actions, and oil and dock workers went on strike. The regime answered
with repression and mass trials, announced having discovered a conspiracy inside the
FLTU, and eventually managed to purge the unions’ leadership from its militant ele-
ments (Schnabel, 2005; First, 1975, p.201).
Gadaffi’s coup of 1969 promised to change the role of unions at first glance. The
leader of the FLTU, Suleiman Maghrabi, who had resisted the Italian occupation and
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the Monarchy for a long time, and who had organised the oil workers strike in 1967,
became Libya’s first Prime minister after the in the same year (First, 1975, p.85). How-
ever, active and politicised trade unions did not match with the ideas of the "leader
of the revolution" that he would develop and present in the next years. Ghadaffi had
uttered, despite his populist rhetoric, severe concern about wildcat self-determination
of the people. According to him, mass organisations represented the direct will of the
people, and as civil society organisations would express particular interests, they were
against the new doctrine. Hence, all civil society organisations operated under the early
established law No.111 of 1970 as heavily restricted "civil groups" (Djam’aat Ahliya)
until 2001, when the law was replaced by a similar draft. Law 111 (1970) allowed civil
society organisations only under the umbrella of the Jamahariya body and banned all
hitherto existing civil society organisations, including independent trade unions. Law
No. 17 of 1972 even stipulated death penalty for everyone who would seek to form a
banned party, grouping, or organisation or support such endeavours without confirma-
tion of the councils.
In the same year, Ghadaffi also addressed the labour movement in a straightforward
manner. He announced that labourers and the revolution would be an indivisible entity,
so there should be no labour unions which could exploit their positions and outplay the
revolution and the working forces against each other. Consequently, old union organ-
isations, no matter if they had earned some reputation by fighting for independence,
against the Monarchy, or struggled with American oil companies, were replaced by a
new union structure built in 1972 from the scratch. Similarly to Jordan, however, more
rigorously, the framework was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour and
union officials were proposed by the Ministry and elections were closely supervised
(First, 1975, p.124;129). The membership in this General Trade Union Federation of
Workers Libya (GTUFW) was automatic (except for foreign workers), although work-
ers had the right to opt out. Law No. 9 of 1985 and law No. 23 of 1998 were the
basis for more detailed regulations on how municipal governments regulate and inspect
the activities of trade unions, still only allowing for a single union in each branch and
region.
The newly established institutions were kept free from regime critics and widespreadly
depoliticised. When Ghadaffi was asked about the relationship of the ASU and the
unions, he clearly stated (First, 1975, p.131):
The trade unions have nothing to do with politics - at no time and at no place. [...]
It must be clear that trade unions and federations are professional organizations
which tackle the problems of their members. Politics must be confined to the
ASU. It is impermissible to conduct politics outside the ASU in any union or
profession. Otherwise, trade unions and federations would turn into political
parties.
Consequently, independent trade union activities on the grass-root level did not
appear. Even when the Port Worker’s Union began to organise in a clandestine way
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between 2005 and 20062, such organisations were nearly impossible to be set up - on
the one hand because of the institutional legal framework but also, on the other hand,
because of the tribally dominated local Jamahirya councils that would not allow for
competition. In 2007 a new law on trade unions was issued, and the GTUFW claimed
to have become more independent of the regime. The International Trade Union Con-
federation (ITUC), however, doubted that real progress had been made, pointing at
the lack of freedom of association, the restricted collective bargaining framework, and
the de-facto ban on strikes. Dissimilar to the cases of Jordan or Egypt, where the mid-
dle class or welfare oriented leaders were able or willing to establish significant white
collar associations, the representation of worker’s demands vis-á-vis the state could be
handled in Libya by addressing the official trade union bodies or the bodies of the
Jamihiriya only.
Despite the appearance of very small clandestine groups, there was, consequently, no
independent trade union action before 2011, nor and militancy or bargaining power in
any key sectors. Libya is the country of the sample that is most dependent on natu-
ral resources with more than 90 per cent of its exports consisting of crude petroleum,
petroleum gas, refined petroleum, scrap Copper, and scrap iron. The 104th rank (2013
- 2017) in the Economic Complexity Index of the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy (ECI) ranking hints at a low diversification of the economy and, indeed, Libya met
all conditions of a classical rentier state. It was estimated that less than 30 per cent
of the population participate in the labour market at all (Schnabel, 2005, p.201). In
the atmosphere of harsh repression of trade union organisations as described above, no
collective action has been reported for many decades, neither in the key sectors nor in
any other sector. The case of Libya is clearly coded KEYS = (0).
6.1.3 2011: The Quick Escalation from Protest to Revolution
Directly neighbouring Algeria and Tunisia, where the earliest protests of 2011 took
place, the pictures of the events also fuelled demonstrations in the Ghadafi-led coun-
try. The initial spark was ignited on February 15 2011, when human rights activist
and lawyer Fathil Terbil, one of the most prominent activists in favour of the families
of victims of the Abu Salim prison incident in 1996,3 was arrested in Benghazi. A
crowd gathered peacefully outside the police station to demand his release and secu-
rity forces opened fire. Watching the events in the neighbouring countries of Tunisia
2Taken from an interview with Union Générale des Travailleurs Libyens (UGTL) chairwomen
Nermin Al-Sharif on Libya al-Hadath TV in the news show Akhbar Al-Bilad on September 27 2016,
see (Al-Bilad, 2016)
3Many of the LIFG fighters that were captured in the early 1990s were brought to the Abu Salim
prison. Due to the poor conditions of detention, prisoners started a revolt on June 28 1996, in which
one guard was killed. As a result, the security forces, on the orders of the then intelligence chief
Abdullah as-Sanusi, perpetrated a massacre of the inmates, mainly from Benghazi. Human rights
organisations estimate that about 1200 prisoners died.
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and Egypt carefully, the armed forces had received an order to show "zero tolerance"
towards demonstrations during that sensitive period of time. In response, the NCLO4,
several Facebook and websites, and according to some sources also the NFSL (Dahn,
2011) called for a "Day of Rage" on February 17. Mass protests broke out in Tripoli,
Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Derna, Zintan, and Bayda and were met with extreme violence
by the security forces. The day caused 24 deaths countrywide and dozens of wounded.
Let alone in Al-Baida, where Snipers shot from the rooftops, 13 deaths were counted.
The regime had warned the population to join the protests in online announcements.
Gadaffi himself joined several hundred supporters who gathered in Tripoli to counter
calls for anti-government protests.
After these events, the militarization of the conflict took place at a surprisingly quick
pace. Only ten days later, demonstrators were equipped with stun grenades for fishing
and bulldozers abandoned by international oil companies, as well as light and heavy
weaponry they received by defectors of the army (Brahimi, 2011, p.606). Radical
chants like "People want the end of the regime" or "No God but Allah, Muammar is
the enemy of Allah" emerged as early as in the first days (Al-Jazeera Online, 2011), and
after the harsh reaction of the security forces, people did not resort to peaceful protests
over several months. Against that background, the domestication and weakness of the
armed forces during the rule of Ghadaffi turned to be a boomerang in the sense that
the apparatus lacked the capacity for collective action and reaction to the threat of the
regime (Haddad et al., 2012, p.137). Consequently, in the city of Benghazi, protesters
were able to overwhelm both police and army forces only 24 hours after the Day of
Rage. Additionally, experienced military leaders like Chalifa Haftar, leading figure of
the NFSL, returned quickly from their exile to take over the military campaigns.
The outbreak of the upheavals was fuelled by grievances under the surface about the
deterioration of living standards in the years before 2011. As Brahimi (2011, p.606)
summarises comprehensively, its initial roots were
...soaring food prices, housing shortages, high unemployment, a rapidly growing
population coupled with low rates of job creation, corrupt and ossified admin-
istrations, brutal security services, the systematic denial of political and civic
rights, and autocratic rulers who had clung to power for decades and were look-
ing to pass it down to their progeny.
The socio-economic aspect of this statement can be supported with economic key
data in comparison with other countries of the sample. The unemployment rate of 17.6
per cent in 2010 is the highest in the entire sample, outstripping Yemen by about 5
per cent. The instability of the economy is mirrored well in the inflation rate. While
the country had a deflation until 2004, the inflation rate increased again, peaking in a
hyperinflation of 10 per cent in 2008. The purchasing power of the minimum wage and
the currency as such fell constantly in the late 2000s, and the index of transparency
4The National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO) was formed in 2005 in exile, by a
group of intellectual expatriates and activists. It was supported amongst others by the Libyan League
for Human Rights and also the NFSL.
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perception remained in the lower third displaying a downward drift. The rampant
youth unemployment (about 40 per cent) clearly indicated the incapability of the state
to fulfil its part of the authoritarian bargain. Even if the events around Fathil Terbil
sparked the unrest, the underlying grievances rooted in the incapability of the state to
provide welfare as expected. Libya is hence coded SOEC = (1).
Competition between different Currents of the Revolution
Three major trajectories of opposition organisations emerged in the second half of
February that would cooperate betimes, set up double structures, and often compete
with each other. First, the 17th February Movement encompassed a large number of
online and grass-root activists, mainly consisted of young, urban, middle-class citizens
of higher education, and was based in an old courtyard in Benghazi. It claimed to
have several civil society organisations under its umbrella and held ties to the Date-
Movements in Tunis and Algiers. Second, local councils emerged soon after February
17, especially in the east of the country, adapting the structure of - and often build-
ing upon - the Basic People’s Congress council system of the Jamhiriya (Tarkowski-
Tempelhof and Omar, 2012, p.4.). As family and kinship often live together or close
in a particular neighbourhood, tribal networks played a significant role inside these
committees. Third, the Transitional National Council Libya (TNC) was founded on
February 27 by a number of prominent figures from inside the country and nationals
living and working abroad.
Different from Jordan, the different currents faced severe difficulties to cooperate. The
cooperation between the 17th February Movement and the TNC was, at best, bumpy.
The movement, radical in its will to overcome the old regime, was suspicious of the man-
ning of the exile council. They feared the re-emergence of the old Ghadaffi-networks due
to the high number of regime defectors inside the TNC. The role of the most prominent
defector, General Younis, was criticised as in-transparent, as well as the role of his tribe,
the Al-Obeid, which became more prominent inside the TNC (Tarkowski-Tempelhof
and Omar, 2012, p.3-4). The youth movement also mistrusted in the same vein the
representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood, which - being heavily marginalised inside
Libya’s political landscape - had in the past already signalled eagerness to cooperate
with the old regime. But the TNC also earned mistrust from many local councils and
local militia leaders on the ground. On the one hand, it was accused of encompassing
too many Benghazi representatives, and having a bias towards two key families, the
Bogaigis and the Garianis, while western provinces seemed under-represented. On the
other hand, it was accused of harbouring too many (western) liberals - often exiles
who would not understand the domestic dynamics on the local levels of the country.
Consequently, the council would neither represent the traditionalistic-Islamic character
of the country, nor its tribal balance of power (Dawisha, 2013, 156-157).
The local councils that were built in the course of the struggle against the old regime
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were a base for tribal coordination and action. The mistrust and dissatisfaction with
the regime that had already led to the coup of 1993, together with desires for revenge
made many tribes withdrew their support for the Ghadaffi regime. Foremost, the
Zawiya in the West withdraw allegiance to the regime, weakening severely Ghadaffi’s
power-house, and also in the East, the Misurata were amongst the first to revolt against
state authorities and would be followed by many others when the rebellion gained mo-
mentum. As, especially, many of the western tribes formed part of the security forces,
these steps accelerated the disintegration of the Army.
The military operations were rather uncoordinated. Every militia, although meant to
coordinate with the TNC, pursued their own interests. As a common ground served
a blurred opposition narrative that advocated for a return to the pre-Ghaddafi state,
invoking anti colonial figures like Omar Mukhtar, as well as resorting to the previ-
ous Libyan flag of 1949-1969. (Tarkowski-Tempelhof and Omar, 2012, p.2-3). Beyond
these symbols, the internal divisions remained and already caused clashes that would
eventually lead to civil war. The bonding with the TNC became an option for the
different tribes after it became clear that they would channel the international supply
of weapons and medical equipment.
During the protests against the government in 2011 and the following militarisation,
union structures did not play a role in mobilising or even uttering constructive workers’
demands to influence the new institutional equilibrium. Unsurprisingly, the GTUFW’s
leadership not only did not participate in the uprisings of 2011 - on the contrary:
The GTUFW together with the Syrian General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU)
called on other trade unions to help stop NATO’s military intervention against Libya
(Schmidinger, 2013, p.46). The QCA code for Libya is therefore (0).
6.2 Algeria (0)
Although a loose alliance of civil society organisations attempted to reform the political
system during the protests 2011, the demands of trade unions were restricted to socio-
economic enhancements. Those unions, that joined the alliance, withdrew after they
received fiscal concessions or managed to better their position inside the system of
(re)distribution of resources. None of the main pillars of the institutional equilibrium as
will be described in section 6.2.1 were openly attacked, and also the role of the national
federation Union Générale des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) was not questioned to the
extent witnessed in Jordan or Egypt. Professional associations, although comprising
regime critics who were especially critical about the role of the military, did not take
the decisive steps to push for reforms. The Outcome for the case of Algeria is therefore
coded (0). The truth table row reads as follows:
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SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
0 0 1 0 1 1 ALG(5)
Table 6.4: Truth table row for the case of Algeria
The variable INOPP is coded (0), as no broader alliance between trade unions and
political opposition parties emerged. Furthermore, tribal and family bonds, as will be
described in section 6.2.1 did not play a pivotal role in the system, especially compared
to the cases of Jordan and Libya. TRI is therefore coded (0). The dominant role of
the UGTA justifies the classification of the variable CEN as (1), and, as argued in part
6.2.2, and especially with regard to the other countries of the sample, the federation
and its unions did still have a palpable bargaining power in neuralgic sectors of the
economy and in negotiations with the state; hence KEYS is coded (1).
6.2.1 The Institutional Equilibrium as Result of the Indepen-
dence War
The political system in Algeria corresponds to what Linz (2000) labels a bureaucratic
and ideology-free authoritarianism. In such systems, a limited number of persons or
groups of persons who mostly have made career inside the system form the linchpin of
the institutional equilibrium. The individuals or groups on the top of the state were
labelled "Political Elites" (Putnam, 1976), "Political Relevant Elite" (Perthes, 2004,
p.5), "State Clan" (Yefsah, 1982) or "State Class" (Elsenhans, 1997; Ouaissa, 2005). In
Algeria these entities benefited from a historical legitimacy that derived either from the
independence war, clientelism, the capability to reward followers by the distribution of
rents, or combinations of the aforementioned.
Similar to Libya, Algeria also fits into the pattern of "Rentier-States" (Beblawi and
Luciani, 1987; Schwartz, 2008). The small number of military leaders and party func-
tionaries that monopolised the key positions in state institutions for decades are de-
pendent of the influx of rents on the one hand and the ability to maintain and invoke
symbolic, legitimizing capital on the other. The elite is riddled with permanent internal
struggles and pattern of constant co-optation. Exclusion of political ambitious groups
create a constant flux at the margins of the circles of power (Ouaissa, 2005), made the
Algerian case rather an "equilibrium of instability" that is characterized by a fragile
balance between the various (potentially) destabilizing dynamics and competitors over
rents (Werenfels, 2007, p.5).
In contrast to Libya, different institutions provide several possibilities of upward mo-
bility beyond tribal affiliations. Werenfels (2007) identifies five main pillars that form
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the core elite in Algeria and that act as decision-maker and veto-powers inside the cor-
ridors of power: The former single-party Front de Libération Nationale Algeria (FLN),
the national Army, the bureaucracy, business networks inside the private and state led
economy, and the national trade union federation.
Brothers in Arms: The Party and the Army
The most powerful party in Algeria, the FLN, has its roots in the struggle for indepen-
dence and remained the sole legal and ruling political party before the legalisation of
further parties in 1989. Established in 1954, it aimed at forming an elite party which
was supposed to guide the way along a socialist development path - at least since its
second congress in Tripoli in 1962, and fixed in the Charter of Algiers in 1964. It had
started as clandestine and later mass mobilising movement that was neither a politi-
cal party in a narrow sense nor a militia or an ordinary army (Roberts, 1983, p.117),
forming thus rather a civil melting pot for the fight for independence of the country.
The networks and connections it set up during that time remained the most important
sources of power and influence until today, most notably the Organisation Nationale des
Moudjahidine Algeria (ONM), the Union Nationale de la Jeunesse Algérienne (UNJA),
the Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA), Union Nationale des Paysans
Algériens (UNPA) and - already established in 1956 and one of the most powerful
organisations - the trade union federation Union Nationale des Travailleurs Algériens
(UGTA). These mass organisations served as channels to communicate and implement
top-down policies and additionally exercised occasionally bottom-op auxiliary function
to the police and the Army enlarging the latter’s web of espionage (Werenfels, 2007,
p.36).
The Army networks in Algeria derive from the the central role of its predecessor, the
Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), the military wing of the FLN, that was orga-
nized as the country’s armed forces after Algeria’s’ independence in 1962. The role
of the Army as been powerful since, and while the regime can be classified as a mo-
bilising party regime, it had from its very beginning a military component due to the
long-lasting independence war against France. This component gained upper hand
when the military commander Houari Boumedienne ousted Ahmed Ben Bella in a mil-
itary coup in 1965 (Linz, 2000; Quandt, 1969, p.288). Relying on and coquetting with
the role of the "spearhead of the revolution", as written in the constitution of 1962,
and moreover the protector and "watchdog on the revolution" (Zartman, 1973, p.211,
emphasis added) the Army became an indispensable veto-power that interfered most
visibly into politics after the elections of 1992. Two years before, the single party sys-
tem had collapsed paving the way for the 1989 constitution and elections in 1991. The
Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) eventually won the elections
and outstripped the FLN as leading party, however, the military quickly nullified the
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results. After the ban of the FIS and the persecution and incarceration of many of its
members, Islamist insurgents emerged challenging the new power holders. The insta-
bility that followed spiralled into a civil war that caused 200.000 casualties and lasted
until 1997. Until 2011, the prevailing power of the Army remained, making its backing
to a necessary condition for a successful candidacy for president5.
Bureaucratisation and economic Hybridisation of the System
The civil bureaucracy of Algeria had been established already during the French rule.
As Algeria had the formal status of a Département and not a mere protectorate, a
complex and potent bureaucratic apparatus was built and eventually left behind when
the country gained its independence. The apparatus was particularly strong, as other
forms of administration had been erased in the name of an ideology of integration, leav-
ing the indigenous population atomized and to a great extent state-dependent (Linz,
2000, p.157). This was paticularily true for tribal self-autonomy on the intermediate
and higher level of the state. Instead of fighting and condemning this French heritage
as imperialistic imposition, the construct was converted relatively seamlessly into the
new national bureaucracy as a part of the greatly promoted socialist project. That
way, since the 1960s it became a prime space for the forming and emergence of a new
technocratic elite (Zartman, 1973, p.213).
Individuals with an urban, educated, relatively wealthy and Francophone background
emerged as dominant groups on the top level, while the bureaucracy also served as a
melting pot for the old, mercantile and urban bourgeoisie of pre-colonial Algeria, the
old tribal nobility including high military ranks and religious figures, and on the lower
level the detribalized peasantry which gained upward mobility through the access to
French education (Roberts, 1983, p.109). In the course of time, horizontal and vertical
clientelist connections emerged and became the bargaining power of the bureaucracy
inside the inner circles of power. While core elites used the bureaucracy as a tool to
exert and widen influence in the provinces on the one hand, the bureaucrats set up
networks with religious brotherhoods, local notables, and tribal networks on the other
(Talahite, 2000). In contrast to Libya or Jordan, however, tribalism did not enter the
higher echelons of power, neither as a ruling practice nor as ideology in any form. The
French heritage and the socialist project produced identities and rhetoric that were
rather urban, often secular, and mostly eager to stress their modernist inclination.
The hydrocarbon sector, being still the most important sector of the economy until
today, was fully state-controlled by 1972. Consistent with socialist economic theory
of that time, the industrial sector was favoured vis-a-vis the agricultural and service
sector as it produced higher rates of growth and revenues. Like in many socialist sys-
5Werenfels (2005, p.60) reports from a political analyst claiming that "without the argument that
they have the army on their side, not even their wives would vote for them". Surely rhetorically
exaggerated, the quote hits, however, the core of a political reality in Algeria.
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tems with planned economy, the production mismatched the real demand, however,
the losses could be cushioned by the high oil and gas revenues. By that way, the State
Owned Enterprise(s) (SOE) became, in the long run, rather a social space than an
economic one. Their function embraced foremost the exchange of favours and social
accommodation inside the patron–client networks of the public administration (Liabès,
1989, p.219).
The emerging dependence on food imports and the decline of the oil prices in the late
1970s and 1980s forced the economic administration to reorient. At the beginning of
the 1980s, 66 large state enterprises were split into 474 specialised units. Managerial
autonomy was granted to newly-designated enterprises and the transfer of ownership
to "fonds de participation" (Shareholding Funds). Privatization efforts that followed
especially in the 1990s posed rather a form of transfer from state monopoly to private
monopoly (Werenfels, 2007, p.49). The emerging system resembled the patrimonial
capitalism which Egypt would set up about a decade later: The organisational and
managerial ties between the new enterprises, the funds and the government were still
intact and exploited (Dillman, 1998; Kumar, 1993, p.98), and economic reform was
instrumentalised for new rent-seeking opportunities for the bureaucratic, political, mil-
itary and ex-military elites (Rouadjia 1994).
6.2.2 An Inherent Part of the System: Trade Unionism
The first conference of Arab workers in 1930 already recommended the independence of
Algeria (’Amr, 2013, p.24). The decision was initially contested from inside and outside
the movement especially concerning the nature and pace of the independence strug-
gle. After French repressions of trade union activities during the years of war and the
incarceration of many union activists, the movement experienced an increased nation-
alisation concerning its rhetoric and its leading staff. As internal struggles remained, in
1956 three union federations existed: The Union de Syndicat de Travailleurs Algériens
(USTA), following Messali Hadj and having an evolutionary and socialist stance, the
Union General de Syndicats Algériens (UGSA) that absorbed parts of the Algerian
branch of the French CDT, in which the Communist party prevailed, and the Union
General des Travailleurs Algériens (UGTA) that was created on the initiative and aus-
pices of the FLN, having a revolutionary and militant stance towards independence.
The UGTA had great influx by Algerian trade unionists of the Algerian Branch of the
Confédération Démocratique du Travail France (CDT) as well and from the French
Confederation of Christian Workers, wishing to contribute to the struggle for indepen-
dence of Algeria (Gobe, 2008). Due to an internal struggle of the nationalist movement
between the FLN and the Messalist Mouvement National Algérien (MNA) in which
the FLN emerged as winner especially during the independence war, until 1962, the
USTA desintegrated and was absorbed by the UGTA.
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The Interdependence between the Regime and the UGTA
The UGTA has been closely allied with the FLN until the opening of the party system
in 1989, recurring on the FLNs power to help the union center to ouster competition
in exchange for loyalty and support for unpopular measures. This balancing act was
questioned for the first time severely during strikes in 1964/65. Eventually the FLN
managed to tighten its grip on the UGTA, purging its leadership, and bringing thus
the union center back on the party’s course. The party was somewhat dependent on
the union federation as workers rights were a pivotal part of its socialist agenda and
rhetoric. At the same time, and similar to the relationship between the ETUF and the
Egyptian regime, the FLN tried to keep opposition forces and regime sceptics out of
the rank and files of the union federation.
The close relationship of the UGTA and the FLN, however, led to a growing alien-
ation between the trade union center and the working class. The UGTA proved to
be incapable of of handling or solving many of the strikes that took place between
1975 and 1980 in large industrial complexes in the public sector. At that time, a new
generation of workers inside the expanding state enterprises, largely adhering to the
consumer model, and less reluctant to strike than the generation of the independence
war (Chikhi, 1982, 61-62), diffused into the lower ranks. A struggle of power between
these new workers and the old cadres of the UGTA and the FLN emerged. Addition-
ally, the Communist Party, that had dissolved the UGSA already in 1957 for the sake
of union unity after the Leipzig World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Congres
1957 (Lichtblau, 1962, p.385), and that had been banned after 1965 and reorganized
in 1966 as Parti de l’Avant-Garde Socialiste Algeria (PAGS), still held influential posts
inside the UGTA.
Different from Libya, where the grip of the regime on the trade unions was uncon-
tested and the oil revenues prevented the country to slide into an economic crisis,
Algeria was more unstable in the 1980s. Given the threat of losing influence inside the
union federation, the regime increased efforts to purge the organisation from critics.
The introduction of Article 120 of the FLN statutes stipulated party membership for
all officials of the mass organisations, including the UGTA, making PAGS members
and other regime critical voices to have reassess their affiliations or go underground
(Lawless and Findlay, 2015, p.38).
These measures, however, could not prevent several popular protest movements, in-
cluding major protests in Oran (1982), Algiers (1985), or Sétif (1986). The social
contract that was established in the years of Boumédiène’s regime consisting of the
exclusion of vast parts of the population from political power in return for the regime
taking care of its well-being (Werenfels, 2007, p.33) got under pressure. Reforms, that
had been applied to the educational and health sector resulted in the emergence of
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a system of privileges (e.g., selective schooling system, private vs. public hospitals,
etc.) alienated segments of the Algerian society even further. In Summer 1988 many
workers faced acute housing shortage, water problems, food shortages, high inflation,
an increase in prices of most commodities, and high unemployment, cementing the
view that the old social contract had been broken (Zoubir, 1993). The following riots
of October 1988 resulting in about 500 deaths and 1000 wounded that would turn to
be the beginning of a democratic opening of the country were accompanied by labour
strikes on the grass-root level. Although the General Secretary of the UGTA still issued
an appeal for workers to end demonstrations and provide "firm support and total trust
in the leadership of president Chadli Benjedid" during the peak of the demonstrations
in 1988 (King, 2009, p.150), the number of strikes organised by the UGTA rose signif-
icantly between 1988 and 1992, as the union center feared to lose its access to the core
elite due to liberalisation politics and possible system change (Ouaissa, 2005, p.117).
The Worker’s Movement during the Civil War
The new constitution of 1989 and the labour code of 1990 marked a new beginning for
the possibilities of organised labour and allowed for a multi-party system and trade
union pluralism. The latter led to several new foundations, and at the beginning of
the 1990s the union landscape in Algeria could be divided into three main categories
of unions. First, the "old" unions under the umbrella of the UGTA, that proved to be
more independent, still formed part the inner circles of political power in the country
on the one hand, and benefited from connections into that circle on the other. Sec-
ond, the FIS started to form trade unions having an Islamic focus and an own union
center, the Syndicat Islamique du Travail Algeria (SIT). These projects were foremost
successful in the fields of education, healthcare and some factories, but did not receive
permissions from the ministry of labour (Abdelkader, 2014). Nonetheless, they played
an important part in the protests of June 1991 initiated by the FIS and disappeared for
the time being from the political landscape after the dissolution of the FIS in March
1992. Third, a range of secular unions stressing their independence from the UGTA
and FLN emerged already after 1989. Due to the pressure of the still FLN controlled
government, the Army, and the UGTA, only few of about 53 new foundations in 1989
and 1990 survived the turbulences of the civil war and its aftermath. The most promi-
nent ones, which were still active in 2011, were the public workers union Syndicat
National Autonome des Personnels de l’Administration Publique Algeria (SNAPAP),
the Conseil National Algérien des Professeurs de l’Enseignement Secondaire et Tech-
nique (CNAPEST) inside the education sector as well as unions in the healthcare sector
such a the Syndicat National des Praticiens de Santé Publique Algeria (SNPSP)6.
When the FIS began to discover trade unionism as a tool to reach political goals, the
6For a comprehensive overview of the independent trade unions after 1990 see Abdelkader (2014,
p.25-28)
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nationalist movement and the old elites never cut ties with the UGTA. This holds
particularly true for the secular nationalist movement represented by the Rassemble-
ment National Démocratique Algeria (RND) and FLN. They helped to recover and
reinforce its hegemony in the trade union landscape, as the UGTA acted as the main
opponent to the newly implemented Islamic unions. At this particular time, the na-
tionalist movement had already lost its important influence on the student and youth
movements inside the universities to the FIS, which was a bitter experience and a sig-
nificant loss of power (Fauzia, 2012, p.174). Thus, a similar symbiotic relationship as
already described for the period of the war of independence emerged again between
the nationalist secular decision-makers and the Army on the one side, and the UGTA
on the other. Especially in exchange for financial and technical support, the UGTA’s
loyalty was bought, and consequently, the stance of the UGTA became more rigours
during the war. Dividing the general mindset of attitudes of the Algerian people to-
wards non-violent endeavours to end the war into the group of "dialogueists" on the one
hand, vouching for peace negotiations, and "eradicators" advocating a military, uncom-
promising path on the other, the UGTA clearly belonged to the latter (Abdelkader,
2014, p.28).
A new Symbiosis in the Postwar Era
In the years after the war, the UGTA regained much of its power and influence. It
remained de facto a part of the state apparatus and the only recognized social partner in
state-employers-employees tripartite collective bargain. At the same time, the number
of independent trade unions had been restricted again. Many unions were not granted
the necessary approval by the state if its objectives are classified as to be contrary to
the established institutional labour system and/or may disturb the public order and
the norms and values of the country (Branine et al., 2008, p.414-415).
The price for the protection of the monopoly to pay by the UGTA was the support
of unpopular measures including privatisation and shut down of public enterprises.
Despite some symbolic collective actions aiming at socio-economic enhancement or
protection of the status quo that are undertaken frequently, the buttress of government
policies of the union center seems a core pillar of the strategy of the UGTA. A high
UGTA cadre interviewed by Branine et al. (2008) claimed in 2007: "We are living
a period of market economy and we must respect the rules of the game. Our main
responsibility is to obtain compensations for workers or re-integrate them in the private
sector job market".
However, while liberal opposition parties portrayed the General Union as a network of
"yellow unions", the federation was still aware of its mission to protect worker’s rights as
far as they concern the authoritarian bargain (Tamlali, 2009). This was especially true
for the lower levels, where healthcare workers, port workers, and other public sector
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employees frequently went on strike. The Federal Education Federation in the states
of Bejaia and Tizi Ouzou cooperated with the independent trade union movement,
and especially energy sector unions fought against the new liberal hydrocarbon law.
Algeria was highly dependent on hydrocarbons which still accounted for roughly 60
per cent of budget revenues, 30 per cent of GDP, and over 95 per cent of export
earnings in 2009. The ECI rank is 114, being one of the least diversified country of
the sample. Industry contributes to 61.5 per cent of the GDP, and the state owned
company Sontrach, a producer of fuels, lubricants, natural gas, and petrochemicals, is
the largest company in Africa. Its trade union, the Syndicate National de Sonatrach
Algeria (SNS) is comparatively well organised and managed to gain a 15 per cent wage
increase in 2006 (M.T., 2006). But also on the top level and in negotiations with the
state, the UGTA managed to gain some victories. In the 1990s, at the same time when
the Libyan trade unions were domesticated inside the Jamihiriya system, the UGTA
managed to push forward and put through the most comprehensive unemployment
insurance of the entire region. Since the 1990, the federation is also part of tripartite
negotiations about the minimum wage (Hammouda, 2011, p.31) which had the highest
increase in purchasing power of the entire sample between 2000 and 2010. Compared
to the other countries of the sample, this bargaining power is impressively high; hence,
the variable KEYS is coded (1).
6.2.3 2011: Trade Unions between Socioeconomic Protest and
the Fight for Recognition
The protests in Algeria broke out two days after a significant rise in consumer goods
including sugar and oil, which came into force at January 1 2011. These protests were
fuelled and inspired by the ongoing protests in the neighbouring country of Tunisia.
In fact, Algeria was one of the first countries in the region affected by the wave of up-
risings and protests that had begun in Tunisia a couple of weeks earlier (Volpi, 2013).
With the growing unrest in the entire MENA region in mind, authorities feared that
large numbers of people would join the announced mass protests on January 7 2011
after the Friday prayers. But contradictory to expectations, the demonstrations were
peaceful, relatively small, and lacked political drive. A reason might have been the
increased police presence and other security measures which were taken in advance
by the regime, but also a high degree of fragmentation among the society, especially
regarding the protests, played a significant role. Fragmentation could be found inside
the Islamic spectre between the Islamic ruling party and the Islamic opposition7on the
one hand, but also between the secular and the Islamist spectrum on the other (Jabi,
2011). Inside the secular camp, the Front des Forces Socialistes Algeria (FFS) also
7Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix Algeria (MSP), avowing themselves to the Muslim Broth-
erhood, forms part of the government, together with the FLN and the RND, the latter being a party
consisting mainly of military staff and administrative clerks and Kabylist politicians prone to privati-
sation politics (Fauzia, 2012, p.173).
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competed in the Kabyle area in the north of Algeria with the RND. (Ottaway and
Hamzawy, 2011).
A Broad Alliance Lacking the Drive to Change the System
The demands carried to the streets in the rallies and demonstrations were mainly
restricted to socio-economic enhancement similar to protests which emerged in the
country nearly every couple of years. As Jabi (2011) states about the beginnings of
the protests in January 2011 in comparison to the protests of the past decades:
Despite some characteristics that are unique to the most recent protests, when
compared with those of the past, the events of January 2011 were not new. For
example, as in previous protests, these recent ones began in the larger cities,
and were characterized by large mass mobilization. They are even similar to
earlier protests in the degree of violence used, as well as the weakness of the
authorities, and in the political and social contexts that have distinguished the
popular protest movement for over two decades.
During the following weeks of January and February, hopes arose among segments
of the civil society that the new wave of mobilisation could be used to push for sys-
temic change. The first civil society alliance that attempted to address demands to
the government emerged as a melting pot of more than 80 subgroups, labelled the Co-
ordination Nationale pour le Changement et la Démocratie Algeria (CNCD) and was
founded on January 21 2011.
It included many student organisations, the human right organisation Ligue Algéri-
enne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme (LADDH) and also the collective SOS
Disparues, devoted to disclosing war crimes and trace the history of victims of the
civil war, signed the intial announcement. Also the RCD was included which, techni-
cally, was forming part of the government. The major independent trade unions that
joined the CNCD were the aforementioned public employee union SNAPAP and or-
ganisations mainly stemming from the educational sector, namely the university based
national union Conseil National des Enseignants du Supérieur Algeria (CNES) founded
in 1991, the Syndicat Autonome des Travailleurs de l’Education et de la Formation Al-
geria (SATEF) founded 1990 in the Kabyle City Tizi Ouzou and being close to the
FFS, and the Conceil de Lyceés d’Algérie (CLA) that emerged under that name for the
first time in 2010, representing high school teachers of the capital Algiers (Beddoubia,
2015; Abdelkader, 2014; ’Amr, 2013). The CNCD’s initial demands included:
- The announcement of the creation of a National Concentration Coordination for
Democratic Change,
- The decision on the organisation of a national march to demand the lifting of
the state of emergency which has been raging for nineteen years and which is
immobilizing the country and violating all the freedoms and
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- The expression of the total solidarity with the Tunisian people in their struggle
against totalitarianism and the establishment of a democratic state.
The UGTA remained largely invisible during the critical phase of the protests
(Lynch, 2013, p.188). Although the union center had contributed to the emergence
of the RND in 1997 and still holds ties to the party, it did not act as mediator or
progressive force, and avoided contact with the CNCD.
Meanwhile, the cooperation between the 80 different groups turned to be difficult and
the alliance got riddled with internal disparities (Mekouar, 2016). When the movement
planned the next demonstration, leading members of the CNCD learned that the RCD
had already scheduled a demonstration at the same time. The CNCD joined in, giving
the impression that the entire rally was organised by the RCD and that the CNCD
posed a mere tool of the party. For many observers, this de-legitimised the movement
as intermediate and moderate change agent. Additionally, the human rights associa-
tions refused to cooperate with the RCD’s leader Said Sadi, who was known for being
an eradicateur defending Army operations with civil casualties during the civil war.
The FFS, that had joined after the initiation of the CNCD also withdrew from the
protest after the impression among many activists grew that the RCD tried to co-opt
the movement.
Trade Unions as Opportunist Agents in Time of Crisis
Although the protests remained largely without top-down organisation and were lack-
ing a coherent vision, the government lead by president Bouteflika felt urged to offer
concessions. On February 3, the government announced that the nineteen-year-lasting
state of emergency would be lifted, a measure that was indeed implemented three weeks
later, moreover, more opposition parties would be allowed, private radio and television
stations permitted, and a a new job creation programme was implemented (Volpi, 2013,
p.108). Also amendments to the constitution that should "strengthen democracy" were
promised. After the announcement and partial implementation of the concessions, the
most active trade unions CNES, SATEF, and CLA considered that their political goals
had been achieved and mobilisation should be "paused" (Mekouar, 2016). By March
2011, it became obvious that the wave of Arab uprisings including their political im-
pacts in other countries would not affect Algeria in a comparable way. Although in
March at least seventy strikes throughout the country took place, held by professional
associations and unions including teachers, rail workers, health sector workers, and
court clerks, the political drive to change the equilibrium of power had significantly
vanished. As Volpi (2013, p.110) states, Algerians felt that the weakness of the state
and the momentum of the protests would allow to improve working conditions and
social circumstances:
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The dynamics of these strikes, which would remain commonplace throughout
the year, illustrate the continuing relevance of the traditional social contract pro-
posed by the Algerian regime: The administration provides better socio-economic
conditions in exchange for continuing (albeit grudging) political quiescence.
This assessment can be backed by economic indicators, especially against the back-
ground of Algeria’s particular history of a devastating civil war in the 1990s and the
development during the 2000s. Although total unemployment was at about 10 per cent
in 2010, it had been constantly falling since 2000 (19 per cent decrease) and even more
since the end of the civil war (21 per cent decrease). The same is true for youth unem-
ployment which decreased from 50 per cent in 2000 to 21 per cent in 2010. Although
inflation rates increased slightly between 2000 and 2010, they mostly remained under
5 per cent and never even rudimentarily approached the 1992 peak of 32 per cent. At
the same time, the purchasing power of the minimum wage more than doubled between
2000 and 2010 which is the highest increase in the entire sample. These numbers and
the fact that most parties and groups of civil society, including trade unions, did not
attack the institutional equilibrium can be read as evidence that the bulk of protest in
Algerian were rather procyclical and part of distribution struggles within the system.
The protests did not emerge because the authoritarian bargain had failed in the eyes
of the populace, but rather because it was still intact and different groups of the popu-
lation attempted to increase their share of the cake. The case of Algeria will therefore
be coded SOEC = (0).
Professional Associations Struggling for Access to Power Circles
The role of professional organisations in Algeria is particularly different, as will be
shown later, from their counterparts in Egypt or Jordan and thus, their role during
the protests was also different. First, they also belong to the framework of the UGTA
where they enjoyed an albeit limited, however palpable degree of freedom. Second, the
independent associations that emerged were barely politicised. Algeria had witnessed
a significant switch from blue collar workers to white collar workers due to increased
efforts of the government to strengthen the service sector in the past decades and, thus,
trade union activities also shifted from the industrial sector - say, blue collar workers,
to white collar workers. Most of them were working in the service or welfare sectors.
These workers were more intertwined with the ruling elite, less adaptive to ideological
agendas and utopia, and eager to keep open channels of communication. Criticizing the
political system and its power holders was no part of their overall strategy (Hussein,
2017, p.8; p.19).
However, some actors were less intertwined with the ruling elites. They could be often
found in the professions that were former FIS strongholds like education and healthcare.
These players tried to get a foot into the door in 2011, playing mass mobilization as
trump in order to get access to the state elite. For instance, Achour Idir, the leader of
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the CLA - that was licensed as union in 2013 - uttered that he would be ready to enter a
political office in 2015 (Hamadouche, 2017), while his criticism of the regime gradually
paled out. Actually, progressive forces did exist, especially in the independent trade
unions. Werenfels (2007, p.106) cites an interviewee from SNAPAP four years before
the protests:
Our first priority should be an autonomous justice. It is impossible to change
the situation if you have a justice that takes orders; we need a state under the
rule of law. What we also need is the retreat of the army from politics and the
election of a president by the people.
These voices could not hold sway during the critical juncture, hence, the institu-
tional equilibrium was not challenged by trade union organisations during the protests
of 2011.
6.3 Jordan (1)
The late 2000s and the turmoil in the protest years 2010-2012 caused a politicisation
of trade unionism inside Jordan that would be visible even the years to follow. In May
2013, nine unions representing more than 7,000 workers founded the Federation of Inde-
pendent Trade Unions of Jordan (FITU-J), challenging the official General Federation
of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU). In general, the focus of the workers unions in
2011-2012 was on the fight for more freedom to unionise, however, some political de-
mands also swapped into their portfolio of claims (Al-Muqdad, 2012). The professional
associations did not hide their willingness to reform the system either. Especially the
demanded reform of the electoral law is crucial in this context. A change of the one-
man-one-vote system and a redesign of voting districts would significantly weaken the
basis of power of the King. The structure of the parliament, where tribesmen loyal to
the King from the countryside and hinterlands of the country pose about 60 per cent
of the MPs, would have been challenged and would have cause a decisive change of
the institutional equilibrium of the country. Acknowledging the progressive role of the
professional associations, and the rather structural, however slightly political role of
the worker’s unions, the outcome for the case of Jordan is (1) according to the QCA
code of this study. The variables are encoded as follows:
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal Code
1 1 1 1 0 1 JOR(30)
Table 6.5: Truth table row for the case of Jordan
6.3. JORDAN (1) 155
The pivotal role of tribalism will be outlined, especially, in part 6.3.1 leading to TRI
= (1), and the corporatist centralisation and comparatively little intra-union competi-
tion before 2011 will be outlined in part 6.3.2 leading to CEN = (1). The last part of
that section also shows the weakness of trade unions inside key sectors of the economy
before 2011, which was a major reason for the emergence of independent trade unions
in that year. Consequently, KEYS is set to (0).
Although many issues are addressed in the parts before, section 6.3.4 will scrutinise
the embedding of the new emerging trade unions and professional white collar asso-
ciations into civil society and opposition groups (INOPP), and deals with the socio-
economic situation of the country before 2011 (SOEC). Although different currents
started protesting at the beginning of the critical juncture, these currents, including
trade union bodies, cooperated in the further course of the events. The cooperation, in
which also the welfare oriented Islamic Action Front (IAF) was heavily involved, was
based on the perception that the institutional equilibrium at that time was not able to
guarantee the compliance with the authoritarian bargain on the part of the state, and
thus needed reform. Consequently, INOPP and SOEC are both coded (1).
6.3.1 The Institutional Equilibrium: The King, the Army, and
the Tribes
The institutional equilibrium in Jordan is based on the King as part of a "linchpin
Monarchy" encouraging controlled social pluralism and maintaining the ability to mo-
bilize parts of the population in a top-down manner (Herb, 1999). Furthermore, the
role of the military and the introduction of law disciplining the state objects (Massad,
2001), and the co-optation of tribes and tribal alliances that dates back already to the
Ottoman Empire (Robins, 2004, p.6-40) is of relevance.
According to the constitution, the legislative power is vested in the National Assembly
and the King (Art.25), the executive power is also vested in the King, who exercises
his powers through his Ministers (Art. 26), and the King is the head of the state
and is immune from any liability and responsibility (Art. 30). Furthermore, the King
has the right to interfere into staffing politics of the parliament and the government
(Art. 34) and has the right to rule by decrees (Art.40). Political parties were banned
between 1956 and 1992 and did also not play afterwards a substantial role in political
participation due to a restrictive party law, an electoral law that favours loyalists, and
a weak position of the parliament vis-á-vis the King.
The Palestinian Question as Decisive Conflict
The Jordanian identity is comparatively young in the region. Before Transjordan was
established in 1921, there was no territory, people, or nationalist movement referring
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to itself as Transjordanian. The country was set up by the British in order to reward
the Hashemite dynasty that had supported British troops in World War I, giving the
Hijazi Hashemite Amir Abdullah a realm to reign under the auspices and subtle con-
trol of Great Britain. Although some anti-colonial upheavals occurred in the 1930s,
Jordan’s independence in 1946 was less a result of fierce local struggle than to shifts in
perceptions and values about colonialism after World War II. This independence had
rather a mere nominal gloss in several instances, as the country continued to depend
on massive British subsidies and, most notably, the country’s Army continued to be
led by a British officer (Massad, 2001, p.12).
The British head of the Army General John Bagot Glubb, was expelled in 1956. The
Army as institution as such was kept intact, Arabized, and nationalised. This followed
the pattern observed already by Fanon (1963) in which nationalist movements in Mid-
dle East maintain and rely on the same institutions that were used to control them
before independence. The same is true for vast parts of the public administration, the
courts, the bureaucracy, and the police. The role of the Army became palpably indis-
pensable especially during the civil war of 1971 when the PLO challenged the King’s
legitimacy to represent Palestinians inside the country (Yorke, 1989; Sirriyeh, 2000,
p.24-25). In support of the King and many of his followers who have always invoked
the fear of the loss of Transjordan identity and its replacement by a Palestinian home-
land, the military branches of the Palestinians were eventually driven out of Jordan by
the Jordanian Army and reorganized in Lebanon. The Army remained one of the most
important pillars of power for the Monarchy during the 1980s and 1990s. The King
provided and granted reserved seats at Jordan’s universities being highly in demand
by ordinary students as well as full scholarships for the spouses of Army officers and
servicemen. Moreover, custom exemptions, Army exclusive shops, tax relief, and other
discounts provided comfortable social-economic conditions and an enhancement of the
role of high ranking military staff in the country’s economy.
The conflict with the Palestinians had also an impact on the relation between tribal
leaders and the King. Especially in the sparsely populated southern part of the coun-
try, dominated by the Bani Sakhr, the backing of the Monarchy has traditionally been
strong. The tribe has always been counted as stalwart allies of the Hashemite ruling
family since the days of Abdallah I (Sirriyeh, 2000, p.79) and has been rewarded since
with government posts and tax exemptions in order to gain stability and prevent se-
cession (Robins, 2004, p.24-27). During the crisis of 1970/1971 also the supporting
role of the tribes became apparent, both inside and outside the Army. A Bedouin
recruitment program had already been started before 1970 and had been intensified
particularly in 1968 when the strength of the PLO had already grown more and more
palpable as military threat to the regime (Lawrence, 1978, p.33-34). As the defeat of
the Palestinian armed forces could be assessed as a merit of tribal zeal, as a reward for
loyalty, the Council of Tribal Leaders (Majlis Shuyukh al-Ashai’r) was set up by royal
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decree on July 31, 1971 few days after the final expulsion of the Palestinian guerrillas
(Massad, 2001, p.50-51;61). The council was dissolved two years later and replaced by
an extra-juridical understanding between the country’s tribes and the Monarchy. This
new understanding (known as Mahdar al-Qasr, or the Palace Convention) aimed at
conceding more weight to tribal law and traditions as well as normalising tribal rules
for the sake of a common Jordanian identity. As most laws concerning Bedouin were
abolished in 1976, two observations can be made. First, the Palace Convention was
one of the fist decisive and explicit steps that strengthened the factual coexistence of
three realms of law in Jordan until today, being civil, personal status, and tribal law.
Second, the see-saw of granting and subducting special rights to tribes mirrors the
identity struggle between tribalism and nationalism inside the country that has not
been solved completely until today.
The Restrictions of the Electoral Processes
Different from Algeria and Libya, Jordan falls into the category of semi-rentier states
(Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Brynen, 1992; Greenwood, 2003). To sustain the co-
optation of Transjordan supporters and business allies, the regime could rely on oil
revenues until the early 1980s, as well as external income that was acquired by sup-
port of other Arab countries, as the Arab League resolved in 1974 that the oil-rich
Arab states should provide multi-annual financial aid to the states in confrontation
with Israel. However, in the course of the 1980s it became apparent that the influx
of rents would not suffice to maintain the existing distribution networks. Similar to
Algeria, facing an economic crisis causing demonstrations and riots in 1988-1989, af-
ter liberalisation politics imposed by the IMF, democratic reforms were implemented.
However, different from Algeria, the Jordanian elites managed to cushion the impact of
democratisation by setting up a institutional shielding that hampered the opposition.
A crucial part of that shielding was the electoral law and processes. Hence, opposition
was formally allowed but it actually remained toothless. Furthermore, this pattern
of hybridisation allowed for competition for the resources to be distributed and gave
the regime a higher legitimacy due to an increased democratic appearance, however,
without imperilling the monarchical system as such; in the words of Greenwood (2003,
p.257):
[...] under the revised terms of the new liberal bargain, the regime could rely
on the mechanism of elections and political pluralism to decide who got what
and how much in an environment of economic austerity. The competitive nature
of elections and a more pluralistic polity helped shift responsibility for citizens’
standard of living to the legislature and the government and away from the
Palace, thereby insulating the Palace from popular discontent with neo-liberal
economic reform.
This strategy already had worked out during the bread riots of 1996, when demon-
strators attacked PM Kabarati for pushing forward the IMF economic reform pro-
gramme despite strong opposition in the elected Lower House of Parliament and inside
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the population. Protesting against the lift of bread subsidies, they chanted "long live
the King, down with Kabarati!" (Andoni and Schwedler, 1996, p.41). The eventual
violent dispersion of the demonstrations by the security forces showed, nonetheless,
the King’s willingness to proceed with the liberalization process. This attitude was
backed by a steadily growing number of businessmen - inside and outside the tribes -
being included into the apparatus via a top-down selection process that lead eventually
to the palpable power shift from a designated "old guard" to the business oriented and
wealthy "new guard" since the elections of 2007 (Larzillière, 2016, p.19).
Especially the cleavage between urban areas in the north-west (including the East-
Bank of the river Jordan) and the south-eastern periphery remained crucial and was
intensified by the fact that Palestinians dominated partly the private sector and parts
of the East-Bank. The King, thus, always trying to consolidate his power, needed to
balance the interests and relied more on the tribal, rural areas. Serving as an exam-
ple, the electoral law of 1986 allocated only 45 percent of the parliamentary seats to
the cities of Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa, although 74 percent of the population lived in
these cities in the 1990s (Sahliye, 2005, p.121). Additionally, the voting principle was
changed to consolidate tribal dominance in the parliament. While the 1989 Jordanian
parliamentary elections were predicated upon the principle of one-man multiple-votes,
since 1993 the one-man-one vote system was in force. The multiple vote system allowed
the voters to cast as many votes as there are parliamentary seats in the districts and
enabled the Islamic candidates to form electoral lists with representatives of Jordan’s
ethnic, social, and religious minorities such as particular Bedouin networks and tribes,
Christians, or Circassians (Sahliye, 2005, p.114). The one-man-one-vote principle, in
contrast, was criticised by Islamic groups, professional associations, and other parts
of civil society as strengthening tribal candidates, acknowledging that family bounds
remain the most important personal connection in Jordan. Given the pivotal role of
tribal bonds inside the political system of Jordan, the country is coded TRI = (1).
The party that got hit the hardest by the changes of the electoral system was the
Islamic Action Front (IAF), an Islamist party affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood.
The parliamentary elections of 1993 diminished the influence of the IAF due to the
alteration of the electoral system and strong push-backs from the regime. In that
particular election, the number of IAF seats fell despite the fact that the number of
received votes increased compared to the results of Muslim Brotherhood candidates
in 1989 (Greenwood, 2003, p.256). The parliamentary elections of 2007 even reduced
the number of seats from 17 in 2003 to 6 due to repression and a skilful exploit of the
electoral law of 2001 by the regime (Brand, 2017). The Muslim Brotherhood, stand-
ing mainly outside the echelons of power, represent religiously conservative circles as
well as parts of the middle class. They especially posed a threat to the institutional
equilibrium of the country as the King - as a Hashemite claiming to be a descendent
from Prophet Mohammad - enjoyed guideline competence in religious issues and ben-
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efited from the legitimacy given by that descent. The religious component has been
important as means to weld together the young nation, and it had already been in-
voked by Jordan’s first King Abdullah I when stating in front of the Army: "Your link
with the army of the Prophet lies in your relationship with me" (Lawrence, 1978, p.27).
6.3.2 Labour Unions: Political Activism in a Narrow Corset
The first workers unions in Jordan were founded in the 1930s and worked in the un-
derground until their formal legal legitimation by the law No.35 in 1953 (Al-Muqdad,
2012). The date marks the beginning of a vibrant civil society era in which several
trade unions spawned, protected by the 1952 Constitution that granted the free es-
tablishment of trade unions within the limits of the law (Art.23). Until 1954, when
already eleven unions were founded, six of them submitted a request to register a
federation in order to unify all trade unions and to represent their interests before
the relevant authorities, establishing thus the General Federation of Jordanian Trade
Unions (GFJTU). Standing under leftist, nationalists, and Nasserists influence, the
federation involved forthrightly into political questions. This included calls for the
termination of the Jordanian-British Agreement of 1948, support of the 1956 as Prime
Minister elected Suleiman an-Nabulsi from the National Socialist Party before and af-
ter his dismissal by the King, and other policies mainly directed at enhancing Jordan’s
disentanglement from British influence (Hurani, 2001a, p.13-15). This attitude and
zeal - that often diametrically opposed the strategies and policies of the palace - led to
crackdowns on unions and the persecution of many of the movement’s leaders, causing
a shut-down of about 60 per cent of the trade union organisations until 1961. With the
establishment of Trade Union Law 21 of 1961, the movement started to flourish again.
The new bloom was accelerated by the Palestinian Question and the struggle against
Israel that had entered the trade union movement as decisive issue in the course of
the 1960s, leading to a doubling of trade union organisations from 20 in 1967 to 40
in 1969. During the civil war of 1970-1971, the GFJTU split into a pro-Palestinian
and a nationalist, pro-Transjordanian fraction, and the movement nearly busted be-
cause of the internal and external struggles it was riddled with. Different to Algeria,
where the regime never managed to control the union movement completely, this weak-
ness could be exploited by the state authorities. The Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labour then took the initiative to assign a temporary executive committee replac-
ing the GFJTU, forcing unions to hold new elections in 1971, and issuing Temporary
Labour Law number 67 granting the minister amongst other right to interfere into and
dissolve unions because of the spread of "destructive" ideologies (Hurani, 2001a, p.15).
Based on amendment 84 to the Labour Law of 1961, which gave the Minister of Social
Affairs the right to classify the professions, handicrafts and industries in which workers
may create unions, the number of workers’ unions was restricted to seventeen. This
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number remained valid until the wake of the protests of 2010. Although not being a
Republic, Jordan had taken the same steps as neighbouring Syria and Iraq by bringing
the trade union organisations under its control, centralising it, and purging it from
regime critical elements.
Professional Associations as Party Substitutes
The development of professional white-collar associations differed from the fate of work-
ers’ unions. Unlike the latter, the constitutions of the professional associations were
not subject to oversight by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (Moore and Sal-
loukh, 2007) and the possibilities for the state to interfere were more restricted, both
inside and outside the law. State intervention and undemocratic procedures were also
more common in worker’s unions: According to a study by Al-Muqdad (2012), mem-
bers had the impression that disputes inside the leadership are not solved by consensus
(workers unions’: 50.7 per cent; professional white-collar unions: 22.8 per cent), and
45.4 per cent of the members of professional white-collar associations and even 63.1
per cent of the members of workers’ unions reported a lack of interactivity between the
unions leadership and its basis, indicating a more authoritarian atmosphere in work-
ers’ unions. Although the regime undertook diverse measures between intimidation and
monetary incentives to penetrate and steer the professional associations like it did with
the worker’s unions, the associations resisted successfully any attempted co-optation by
state authorities (Moore and Salloukh, 2007, p.13). Additionally, while the foundation
of licensed workers unions ceded in 1976, two other professional associations, namely
the Legal Accountants Association and the Artists Union were still allowed in 1987
and 1997 respectively (Al-Muqdad, 2012, p.451)8. Given that relative freedom, and in
the absence of political parties that had been banned in 1956, professional associations
became party-substitutes. They provided space for the voices of opposition and held
competitive elections that reflected the strength of the political currents that corre-
sponded to the particular Zeitgeist of the different phases of Jordanian history (Brand,
2017). During the 1980s, the influence of Islamic groups rose inside the professional
associations, leading to the first chairman affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in
1992. Unable to exert palpable influence inside parliament due to the laws and policies
of the regime, the Brotherhood increased further activities inside professional associ-
ations. With its welfare oriented rhetoric it filled the gap left by leftist groups which
suffered internal struggles especially after the dissolution of the USSR. Since the early
1990s, a competition began in the elections of the white-collar associations between the
"white list" (Islamic inclination) and the "green list" (leftist-national inclination). These
lists also mirror the two largest opposition blocks in parliament. In the decades before,
8For a comprehensive overview of the existing workers’ unions and professional associations includ-
ing their year of foundation and membership numbers in 2010 see Al-Muqdad (2012, p.451-453).
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nationalists, who were betimes challenged by leftist candidates, dominated the union
boards. However, until 2011 candidates with inclinations to political Islam succeeded
in controlling the unions of engineers, agricultural engineers and nurses, while the two
sides exchanged over time control over lawyers, doctors and pharmacists (Al-Muhaisn,
2011).
Restricted Bargaining Power due to the Political and Economic Structures
Concerning the topics dealt with, before the protests of 2010-2012, the attitudes of the
professional white-collar association were mainly coined by a stance opposing the peace
treaty with Israel on the one hand and a membership structure that represented vast
parts of the middle class on the other (Al-Nuaisha, 2011, p.46). In both organisations,
worker’s unions and professional associations, socio-economic issues were addressed
quite frequently, however, the narrow corset the workers’ unions were forced into pre-
vented a straightforward stance against regime politics. Under these circumstances,
the bargaining power of trade unions vis-á-vis the state was comparatively low. This
is also due to the economic structure: The country’s economy is among the smallest
in the Middle East and is heavily dependent on foreign assistance. Mining of potash
and phosphate is a main source of GDP, and packaged medicaments, knit sweaters,
and potassic fertilizers are important export goods. Due to its geographical situation,
the transport of re-exported goods is also an important sector of the economy. Apart
from the remittances from abroad, the country relies little on pure rents as it has
a comparatively knowledge intensive production structure, which is mirrored in the
48th rank according to the ECI ranking - being even one rank before New Zealand.
The privatisation programme adopted in 1996 affected many government owned key
services like in the telecommunications, electricity, air transport, and mining sector.
Meanwhile, the GFJTU had not found a strategy to address privatisation and lost,
due to lacking responsiveness towards workers’ demands, the support of much of the
workforce (Al-Muqdad, 2012). While in Algeria the unions in the hydrocarbon sector
had enough bargaining power and will to reach some concessions, the General Trade
Union of Mines and Mining Employees in Jordan often condemned strikes in the min-
ing sector, and the largest official union by 2011, the General Trade Union of Land
Transport Employees and Mechanics, became rarely active despite of its centralisation
and the importance of the sector9. Furthermore, trade union density had been con-
stantly falling since 2001, and also the sheer membership numbers of unions were very
low. The Union of the Textile Industry, which had achieved to conclude the second
most agreements with employers in the 1990s (Hurani, 2001b, p.93), had less than 900
members in 2011 (Al-Muqdad, 2012). Consequently, KEYS is coded (0) for the case of
9The high membership numbers resulted from the compulsory membership of taxi drivers. Between
the 1980s and 1990s membership was also mandatory for all transport workers who needed any kind
of licence.
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Jordan.
6.3.3 Trade Unions in the Protests 2011 - 2012: Active on
many Frontiers
The protests started to gain momentum in January 2011 and abated at about November
2012. Different currents merged in the protests and Jordan witnessed a time of intense
activism and networking between opposition groups and civil society.
The Foremath of the Protests in 2011
The number of labour protests had already risen slightly but constantly since 2006, and
at least two incidents which lay ground for the larger protests in 2011 are worthwhile
mentioning. The collective actions in the port of Aqaba of 2010 and public sector day
workers strikes in Dhiban. While the first can be categorised as mainly political, the
second had a rather socio-economic dimension. Additionally the discontent with the
political system rose steadily among members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF.
Protests in the port of Aqaba already emerged in 2009 when public workers protested
plans to end subsidised housing, demanded higher wages, and the right to establish an
independent trade union. A mediation role of the GJTFU was rejected by the protest
leaders. Although the strikes and sit-ins were dispersed violently by the police, the
government also offered a pay package that met the workers’ demands (International
Trade Union Conference (ITUC), 2010). Nonetheless, the planned sale of the port to
a private investor and unmet promises brought labourers back on the streets in 2010,
encountering police repression again. This time, the Army commander in Aqaba inter-
vened directly protecting demonstrators who had taken refuge in the nearby military
hospital from the security forces of the police. The protection by the Army - that
was also reported in the media - had a significant impact on the strike culture of the
country. Tell (2015, p.6-7) clearly states:
As a result, a corner was turned: Jordanian labourers had proved themselves
able to challenge neo-liberal policies, and workers of East Bank origin realized
that the support of kinsmen and sympathizers in the military mainstream could
be used effectively to confront the regime.
The events in the port of Aqaba in 2010 triggered further protest across the country
and across various professions. Most visible the clandestine Teachers’ Union, having
been banned in the 1950s, protested in several cities against budget cuts, dismissals,
and foremost for legal recognition by the government. In the course of the growingly
intense protests that witnessed the dismissal of the two leaders Mustafah Raushdeh
and Adma Izrekat, the National Committee of Retired Servicemen Jordan (NCRS)
became aware of the protests and managed to merge interests and coordinate mutual
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action with the teachers’ union. The NCRS had emerged in 2007, when Army re-
tirees started to criticise that the reforms of Abdallah II cut some privileges of the
military and hit the retired staff particularly hard. Meanwhile, as stated by NCRS
participants, the members of the professionalised Army and the new generation of re-
tirees would face better conditions. The committee embraced many veterans of whom
many fought in the 1970-1971 war, and started with socio-economic demands but soon
turned to political issues (Tell, 2015, p.5-6). Their standpoint was characterised by
anti-Palestinian attitudes and by a denial of Palestinian participation within the po-
litical framework (Al-Shalabi, 2011, p.97). A document already issued by the NCRS
May 1 2010 underlined the supposed threat of a Palestinian influx and warned about
solving "the Palestinian Question at the expense of the Jordanian People". Being care-
ful to express loyalty to the King, the committee attacked the government though,
criticising "monopolized cabinet formation and decision making". This politicisation
resembling unprecedented critic and touching "red lines" of the political equilibrium
entered the teachers protest, and soon slogans combined socio-economic grievances,
critic of the government, and nationalistic rhetoric about the alternative Palestinian
homeland. For the teachers association, being - just like most professional associations
- participant in the "anti-normalisation" campaign that started 1994, the NCRS was a
suitable partner for protests. Soon the union would adopt the demand of the dismissal
of the government and take it to the streets.
According to another reading, the protests led by public sector day workers and some
activists in Dhiban, a small town about 70km south of Amman, would have been the
"cradle of the Arab Spring" in Jordan. Unrest in the region dates back at least to
2006, when a clandestine day labourers union led by Mohammad Sunayd organised sit
ins and strikes to demand better working conditions, higher wages, and secure jobs in
the public sector, hence, basically the abolition of the practice to hire day labourers
(Adely, 2011, p.36). Concessions by the government followed but were not fully imple-
mented, leading to further day labourers protests on May 1 2010 in the headquarters
of professional white-collar unions in Amman. The conflict had gained some attention
throughout the country and led to the sacking and multiple incarceration of Sunayd
in the following months. Spurred and elated by the protests of Aqaba and the mobi-
lization in Tunisia, on January 7 2011 day labourers and youth members of the Social
Left organised a rally in Dhiban that exceeded the organisers expectations in size and
would turn unexpectedly political in its postulations. Amis (2016, p.173) reports of an
organiser who he interviewed, who stated:
We hadn’t planned on mentioning the Prime Minister, let alone the King. Back
then this was a red line. We were scared [...] and no one knew what might
happen. But to our surprise, others started to join us and take part...before we
knew it, we were calling for the fall of the Samir Rifa’i government
The interviewee belongs to the squad of organisers that planned the next rally on
January 14 2011.
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Simultaneously to the emergence of the nationalist movement and the day labourers
protest, a third current emerged after the parliamentary elections of November 2010
Islamic organisations and parties, foremost the IAF Muslim Brothers criticised that
the newly elected House of Deputies would "not genuinely represent the Jordanian
people" (Al-Shalabi, 2011, p.94). In many Friday marches in December, organised by
the movement in down-town Amman, the dissolving of Parliament emerged as one of
the leading demands. A year before the protests of 2010, Irhil Gharaibeh, Deputy Sec-
retary General of the Islamic Action Front, openly called for reform and demanded to
establish an expanded national front to convert Jordan into a constitutional Monarchy.
Although the statement had been relativised and dismissed by the party’s leadership,
stressing a more moderate reform strategy, the discontent with the political system
and foremost the electoral conditions remained palpable among the ranks and files of
the IAF and was still present when the pictures of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt
arrived on the media screens in early 2011.
The Course of the Protests: A Networking Civil Society
The tensions and protests in Jordan that already emerged before the upheavals in
Tunisia and Egypt gained a new dimension against the background of anti-government
mass demonstrations that started elsewhere in December 2010. As activist Mohammad
’Ubaid stated in Amis (2016, p.176):"The roots of the Jordanian movement were there
before the Arab Spring, but the Arab Spring gave it strength". The first huge mass
demonstration, labelled "Day of Rage" by the press took place on January 14 2011 when
about 12.000 demonstrated in about 20 cities against the rise in prices. These calls
were complemented by the call for resignation of the prime minister Al-Rafa’i who was
accused by demonstrators to be the "main enemy of the people" (Al-Quds al-’Arabi,
2011). On February 26, the demands of ten thousands of protesters included the disso-
lution of the parliament, calls for democracy, and the introduction of a constitutional
Monarchy. Many voices demanded the return to a liberal constitution draft from 1952
from the short time of incumbency of King Talal (1951-1952) (Amis, 2016, p.174),
amongst others promoted by leftists and most openly advocated by the Communist
Party (Tariq al-Sha’ab, 2011a). It was the date when three currents in which trade
union organisations were active in combined forces for the first time. These currents
would merge, intertwine, and blur in the course of the protests in 2011-2012.
The Muslim Brotherhood, that had close ties to and some influence the professional
associations, did not participate in the rallies of January 14 2011, however. Sticking to
a less radical approach and aware of benefits of open channels to the government, the
brotherhood perused the strategy of pushing outside the streets for reforms first, and
after telephonic consultations between its leaders and high level governmental represen-
tatives the days before, the Islamic Action Front which is associated with the Muslim
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Brotherhood, and the professional unions boycotted the march (Al-Quds al-’Arabi,
2011)10. Hence, the protests were mainly lead by leftists and nationalists parties and
movements, including parts of the NCRS pensioners committees, and single dissidents
of the professional union of engineers (Al-Quds al-’Arabi, 2011).
On January 25, the Islamic movement, especially the Islamic Action front, was part
of the rallies, however, demanding for reforms the government had promised to imple-
ment as a result of a dialogue the weeks before. The main concerns were about the
announced changes in the electoral law, and the Muslim Brotherhood accused the gov-
ernment of diversion and buying time. By their participation, also many professional
associations joined the rallies.
On February 1, King Aballah II reacted by sacking the Prime Minster and the cabinet,
and promised reforms, pursuing a similar strategy like the King in Morocco in the
sense of trying to present himself as willing spearhead of the reform process. However,
the constant pressure from the street did not cede and several new movements and
alliances emerged during 2011. By that time, diverse groups had organised or joined
protests, including parties like the Islamic Action Front, the Popular Unity Party, and
the Jordanian Reform Front. Also interest groups formed related to geography, such as
Ahrar al-Tafileh, Harak al-Ayasra in Jerash, the Theban movement and the movement
of Ramtha. Furthermore, temporary interests were uttered supported by disturbances,
sit-ins and riots by day labourers in agriculture, port workers, or miners (Diradka,
2016). Especially May 2011 witnessed the emergence of new players on the macro-
level, joining forces and aiming at coordinating collective action. The most visible was
founded on May 19, labelled the National Front for Reform, and headed by lawyer
and former prime minister Ahmad Obeidat.11 Cooperation and reform suggestions
continued until late 2012.
The Trade Union Organisations Becoming Active
Different from Algeria, Jordanian trade unions started to mingle into politics and
questioned the nature of the institutional equilibrium. During May 2011, about 250
members of professional associations, most of them, engineers, lawyers, writers, and
workers form the health sector formed their own organisation called "Trade Unionists
for Reform" (Naqabiun min Adjal al-Islah). In their initial statement, after an explicitly
nationalistic and anti-Zionist preamble, they directly attacked the balance of power in
the country and the superior position of the King by demanding:12
10The city of Irbid is an exception as the influential cleric Al-Saquri was heavily involved into the
protests.
11It included a broad spectre from Islamic movements like the Islamic Action Front, nationalist par-
ties like The Arab Ba’ath Progressive Party, the National Action Party, and the National Democratic
Public Movement Party, as well as left-wing parties like the Jordanian Communist party, the Demo-
cratic Unionist Party, the Jordanian Democratic People’s Party (Hashd), the Jordanian Democratic
Popular Unity Party, and the Progressive Party (Mahafzah, 2012).
12The initial statement and a number of signees can be found on the web page of Al-Madina Online
(2011).
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1. The rejection of all forms of absolutism, and the need for profound and funda-
mental constitutional amendments that would lead to "the people as a source of
authority".
2. The convergence of power and responsibility, not authority without responsibility
or accountability, and no one to be above the law and the Constitution.
3. Election of the Houses of Deputies in accordance with a fair law and the super-
vision of an independent body.
4. Formation of a parliamentary government, led by the parliamentary majority,
and the rotation of power in a democratic manner.
5. Separation of powers, full independence of the judiciary and the establishment of
a constitutional court.
6. Limiting the role of the security services in protecting the homeland, stopping its
interference in political and civil life, and revoking its exceptional powers
7. Fighting corruption and mismanagement, no immunity from accountability and
fair trial for anyone, and the indemnification of what has been stolen from the
people’s wealth.
In contrast, workers unions maintained first a low profile in the political sphere.
Given the restrictions and the history of domination and penetration by state author-
ities, they had a slightly different agenda. The country witnessed many new union
foundations in 2011 by which the role of the general federation was challenged. Over
the years, the organisation had lost credibility, as the trade union federation sometimes
had supported procedures like the rise in taxes or implementation of new taxes affect-
ing the working class if the economical situation seems to demand it. These attitudes
are connected to the quasi-dependence of the national union association on the public
grants its household is mainly relying on (Al-Muqdad, 2012, p.455). Hence, while the
professional associations already founded their own organisational committee (Madjlis
Al-Naqib) at the beginning of the 2000s, the workers unions focussed in 2011-2013 on
the struggle for recognition and changes in the legal framework for unions, using and
accepting Muhammad Al-Sunayd - who led the day labourers strike in Dhiban - as
figurehead. On August 13 2011, the parliament decided to pave the way for new, inde-
pendent trade unions. Already by June 2011, six independent trade unions had been
formed, among others the influential Trade Union of Jordanian Electricity Workers and
the Union of the Phosphate Workers (Adely, 2011). On October 6 2012, the General
Federation announced in an extraordinary conference changes in its charter, however,
not satisfying the independent trade union movement that aimed at more freedom and
an increase of the participation rate of Jordanian workers in unions.
November 30 2012 can be regarded as the end of the critical juncture, when finally the
"bubble burst" (Amis, 2016, p.187). The regime imposed a cut of subsidies causing an
6.3. JORDAN (1) 167
up to 50 per cent price increase for transport and cooking gas. The protests that fol-
lowed were met violently and dispersed. All professional associations except the nurses
went on strike the next Sunday. However, the movements of the country lost gradually
their regime sceptical stance. This was due to harsh reaction of the security apparatus,
as criticism was more often punished according to the civil code. Additionally, civil war
in Syria and Libya, and growing dissatisfaction with the performance of the Muslim
Brotherhood government in Egypt, hampered much of the motivation.
6.3.4 The Alliance between Political Reformers and Rent Seek-
ing Protesters
Concerning the variables SOEC and INOPP, some interpretation is necessary. A look
at the economic data of Jordan gives some insights on the situation before 2011. De-
spite a peak at the beginning of the 2000s, unemployment had constantly fallen from
about 20 per cent to 12,5 per cent between 1991 and 2010. However, 12,5 per cent is
still a high percentage: It is the fourth highest unemployment rate of the sample and
at the same level as Yemen. Youth unemployment was about 20 per cent in 2010. Sim-
ilar to Tunisia, inflation rates fell between 1990 and 2000 but then started to increase
again, leading to decrease of the purchasing power of the minimum wage of about 4
per cent between 2009 and 2010. The question remains whether this was perceived as
the major reason for protest by Jordanians.
A quantitative study by Salah (2013) (cited in Al-Qadi (2015)) clearly showed that
socio-economic grievances were the main reason for mobilisation of young activists, fol-
lowed by a reform of the constitutional amendments (56.4 per cent) and a reform of the
electoral procedures (20.5 per cent). Yet, mobilisation rates were higher among public
sector workers than among the unemployed and those earning less than 500 Dinar per
month (Diradka, 2016). Demands of the heterogeneous protest movement included
an increase of the minimum wage, job creation, and enhanced working conditions in
general on the one hand, and a call for political reforms in order to enhance freedom
and liberty on the other. Also the nationalistic dimension and questions about the
Palestinian homeland, that had mobilised civil society and professional associations al-
ready before 2011, played their role in the juncture of 2011-2013. The initial protests,
however, that started in January 2011 and that laid the foundations for the protest
movements that followed had their origins in the peripheries and were driven by socio-
economic demands, especially the rise of prices. Even if most groups soon agreed on a
more broad political agenda following the reasoning that the socio-economic conditions
were a result from a deficient political system (Al-Qadi, 2015, p.91;95-96), we can safely
assume that the breach of the authoritarian bargain was the main driving force behind
the protests among the early risers. The case of Jordan is therefore coded SOEC =
(1).
Concerning INOPP, the Muslim Brotherhood - the largest opposition group in 2011
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- managed to benefit from the mobilisation potential via the professional white-collar
associations. The fact that both organisations boycotted the January 14, 2011 rally,
whereas both participated in the January 21 demonstrations is a first indicator. Fur-
thermore, for instance, former Bar Association President Saleh Armouti, member of
the Brotherhood dominated Islamic Current was on the forefront of the January 21
protests in 2011. Ties of the Brotherhood also reach into the workers unions: MB’s
deputy leader Bani Irshaid, secretary general of the IAF 2006-2009 and still member
of the Executive Office in 2010, was an active trade unionist and became chairman of
the General Union of White Cement Workers in 1992, and of the General Union of
Construction Workers in 1995 which are both part of the GFJTU framework. Maysara
Malas, chairman of the Liberties Committee of the Engineers’ Union, and also at the
forefront of the January 21 demonstrations in 2011, pins the role of the Brotherhood
down in an Interview seven years later when stating (Abdalrahman, 2018):
[...] the Muslim Brotherhood can call and mobilize for the largest participation
in the movement, without leading the face or leadership so that it cannot even
be accused of riding the wave.
Apart from the Brotherhood, especially trade union organisations became a valuable
tool for many political activists - and vice versa - many newly emerging organisations
actively sought the proximity to the political spectrum, coinciding with observations
of Valenzuela (1989, p.9-13) from Latin America and East Asia. Because of these
intertwinings, and also because of the close coordination in several committees, and
mutual coordinated action, it can be assumed that the trade union movement was
embedded - or grew into embedding - into a network with opposition movements. The
case of Jordan is therefore coded INTEROPP = (1).
6.4 Morocco (0)
The institutional equilibrium of the Monarchy of Morocco relies upon the institution
of the King, his tribal allies, and a hybridisation of the system that managed to steer
away discontent from the royal house. Having a long lasting union history and also
a history of labour unrest, since the 1990s there is a kind of truce between the ruling
elite and the unions. Co-optation and fragmentation that was caused by labour law
that allows for union plurality, in combination with a vibrant, yet also fragmented
party landscape, split and weakened trade union institutions over time. Hence, while
the 20th February Youth Movement challenged the equilibrium which ultimately led
to a new constitution, unions were barely active in that political reform process and,
similar to Algeria, stuck to socio-economic demands. While the Arab uprisings did
not alter Morocco’s macro-politics, and the continuity of monarchical rule was pre-
served, unions focussed on and achieved change in socio-economical micro-politics only
(Buehler, 2015b, p.92). Thus, they cannot be labelled as critical inference factor aiming
at disturbing the institutional equilibrium inside the country; the QCA outcome for
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Morocco is set to (0).
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
0 0 0 1 1 0 MOR(3)
Table 6.6: Truth table row for the case of Morocco
The importance of tribal connections, especially inside the makhzen as will be
shown in section 6.4.2, and which resembles the case of Jordan, justifies the coding
of the variable TRI as (1). Furthermore, as will be outlined in section 6.4.4, and
compared to the other sample countries, Morocco did comparatively well according to
many economic indicators. The variable SOEC is coded (0), as a possible breach of the
authoritarian bargain was not a central incentive for the protests, as they had been in
Jordan. Section 6.4.2 will analyse the logic of hybridisation of the Moroccan system in
which union plurality and decentralisation had been and remained, as shown in part
6.4.3, a historical feature of the union landscape in Morocco. The variable CEN is thus
coded (0). The anomic threat unions posed historically to the regime and a rediscovery
of of bargaining power at least after 2007, as will be outlined especially in part 6.4.4
showed the potentials unions had in key sectors. KEYS is therefore coded (1).
While trade unions worked closely together with parties in the opposition, these parties,
however, did not try to alter the institutional equilibrium in a significant manner.
By fact, trade unions did not have any kind of sustainable alliance with those forces
that actively tried to change the institutional equilibrium. As will be outlined more
elaborately in section 6.4.3, the variable INOPP in set to (0).
6.4.1 Monarchy, Islam, and controlled Pluralism as Istitu-
tional Equilibrium
According to its constitution, Morocco is a constitutional, democratic, parliamentary
and social Monarchy. However, despite long-lasting ostensible and vividly promoted
reform endeavours, the country remains authoritarian in the sense that it is charac-
terised by strong central power and limited political freedoms. Morocco forms an
example of a "hybrid political regime", in which a particular institutional arrangement
imitates democratic legitimization which is, however, distorted by a series of legal re-
strictions and subordinated to an authoritarian rule exerting supreme power (Desrue,
2013; Olivier et al., 2008). The linchpin of the institutional equilibrium in this form of
rule is the King and his inner circle. Article 19 of the constitution of 1996 granted the
Monarch a special position in the system of power, stating:
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The King, "Amir Al-Muminin"(Commander of the Faithful), shall be the Supreme
Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be
the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State. As Defender
of the Faith, He shall ensure the respect for the Constitution. He shall be the
Protector of the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups and organisa-
tions. The King shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Nation and
the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries.
6.4.2 The Role of Religion and Tribalism in the Political Sys-
tem
The rule of the King. similar to Jordan, has a religious and a tribal legitimatory
dimension. Already the first King after independence in 1956, Muhammad V, relied
on the support of nationalist and explicitly religious groups at the same time. The
religious groups did not attempt to form a Caliphate like system where Islam is Religion
and State (din wa dawla), but rather aimed at adding an explicitly Islamic dimension
to the modern political system (Voll, 2013, p.58). Moreover, the Kings’ claim to power
is based on a claim of shorfa lineage making him a descendent of Prophet Mohamed.
When from 1980 onwards, religious movements appeared being sceptical towards the
legitimacy of the monarchical system, the royal family managed to keep the upper hand
in religious questions, especially by relying on Sufi orders (Layachi, 2013, p.359-360;
364-366), and plying off the leftist and Islamist movement against each other (Dalmasso
and Cavatorta, 2011). The King maintains a close relationship to the institutionalised
clerical elite in the country, as he is the political and religious leader in one person.
The ritual of the Bay’a confirms his religious acceptance and leadership and many
influential clerics belong to his close advisers. Additionally, the Monarch relies on a
network of close allies consisting of local tribe leaders, businessmen, high clerks of the
administration, and Army officers. This network, being a main pillar of the Monarchy
for centuries, is often labelled makhzen
Hybridisation and Fostered Co-Optation of Political Players
Thinking of the Moroccan political system as a network around the King that is able
to distribute resources and opportunities, it was able to bind, co-opt and most notably
attract political players and make them pliable. Showing a clear difference to Algeria’s
bureaucracies, Waterbury (1970, p.399) observes:
“[T]he real politics of the country became concentrated in the competition for
patronage among various ministers and their protégées. This kind of competition
was and is far easier for the King to manage than that of political organizations
and political ideology.”
This is also true for the party system and the parliamentary procedures. First,
by articles 23, 24, 27 and 30(7) the King received powerful possibilities to intervene
into the legislative process, the composition of the executive branch, and jurisdiction,
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violating formally the principle of the division of power. Second, the stimulated com-
petition inside the pluralist society, and the wide inherent range of political ideologies,
often caused feuding, mistrust, or even gridlock in the political process. In these cases
the King managed to present himself as the main arbitrator of the political scene and
the guarantor for stability in the country, allegedly making use of the political plural-
ism as a tool to divide and fragment the political parties. The "imaginary parliament"
(Claisse, 1985), which was elected in a frequent cycle of four years, held debates and
carried out bills, but had not the freedoms, competences, or sometimes the will to
challenge the Kings’ hegemony. At the same time, organisations outside the institu-
tional sphere (state institutions, political parties, trade unions, media, associations)
contributed to the consensual management of the permanent but restricted reform en-
deavour. Similar to Jordan, these institutions helped to dilute responsibilities in times
of crisis, absorb criticisms or take the blows (Molina, 2011, p.436). At the same time,
the regime expanded its networks of co-optation which had been including tribal lead-
ership and local notables for decades (Buehler, 2015a), by fostering the emergence and
upkeep of loyalist parties.13
In this environment, civil society organisations, parties and - different from Jordan -
also trade unions benefited from a relatively liberal handling of approval procedures
and could operate relatively free inside the country. This allows for a more elastic view
on the premises of the concept of authoritarianism in the MENA region, however, civil
society organisations cannot be seen as progressive or pushing for rapid democratisa-
tion of the country. They rather emerged in a space that was opened by the regime,
allowing to advocate reforms within the existing political framework of power. They
are not allowed to put the monarch’s legitimacy into question or cross other, the bal-
ance of power changing "red lines". Hence, inside this space, they encounter a form of
regime-controlled liberalisation that does not allow for the challenge of the monarchical
control over the decision-making process, and that is rather part of the legitimation of
the state order than a risk to it (Maghraoui, 2011).
6.4.3 The Co-optation of the Trade Union Movement and the
Anomic Threat
The major trade union organisations did not elude from this logic of controlled plu-
ralism. By 2010 being split into 21 different trade union federations, and riddled with
internal divisions, unions had gradually lost their ability to mobilise workers and face
or address the challenges and consequences of the implemented neo-liberal programs
in the 1990s (Jibril, 2004). Unions were mostly affiliated to particular political parties
13Loyalist parties allied with Mohamed VI included the Parti Authenticité et Modernité Morocco
(PAM), the Rassemblement National des Indépendants Morocco (RNI), the Mouvement Populaire
Morocco (MP), the Union Constitutionnelle Morocco (UC), and the Mouvement Démocratique et
Social (Buehler, 2015a, p.365).
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and did not challenge the very nature of the power balance in the country, say, the
Monarchy, for decades.
The Fight for Independence and Early Fragmentations
It has not been like this ever since. The history of the Moroccan trade union move-
ment as such is linked to the colonial history of the country. Starting in the 1930s,
workers unions formed first as clandestine organisations consisting of French and Mo-
roccan workers. Strikes in 1936 in the Sugar Company in Casablanca, spreading to
other factories in the city, as well as to the phosphate mining centres of Louis Gentil
(now Yousouffia) and Khouribga built a watershed in Moroccan worker’s history. They
resulted among other things in the concession to form unions, albeit for French workers
only. This can be considered as a major reason for the growing nationalist conscious-
ness among Moroccan workers and unions in the years to follow (Clement and Paul,
1984). The trade union movement that would emerge had often shown and proven a
significant potential to mobilise the masses in Morocco’s history and was characterised
by palpable militancy. After the assassination of Tunisia’s most prominent labour
leader, Ferhat Hached, in 1952, Moroccan unionists rallied the streets of Casablanca
and, following the call of nationalists, equipped themselves with improvised weapons.
At the end of the rally, unionists attacked the colonial police with axes and batons
(Buehler, 2015b, p.92).
In 1955, one year before the formal independence of Morocco, the well known activists
Bouazza and Ben Seddiq managed to found the Union General du Travail Morocco
(UMT), that would become a powerful player in the political arena and the start for
institutionalization on the macro-level. Meanwhile, the connection to the Istiqlal Party
and hence to the state apparatus grew stronger. The union officers got special benefits
and were de facto paid by the state. The struggle for independence had unified the
working class, however, it had also concealed the question of basic orientation of the
UMT between class struggle and nationalism, that became more evident in the late
1950s. Discords between the UMT and the Istiqlal Party lead to the establishment
of a second union center in 1959 labelled Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc
(UGTM), and taking with it several important UMT locals among the teachers, dock-
ers and miners. It was promoted as a step against the attempt of the UMT leadership
and leftists inside the Istiqlal to take over the nationalist movement and the party
(Clement and Paul, 1984). In the same year a new leftist party was founded, the
Union Nationale des Forces Populaires Morocco (UNFP). After 1972, following a dete-
rioration of the relationship between the UNFP and the UMT, the UNFP split. There
was bloc close to the UMT, still labelled UNFP, and having a nationalist stance on the
one side, and the new Socialist Union of Popular Forces Union Socialiste des Forces
Populaires Morocco (USFP), defining itself as rather leftist-progressive on the other.
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The latter founded the Confédération Démocratique du Travail Morocco (CDT*) in
November 1978, despite a nationalist atmosphere and overemphasis of national unity
due to the annexation of Western Sahara. Two years before the Islamic "Union Na-
tionale du Travail au Maroc" (UNTM), having its stronghold in the educational sector
was founded. Due to the emergence of many trade union organisations with strong ties
to political actors since the 1960s and 1970s, already Moore (1970, p.184) attests that
especially for parties, no matter how meagre their membership, it became "fashionable
to create ’union appendages’". The four aforementioned union federations, together
with the CDT split "Fédération Démocratique du Travail" which was formed in 2004,
were the most influential union centres among the 21 existing ones in 2011.
Unions Becoming Appendices of Political Parties
In contrast to Jordan with its high degree of union centralisation, the power to mobilise
made unions beneficial partners and tools for political parties in Morocco. While the
trade union organisations mostly stuck to the guidelines of their political affiliates or
maintained a low profile in political issues touching the distribution of political power
(the UMT even declared itself explicitly a-political (Catusse, 2001, p.47-48, fn. 31),
they uttered and perused socio-economic demands in a more straightforward manner.
The massive protests against market-oriented politics implemented by the regime, most
palpable in 1979, 1981, and 1990 were organised by unions and led to violent clashes
with the security forces and fatal casualties. The protests developed a pushing and
militant dynamic, leading to a harsh governmental reaction. In 1979, when unions
mobilised especially among public employees of education, mining, and railway workers
to pressure the elected government to raise wages and to compensate for price increases,
688 unionists were jailed, 708 teachers fired, and 178 healthcare workers dismissed
(Buehler, 2015b, p.94). The riots of 1981 even peaked in a massacre of 645 participants
and thousands of injured, and systematic repression of union leaders. The massive
impact of and power unfolded by the street protests can be explained by the ability
to activate disenchanted masses from the poorer areas that were bandwagoning along
with the union organised rallies, due to the deterioration of the social-economic status
of many urban dwellers that was a side effect of market-oriented politics. Eventually,
most of the demands of the protesters were met and most price controls were reinstated.
This ensured a kind of truce between the leading trade union organisations and the
government for the years to follow. Even after the riots of 1990, causing 40 fatal
casualties, when 20.000 mostly unemployed young men swarmed the streets and caused
significant material damaged, the regimes’ answer was rather moderate, although a
campaign was launched against CDT leader Noubir Amaoui with a delay of two years
(Waltz, 1995, p.128). This history of protests and riots caused a learning process of
the monarchical power holders and among unionists. The latter, still being aware of
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their mobilisation potential, nevertheless sought more the shelter of political parties
and moved towards becoming a player and beneficiary inside the retaliation game of
the Monarchy and the domesticated plurality, however, without searching for direct
confrontation. The regime, on the other side, bearing the possible power of unions
in mind, became more responsive to union demands for the sake of curtailing what
Zartman (2016, p.71) labels the "anomic threat" that trade unions showed to be able
to inflict. This bargain, however, led to an open space, as unions - just as political
parties - tended increasingly to neglect the demands of the deprived population inside
the country that stood outside the distribution networks linked to the regime. It was
this space where the February 20 Movement finally emerged.
6.4.4 The Twofold Demands: Economic and Political Demands
Separated
The protests of early 2011 triggered a reform process inside the country as well as
some socio-economic concessions which were wrenched off from the regime amongst
others by the leading trade union centres in a number of negotiations. Taking a look
at the economic data, and similar to Algeria, the protests of workers and unions can
be assessed as rather pro-cyclical: They did not mainly aim at changing the very
nature of the institutional equilibrium and focussed on increasing the share of state
revenues they receive. A look at the economic figures of the country supports this thesis:
Unemployment was about 9 per cent in 2010, however, the rate decreased constantly
since 2000 after it had been increasing at the end of the 1990s. It is the second
most continuous decrease in the sample (again, after Algeria). Youth unemployment
remained between 17 and 18 per cent, this is quite high, however, compared to the
rest of the sample it is in the bottom half. Inflation rates were among the lowest in
the sample and remained under 4 per cent per year between 2000 and 2010 and had,
by trend, been falling since 1990. The purchasing power of the minimum wage had
increased by more than 120 per cent between 2000 and 2010, whereas the minimum
wage system, which was introduced already in 1936, was comparatively elaborated and
well implemented (Agénor and Aynaoui, 2003, p.12). The case of Morocco is thus
coded SOEC = (0).
Early Protests: Demanding for a King that Reigns but does not Rule
In January and the beginning of February 2011 the upheavals and political changes
in Tunisia and Egypt had only triggered small manifestations of solidarity in Morocco
with an international focus. But slowly voices and platforms covered by the anonymity
of the internet began to ask questions about the situation inside Morocco. Several
influencer and groups called for nationwide mobilisation on February 20 2011, forging
thus a movement carrying the name of that particular date, and being a movement that
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would play a crucial role in the moths to follow. Some demands were socio-economic
in nature and addressed the dissatisfaction with the growing cost of living, or the high
youth unemployment uttered in earlier protest waves, however, a more radical, political
tone weaved itself into the slogans. Requests included (Molina, 2011):
- the realization of profound and radical constitutional and political changes to
consolidate a democratic state built on strong institutions
- the construction of a state based on the rule of law, say, a more effective fight
against corruption
- a free and independent legal system and division of powers
- a political system of parliamentary, say, constitutional Monarchy
Especially the last point the demands of the February 20 Movement earned the
reputation of being rather moderate in comparison to its inspirational sources such as
Tunisia and Egypt. The Monarchy as form of government, and Mohammad VI as its
highest representative, was not put particularly into question. Nonetheless, even if we
consider the slogan "a King that reigns but does not rule14" as a rather evolutionary
than a revolutionary attitude, still the political quality of the demanded changes is
remarkable and a phenomenon not witnessed in this extent before in the younger his-
tory of the country. The movement managed to incorporate different political players
and currents, such as numerous non-governmental organisations like human rights as-
sociations, four small left-wing political parties, their and other parties’ youth sections
(including some in the government coalition), the Islamists of Al-Adl wal Ihsan and
Al-Badil Al-Hadari, and a part of the Amazigh (Berber) movement (Molina, 2011,
p.437).
The Rediscovery of Old Union Bargaining Strength
The protests of the February 20 Movement were accompanied by trade unionists and
strikes. These activities differed with respect to their goals from the political aspects
the February 20 movement stressed, and mostly covered socio-economic demands only.
In fact, labour protests began to increase significantly before the rise of the February 20
Movement: On November 3 2010, public employees called a nationwide 48-hour strike
with 85 per cent participation followed by a 72-hour strike on January 10 across all
government office nationally, achieving a participation rate of 80 per cent. On January
28, the phosphate miners’ union, an institution historically known for its militancy,
went on strike for a health insurance actually granted by the labour law - but in
14The original slogan malakiya barlamaniya - yasud fiha al malik wa la yahkum is more flexible as
its common English translation, as the word "sada - yasidu" covers a lingual field from "dominate" over
"predominate" to "reign". That way, the future role of the Monarchy was more open and somewhat
blurred, and more political players could be included into the movement.
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reality not available. The increase of collective action, which was mostly backed by
the most influential trade union federations, was a result of a disappointment with the
new government of which socialist inclined parties were members of. Before, labour
leaders did not endorse in earlier protests of the 2000s in order to avoid compelling
their allies in the government (Buehler, 2015b, pp.98-99). However, the unions became
disillusioned from about 2007 onwards, perceiving that they could not count on the
socialists to implement their demands.
With the strike in the mining sector, the union had hit a neuralgic point as Morocco
was in 2011 the world’s largest exporter of phosphate. The state owned Office Chérifien
des Phosphates OCP remained the primary company for phosphate mining in Morocco,
with more than 300,000 employees, producing 3 percent of its GDP and exporting
almost 30 percent of its total exports (Catusse, 2009, p.2). Other key areas of the
economy were agriculture, tourism, and the textile industry.
Even the UTM, often being accused of being regime friendly, struggled successfully
for the right of its members in the textile sector. After a collective dismissal of 186
workers because of collective action at Somitex SA in 2004, the union submitted a
complaint to the ILO (Case No. 2404, Morocco) and eventually reached a settlement
by reconciliation: The workers concerned obtained material compensation, fixed jointly
with the employer. The long lasting process is symptomatic for state-labour relations
in the late 2000s. Strikes and sit ins often lacked participation and were often dispersed
by the security forces (In Defence of Marxism, 2011), and authorities tried to exclude
trade unions from from negotiations between the industry association, employers, and
the state (, ILO). Still, unions had mostly enough strength and willingness to face state
authorities when it counted.
Against that background, the high degree of privatisation of the Moroccan economy
since the 1990s is a key feature to understand the role of trade unions vis-á-vis the
state. New modes of tripartite negotiation that also involved the new class of owners
openly broke with the tradition of direct face-to-face confrontation between workers’
unions and the state (Catusse, 2009, p.23-24), which had been traditionally the main
employer. The privatisation policies that also included basic infrastructure already at
an early stage (Khosrowshahi, 1997, p.245), together with a straightforward policy of
diversification that aimed at reducing the state’s dependence of single, state owned
industries like phosphate, making the state less vulnerable to collective action and
strikes. Still, benefiting from its history of militancy, unions enjoyed bargaining power
and influence on macro politics, as Agénor and Aynaoui (2003, p.12) still claim about
the minimum wages in 2003:
[...] they are usually the outcome of political and discretionary decisions, fol-
lowing overwhelming pressure from the trade unions. The few available studies
reveal that the urban minimum wage regulation (which concerns mostly unskilled
workers) is pretty well enforced in the private formal sector, through an active
role of the administration and the trade unions.
When the wave of upheavals spread across MENA, trade unions saw a possibility to
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push trough demands and regain credibility. By fact, the politically split union move-
ment had lost more and more the support of the working class, as could be seen in the
professional elections before 2011 in which the amount of trade union members in the
working councils dropped from 47 per cent in 2003 to 35 per cent in 2009 (Meknassi
and Rioux, 2010, p.10). It can safely be assumed that the new self-perception of unions
after 2007 had strengthened its position in the country and especially in key sectors.
Dissimilar to Jordan, this history of recent struggle, and the still echoing anomic threat,
gave unions a comparatively high bargaining power. The variable KEYS is therefore
coded (1) for Morocco.
This strength proved to be an asset in socio-economic negotiations that started soon
after February 20. Issues were the enhancement of wages, the creation of new job op-
portunities, and issues related to the pension system and income taxes. State-labour
consultations were announced already on February 21 by prime minister Fassi that
would comprise four unions — the relative recent Fédération Démocratique du Travail
Morocco (FDT), being close to government, the UMT, UGTM, and UNTM. These
unions exerted tangible pressure to push their socio-economic demands. Additionally,
the CDT - that boycotted the social dialogue accusing the regime of diversion and
hampering of the reform process by setting up inadequate committees instead of show-
ing direct action - increased the pressure form outside the negotiations. After the
settlement of inter and intra-union disparities about the nature and extent of their
claims, and some rounds of negotiation spiced with partially harsh denials of govern-
mental proposals, on April 26 the body agreed upon a package of several measures.
It included retirement bonuses, professional promotions, wage and pension raises and
an increase of the minimum wage. The success of these negotiations can be traced
back to the potential to mobilise, which the unions had shown in the decades be-
fore, being a part of the collective memory of the country and the ruling elite - which
was trying to circumvent the anomic threat the movement could pose (Buehler, 2015b).
Trade Unions as Onlooker Nodding through Weak Reforms
However, different from Jordan, trade unions in Morocco did not engage much into
discussions about system reform. They rather took the chance to reconnect with their
base by pushing through socio-economic demands. Meanwhile, other players fought for
reform.
King Muhammad VI announced in a speech on March 9 far-reaching reforms. The
breadth and specific nature of the promises endorsing a substantial power shift away
from the royal palace to elected institutions took many people by surprise. A core ele-
ment was the announcement of a new constitution replacing the 1996 version, granting
the parliament more rights vis-a-vis the King. In his speech, the King picked up many
demands made by the February 20 movement, without mentioning the movement itself,
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and presented himself as the trailblazer of the "reformist momentum". The strategy
coincided with the self-image the King is promoting since his inauguration in 1999,
depicting a picture of a reform-willing monarch being worried about the stability of
his country. Moreover, the implementation of a new constitution or constitutional
amendments has a long-lasting tradition in the country, as there have been undertaken
seven such endeavours since independence already, the last in 1996. Shortly after the
Kings’ March 9 speech, the Commission Consultative pour la Revision Constitutionelle
Morocco (CCRC) was implemented consisting of nominees of the King only, which was
criticised by many activists. Furthermore, the meetings of the commission were not
public and other civil society groups, trade unions, and even the February 20 move-
ment got merely the opportunity to submit proposals in audiences in the framework
of a so-called "political mechanism accompanying the constitutional reform" (Molina,
2011, p.439). The constitution, that was worked out in opacity and in a tight time
frame, and that was supported by a positive media campaign, was accepted by the
population in a referendum on July 1 2011 with more than 98 per cent. The lead-
ing trade union centres UTM, UGTM,and CDT, just as the majority of trade unions
took the same stance as their parties and canvassed actively for the new constitution.
Nonetheless, the outcome was rather sobering compared to the hopes the March 9
speech had risen. The new constitution did indeed introduce a formal enhancement
in human rights, enhanced the independence of the government, and tackled judicial
reforms. However, the basic role and power of the King was barely altered. He kept
amongst other privileges the rights to rule by decree (Art. 42), the power to appoint
and dismiss ministers (Art 47), and his status of the "Commander of the Faithful" (Art.
41) (Maghraoui, 2011, p.696).
Without going into further detail of the assessment of the constitution of 2011, two
statements can be made. First, the constitution did not meet the hopes and demands
of the progressive voices the February 20 Movement, and, second, it was the movement
indeed that opened the road for reform as the progressive force inside the country.
Even Belkeziz (2012) who explicitly defends the outcome of the constitutional reform
process, acknowledges the Movement as the driving force. Hence, it can be identified
as interference factor trying to alter the institutional equilibrium of the country. The
role of parties and trade unions was, in contrast, rather hesitant (Maghraoui, 2011;
Biagi, 2014). There was little intersection or exchange between unions and the move-
ment, as the movement stressed that it emerged outside the established framework,
say, explicitly outside the party and trade union framework. Moreover, it was the
lack of political progressiveness that hampered a more close collaboration, as activist
Mohammad Hanafi stresses when writing about "union goals" and "movement goals"
(Hanafi, 2011):
February 20 movement is not a party movement, it is, moreover, not directed by
a particular union, or a group of trade unions, even though some of its founding
constituents are of trade union nature. Any attempt to make it a trade union
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movement limits the possibility of opening to the masses, because they [the
unions] are only seeking to achieve union goals, rather than achieving the goals
of the February 20 Movement.
Morrocan Journalist and activist Miriam Moukrim attests the Movements’ failure
to achieve its main goal of a far-reaching reform of the political system in Morocco,
and ties that to the inability to activate established political players, amongst others
the trade unions (Moukrim, 2015). This means, that trade unions did have allies in
the parliaments among the opposition parties with which they were working closely
together, however, unions did, just like their allies in opposition, not interfere into the
reform process like the February 20 youth movement. The variable INOPP is hence
set to (0).
6.5 Tunisia (1)
By 2010, a strong bureaucracy and security apparatus as well as a ascending business
elite were the main pillars of Ben Ali’s power. Also the Tunisian trade union federation
UGTT had been an inherent part of the system. It was horizontally fragmented into
a leading elite mostly located in Tunis, and a more radical base in the south. Even
without focusing on the role the UGTT played in the transitional process - for which it
gained the Nobel Prize for Peace in 2015 together with the Bar Association, the Ligue
Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme (LTDH), and the Chamber of Commerce Union
Tunisienne de l’Industrie, du Commerce et de l’Artisanat (UTICA) - the role of the
trade union movement in Tunisia can be seen as decisive for the change of the institu-
tional equilibrium. For 2011 it turned true what Yousfi (2015, p.56) states: When it
came to collective action, especially in times of crisis, the progressive part of the UGTT
often could win through and was the one to take the decisions. The QCA codification
for the country is (1).
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
1 0 1 0 1 1 TUN(20)
Table 6.7: Truth table row for the case of Tunisia
Especially in comparison with Libya, Jordan, or Morocco, and as will be outlined
in part 6.5.1, tribalism was existent in many parts of the country, however, it did never
play a pivotal role in the country’s macropolitics. The variable TRI is therefore coded
(0). Due to economic mismanagement the state was not perceived capable to maintain
the authoritarian bargain in a satisfactory manner for the populace. This becomes
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evident when taking a look at the economic pattern and indicators of the country as
will be done in part 6.5.1. Hence, the variable SOEC is coded (1). In this environment,
and as will be outlined in part 6.5.5, the UGTT had lost its control over the union
movement and also a huge amount of bargaining power in key sectors, especially since
2000. The variable KEYS is coded (0). As the UGTT still remained the dominant
trade union federation with a high degree of centralisation, the variable CEN is coded
(1), and due to its independence from political parties, which had always been a core
attribute of the heterogeneous federation as shown in part 6.5.5, the variable INOPP
is coded (0).
6.5.1 The Equilibrium: Police State, Corporatism, and Pat-
rimonialism
By 2010, Tunisia was a Republic dominated by a single party that was characterised
by a large bureaucratic body intertwined with state institutions. The President of the
Republic posed the most powerful position in the equilibrium. He had the rights to
propose bills which have to be prioritised in parliament (Art.28), was able to rule by
decrees, and could declare emergency status (Art.46). His term could be extended by
law in case of war or immanent peril and he could be re-elected infinitely (Art.39).
Additionally, he had the right to dismiss members of Government (Art.51) and was
the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Art.44).
A Tradition of Keeping the Military in Check
Habib Bourguiba, who emerged as first President from the anti-colonial struggle against
France, was a civilian with little sympathy for the military. During his incumbency he
continuously argued that the scarce resources of the country should rather be spent on
development than on defence (Bou Nassif, 2015, p.67, fn.10). Bourguiba’s main pillar
of power, just like the one of his successor Ben Ali, was the single party (the Neo-
Dustour Party between 1957 until 1964, then the Parti Socialiste Destourien Tunisa
(PSD) until 1988) that penetrated the Tunisian society. Party membership soon be-
came necessary for any Tunisian who aimed at making a career in the public sector.
Simultaneously, the emergence of a controlled sphere of civil society organisations was
encouraged. This controlled civisme (Bellin, 2015, p.126), changing in extent over the
post-colonial history, led to a comparatively vibrant civil society, which distinguishes
Tunisia from other authoritarian party systems according to Linz (1971).
The ascendency to power of General Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, Bourguiba’s Prime Min-
ister and former director-general of national security, changed the power structures
slightly. Ben Ali’s power base was less located in the PSD but rather in the armed
forces and the Ministry of Interior. A subtle power struggle between the party’s bureau-
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cracy and ambitious Army officers was unleashed, with the latter now more frequently
becoming governors, ambassadors, and ministers. However, the favouritism was super-
ficial only, as Bou Nassif (2015, p.69) states:
And yet a careful examination of Bin ’Ali’s allocation of positions to military
elites during the initial years of his rule reveals no rupture with Bourguiba’s
practices. Although he appointed more officers to ministerial and diplomatic
positions than did Bourguiba, the difference was marginal. Further, most of the
officers whom Bin ’Ali appointed to civilian posts belonged to his own cohort;
the new president was rewarding life-long friends, not the military institution.
The powerful party soon feared loss of influence and found an ally in the domes-
tic security forces, in particular in the Direction Générale de la Secureté Nationale,
and the police, which both competed with the Army about resources and viewed the
installation of Army staff in their leading ranks as threatening. In 1991, the police
eventually managed to drive a wedge between the Army and the president. In the
Barakat al-Sahil affair, Minister of Interior Abdallah Qallal presented a Captain in
the national TV who claimed to be part of a coup attempt steered by elements of
the Islamist Al-Nahda party, and aiming at the establishment of a Iranian-like Shari’a
State in Tunisia. The allegations, which turned much later out to be extracted under
torture, had a deep impact of Ben Ali, who now even more started to rely on the Party
and the domestic security services.
Patrimonial Clan Structures but no Systematic Tribalism
In contrast particularly to Morocco and Libya, Tunisia is the country of the sample
with the least tribal and/or sectarian tensions. The relative homogeneity of the small
country, that was actually meant to become a part of Libya under Italian rule, has
allowed almost no emergence of particularistic groups based on ethnicity that would
have delimited themselves against others in order to increase their share of the country’s
rents. This might have been a reason why a secularist-modernist project, which the first
leaders around Habib Bourguiba had in mind, faced relatively little resistance from the
populace. Moreover, it was one of the pivotal credos of Bourguiba to fight centrifugal
forces of regionalism and tribalism and all leftovers of the "traditional structures of
yesterday" (Micaud, 1969, p.471). Although tribal traditions and thinking did still
exist by 2010, especially in the south of the country, the population had an ambivalent
relationship towards it. Tribal solidarity was often regarded as something inevitable,
yet often misused for propaganda against the region by the regime, which had made
people even reluctant to discuss it (Khalil, 2014, p.51-53). Consequently, no serious
political players emerged drawing somewhat on tribal bonds.
This does not mean that blood did not play a role in the political system of Tunisia. Like
in each MENA country - and to different extents beyond - influential families did find a
way to profit from kin connections in order to advance the political career or enrichment
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of their members. This was particularly true after the regime started to promote
privatisation politics. The family of Ben Ali himself is said to have befitted on a grand
scale. The security apparatus he had set up under his control gave him and his family
of about 140 persons vast powers that included arbitrary expropriation and power
over lives wrapped ostensibly in the decisions of an obedient police and jurisdiction.
Especially Leila Trabelsi, Ben Ali’s second wife gained fame for her ruthlessness and
became known as the "Régent de Carthage," a reference to her growing influence in
politics. Her children conducted business all over Tunisia, and her brother Belhassen,
called le parrain (the godfather), illegally assumed control over several enterprises and
real estate. According to the Central Bank of Tunisia, relatives of the former president
and his wife owned at least 180 major companies (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011, p.9).
Nonetheless, compared to the countries of the sample, and given the lack of political
power on the political macro level, tribalism was no decisive element of the institutional
equilibrium. The variable TRI is therefore coded (0) for the case of Tunisia.
The Rise of Political Islam in the Shadows
While tribalism played a minor role, religion entered politics in the second decade after
independence. Similar to the mass mobilising party system in Algeria, the fight against
Islamism became a decisive element to understand the dynamics of the country.
Political Islam had a difficult stance from the beginning of the post-independence era.
Bourguiba himself initiated the expropriation of properties of religious foundations,
abolished the existing Shari’a courts, and stressed his secular reformism. Different
from the regime of Morocco, which managed to unify tribal and religious currents un-
der the leadership of the King, Bourguiba’s rhetoric was straightforwardly republican,
he repelled religious influence and even accused the ’Ulama of the country, including
those from the influential Sufi currents, of collaboration with the French (Wolf, 2017,
p.28). In the shadows, fuelled by disdain of Bourguiba’s modernisation project, an al-
legedly corrupt and submissive clergy, and disappointment about the perceived failure
of the Panarab Project due to the defeat of 1967, the Djama’a al-Islamiyya formed
as first palpable Islamist group in 1972. It gained influence especially in the Tunisian
heartland in the west and south, where people experienced a relative amelioration of
living standards due Bourguiba’s countrywide education programme. However upward
mobility was often blocked (Wolf, 2017, p.28). This center-periphery divide between
heartland and coastal areas was the result of a middle class that had developed around
olive oil production in coastal areas, and that had led to the concentration of wealth
and power in the north and the east of the country over time (Ayeb, 2011). These
circumstances produced an economic dependence of the south on the north that still
played a role in the early 2000s - although the south is rich in natural resources such
as water, agricultural lands,oases, ores, gas and oil.
The Djama’a and its successor - the 1981 founded Movement de la Tendance Islamique
6.5. TUNISIA (1) 183
Morocco (MTI) - as well as its successor the Al-Nahda party (founded 1988) were con-
stantly riddled with splits about issues of militancy versus non violence, democracy
versus theocracy, the role of the president in the institutional setting of the country,
or women’s rights. Its moderate parts had contacts to an "Islamo-Destourian" wing,
and even Bourguiba himself, occupied with the fight against the far left in the 1970s
and early 1980s, turned at times a blind eye on the new Islamic current (Wolf, 2017,
p.38-39). This changed on August 2 1987, when at the height of the tourist season
bombs exploded at four hotels in Monastir - Habib Bourguiba’s birthplace and one day
before his birthday (Borowiec, 1998, p.39-40). Bourguiba was furious and although
a group called Islamic Jihad, a splinter of the MTI that split around 1984, claimed
responsibility, the government sought to link the violence to the Islamic movement as
such. Consequently, besides the two bombers, also MTI chiefs Hamadi Jebali, Salah
Karker, and Ali Larayedh were sentenced to death in absentia. The decision triggered
criticism from inside and outside Tunisia, and even Ben Ali, who was responsible for
the crackdown on the 1978 general strike and who had the reputation of being a hard-
liner regarding the Islamists was more than sceptical. When Ben Ali found out about
a planned coup of the MTI scheduled on November 7 1987, he scheduled his own coup
before that date. In this "medical coup", he managed bloodlessly to overtake the coun-
try by letting then 85 year old Bourguiba be declared mentally incapable of ruling the
country any further. The Islamic movement decided to await the first decisions of the
new President.
Ben Ali’s initial politics promised change in Tunisia. He was ostensibly more eager to
give Tunisia a religious image, however, in 1988 he criminalised activities and meetings
in mosques by people other than those appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs,
by this way hitting MTI’s traditional recruitment base and site of activism (Wolf, 2017,
p.69). After several crackdowns in the 1990s, the anti-terror law, rapidly drawn up af-
ter 9/11, gave security forces vast freedoms and systematic torture became a standard
procedure welcoming young men in interrogations (Ayeb, 2011, p.469).
Second, Ben Ali promised democratic opening, changed the name of the PSD to
Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique Tunisia (RCD), and called for elections
in 1989. The MTI, which changed its name to Haraka Al-Nahda - as the electoral
law prohibited the formation of parties on religious, racial, ethnic, and geographical
grounds - won 17 per cent, although many observers claim that electoral fraud had
halved their initial share of votes. Amendments to the electoral code prevented further
large-scale victories of the Islamist or any of the six legal opposition parties. By 1990,
80 per cent of the seats in the lower chamber, the House of Deputies, were allocated
according to the first-past-the-post system and hence RCD controlled, while opposition
parties competed about the other 20 per cent. The constitutional law on the pluralism
of candidatures for the presidential election of 1999 restricts even more blatantly the
participation in the electoral process. The law provided that only the "first responsi-
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ble" for a legal political party (Secretary General or Chairman) may become candidate,
provided that he or she has been in office for at least five years at the time of the official
application, and that his or her political party is represented in parliament for at least
one term (Gobe and Chouikha, 2000, p.34-35).
Economic Reforms with a Patrimonial Capitalist Touch
Although the "socialist experiment" between 1961 and 1969, when Bourguiba supported
the collectivisation of land and a planned economy suggested by Ahmed Ben Saleh, had
been declared a failure, the predominance of the state in economics remained unbroken.
Most economic indicators showed an increased share of the public sector in the national
economy from 1969 to 1980, although the new investment codes of 1972 and 1974
provided incentives for private sector investment. About 110 new public enterprises
emerged from 1973 to 1984, and in 1981 public sector enterprises still contributed about
60 percent of the value of all manufacturing production (Beinin, 2015, p.76). Although
by the mid-1980s Tunisia experienced an economic crisis, the dominant social forces
were unwilling to initiate changes that might have jeopardised their power to control
the country (Murphy, 1999, p.5).
This did not change when Zine el Abidine Ben Ali seized power. Promising to usher
in a new era of political liberalization, the new president was committed only whole-
heartedly to the process of economic reform (Murphy, 1999, p.5). Similar to Egypt’s
patrimonial capitalism, especially circles close to Ben Ali benefited form most measures
of economic opening and liberalisation. Additionally, the regime started to resort more
to violence and repression in order to calm critics. This mode of government caused
an alienation of the population from the ruling elite. Political opening did not directly
threaten the power of the Ben Ali network and the ruling party as long as an atmosphere
of fear could be upheld. The party lacked power and connections into the state to be
really able to achieve sustainable change, and it also lacked connections into all strata
of the population to be able to monitor its needs. Deviance and dis-accord were met
with coercion. Consequently, Murphy (1999, p.233) writes already at the end of the
1990s:
Ben Ali’s version of corporatism is ultimately unsustainable in its present form.
The failure to provide adequate institutional means for interest articulation and
mediation acts to undermine any national consensus by alienating and marginal-
izing elements of society. Equally, the dependence upon coercion indicates that
the organic nature of state-party-society relations has been whittled away. The
problem for Ben Ali is that authoritarian measures are both the result of, and
the cause of, political tensions that threaten to undermine the very political
construction from which they originate.
This was exacerbated by a continuous deterioration of economic key indicators and
the standard of living of the population. Although the total unemployment rate in
Tunisia decreased from 15 per cent in 2000s, the rate of 13 per cent in 2010 was still
comparatively high: It was about one third higher than in Morocco or Syria and at
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the same level as Jordan and Egypt. Youth unemployment was with about 29 per cent
in 2010 the second highest in the sample. Taking a look at the internal disparities
reveals that in the peripheral areas, in which protests and also union activity began,
total unemployment rates were between 22 and 25 per cent (Verdier-Chouchane and
Obayashi, 2011). This means that a vast part of the population could not benefit
from the increase of the purchasing power of the minimum wage of about 95 per cent
since 2000 - which still was one of the lowest increase of the entire sample. Given the
increased use of violence and political repression while the state was less capable of
displaying an economic performance that could hold up the authoritarian bargain, the
variable SOEC is coded (1) for Tunisia.
6.5.2 A Horizontally Stratified Union Federation with a Vi-
brant History of Workers Struggle
Three features of Tunisia are important to explain the history of trade unionism inside
Tunisia: First, the concept of Controlled Civisme in combination with a need to show
some "democratic progress" towards international donors, always created a small space
for civil society engagement. Second, the center-periphery split allowed for network
building outside the grip of surveillance of the regime, which was focussed on con-
trolling the Sahel, the industrial centres of the north, and the capital. The division
of Tunisia into a coastal area and the heartland is, however, misleading, as cultural,
economical, and societal differences also persist between the south and south-east of
the country on the one side, and a Gafsa-Sfax-Kerkennah Islands axis and the coastal
strip from Sfax to El-Jem and Mahdia on the other. This semi-industrial area, which
became a stronghold of the Al-Nahda party (different from the more remote south and
south-east) after 2011, can be regarded as intermediate zone between the centres of
power and the neglected peripheries of the country.
The impoverishment and marginalisation of the interior already impelled social mobil-
isations during the French rule and were a pivotal component of the nationalist move-
ment. Indeed, many of the initial founders of the Union Génerale des Travailleurs
Tunisiennes (UGTT) in 1946 originated from this intermediate region (Beinin, 2015,
p.171). Under Ben Ali, the UGTT witnessed an alienation from its base - which still
proved to be very active in many aspects especially in the intermediate zone and the
peripheries.
Third, similar to Algeria, the UGTT was somewhat always a part of the system, ben-
efited from its historical role during the struggle for Tunisia’s independence, and also
from a certain proximity to the regime. The relationship between the ruling party and
the UGTT was, however, by no means free of tensions.
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Early Confrontations between the Ruling Party and the Trade Unions
An increasing number of strikes in the 1950s and early 1960s called the attention of
the single party and led to repression and the attempt to turn the UGTT into an
educational arm of the ruling party. The constitution of 1959 stipulated in Art.19 that
one-third of the Chambre des Conseillers, the second chamber whose members were
appointed by local authorities and the president, should be elected at the national
level from among employers, farmers and workers. Candidates should be proposed by
the concerned professional organisations and seats were distributed equally among the
professional sectors. By that way, the UGTT was meant to become a corporatist mass
mobilising organisation to monitor the workers’ grievances and to provide upward mo-
bility for loyalists. These plans seemed to work out like a charm in the first two decades
of the country’s history, as the government enjoyed great influence on the federation:
Bourguiba managed to remove UGTT president Ben Saleh in 1956 and his successor
Ahmed Tlili in 1963 by influencing the UGTT’s electoral procedures; their successor
Habib Achour was simply arrested in 1965 (Wilder, 2015, p.351).
It cannot be determined whether the Labour Code of 1966 became relatively progres-
sive because the regime felt secure due to its dominance over the unions, or if it feared
massive wildcat strikes and clandestine unions if the law had been too strict on trade
union issues. The law stipulates comparatively low hurdles to register a trade union
(Art.250), gave them a voice in many employer-employee issues, and did not explic-
itly grant the UGTT the role of the countries sole trade union center - like in other
corporatist mobilising party systems like Algeria, Libya, Egypt, or Syria.15 Also the
avoidance to strengthen the UGTT may have been a reason which had never been put
completely under control, especially after it had proven to be a strong opponent in the
late 1970s.
6.5.3 A Struggle with an Ambivalent Outcome: The 1977/1978
Upheavals
Despite increased repression, 1977 and 1978 became the most contentious and strike-
loaded years in Tunisa’s young history. European states closing their borders for
Tunisian goods due to a recession caused, among other things, strikes in the large
industrial complex of the textile industry in Ksar-Hellal, the birthplace of the Neo-
Dustur party. The conflict led to a regional upheaval in 1978. Workers all over the
15The split of the UTT in 1956, led by Habib Achour who had a rather pro-government stance and
who could influence also the UGTT, may also have remained positively in the minds of the lawmakers.
Another secession occurred in 1984, when the Union Nationale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UNTT)
formed as a result of internal disagreement in the UGTT board, absorbing about one quarter of the
UGTT members (Tartter, 1986, p.245). The UGTT, although having a powerful position and the
backing of the regime which harassed new unions like the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs
Tunisiens Tunisia (CGTT) in the 2000s, has never been the sole trade union center by law.
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country were rallying against a deterioration of living standards caused by the fall of
the price of olive oil and phosphate due to increased regional competition. The value of
Tunisian exports decreased by nine per cent between 1974 and 1977, and in the same
time external borrowing tripled the countries debt (Alexander, 2010b, p.78). The party
leadership demanded more control of the UGTT leadership over the protests, and when
this turned out to be impossible, the government demanded new union elections and
control of UGTT finances in 1978. The union leadership, which to a certain extent
managed to emancipate from the grip of the party in the years before, called a general
strike for 24 hours, which eventually caused mass protests, riots, and strikes in the
major cities of Tunisia, producing civil-war like sceneries.
The phase of regained strength and independence of organised labour was preceded
by a widening of the base of the UGTT. A number of new white-collar unions includ-
ing secondary school teachers, university professors and bank workers had joined the
federation (Wilder, 2015, p.352), and moreover, Habib Achour had quietly dropped
the UGTT’s long-standing policy of excluding communists from union offices (Wilder,
2015, p.351). After an alleged plot against Bourguiba in 1962, the Communist Party
was prohibited in 1963, however, many members remained active in groups like the
Union Générale des Étudiants de Tunisie (UGET), the most important and only le-
gal—student body. The infrastructure of the UGTT, which was well organised and
financed, attracted many new members, especially in the peripheral and intermediate
zone where the grip of the PSD or RCD was not as strong as in its northern strongholds.
Moreover, political considerations were taken into account by many players in the coun-
try. As the succession of Bourguiba, who suffered from an apparently serious illness in
the 1970s, was not clear, many wanted to avoid spoiling their chances with the labour
movement. The leadership of the UGTT had proven to be a valuable ally for the PSD
in the Monastir crisis, when a group of liberals tried to seize regional party influence.
The UGTT had regained its influence and consequently, when UGTT leader Habib
Achour was confronted with his closeness to the PSD, he resigned from the central
committee of the Party keeping his UGTT post. Although he and other leaders were
imprisoned in the wake of the 1978 turmoils, strikes continued in the early 1980s, lead-
ing eventually to the release of Achour himself (Bellin, 2002, p.111).
The last years of the rule of Bourguiba were characterised by much broken porcel-
lain concerning state-UGTT relations. As at the economical level the country faced
difficulties to provide jobs and keep its part of the bargain rule, the state invested in
capital intensive technology to enhance the revenues and overstaffed most public owned
enterprises to absorb unemployed workers at the same time. Enterprises ran at 40-60
per cent productivity and were highly subsidised, and also subsidies for food and other
basic goods sky-rocketed (Alexander, 2010b, 78-79). The IMF pressured in 1984 for a
subsidies cut that would have doubled the cost of bread and other goods leading again
to several days of major riots across the country. The state ultimately reacted with re-
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pression against the UGTT that backed many strikes (Bellin, 2002, p.111-112). When
the UGTT threatened a general strike if the decline in real wages was not halted, the
government withdrew finance — a serious threat to the union’s budget — and prohib-
ited union meetings in the workplace. The labour newspaper was also banned for six
months, and in December 1985 Habib Achour and other union officials were sentenced
to prison (Tartter, 1986, p.245-246).
The UGTT: A Federation Incapable of Controlling its Base
The seizure of power by Ben Ali in 1987 changed the standing of trade unionism.
Trade unionists were released from prison and public sector workers, fired for union
involvement, were reinstated (Bellin, 2002, p.116-117). Reforms of the labour law aimed
at securing social peace rather than containing the union movement (Bida-Jbali, 1989).
Two major reasons can be identified to explain that turn. First, Ben Ali’s ambivalent
relationship with the military, which he did trust to a limited extent only, but on which
he would have had to resort to put down mass protests. Second, the UGTT leadership
was a straightforward and loyal ally in the fight against Islamist forces and in particular
the Al-Nahda party. The second point changed over time, however.
The fact that Al-Nahda leader Ghannouchi encouraged to join trade unions and the
UGTT since the 1980s, claiming among other things that Fadhel Ben Achour, one of
the "fathers of the Islamic renaissance and defender of Islam in Tunisia", had been one
of the UGTT’s founders (Wolf, 2017, p.59), broadened again the base of the UGTT.
By the end of the 1980s, about 20 per cent of the members could be counted to the
Islamic spectrum, making the unionists on the lower level even more unpredictable and
uncontrolled by the leadership. Until the early 2000s, the regime and the party thus
faced a dilemma, as Wilder (2015, p.358) notes:
Threatening union leaders would do little to realise the government and private
capital’s objectives. Either the government would have to make concessions or
they would have to steel themselves for a new level of violence. Once the regime
was resigned to granting concessions, fighting for a less autonomous UGTT lead-
ership would have served little point. It would only have undermined the effort
to sell the bargain to workers.
Against this background, Yousfi (2015) classifies two currents also inside the UGTT
leadership: One current submissive to power and quasi-integrated into the state appa-
ratus, pursuing a passive or evolutionary strategy, and another one resistant to power
that controlled certain intermediate structures inside the association willing to use
pressure if necessary vis-á-vis- the regime.
The independence of the basis was further increased when the generation of the left-
ist students of the 1970s and 1980s entered the professional associations in the 1990s
and were also elected into official union posts from the 2000s on. This generation
of Arab nationalists, Maoists, Trotskyists, Social Democrats, and independent leftists
who viewed the UGTT leadership with reciprocal distrust became well represented in
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the unions of primary and secondary school teachers, health, postal, and telecommu-
nications workers (Beinin, 2015, p.142). In contrast to Morocco, however, the anomic
thread that derived from the union movement could still be better controlled due to
the centralisation of the union movement. While in the Kingdom the fragmentation
of the union landscape weakened the union movement as a whole, however, due to the
lack of control there was still a high residual risk. This residual risk also remained in
Tunisia, however, the superstructure of the UGTT allowed for a high degree of control.
The regime faced besides the Bar Association also the the Syndicat National des Jour-
nalistes Tunisiens (SNJT) - the only union recognised outside the framework of the
UGTT - which criticised the government for restricting press freedom and its harsh
treatment of journalists. The government was influential enough to exchange the lead-
ership in 2009, though (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Also the leadership of the Asso-
ciation of Engineers held close ties to the regime and got a representation problem at
the beginning of the 2000s (Gobe, 2009).
Also the Bar Association repeatedly protested against the harassment of lawyers who
defended opposition figures and critical journalists. The cohesion and straightforward
collective actions, which included several general strikes of lawyers in the 2000s made it
a center stage of struggles both for the opposition and the government (Gobe, 2010b).
They were also an essential part of the 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms
organised by opposition and human rights groups in November 2005 to steer inter-
national attention on the human rights situation in Tunisia while the country hosted
the World Summit on the Information Society. If violence is considered an important
pillar of Ben Ali’s regime, these forces tried slightly to change the equilibrium of power,
albeit their success was eventually limited.
6.5.4 The Revolution: A Hesitant but Still Powerful Inter-
vention of the UGTT
Among scholars and other observers of the Arab Uprisings, the UGTT is the most
striking example of an active trade union federation during the protests. As an institu-
tion that had historically displayed a relative continuous proximity to the regime, and
yet represented various strata of the society, the federation struggled for some weeks to
find a unified position. Eventually, it became an important player during the regime
change and afterwards. The impulse for the upheavals of 2011 - and also for a change
of position of the UGTT towards a more regime-critical stance - initially came from
the intermediate zone. The protests of Gafsa in 2008 laid a cornerstone for the uprising
of 2011.
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From Gafsa to Sidi Bouzid to Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis
In 2008, more than 10.000 protesters were mobilised during struggles that started in
the phosphate mining region of Gafsa and that caused the most important protest
movement of Tunisia since 1984 (Gobe, 2010a). It resulted in three people being killed
and around 100 arrested and is often referred to as the "first phase" of the revolu-
tion that would ouster Ben Ali three years later (Mabrouk, 2011, p.473). The region
around Gafsa suffered from economic decline since the implementation of structural
adjustment programmes in the 1980s. Due to restructuring, from 1980 to 2006 the
number of employees of the Gafsa Phosphate Company (GPC) fell from 14–15,000 to
5,000–5,800. Unemployment ranged from 20.9 to 38.5 percent and poverty rates were
30–40 percent. When the phosphate price tripled in three years until May 2008, the
company announced new jobs, however, it did apparently not adhere to a 1986 agree-
ment stipulating to give 20 percent of all new positions to qualified locals and children
of former employees. The local population alleged - being a recurring motive also in
the 2010s - that workers from the political centres in the north of the country whose
families held ties to the regime would be privileged compared to the regional workers
and specialists. The mining union, however, refrained from taking the initiative to
bargain, and also the UGTT mostly showed reluctance. Consequently, the federation
became a target itself, for instance, by local branch leader ‘Amara ‘Abbasi, who was
also member of parliament and the RCD, and who had relatives owning manpower
firms (Beinin, 2015, p.167). In Redeyef a small group of local trade unionists position-
ing themselves against the UGTT’s regional leadership started to set up a bargaining
committee led by Adnene Hajji, secretary general of the local elementary school teach-
ers union (Chouikha and Gobe, 2009). The protests that caused many incidents due
to the harsh reaction of the security forces were supported by local trade unionists, the
Union des Diplomés Chômeurs Tunisia (UDC)16 and delegations from branches of the
LTDH in Kairouan, Jendouba, and Monastir led by Messaoud Romdhani. The regime,
unwilling - or unable - to enter into bargaining, raided homes of movement leaders,
resorted to violence and tear gas grenades, and arrested the main activists, including
the committee of Redeyef. This triggered the reaction of all local trade union commit-
tees in Redeyef, except the miners union. After minor concessions by the GPC and the
government, the wave of strikes abated by the end of the year without achieving its
main goals (Beinin, 2015, p.327). The networks that were set up during this period,
however, were reactivated and played a major role in the downfall of the regime in
2011.
The "second phase" (Mabrouk, 2011, p.473) started on December 17, 2010. The self-
16The UDC groups unemployed persons - foremost university graduates - in Tunisia under one
umbrella since 2006. Although unofficial before the revolution, and not part of the UGTT, both
organisations have cooperated, although the UGTT’s demands for wage increases for state officials
are often regarded by the UDC as being pushed through at the expense of new jobs (Vatthauer and
Weipert-Fenner, 2017, p.22-26).
6.5. TUNISIA (1) 191
immolation of the street vendor Muhammad Bouaziz on that date can be regarded as
the initial event for the revolution in Tunisia and for the uprisings that shook the entire
Arab world and beyond. Although the incident has to be read and interpreted against
the background of the social environment in which it occurred, and the "collective im-
provisation, exploitation of opportunity and acceptance of risk" (Mabrouk, 2011, p.626)
that the Tunisian people showed in its aftermath, the incident triggered a sequence of
events and became the starting point for a domino effect inside the entire region. Al-
though the first two weeks of protests in Tunisia lacked a homogeneous vision of what
was actually sought (Mabrouk, 2011, p.627), the militancy of the protests that spread
from the home town of Bouaziz through the entire transitional region increased with
every harsh reaction by security forces. Protesters attacked policemen and police sta-
tions, leading to an up-winding circle of violence that peaked in massacres by the police
on January 8 2011 in Tala and Kasserine. On January 12 2011 Professor Hatem Bal-
tahir was shot dead by police in the town of Douz, triggering attacks on governmental
buildings and security headquarters. Whole districts were turned to "liberated areas"
out of the control of the police (Mabrouk, 2011, p.627). Protesters now chanted more
openly slogans against the government including "bread, freedom, national dignity" like
used already in Gafsa 2008, and also "work is a right, you band of thieves" targeting
Ben Ali and his family. After Ben Ali insisted in a speech on January 9 that he is will-
ing to reinforce order with all measures whatsoever, the protests reached greater Tunis,
where citizens of the middle class joined the until then workers and lower strata driven
protests in the suburb of Kram (Mabrouk, 2011, p.475). While in the following days
also Sfax, the second largest city and economic center of Tunisia also witnessed mass
demonstrations, on January 14 the Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis was the venue of the
largest demonstration in the history of the country. The day before Ben Ali announced
in a third and final television appearance that he had "heard" and "understood" them,
promising not to run for a sixth term in 2014. Nonetheless, protests did not abate, and
swelling numbers Tunisians carried signs reading "Game Over!" and chanting "Ben Ali,
dégage!" ("Get out!") (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011). On January 14 he left the country.
6.5.5 The Role of the Army and Islamic Associations
The events that lead to the flight of Ben Ali escalated comparatively quickly. Several
players had a stake in the course of the developments, either by clearly aiming at the
change of the institutional equilibrium or by refraining from upholding it. Perhaps most
striking in comparison with other MENA states that witnessed large scale protests and
attempts to change the power structure, the Army in Tunisia did not intervene into
the protests. This can be traced back to the preference of Ban Ali for the domes-
tic security forces, especially since the Barakat al-Sahil affair in 1991. In 2010, the
Army employed 35,000 men and women, while the number of the security forces was
192 CHAPTER 6. MENA LABOUR UNIONS (2010 - 2012)
commonly assumed to number as high as 130,000 (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011, p.6),
and government spending on the military constituted only 1.4 per cent of the GDP 17.
The Army refused repeatedly to interfere violently in the protests, especially as many
officers had no incentive to protect the regime and the probability for a coup would
have increased significantly if the Army leadership had given such orders. Hence, even
if the commander of the Army, ’Ammar, would have wanted to keep Ben Ali in power,
the officers corps had denied orders, especially those orders which included shedding
blood of civilians (Bou Nassif, 2015). Consequently, while the military led the repres-
sion of the upheavals in the late 1970s and mid-1980s, in 2010-2011 the heavy-handed
response to the December-January protests was led by the police, who did not refrain
from opening fire on unarmed protesters (Arieff and Humud, 2014, p.14). The Army
decided to protect the demonstrations, especially after the deployment of the military
to the streets on January 12 2011. Besides, when Ali Seriati, commander of the presi-
dential guard of 8,000 soldiers allegedly planned a coup himself and persuaded Ben Ali
to flee, Army leader ’Ammar initiated the arrest of Seriati and his associates, while at
the same time giving safe passage to Ben Ali by securing the airport (Schraeder and
Redissi, 2011, p.13).
A second player that surprised observers was the powerful Islamic movement. Although
religious individuals participated in the protests, the Islamic spectrum, foremost the
Al-Nahda party, did not make visible appearance by spreading signs at demonstrations
or organising events. It became an important political player only after Ghannoushi’s
return from his exile in London at the end of January, and, perhaps more palpably,
after the interim authorities granted Al-Nahda legal status as a political party in March
2011 to include it into the following transitional process. The decision to remain in
the background during the peak of the protests can be attributed to the caution of the
leadership, who was very eager to avoid the revolution to appear internationally as an
Islamist coup. This coincides with the stance of Ghannouchi who portrayed himself as
a moderate and a democrat (Arieff and Humud, 2014, p.17). Other Islamist currents
had a difficult start to organise, as their infrastructure had often been destroyed by
the systematic persecution under Ben Ali. But also the secular registered opposition
parties18 did not play an outstandingly progressive role. They even cheered the an-
nouncement of Ben Ali not to run for office in 2014 as a victory, while young protesters
did not see a reason to celebrate.
The driving force behind the upheavals, especially in the first weeks, was the unor-
ganised youth, unemployed individuals, and their local networks. The latter included
families, kin-groups and tribes, organising spontaneous gatherings to share mutual ex-
periences of deprivation and abuse. The family of the street vendor Bouaziz formed
17The spending of other countries in the region was much higher, such as Algeria (3.3 per cent),
Egypt (3.4 per cent), Libya (3.9 per cent), or Morocco (5 per cent) (Arieff and Humud, 2014).
18in 2010 the most influential parties were the Parti Démocrate Progressiste Tunisa (PDP), founded
by Ahmed Nejib El Chebbi, the former Communist Party Ettajdid led by Ahmed Brahim, and the
Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les Libertés Tunisia (FDTL) led by Mustafa Ben Jaafar.
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the nucleus and his fate triggered much solidarity. Also human rights activists, who
followed the events, engaged first on the micro level. Especially lawyers were able to
formalise the demands of the protesters and they had also been directly engaged with
the Bouazizi family in the wake of their son’s suicide from an early stage on (Mabrouk,
2011, 631-632).
Weakened Bargaining Power as a Result of the Horizontal Fragmentation
The horizontal fragmentation of the UGTT resulted in a decreased bargaining power
for both sides. Demands of the lower level were often taken less seriously as employers
knew that the support of the leadership in Tunis was questionable, and the leadership
in Tunis had difficulties in pushing for demands - if they did so at all - as it was not clear
if they could count on the support of the lower ranks, which often where dissatisfied
with the UGTT strategy. This affected also the bargaining power in key sectors.
By 2010, Tunisia had a comparatively diversified economy in which machineries and
textile products account for the largest share of exports. Phosphate mining accounted
for about 2 per cent of the GDP and was an important source of state revenues.
Already under Bourghiba, the diversification of the economy was spurred, especially
the establishment of the light manufacturing industry (primarily textiles, garments,
footwear, leather work and, increasingly, mechanical and electrical appliances), as well
as the services sector (mainly the tourism industry and adjacent sectors (Erdle, 2011,
p.20-21)).
The role of the UGTT as guardian of the authoritarian bargain, as demonstrated in
the economic upheavals of 1978 and 1984, had softened in the course of the 1990s.
Different from Morocca, an anomic threat did not play a major role any more. The
passive role of the federation during the Gafsa protests of 2008 shows a lack of militancy
and confidence to confront the state. These upheavals, like the ones of 1978 and 1984,
led to concessions of the government for which, however, the few active unionists had to
pay a high price. The main protagonists of the upheavals of 2011 were the unemployed.
Although a militant stream controlled federations such as those of education or of postal
services and telecommunications as well as some regional and local unions (Yousfi, 2013,
p.23), of which the most could be found in the transitional area, by fact, its sole power
would not have been enough to force the state into negotiations about the equilibrium
of power. Apart from that, the early privatisation and diversification of the economy
weakened unionism, especially since end of the 1990s when elites agreed that market
forces and private businesses rather than state planning and the public sector should
become the main pillar of state revenues and economic development (Erdle, 2011, p.18).
It affected especially the bargaining power on the plant and enterprise levels, as Aduani
and Ben Sedrine (2018, p.7) pin it down stating about the private sector:
The workforce mobilised in this industry is unskilled and therefore easily replaced
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in times of low unemployment, particularly among women. The trade union’s
negotiating power in relation to the labour market is therefore relatively weak.
Added to this is the low rate of union membership in this sector.
The crucial role the UGTT played during the transformation process after the
fall of Ben Ali, and the increase of membership numbers and bargaining power it
gained in the years that followed should not hide the fact that the position of the
federation on the shop floor and grassroot level was weak before 2011. As the 2007
ITUC Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights shows, strikes have been held
in the education and health sectors, banks, the postal service, agriculture, and many
public companies and offices, nonetheless, the results were repression rather than state
concessions. True, since the 1990s, Tunisia had a unique system of unified contract
negotiations. Every three years the UGTT negotiated with the UTICA about 51 sector-
specific collective bargaining contracts covering most of the public as well as about 80
per cent of the private sector. And although the UGTT was involved only to a limited
extent, the 2008 upheavals in Gafsa strengthened its bargaining position on the macro
level. Nonetheless, the 2008 negotiations themselves, just as the ones of 2005, produced
results that were dissatisfying for the bulk of the workforce. At least since the 2000s,
the UGTT was forced into the defensive, facing more rigorous demands of the UTICA,
and losing even more support on the local levels. The determination of the variable
KEYS, hence, follows the assessment of Hartshorn (2018, p.116), who clearly states:
Whoever did have influence over the political system, it was neither the UGTT
nor its leadership. While the organisation was able to directly influence and
even set policies during the socialist era of Bourghiba’s rule, and maintained the
capacity to at least disrupt the system in the 1970s and 1980s, it showed no such
capacity in the 2000s. When and where militancy remained, it did so only at
rank-and-file level and only at certain regions of the country.
Consequently, the case of Tunisia is coded KEYS = (0). Nonetheless, the union
federation eventually interfered in the protests - and against the regime.
The Late Response of the UGTT
The role of the UGTT during the 2011 protests was ambivalent from the very beginning,
clearly showing the two trajectories identified by Yousfi (2015). On the one hand, the
local trade union branches, including representatives from local educational branches,
provided infrastructure and a setting for spontaneous organisation of opposition to the
regime (Mabrouk, 2011, 631-632). In the course of time, UGTT officials started also
to protect and to accompany the protests, like pleading for the release of protesters
arrested during a rally in Sidi Bouzid on December 25 2010 (Yousfi, 2015, p.62-70).
Unionists in the peripheries and the transitional areas supported - with or without the
approval of their next level representatives - the demands of the demonstrations. In
contrast, the national executive bureau of the association in Tunis acted rather cautious
and did not, for instance, approve the huge demonstration on the Habib Bourguiba
6.6. KUWAIT (1) 195
Street on January 14 2011 (Ben Achour, 2018). On January 4 2011, however, the Com-
mission Administrative Nationale de l’UGTT, declared solidarity with the protesters.
At that point of time, the leadership still refrained from clearly taking a leading role
in the countrywide protests, although the national UGTT board demanded - for the
first time in its history - far-reaching democratic reforms. Nonetheless, the majority of
the executive bureau belatedly acceded to pressure from below by authorizing regional
general strikes in Sfax - the union’s historic heartland, where success was most likely
- Kairouan, and Tozeur on January 12, and a two-hour strike in Tunis on January 14
(Beinin, 2015, p.200) The trade union movement as a whole, including white and blue
collar organisations, organised actions like sit-ins, strikes, and demonstrations.
Although four parties in Tunisia carry the name Labour (the Communist’s Worker’s
Party, the National Democratic Labour Party, the Democratic Forum for Work and
Freedoms, and the Tunisian Labour Party), the union federation kept political parties
at arms length and represented various strata of society (Yousfi, 2017). It also sup-
ported a broader alliance of individuals of the middle class that demanded more civil
and human rights, and marginalised individuals and collectives that focussed on bread
and butter demands (Ayeb, 2011, p.476). The historical proximity to the ruling party
made it an inherent part of the system, similar to the UGTA in Algeria, and more
independent than the Egyptian EFTU (not to mention the fully controlled the Syrian
and Libyan Trade Union Federations). The UGTT was seldomly allied with opposition
parties, and if, it was an issue based relationship over time. Given that freedom, the
variable INOPP is coded (0) for the case of Tunisia.
6.6 Kuwait (1)
Trade unions in Kuwait hold an exceptional position in the Arab World and the Gulf
area, as they formed mostly around ministries in the governmental sector. Despite be-
ing relatively close to the regime, unions showed their boundaries of loyalty towards the
Sheikh during the protests of 2011. This behaviour can be read, in contrast to Tunisia,
against the background of the struggle between an educated upper- and middle class
that tried to defend recent democratic reforms on the one side and the ruling family
on the other.
The active role of official trade unions during the struggle for the protection of the
fruits of a long lasting endeavour of the opposition to strengthen the parliament jus-
tifies the coding of the Outcome for Kuwait as (1). This is especially true, as for the
first time the movement did not only support the opposition and the electoral reform
it was fighting for; it also confronted officially and unified the policies of the ruler.
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SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
0 1 1 1 1 0 KUW(2)
Table 6.8: Truth table row for the case of Kuwait
The importance of tribal connections that runs like a red thread through the de-
scription of its institutional equilibrium (especially shown in section 6.6.1) justifies the
coding of the variable TRI as (1). Although economic indicators displayed a worsening
of the socio-economic conditions in the country (see part 6.6.3), the welfare state was
still healthy, and demands of the protesters in 2011/2012 targeted mainly issues of the
political participatory procedures. Hence, the variable SOEC is coded (0). As the legal
framework produced a highly centralised national federation and only allowed for one
union per profession and/or enterprise, as will be shown in part 6.6.2, CEN is coded
(1). Furthermore, as especially the unions in the crucial petrol and petrochemical sec-
tors showed some self-confidence and militancy in the past, as will be outlined in part
6.6.2, the variable KEYS is coded (1). Eventually, and as will be shown in part 6.6.2,
the trade union movement was personally intertwined with parts of the opposition, in
particular with the semi-loyalist tribal confederations. The variable INOPP is hence
coded (1).
6.6.1 Institutional Equilibrium: The Semi-Democratic Exper-
iment
In sharp contrast to Tunisia, Kuwait is officially a Sheikhdom and characterised by trib-
alism, yet, it cannot be classified as traditional Gulf Monarchy. Due to a long-lasting
democratic struggle that has its roots in the 18th and 19th century (Tétreault, 2000),
an outstanding hybrid system emerged that is often labelled the "Kuwaiti democratic
experiment" (Yetiv, 2002; Salameh and Al-Sharah, 2011) or an "experiment in semi-
democracy" (Kinninmont and Sirri, 2014). The main economic and political resources
are oil and a huge welfare state, allegedly the most generous one worldwide. The most
important groups struggling for the corridors of power are the family Al-Sabah, that
rules the small town and the country that emerged around it since 1756 continuously,
a powerful urban merchant class, rural and suburbial organised tribal associations, and
eventually Islamist groups both Sunni and Shi’i.
The Ruling Family and the Merchant Class
Until the late 19th century the relationship between the Al-Sabah Family and the
population of Kuwait and its surroundings was characterised by a mutual dependence.
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Exerting rather administrative functions, the as-Sabah did not possess huge assets
themselves and were dependent on the benevolence of the merchant class to run the
administration. The members if the family were sometimes perceived as "perhaps the
worst dressed and most ill-lodged residents in the place." (Al-Nakib, 2016, p.29). The
authority of the Al-Sabah sheiks was limited by the omnipresent threat that Kuwait’s
merchants would leave for another port along the Arabian Gulf, taking their wealth,
skilled labour, and assets with them. Hence, unpopular As-Sabah policies were often
moderated and sometimes even reversed completely if they bore the danger of trigger-
ing the exodus of wealthy families (Casey, 2007, p.35). The same was true for the lower
strata of society. Because of the sparse population of the area, the As-Sabah family
could not afford to repel the poor population, mainly Bedouins, that was suffering
from a relatively high inequality of incomes and wealth. Welfare and charity became
a main pillar to hold the simple workers in town and this welfare and charity, again,
was financed by the merchants.
The systematic and industrialised exploitation of oil that started about 1934 changed
the economic pattern and power relations inside the country. As the young oil in-
dustry emerged under the control of the As-Sabah, the wealth of the family grew
unprecedented and decreased its independence towards Bedouins and merchants. Al-
ready Mubarak the Great (1896-1915) challenged the old balance significantly when he
entered into a competition on welfare with the merchants. This had become possible
due to some accumulated assets in the form of family owned plantations in the Shatt
al-Arab Region and, perhaps more important, the introduction of a tax system (Al-
Nakib, 2016, p.23). This move already weakened the influence of the urban merchants.
Against the background of the new oil revenues in the 1930s, soon criticism emerged
claiming that Sheikh Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, would keep most of the money in his
own pocket. A type of proto-democratic movement emerged until 1938, called Majlis
movement, in which merchants built an opposition majlis to push for redistribution
politics. Even if it was soon dissolved and replaced by a consultative council consist-
ing of As-Sabah and merchant families, the overall pressure was high enough to force
the As-Sabah to split the oil revenues by 1951 so that half of all future profits would
be spent on public projects, infrastructural improvements, and government services
(Casey, 2007, p.57-60).
After the country’s independence from Britain, the family could consolidate its power
through the constitution of 1962. The Amir is the pivotal element of the system, as he
is the head of the state and his person is immune and inviolable (Art. 54), and he is for-
mally part of the legislative (Art.51) and executive (Art.52) power. The judicial power
is vested in the courts, which exercise in the name of the Amir within the limits of the
Constitution (Art.53). Technically, the power of the Amir is restricted by the national
assembly which is elected every four years. The assembly has the right to approve or
disapprove a newly determined Amir, however, it has to accept one candidate of a list
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of three candidates proposed by the As-Sabah family (Art. 4). The Amir names the
prime minister who is often the heir prince, hence the Al-Sabah male next in line to be
Amir. The national assembly cannot cast a question of confidence against the prime
minister (Art.102). Additionally, the Amir may dissolve the National Assembly by a
decree (Art.107)19.
The Sheikh dissolved the parliament for the first time in 1976, following a government
crisis caused by the urban merchant and middle class that soon discovered the parlia-
ment as a platform for opposition. They demanded more transparency concerning the
oil contracts and the factual revenues of the state (Sabrie and Hakala, 2013, p.7).
Tribal Bedouins as Backbone of the Regime
In 1980 a reform of the electoral constituencies was implemented, favouring tribal
associations which tended to have been more loyalist towards the As-Sabah family.
Tribal associations grew in strength and importance in the political system of Kuwait
since 1975 when the first "tribal primary elections" were conducted in order to nominate
a common tribal candidates for the elections. The absence of political parties gave space
to tribal affiliations that soon filled the political vacuum (Salih, 2011, p.142)20. Tribes
have played a crucial role in the political system of Kuwait ever since and continue
to be a pivotal player in the modern system. Their steady influence persisted due to
several features. First, established tribes fulfilled the function of "gatekeepers" that
had a say about who earns Kuwaiti citizenship, second, a tribal concentration in many
residential areas increased their influence on the local level, and third, they formed a
connection network providing job opportunities rendered possible by the dominance of
tribal affiliates in the public service (Salih, 2011, p.143).
Benefiting from cheap foreign labour and from the rich oil resources of the country,
the wealth of the state increased and soon a massive welfare state was introduced. For
Kuwaiti citizens, and especially the Bedouins among them, the "Arab Social Contract"
can be regarded as valid explanation of pattern of behaviour, as Salih (2011) observes:
Although friction between the two forces has frequently occurred [...], the political
alliance between them is maintained. In effect, the Bedouins look to the State
to cater to their economic well-being in the form of jobs, housing, medical and
educational services, and infrastructure, and the Monarchy looks for the Bedouin
for political support.
The favouritism towards the Bedouins and particular loyalist tribes made calls for
a reform of the political system grew stronger in the 1980s among groups that saw
themselves discriminated against. These calls were formulated not only by the urban
middle class but also by a new emerging player especially since 1979: Islamist groups.
19The parliament has been dissolved six times between its establishment and 2010 (2009, 2008,
2006, 1999, 1986 and 1976).
20Different from Libya, political parties in Kuwait were not explicitly prohibited. The lack of
mentioning in the constitution, the lack of a party law, and the lack of tradition simply seem to have
hampered their formation and additionally led to the absence of serious attempts to form such entities.
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A heterogeneous movement emerged challenging the system and demanding a reform of
the electoral constituencies and a strengthening of the role of the parliament vis-á-vis
the Sheikh. Political turmoil that was produced after the dissolution of the government
in 1986 served as one of the claimed justifications of the intervention of Iraq in 1990.
The Iraqi Intervention and a Strengthened Parliament
The Iraqi intervention weakened the position of the As-Sabah family. First, the ab-
sence of the ruling family during the occupation and the belated return after liberation
caused displeasure among parts of the population. Even the opposition that fled the
country, and that supported the Sheikh after consultations in exile, was discredited in
the eyes of those who stayed in the country. This was also true for the parts of the
constitutional movement that fled abroad. The opposition movement thus split in the
1990s along the remainders-exiles cleavage and religious lines.
In 2010, the following groups were still of importance: The rather leftist Democratic
Forum (1991) and the National Democratic Alliance (1992) are representatives of cross-
sectarian groups that set up together with other independents the National Action Bloc
(since 1992) in parliament. Additionally two Sunni opposition groups prevailed, being
the Islamic Constitutional Movement (1991) that followed the tenets of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and the older, Salafist coined Islamic Parliamentarian Alliance (1981),
together with two mainly Shi’ite groups being the National Islamic Coalition (1988)
and the Shirazi coined Justice and Peace Alliance (2004) (Casey, 2007; Sabrie and
Hakala, 2013, p.123). None of these organisations ever succeeded in gaining more than
4 seats in the parliament while facing a block of about 20 Bedouin deputies who could
often build majorities by mobilising some of the 8-10 independent deputies.21 These
groups were strengthened in the 1990s vis-á-vis the ruling family and also played a ma-
jor role in the turbulent years from 2006 until 2012, when the parliament was dissolved
three times in total (2006, 2008, and 2009). The time from 2006 until the protests
of 2011 was characterised by a struggle between the parliament on the one side and
the As-Sabah family on the other. When Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir as-Sabah died in
January 2006, the 76 years old Sa’ad al-Abdallah as-Salim as-Sabah was elected by
the As-Sabah family. However, his health was weak and he even could not come to
parliament to take the oath. The parliament convened on January 24 2006 and de-
cided by consensus to remove Sheikh Sa’ad from office. On January 29, Sheikh Sabah
al-Ahmad al-Djabir as-Sabah was confirmed by the Parliament as Amir and took his
oath of office. This process was a severe break with the previous custom to rotate the
office between the two branches of family.
Also the layout of the voting districts was spotlighted by the parliament. The domi-
nance of tribal groups - whose self-coordination could not been contained by the crim-
21For a comprehensive overview of the election results in Kuwait 1992-2008 see Salih (2011, p.152).
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inalisation of preliminary elections by a law in force since 1998 - made the parliament
push for an electoral reform, which was meant to decrease the electoral districts from
25 to 5. When the As-Sabah family realised that they would not get a majority for
their counter-proposal to reduce the amount of districts to 10, the Sheikh dissolved the
National Assembly and announced new elections. Contrary to his expectations, the
newly elected parliament embraced a majority for the five-district-proposal which was
finally approved on July 27, 2006.
6.6.2 A Palmful - yet Powerful - Unions in the Governmental
Sector
The history of Kuwaiti trade unionism reaches back to the 1960s and 1970s. It has
been, since, an inherent part of the semi-democratic experiment, however, with severe
restrictions. By fact, it is only a very small share of employees that was allowed to
organise. Nonetheless, these unions became serious and self-conscious players in the
political arena and often mouthpieces of the opposition.
Kuwait’s Horizontally Fragmented Labour Market
Because of the sky-rocketing economy, since the 1950s labour became sparse and the
rising salaries attracted many guest workers from more than 30 different countries.
Especially guest workers from Arab neighbours, who where quite frequently prone to
nationalist, Ba’athist, and Nasserist ideas, and who were quizzically regarding the idea
of a Monarchy, were sceptically and attentively watched by the old national elites.
This political threat and the fact that according to different censi the amount of guest
workers threatened to outnumber the local population in the 1950s, and de facto did
in the late 1960s, led to the emergence of nationality as form of dominance strategy.
The new nationality law of 1959 can already be interpreted as one of several "tactics
designed to divide Kuwaitis and expatriates and then co-opt the Kuwaitis" (Al-Nakib,
2016, p.178)22. Besides, the law caused the emergence of a new strata of society, the
so called "bidun". Deriving from bidun djinsiyya [without citizenship], the term was
attributed to workers of Palestinian origin, as well as some Iraqi, Egypt, and other
Arab expatriates.23
According to Kuwaiti legislation by 2010, labour could be divided into four branches
whereas each of their employees are governed by different labour laws:
- the private sector (al-qata’a al-ahli bi-suratihi al-’am) ruled by Law No.38 of 1964
22Article 1 defines Kuwaitis as those people who settled in Kuwait prior to 1920, Article 4 excludes
non-Muslims from citizenship, and the lion’s share of the document assures that it is difficult to get
Kuwaiti citizenship by another way, and that it is easy to lose it, once acquired by "virtue".
23Yet, the first biduns were mostly Arab Bedouin who were unable to register as citizens before
1920, due to illiteracy, homelessness, poverty and lack of access to public authorities.
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concerning labour in the private sector,
the oil sector (al-qata’a al ’umal al-nifitia) ruled by the Law in the oil business
sector No.28 of 1969,
- the governmental sector (al-qata’a al-hukumi) ruled by Law No.18 of 1960 con-
cerning labour in the governmental sector,
- a hybrid sector of lower employees of the government and its subcontractors who
carry out basic public services (al-qata’a al-khidmat al-’ama) ruled by Decree 7
of 1960.
The interplay between these laws exacerbated the gap between guest workers and
indigenous citizens. For the filling of vacancies, Kuwaitis are given priority in any case,
right before Arab nationals, being the second priority. If there are no qualified and
willing applicants of these groups available, employers may resort to guest workers of
other nationalities. As the governmental sector provides workers with financial and
leisure benefits unmet by the other sectors, and the law grants every Kuwaiti citizen
the right to fill a governmental position, this sector was soon filled up Kuwaiti nationals
and even inflated to an extent that bears the clear characteristics of disguised unem-
ployment (Al-Enezi, 2002, p.889).24 At the same time, in the private and the public
service sector, expatriates prevailed, due to less favourable working conditions, frequent
controls and lower wages. This is mirrored particularly in Law 38/1964, which is also
the only one that regulates or even mentions the formation of trade unions, stipulating
by Art.69 that these regulations also apply to the governmental and the oil sector.
The Legal Framework Producing Trade Unions around State Institutions
Basically, the formation of trade unions in Kuwait is legal, however, three barriers
were included to limit their political power. First, mere exclusion on the ground of
nationality. Law 38/1964 exempts most Indian and Pakistani Government workers,
temporary and casual workers hired for a period of less than six months, domestic
workers, enterprises with less than five workers and without machinery, and sea work-
ers (Art.2, 38/1964). Thus, a vast part of the working class, and most of the foreign
workers, did not benefit from the rights specified by the law, and are not allowed to
form trade unions. Those foreign workers who already stayed for more than five years
in the country, and who can prove good conduct by an official record of the responsi-
ble institutions, may join a trade union under restricted conditions (Art.72, 38/1964).
They cannot found unions and they cannot be elected into the administrative coun-
cil of any union in order to try to make a career inside the union. Additionally, the
24Since the industrialised exploitation of oil in the 1930s the government replaced the merchants
not only as the providers of public welfare, but also as the main employer of national labour.
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entire public service sector is exempted from forming trade unions. Being less attrac-
tive to Kuwaiti nationals due to lower wages, low reputation, and a strict yearly work
assessment conducted by committees chaired by the responsible ministry (Chap. III,
Art.34-43 Decree 7/1960), foreign guest workers prevail in the public service sector.
Second, the economic and political activities of unions were restricted heavily. It was
prohibited for unions to engage in political, religious or sectarian issues, to invest funds
in financial, real estate or other speculation, and to accept donations of any kind except
with the explicit approval of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour.
Third, setting up a trade union was tied to extraordinary bureaucratic difficulties. It
was not permissible to form a trade union if the number of represented workers is less
than one hundred. Furthermore, there was no union plurality allowed, as it was not
permissible to form more than one trade union for workers of one establishment or one
occupation.
The foundation of new unions is particularly difficult as the union landscape has already
been drawn-out and shaped with little space left for new unions. That is particularly
because - setting the case of Kuwait apart from other countries in the MENA region
and even worldwide - of the fact that most of the operating trade unions are not organ-
ised alongside professional lines or crafts. They emerged around administrative bodies
like ministries or state-owned enterprises.25. The first unions, that were founded in
the direct aftermath of the issuance of the Law 38/1964, comprise the trade union of
the workers of the municipalities (1964), the trade union of the Ministry for Public
Works (1964), of the Ministry of Health (1964), the Ministry of Education and Higher
Education (1964), and the union of the workers of finance and customs (1965). On
April 1 1965 these unions formed the Association of Unions in the Governmental Sector
which was joined later by the trade union of the workers of the Ministry of Electricity
and Water (1965), the Ministry of Communications (1968), and the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Labour (1972).
The Self-Confidence of Trade Unions in the Petrol Industries
Unions had already emerged around the oil companies and branches of the country be-
fore the implementation of Law 28/1969 and the parallel amendment of Law 38/1964
allowing for the application of Chapter IX (formation of workers groups) in the oil sec-
tor. Whenever anything changed in the structure of the oil sector referring to the emer-
gence or split of companies, these developments were echoed in the structure of trade
unions. Consequently, the first union in the oil sector that emerged was the Workers of
the Kuwaiti Oil Company KOC (1964), followed by the Japan Oil Company Workers
Union in the Khafji Neutral Zone (suspended in 1970 after the implementation of Law
25For all information and figures about the following trade unions mentioned here see the official
website of the Kuwaiti Trade Union Federation KTUF http : //ktuf.org/
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28/1969 and the amendments to Law 18/1964 Chapter IX), and the American Oil
Company Workers’ Union (dissolved in 1977 after the complete nationalisation of the
oil sector). These three unions formed the Workers Union of the Oil and Petrochemi-
cal Industry (1965), being an association that persists until 2011. It was later joined
by the Workers Union of the Petrochemical Industry (1972) after petrochemicals grew
more important for the country’s economy. Later formed the Equate Petrochemicals
Workers Union (1998) after the foundation of Equate, a global player in petrochem-
icals nowadays, the Kuwait Oil Tankers Workers Syndicate (2000), and the Gulf Oil
Company Workers union (2003) that was founded as the legal subcontractors of the
Japanese Arabian Oil Company (AOC).26
In 1968, the Kuwaiti Trade Union Federation (KTUF) was established in order to co-
ordinate the trade unions that had emerged until then and that remained until today
the umbrella organisation of the unions that would follow.
Especially the unions in the petrol industry were characterised by frequent activism
and in special occasions also militancy. Their role power should not be underestimated,
especially regarding the importance of the sector. The Gulf Monarchy is highly de-
pendent on hydrocarbons, although it managed to diversify the economy by building
downstream industries and to specialise on human capital intense products like Ethy-
lene, Polyethylene, Ethylene Glycol or, Polypropylene. Still, top exports of Kuwait in
2010 were Crude Petroleum, Refined Petroleum, and Petroleum Gas. Petroleum and
chemicals accounted for about 90 per cent of the total exports.
Union activity in this key sector tackled political questions (Tétreault, 1993), as well as
economic questions, although strikes were no explicit means to settle disputes according
to Art. 88 of the labour code of 1964; and also in the new labour law of 2010, strikes
could, in effect, be prohibited in all cases of collective labour disputes (Al-Adjmi, 2016,
p.130-131). Major disputes in key sectors of Kuwait took place in 2006, 2008, and also
in 2011, when eventually wages in the petroleum sector were increased by 66 per cent.
This stands in sharp contrast to the weak outcomes of workers struggles in Tunisia as
outlined in the precedent case study. In Kuwait, already in a confrontation in 2007
- in which the government announced a harsh response to possible strikes - observers
warned about consequences and repercussions if the trade unions chose the option of
confrontation, and even more if parliamentary blocs supported the unions against the
government (Al-Sa’adi, 2007). Given that bargaining power despite a union density of
about five per cent in 2010, the case of Kuwait is coded KEYS = (1).
26The AOC has historically exploited the oil fields in the area around Khafji that had been disputed
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. After the settlement of the border conflict already in the 1970s
and a tightening of Kuwaiti legislation concerning foreign companies in the oil sector at the begin of
the 2000s, the foundation of the Kuwaiti Gulf Oil Company provided a legal loop-hole for Japan to
secure its oil supply and continue the traditional exploitation of the fields.
204 CHAPTER 6. MENA LABOUR UNIONS (2010 - 2012)
Trade Unions Between Leftism, Political Islam, and Tribal Bonds
Besides the formal trade unions, there are other labour related groups, especially pro-
fessional associations that are organised under Law No. 24 of 1962 regarding clubs and
public benefit associations. The Kuwaiti Teachers’ Society (KTS) is the oldest of the
professional associations and is characterised by a history of struggle. It was active
before the independence, banned, and allowed to reorganise in 1963 under its today’s
name (Ghabra, 1991, p.202). Other important professional associations are the Kuwait
Society of Engineers (KSE) founded in 1962, the Kuwait Medical Association (KMA)
founded in 1963, the Kuwait Journalist Association (KJA) founded in 1964, the Kuwait
Accountants and Auditors Association (KAA) from 1973, being an association center
of today five associations, and the Kuwaiti Aircraft Engineer and Pilot Association
(KAEPA) founded in 1973.
The relation between the state and the professional associations was ambivalent. On
the one hand, the ruling elite searched to influence, use, or tame the associations. The
fact that many of the civil society organisations depend on state finance gives the state
a powerful tool to pursue these goals. On the other hand, opposition forces tried to
position themselves inside the associations to be able to mobilise and pressure the gov-
ernment and the ruling family (Tétreault, 1993, 276-277). This generated a vibrant
dynamic, as during the 1960s and 1970s, labour unions, many associations, and fore-
most the associations of teachers and students built a platform for those who called
for Arab unity, total independence from foreign rule, the liberation of Palestine, and
a socialist system (Ghabra, 1991, 203). When the Amir dissolved the parliament for
the first time in 1976, seven civil society groups raised their voices by issuing a state-
ment calling for "the return of legitimacy and constitutional rule, and the restoration of
democratic gains as soon as possible." These bodies were the Kuwait General Union of
Workers, the Association of Writers, the Bar Association, the Journalists Association,
the Independence Club, the Teachers Association, and the National Union of Kuwaiti
Students. Eight members of the executive bureau of the KTUF were arrested, as the
federation turned out to be the main distributor of the statement among the popula-
tion (Al-Dayin, 2009).
With the decline of Arab nationalism, the cards of political influence inside the unions
and associations were redistributed. Political Islam seeped into civil society organi-
sations and slowly replaced the outworn ideologies of the leftists, and gained control
over the administrative bodies of many associations, foremost the powerful teachers
association with their more than 14.000 members. Its influence, however, vanished
over time. The trade unions in the governmental sector could - besides some singular
successes in the 1980s - not been influenced by Islamic groups.
Different from the lists of names of the initial founders in the 1960s, today names of
tribes like al’Anniza, al’Ajmi, Ar-Rashid, and Al-Mutayr dominate the executive bu-
reaus. These tribes were loyal to the Amir, however, they were not of the dominating
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loyalist tribes Al-Hauadjr, Bani Qahtan, Al’Atban or al-Mitran, and provided many
independent MPs. For the KTUF and most governmental unions seems true what
Tétreault (1993, p.277) observes when writing about official trade unions as a "kind of
opposition, fulfilling what they believe are constitutional or functional responsibilities
even if these contradict what are understood to be the government’s desires", opposing
its authoritarianism by using "their formal positions in the state to resist government
control in the name of civic values". On the economical side, and somewhat conse-
quently, following the logic of the Arab social contract, trade unions have played a
big role as political instruments pressuring on the government and members of parlia-
ment to give in to populist demands that may often "not be fiscally sound" (Alsharekh,
2017). However whenever the democratic process of the country was at stage, unions
mingled into politics, despite the definite prohibition by the labour law, and advocated
a peaceful solution and the protection of democratic institutions. The same would turn
true for he juncture 2011-2013.
6.6.3 The Upwinding Conflict between the Parliament and
the Ruling Family
The trial of strength between the Parliament and opposition parties on the one side
and the ruling family and its networks entered a new level of escalation when the
pictures of the Arab upheavals from Tunisia and Egypt arrived in Kuwait. Mass
protests followed in 2011, whereby these protests rose out of the willingness to protect
the results of the slow democratic evolution inside the country rather than because
of socio-economic concerns. This remains true although the economic situation in
Kuwait worsened slightly: Unemployment rose between 2000 and 2010 but did not
scratch at the 2 per cent mark, however, youth unemployment nearly doubled from
about 5 per cent to 10 per cent at the same time. The inflation rate increased by trend
during that period and peaked in 2008 with 10.5 per cent. However, compared to the
case of Tunisia or Jordan, these figures are rather advantageous. Furthermore, taking
a look at the protests movements reveals that the case should be read against the
background of the semi-democratic experience that rendered the country an exception
in the region. Starting with the Orange Movement in 2005/2006, and including the
Fifth Fence movement as well as different groups like Islamists and the semi-loyalists
in parliament, it becomes clear that socio-economic deterioration of standards of living
had not been the driving force behind the protests. This thesis is also supported by
the fact that the country still runs one of the most comprehensive welfare states of the
world. The case of Kuwait will thus be coded SOEC = (0)
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The Background: A Struggle about the Electoral Reform
The foremath of the events that were widespreadly called "Arab Spring" was coined by
controversies and tensions between many political players, sides, and even within the
political camps of Kuwait. The opposition suffered from high fragmentation between
Islamists, Secularists, and tribal associations sceptical of the government, as well as
from quarrels within these groups. On the other side, the offset of the old Sheikh and
the appointment of a new one, disrupting the circle of oscillation between the family
branches, caused some discords in the ruling family itself (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.215). The
latter was exacerbated by the nomination of a Prime Minister of the Jaber branch of
the Al-Sabah family, so for the first time the top three positions Emir, Crown Prince,
and Prime Minister were held by the same branch of the family.
The Orange Movement that eventually emerged after 2006 was one of the prototypes
of the youth movements that would shake the scaffolds of power of the authoritar-
ian regimes of Middle East in 2011. It aimed at fighting corruption and found in the
ongoing struggle about the electoral system a gateway and starting point to engage po-
litically. Many of the movements founding members had recently finished their studies
in the United States and were shocked by the culture of corruption they perceived in
their own nation after their return (Albloshi and Alfahad, 2010, p.220). The movement
used social media to organise and set politicians under pressure, and also resorted to
print media in order to enhance their basis, gained support of 39 students associations
and, more important, of the block of the 29 in the parliament. The bloc comprised op-
position forces from different political backgrounds such as the leftist-secular Popular
Action Front and the Islamic Constitutional Movement, and was also advocating for
the five district solution. (Albloshi and Alfahad, 2010; Al-Mdaires, 2010, p.223).
Their cooperation was restricted to particular issues but lacked meta-coordination and
a mutual vision for the future. However, the Orange Movement campaigned together
with and for the bloc of 29 after the dissolution of parliament by the Sheikh. In the
following elections, candidates supporting the five district solution gained victory and
eventually implemented the electoral reform.
In the following years, the relationship of the parliament towards the prime minister
and his government was coined by struggle, blockade, dismissals and tensions. Against
the backdrop of the increasingly strong opposition, civic freedoms and rights were
restricted, and the Sheikh eventually dissolved the parliament and announced new
elections in 2009. The members of the new parliament appeared to be more govern-
ment friendly, however, tensions remained and the Prime Minister was forced to resign
in December 2010 due to a vote of no confidence. It was this fragile atmosphere, when
the pictures and messages of the protesting masses of other Arab countries arrived in
Kuwait.
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A First Victory of Opposition Forces
Only few days after the downfall of President Ben ’Ali in Tunisia, ruling elites in Kuwait
announced generous gifts to the citizens, ostensibly due to the 50th anniversary of the
country’s independence, the 20th anniversary of the liberation from Iraqi occupation,
and the 5th anniversary of the inauguration of the new Emir. Each Kuwaiti received
1,000 Kuwaiti Dinars (roughly 3,600 Euro), as free coupons for basic food items for
fourteen months between February 1 2011 and March 31 2012 (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.222).
Inspired by the movements of the young "Arab Spring", a new youth movement (the
Fifth Fence) emerged, trying to defend the achieved reforms in the country and at-
tracting opposition members of parliament. They brought opposition strategies to a
new, more radical level, in the words of Ulrichsen (2014, p.222):
[...it] created a destabilising new dimension to oppositional politics [...] as the new
groups were less willing to play by the established "rules of the game" and more
inclined to test hitherto-sacrosanct red lines. Carefully constructed parameters
of "traditional" opposition came under sustained pressure as political figures and
groups became outflanked by more volatile competitors with differing sets of
political demands and time frames for achieving them.
Different corruption sandals that were revealed in late summer infuriated the pub-
lic and deepened the support for opposition forces. In September 2011, payments of
about 350 Million in total were discovered that had trickled from the government to
16 MPs who mostly voted in favour of the government. These events propelled and
strengthened the first wave of mass anti-government protests calling for the resignation
of the Prime Minister.
Led by Musallam Al-Barrak, a progressive politician of the left-liberal Popular Action
Front, demonstrators of a wide range of persuasions and backgrounds took the streets
on November 16 2011. A day before, the constitutional court had averted an inter-
pellation of the Prime Minister in parliament about the corruption scandals. Public
anger grew and made demonstrators to storm into the National Assembly chanting
anti-government slogans, and on November 27 2011, tens of thousands of Kuwaitis
pushed for the resignation of the Prime Minister in the streets of downtown Kuwait.
Against the backdrop of the falling regimes and the violence the year had witnessed all
over the Arab world, the ruling family gave in, and Prime Minister Nasser Mohammad
al-Hamad as-Salah resigned a day later (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.223).
The Escalation before the November 2012 Elections
The results of the 2012 February elections were another sign that the ruling family
and their allies had lost more control in the country than they might have expected.
Hoping for a more loyal parliament, the Amir dissolved the parliament and announced
new elections, however, the opposition bloc - and especially tribal and Islamic candi-
dates - experienced a landslide victory. Facing many sceptical and progressive MPs,
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the as-Sabah family had more difficulties to ward off legislative proposals curtailing
their power. Yet, the parliament could not find a mutual way to tackle policy issues,
and Islamic currents tried unsuccessfully to push for a more prominent role of religion
in society and state, alienating the secular and popular opposition forces.27 Dissatis-
fied with the outcome, the Amir dissolved the parliament again and announced new
elections for December 2012. Additionally, he introduced the one-man-one vote system
instead of list system for the elections and tried to touch the five district layout of
electorates. This triggered an outcry in vast parts of the political arena and for the
first time the Amir himself was openly attacked when Mussallam al-Barrak addressed
him directly on October 15 postulating: "We will not let you, your highness, rule this
country on your own [ ... ] We are not scared of your new batons or the jails you have
built". That way, the slogan "we will not allow you, we will not allow you" became
the slogan of the March of Dignity that took place a week later, and in which many
protesters resorted to the color orange to summon continuity with the already abated
2006 youth movement (Ulrichsen, 2014, p.225). The demonstrations were dispersed
with tear gas, marking the peak of violence in the country.
The December 2012 elections were boycotted by all major opposition groups from con-
servative tribal and Islamist candidates to merchant and liberal ones, and including
Kuwait’s largest three tribes — the Mutair, ’Awazem, and ’Ajmi. Also youth groups28
whose relationship to the "established" political opposition was characterised by ten-
sion and a lack of consensus over objectives and methods, formed the main incentive
of the initial protests that swept Kuwait in 2011.
Weak White-Collar Associations, Firm Trade Unions
The role of trade unions and professional white-collar unions was heterogeneous reach-
ing from total passivity to collective action. The professional associations lost influence
since the days of Arab nationalism and struggled with issues of competence for the sake
of defending the quality of the profession and national issues. A good example provides
the Teacher’s Society that struggled about the actual standard of teaching in the sense
of the quality of the people entering the profession and of their training. The majority
of Kuwait’s’ teachers were Arab foreigners who faced a growing minority of Kuwaiti col-
leagues lacking qualification and receiving positions due to their nationality (Alobaid,
2006, p.236;243). The Teachers’ Society, intimidated by the little rights the laws pro-
vided for uprisings of foreigners, especially concerning Kuwaiti domestic politics, was
thus unable to tackle the problems. Consequently, Alobaid (2006, p.249) observes and
concludes in his large-n quantitative research about the situation of teachers in Kuwait:
27Among the proposals were the declaration of the Sharia’ as "the" source of law instead of "a"
source of law in the constitution, a morality police to observe woman behaviour in public, and high
penalties against blasphemy.
28In March 2012 the Civic Democratic Movement formed out of three youth organisations that
expressed definite dissatisfaction with the work of the MPs in parliament.
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As the situation stands, the union does not represent children, school, or society,
nor does it attempt to act in these groups’ interests. The union is located in
one small building, where members do trivial work: they produce a monthly
magazine, and often some afternoon activities for students. The Teachers’ Union
in Kuwait has little authority, and since membership is voluntary, teachers seem
not concerned to join; none of the teachers interviewed during the research were
members; teachers viewed the union as useless and powerless. Some did not even
know that this union existed.
Other professional associations present a similar picture. The Bar Association strug-
gled with complaints about lawyers who do not show up in court and a deterioration
of the profession’s reputation in general (Sabah, 2008). The Engineers Association
was headed by Hissam Kharafi of the family that owns the M. A. Kharafi & Sons
conglomerate in the private sector and was consequently mainly struggling against the
contracting of foreign companies in Kuwait. And the Journalists Association surpassed
itself in its announcements praising the Amir on its official website.
Trade Unions as Reform Oriented Political Players
The situation in the oil sector and the governmental sector was different. The oil unions
have been facing the Project Kuwait since 1997 which was a 7 billion, 25-year plan
to increase the country’s oil production with the help of international oil companies.
The oil unions were active, more militant, supportive to strikes against privatisation
and threaten sometimes with "escalation" in the struggle about Kuwaiti jobs, if the
government would not give in in negotiations. In the oil and the governmental sector,
demands for higher wages also emerged in the course of 2011, the year of the "Arab
Spring"29. The rise of 25 per cent wage increase announced by the government seemed
not enough for many unions and led to strikes of customs workers and employees at
Kuwait Airways (REUTERS, 2012).
In the political arena, trade unions in the governmental sector supported the reform
of the constituencies and held connections to the moderate opposition in parliament.
The year 2009 and the dissolution of the 2006 parliament yielded a political active
trade union movement and leadership. Abdulrahman al-Ghanim, vice-president of
the KTUF was elected to the first chairman of the newly established "Civil Society
Forces" in June 2009. The CSF aimed at unifying moderate reform oriented groups
and operated under the slogan "Building our country realistically is the will of change
that our Emir wanted" (Al-Ra’i-Media, 2009). Simultaneously, Khalid Al-Tahous, the
president of the KTUF and a member of the Al-’Ajmi tribe announced his candidacy
for parliament30 and got elected.
29For an impression of the diverse strikes and struggles of Kuwait’s trade unions in 2011 see the
issue of the KTUF, monthly magazine Al-’Aamal from October 2011 (No. 509).
30Material of US Diplomacy published by the online-platform Wikileaks in 2009 classify At-Tahous
as "Independent Conservative" (LeBaron, 2006). Against the aforementioned tribe dominance in the
unions, this classification can be applied for most ranks in the leading organisations of the movement.
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During the time between 2009 and the February 2012 election, the KTUF leadership
presented itself as a civil society force trying to protect the democratic achievements
of the country. In an interview with the newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, that was also
published in the KTUF Magazin Al-’Aamal, Al-Ghanim criticised the MPs for playing
the card of the "Arab Spring" by rallying on the streets instead of resorting to the tools
provided by parliament to solve the problems of the country. Additionally he criticised
Popular Action Front leader Al-Sa’adoon for his pro-privatisation course (Al-’Aamal
No. 509, September 2011, pp. 12-14). A month before he had criticised the dominance
of tribal and sectarian elements in the 2009 parliament (Al-’Aamal No. 508, August
2011, pp. 13-14). The KTUF repeatedly condemned violence by all sides and focussed
on socio-economical issues while it gave every now and then glimpses of a preference
for the five-district, and sometimes and also to the one-district solution.
With the announcement of the December 2012 elections and the one-man-one-vote
system combined with rumours about increase of electorates by decree, the KTUF and
its affiliated unions finally nailed its political colours on the mast. In a extraordinary
session on October 21 2012, the executive bureau of the KTUF announced:
After deliberating on the events resulting from the repression and clashes that
led to many injuries among the citizens, which came after the announcement of
the decree of amendment in the electoral system, the Executive Council of the
General Union of Workers of Kuwait boycotts the elections scheduled for early
December, in the wish to restore security and stability throughout the country
to follow up its normal democratic path, which constitutes the protective shelter
for economic and social development, and to preserve the dignity of this dear
country and its people, and ask Allah Almighty to protect Kuwait and its Amir
and its people from all evil.
This statement was carried jointly by most of the KTUF’s trade unions. Some
unions decided to issue statements that deviated in their radicalism: The Federation
of Governmental Unions used the more cautious formulation of "the need to review the
decision of the Palace of the choice of the voter to one candidate" and only threatened
an election boycott, while the oil unions let no doubt about the decision to boycott
and mentioned in a sinister formulation that "the constitution guarantees the right
to organise gatherings in a peaceful manner". Even if the union of the ministry of
electricity and water did not mention a boycott and only condemned violence, just as
the Union of the Workers of the Ministry of Public Works,31 the stance of the entire
movement was political to an extent never witnessed in the history of Kuwait.
These statements were confrontational and by no means self-evident. While the op-
positional current united non-governmental organisations, trade unions, and student
groups with opposition political leaders, it was not able to attract liberal groups, such
as the National Democratic Alliance or conservative Salafist (Alsayed, 2013). The
outcome for the case of Kuwait is coded (1).
31All statements in full length can be found in the KTUF magazine Al-’Aamal No.521 November
2012 pp.8-12.
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6.7 Oman (0)
The Sultanate32 of Oman is characterised by widespread powers of the head of state
and a unique influence of Ibadi Islam in combination with a tribal tradition. The
ruling authority of the Al Bu Said family is fixed in the Basic Structure of the State
(the Constitution), and a number of Sultani Decrees that serve as legal framework for
the country. Democratic institutions and processes were relatively new to the country,
and among the Gulf countries of the sample, it is the sharpest contrast to the semi-
democratic experiment of Kuwait. The Omani regime also resorts to a constructed
and carefully nursed collective memory coined by the utopian vision of tribal cohesion,
the preservation of the country’s independence, and the person of the Sultan himself
(Alhaj, 2000, p.101).
The small changes in the institutional equilibrium that were achieved during the
protests of 2011 went their way without any interference of the young trade union
bodies in the country. Perceived as a broker between the state and the business elite
on the one side, and the Omani workforce on the other, the institutions were introduced
in a top down manner and refrained from mingling into politics or from participating
in the reform process whatsoever. The outcome for the case of Oman is therefore coded
(0). The entire row has the following coding:
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
1 0 1 1 0 0 OMN(22)
Table 6.9: Truth table row for the case of Oman
Although the business elite probably became the most important pillar of the power
base of the Sultan, the country remains highly characterised by tribalism and family
bonds. Based on the descriptions in part 6.7.1, the variable TRI is set to (1). Given
the centralised character of the General Federation of Omani Trade Unions (GFOTU),
and the lack of open trade union competition as will be outlined in part 6.7.2, the
variable CEN is set to (1). These centralised union structures, which were created in a
top down manner, remained close to the state and lacked militancy or initiative since
their implementation. Following the assessment made in part 6.7.3, the variable KEYS
is set to (0).
The variable most difficult to determine is SOEC. On the one hand, Oman, for sure,
32The term Sultanate (Sultaniya, deriving from "sulta" meaning authority, power, or control, gained
fame by the term Sultanism as used by Max Weber and later conceptualised by Juan Linz. Sultanism
is an extreme form of patrimonialism among authoritarian regimes in which the power of discretion
of the leader is maximised. For a brief introduction see Chehabi and Linz (1998).
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had a higher standard of living than most of the countries of the sample. However, first,
it was the country that struggled the most with its state budget among oil dependent
countries of the Gulf region. Second, the demands of the protesters addressed socio-
economic issues like youth unemployment or low wages which were the motivation of
the bulk of the early risers. This is a major difference to countries where the variable
SOEC is set to (0) such as Kuwait, or Morocco and Algeria which witnessed procyclical
protests. These pattern of protests, in which the protesters assumed that with the
existing equilibrium the social contract could not be held, renders the case rather
similar to Jordan. Supported by a more elaborate assessment of the socio-economic
situation of the country in part 6.7.1, the variable SOEC is coded (1).
6.7.1 The Sultan, the Mufti, and the Sheikhs
The pivotal figure of the Omani political system is the Sultan, whose "person is invi-
olable, respect of him is a duty, and his command is obeyed" according to Art.41 of
the constitution. The system of governance is hereditary in the male descendants of
Sayyid Turki bin Said bin Sultan (1832 - 1888). In the 2000s, Sultan Qaboos exerted
different high ranking positions in the state, such as prime minister, defense minister,
finance minister, minister for foreign affairs, and chairman of the central bank (Katz,
2004, p.3).
Taking the legal framework into account, the system bore resemblance to Sultanism
as defined by Linz. Besides the Sultan, important political institutions of the system
were the Royal Family Council, the Defence Council, the Council of Ministers, the
Majlis Al-Dawla (resembling a second chamber), the Majlis Al-Shura (resembling a
first chamber), and the Supreme Court. The Sultan had the right to interfere in all
of these institutions. He formally presided the Council of Ministers (Art. 42) and he
appointed the Prime Minister, whereas the competencies of the latter are not fixed in
the constitution: The competences and powers of the Prime Minister are determined
each time anew in the Sultani Decree of appointment (Art.48). Furthermore, the Sul-
tan appoints and dismisses undersecretaries of ministries, secretaries-general and their
equivalents, and senior judges.
The Madjlis Al-Dawla consisted of appointees that rendered outstanding services to the
country or "whomever His Majesty the Sultan chooses" (Art.58), and had a consultative
function. The same is true for the Council of Ministers which was, moreover, politically
collectively responsible before the Sultan for the implementation of the general policy
of the State (Art.52). The Madjlis Al-Shura consisted of elected members representing
all the Provinces of the Sultanate (Art.58(8)). It can be dissolved "in circumstances
His Majesty determines" (Art.58(19)), and had virtually no authority in the areas of
foreign affairs, defense, security, and finances.
Even the most vital opposition groups did not challenge the system but were rather
competing for access to the country’s rents (Alhaj, 2000, p.100). A first wave of hy-
6.7. OMAN (0) 213
bridisation of the traditional system began by the establishment of appointed-elected
consultatory committees in order to increase the opportunities of participation.
The Imamat, Dhofar, and the Beginning of Systematic Co-Optation
By 1970, Oman faced several challenges under the rule of Sultan Said bin Taimur. The
country was economically weak, displayed high rates of illiteracy and a virtually non
existent health system. The country was protected, and hence, dependent on Great
Britain, making the Sultan a target of permanent criticism, and was undermining his
legitimation inside the country. This was particularly true for the Imamat in the in-
terior of the country, which enjoyed autonomy since the treaty of Seeb that ended a
rebellion against the coastal Sultans in 1920.
The Imam Ghalib Alhinai had just been defeated with the help of Great Britain in the
conflicts of 1954 and 1957 mainly caused by questions of oil concessions, and the Imamat
was absorbed into a unified but still unstable state structure. Additionally, the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), consisting of Marxist-Leninist groups and
Arab Nationalists had launched an ongoing military campaign in the western Province
of Dhufar in 1962, aiming at the establishment of an Arab socialist republic resembling
the model of South Yemen.
On June 23 1970 Sultan Said was overthrown by his own son Qaboos bin Said in a
bloodless palace coup. In his first years, Qaboos was heavily relying on British consul-
tancy, their "hearts and minds" campaign, and especially military support. The Royal
Omani Forces had been modernised with the help of the British before and consisted of
many mercenaries from outside the country (Takriti, 2013, p.196). This was a reason
why the Army could be deployed more rigorously on the one hand, and this is also
a reason why it never became a decisive element of the institutional equilibrium like
in Algeria, Egypt, or Jordan. Against the background of the negative reputation the
family earned during the reign of his father, the new Sultan started a state building
process that would grant him stability until his death in 2020.
Sultan Qaboos used the increasing influx of oil revenues to set up state institutions
that would be able to give highly paid jobs to the elite of the country. This way of
co-opting local leadership, as seen in other countries of the sample from Algeria to
Kuwait, targeted foremost wealthy merchants and tribal sheikhs (Valeri, 2012, p.268).
But these tactics also bore fruits in the Dhufar conflict. The rebel forces did not only
comprise impoverished lower strata individuals but also notables and former public ser-
vants (Takriti, 2013, p.171). After a amnesty and the promise to reward leaders who
left the rebel fractions with financial benefits and job opportunities, the tide slowly
turned in favour of the regime. The Marxist-Leninist front, that was weakened after
an internal struggle with the Ma’shani tribe that had attempted to negotiate with the
regime on its own, lost more and more allies, and faded away in the course of the
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1970s.33.
From the very beginning Sultan Qaboos and his allies stressed that the new leader of
the country also had religious legitimation. While not being able to exhibit religious
descent like the King of Morocco or the King of Jordan, the Sultan presented himself
as the "Hand of God" on earth, "destroying the Almighty’s enemies" (Takriti, 2013),
especially during the Dhufar crisis. The Sultan also created and incorporated religious
institutions. The lower strata of municipal Shari’a courts dealing with civic and per-
sonal cases remained virtually untouched while at the top level, for the first time in
the history of Oman, the post of the Mufti was introduced. The new 29 year old Mufti
Ibrahim bin Sa’id ai-’Ibri was a government friendly former judge of the highest Appeal
Court and remained in office until - and beyond - the protests of 2011.
At the same time, the regime was cautious of not letting religious fanaticism of any
kind spread through the country. In 1994 several hundred protesters were arrested
whom the Sultan, accused of being Islamic extremists, however, providing little evi-
dence; another wave of arrests followed in 1997, 2002, (Peterson, 2004, p.134-135), and
2005.
Shura, Sheikhs, and yet another Oil-Based Authoritarian Bargain
Starting from the 1980s, restricted possibilities for political participation were created.
Similar to Bahrain and Kuwait, the inequality that arose from the new oil production
triggered grievances which were perceived by the regime - especially in combination
with Arab nationalist or welfare oriented Islamist rhetoric - as a threat (Alhaj, 2000,
p.100). Since the systematic exploitation of oil, and as a part of the Sultan’s state
building agenda, the regime began to multiply the channels of participation. Different
from Kuwait, however, the introduction and strengthening of participatory institutions
was not a result of a bottom up struggle of marginalised strata of society. In Oman, the
process of hybridisation of the system was top-down driven and rather pre-emptive than
reactive. The nature of the new consultation institutions latched onto the tradition of
Shura (consultations mostly in councils), which was actually a traditional means of the
Imamat. Imams in Oman’s Ibadi current of Islam are, at least theoretically-theological,
elected freely. By this way a path-dependency could be suggested, as Shura has been
- albeit in different forms and to different extents - a core element of all systems that
emerged in Oman (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.63).
In 1981 the first nationwide council, the State Consultative Council Oman (SCC), was
formed which was succeeded by the Oman Consultative Council (OCC) in 1991 (Alhaj,
2000, p.101). Universal suffrage was achieved for the first time when the parliamentary
33The Ma’shani was the tribe Sultan Qaboos’ mother descended from. The Marxist-Leninist Popular
Front for the Liberation of Oman reacted to their possible defection with a brutal punitive expedition
which, in hindsight, destroyed much of the trust and bonds the Front had set up also with other parts
of the Dhufar population. The next tribe to defect, the Kathiri, dwelling around Sultan Qaboos’
birthplace Salalah, eventually broke free without major consequences (Takriti, 2013, p.267-269)
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system, as described above, was introduced (the Oman Council comprises the Madjlis
al-Dawla and Madjlis al-Shura).
Although the elections are basically free and fair, similar to Jordan, tribalism is a
decisive factor (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.53-54). Indeed, tribalism was a major concern of the
young sultan, who assured in his inauguration speech that he would "fully appreciate
the responsibilities of the sheikhs of the tribes" and support these responsibilities with
salaries (Takriti, 2013, p.201). This was part of the deal, and many Sheikhs agreed,
becoming another silent gear wheel in the authoritarian machinery of the Sultan, as
Takriti (2013, p.202) puts it:
Every sheikhly visit was the occasion of a Faustian exchange: the alienation of
the political in return for the economic. All the announcements sounded the
same. It mattered not who the sheikh was or which territory they represented.
What counted was the repetition, the constant and persistent re-enactment of
the Omani submission to the Sultan.
This loyalty was bought with the increasing oil wealth, which has also been used
to finance the military campaigns in Dhofar, the establishment of a modern infrastruc-
ture, and improving the living standards of the population in general by public sector
employment (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.60).
In contrast to many other countries of the sample that are also characterised by a
high degree of tribalism, in Oman the social affiliation was institutionalised. The Di-
rectorate of Tribal Affairs of the Ministry of Interior lists tribes and their respective
members and sheikhs, determining which individual is officially allowed to hold the ti-
tle of sheikh (Valeri, 2012, p.273). Tribalism was also even used as a means to weaken
religious animosities among the population: In 1980, shortly after the Iranian revolu-
tion, authorities decided to establish shuyukh qabila (sheikhs of tribe) for the Baharina
and Lawatiyya communities of the capital (Valeri, 2012, p.272). These clans avowed
to Shi’i inclinations of Islam and never had such a post, that was meant to act as
intermediaries between the members of the community and the administration, before.
The Decline of the Oil Economy and Privatisation
Similar to most Gulf states, the Omani regime became aware of the finite availability
and exploitability of oil fields. Indeed, the share of natural resources of the GDP fell
from an all-time high of 82 per cent in 1979 to a low of 24 per cent in 1998. Expect-
ing the share to fall to 9 per cent in 2020 (Katz, 2004, p.4), and facing an increasing
budget deficit (Al-Farsi, 2013, p.57) the regime announced different measures in its
"vision 2020", foremost the strengthening of the private sector and diversification of
the economy.
The major shift in privatisation politics came in 1996. By that year, the state was a
major player in almost all branches of the economy including the finance sector, the
insurance sector, the petrol sector, or fishery and its downstream industries. A business
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law was absent as each public company was established under and/or ran by its own
Sultani Decree (McKinney, 1997, p.131). Sultani Decree 42/1996 promoted privatisa-
tion as state policy, including the privatisation of up to 40 per cent per facility in core
areas of the state like water supply, electricity, sewage systems, highways, communica-
tion and mail systems. Art.11 of the new Basic Structure of the State provided that
"The national economy is based on justice and the principles of free economy". Di-
versification was planned by promoting small and medium scale industries, improving
agriculture and fisheries, and investment in tourism (Mubeen et al., 2017, p.11).
As the regime did not expect these measures to be enough to absorb the new cohorts
of young Omani employees entering the labour market, and as a reaction to demands
from vast parts of the population, policies of Omanisation were introduced. Against
the background of a foreign labour force that exceeded 70 per cent, the aim was to de-
crease foreign labour to 50 per cent in the overall workforce, to 25 in the private sector,
and to 5 per cent in the government sector respectively. The aims of diversification
and privatisation on the one side and Omanisation on the other, however, more than
often contradicted each other, as the Omani workforce was simply not skilled enough
for the newly created jobs, or lacked the willingness to work anywhere else than in the
governmental sector (Al-Hamadi et al., 2007; Ali et al., 2017; Swailes and Al-Fahdi,
2011). Thus, the public sector became more and more dysfunctional and hampered,
as Common (2008, p.189) reports, recurring to (Valeri, 2007):
[...] problems have been delayed by ‘using the public sector as a safety valve.
In particular, they (senior officials) tolerated a high degree of nepotism in the
bureaucracy positions’ which results in recruitment into a particular ministry or
agency from the senior official’s own tribe. [...] Officials confided that nearly 50
percent of their working day was occupied by either personal visits or telephone
calls from people from particular villages or tribes pleading for employment, or
on behalf of relatives.
The preference for public sector employment was also an outgrow of the wage
structure of the Omani labour market. By 2010, about 70 per cent of Omani private
sector workers earned less than the official monthly minimum wage of 200 Omani
Rials (Valeri, 2012). Oman stands out among the the Gulf countries, as the official
unemployment rate that remained according to World Bank data between 4.5 and 5
per cent during the 2000s, and youth unemployment was about 10 per cent - which
are the most disadvantageous numbers of that region. Inflation rate peaked in 2008 at
about 12 per cent and decreased again to about 3.5 in 2009 and 2010.
The grievances before - and also later during the protest 2011 - were clearly related
economic issues. This is also a major difference compared to Kuwait, where SOEC is
coded (0). The grievances arose out of a feeling that the social contract was - if not
broken - at least at stake. Still, according to the CIP index, the population of Oman
had the highest trust in their administrative authorities of the entire sample. This
means that while the people were socio-economically dissatisfied, they thought that the
state would still be able to fix their situation - and also the social contract. It was the
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perception of skewed distribution of wealth that brought people to the street. Especially
the newly emerged business elite became a core target of the protests. While the process
of diversification faced some difficulties on the supply side of labour, the demand side,
say, the emerging business elite, managed to bring itself into a rather beneficial position.
The co-optation policies of the Sultan, that traditionally included modern educated
groups, leading merchant family members of Muscat, the tribal Shaikhs of interior
Oman, and some prominent religious figures (Alhaj, 2000), began to heel towards the
uprising and heavily supported business elite. The turn to the merchant class was by
no means a surprising strategy. Oman had established a chamber of commerce already
in 1978 and, similar to Morocco or Tunisia, a symbiosis between the government and
rising business circles emerged. Against that background, it is permissible to say that
a breach of the social contract - in the eyes of the protesters who frequently compared
their situation with other Gulf countries - was a driving motive for the protest in 2011.
These demands where not pro-cyclical like in Algeria, nor mainly political in nature
like in Kuwait but were rooted in the feeling that the state would not be willing to
adhere to the social contract and meant as a gentle reminder. The variable SOEC is
therefore coded (1).
6.7.2 Civil Society and Organised Labour
In contrast to Kuwait, civil society in Oman remained after the seizure of power of
the new leader virtually non-existent for decades. For the first twenty years or so, this
might be little surprising, as, in Peterson (2004, p.126)’s words, the country "lacked
nearly all infrastructure, including a modern port, roads, schools, electricity outside
the capital area, and even office space for the government". Hence, at the same time
when other countries’ trade union movements in MENA got into rows with the ruling
regime after the magic and nostalgia of the anti-colonial struggle had slowly abated, in
Oman there was barely a modern industry, no active workers’ movement, no systema-
tised unionism, and actually no civic movement in the Toquevillian sense at all - while
Great Britain still had a well-established foothold on the country.
Nonetheless, the PFLO managed to mobilise workers all around the country at the
beginning of the 1970s. The largest strike in the younger history of Oman took place
on September 1 1971 in the worker’s camps in Ruwi, the commercial hub of Muscat
(Takriti, 2013, p.220). Protests emerged foremost around low wages and the influx of
foreign labour (Peterson, 2004, p.131). The PFLO also established later the National
Committee of Omani Workers in October of the same year which did, however, not
play a role in the further history of the country.
The answer of the regime was twofold: on the one hand, security forces aided by
the British military crushed strikes relentlessly wherever they appeared at a broader
scale. On the other hand, parading the welfare oriented aspects of Islam, the Sultan
attempted to sooth worker’s grievances by addressing the duty of employers to treat
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workers well (Takriti, 2013, p.225). Bottom-up labour organisation would, against that
background, remain unfeasible and unthinkable at lest until the 1990s.34
The high degree of tribalism in the country has, according to some scholars, heavily
hampered the emergence of blood ties crossing civil society (Alhaj, 2000). While this
is substantially true, also the very non-tradition of engaging in civil society activities
cross-cutting primordial or traditional local ties played a role. Erfan and Sofy (2014)
found in their comprehensive study of civil society obstacles in Oman that these organ-
isations were often prone to be instrumentalised by particular individuals or groups,
often lacked the formulation of a popper goal and vision, and also often lacked the
awareness of the importance of sticking to the rules of the Omani legal framework
as well as to the self-established internal regulations, including clear democratic pro-
cedures. Their unclear legal status and the lack of experience in finance and public
relations prevented civil society organisations to put their names on the map of the
political arena, which was exacerbated by the unawareness or negative approach of
government representatives on all levels about the possible partnership between civil
society organisations and the public administration.
Initiatives had also problems in attracting volunteers, which was mirrored in low mem-
bership and participation rates in general assemblies and board meetings, and often
members stayed in their positions for many years. By the end of the 1990s, many
young people simply lacked interest in volunteering. Al-Farsi (2013, p.206) cites the
chairman of the Omani Writers Association stating especially regarding graduates, that
"the cultured people [...] are not aware of their role in society".
Underdeveloped news networks and government censorship did not better that situa-
tion. In 2008 a Council of Minister directive of the Information Minister was leaked,
instructing him to restrict the public’s freedom to criticise government officials. To a
higher degree than many other countries of the sample in which the freedom of press in
heavily curtailed, the Omani media landscape resembles the Syrian media system, as
there is very little possibilities in obtaining information, and the press is heavily con-
trolled by the regime. Broadband coverage was low and in most rural areas absent, and
the 51 per cent state-owned Omantel was the only internet service provider in Oman.
Even in the Sultan Qaboos University library, three government agencies censored
books and magazines (Eickelman, 2001, p.195). Accurate statistics and information,
especially for civil society activists, was more than difficult to obtain (Erfan and Sofy,
2014). All these problems did not cease, even after Art.33 of the Basic Structure of
the State and Royal Decree 14/2000 explicitly allowed for civil society associations.
34Like in almost every Gulf country, sometimes conflicts and strikes among guest workers did happen.
These collective actions mostly ended with dismissals, except if the governments of the respective
countries intervened, such as India in the case of the arrest of about 2000 Indian guest workers in
Oman in 1978 (Valeri, 2012, p.114).
6.7. OMAN (0) 219
The New Labour Unions as Top-Down Initiative
Although Oman had not ratified ILO Convention 87 (the Freedom of association and
protection of the right to organise convention, 1948) or ILO Convention 98 (the Right
to organise and collective bargaining convention, 1949), the beginning of the 2000 her-
alded a new era for trade unionism. First, Royal Decree No. 35/2003 allowed for
representative committees of workers inside enterprises and a nationwide coordination
similar to the JLC-GCBW system in Bahrain. In 2006, Sultani Decree 112 introduced
the term trade unions (naqabat) for the first time and guaranteed that they had the
"right to exercise their activity freely without interference in their affairs" on the part of
the state. Finally, Ministerial Decree 294/2006 regulated the terms and conditions for
legal strikes. The impulse to allow trade union structures, however, did not come from
the populace in a bottom-up manner. Two major top-down reasons can be identified
instead:
First, trade unions were seen by the state and parts of the business elite as a poten-
tial enhancement for the communication between and within industrial institutions.
Consequently, domestic servants, members of the security apparatus, as well as of the
state administration and other governmental units were exempted from Royal Decree
35/2003. The overall aim was to increase overall productivity (Al-Barashdi and Al-
Suqri, 2014, p.112). Experiences with workers’ committees inside formally foreign com-
panies served as inspiration, such as in Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) which
had been majority-owned by Royal Dutch Shell for a long time and inside which em-
ployee committees traditionally worked since the 1970s (Louër, 2015).
Second, Oman was getting increasingly embedded into the international community, es-
pecially concerning financial issues. Fathoming out possibilities for international trade
cooperation and loans, the country opened up for international regulations which were
also a driving motive behind the evolution of the labour code (Louër, 2015).
Concerning the formation of the new trade union bodies, the government was quick of
the mark to steer the process from the very beginning. In 2005 a committee was set
up in order to supervise and spur elections in company-level workers representatives
committees. A year later, 43 of these committees represented almost 15 per cent of the
private sector employees (Valeri, 2007). The still slow and often hampered process of
union formation, that mostly resulted from a shortage of volunteers, led repeatedly to
the postponement of the foundation of the first trade union federation. It was eventu-
ally established on February 15 2010 when some 50 individual unions joined the new
General Federation of Omani Trade Unions (GFOTU). A further step in profession-
alisation was achieved by Ministerial Decree 59/2010, thus creating the possibility for
unionists to become full-time officers in their respective trade union or the federation.
The first union bodies displayed little militancy and were, as stated by an interviewee
cited by Al-Farsi (2013), "trying to build a mutual partnership with the government"
while reassuring that "people’s presumption that this cooperation will lead to gov-
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ernment control over the Union is not correct". Also the relationship to the business
owners was notedly friendly: At a conference in 2012, GFTOU vice-chairman Nabhan
Al-Batashi stated that "the end of the ideological struggle between labour and busi-
ness owners" had arrived, and described the underlying attitude of trade unionism as
being protective towards the enterprises they agitate in, depicting the latter as "breast-
feeding mothers" (Khadr, 2012). The closeness of the union bodies to the ruling elite
resembles the state-union relation the Bahraini GFBTU had in its first years after its
foundation. Also similarly, the Omani union movement was benefiting from financial
government support during the first years of their emergence. This was also true for
union workshops in all governorates and an utterly positive stance of government of-
ficials, leading to an increase of GFOTU member unions to over 170 by the end of 2010.
6.7.3 An Embryonic Trade Union Movement with Little Bar-
gaining Power
Given the friendliness of the new union bodies towards the regime, it is little bewilder-
ing that their militancy was rather underdeveloped. An official FAQ of the Ministry of
Manpower Oman (2020) answers the question about achievements of the labour move-
ment with a positive assessment mentioning the improvement of wages and leave, an
increase in production, the reduction of frequent resignations, and reduction of shifting
of workers from one facility to another. Pragmatically, the page continues stressing
that the trade union work of the recent years has led to a "reduction of resorting to
counter-productive means such as strike" and the resort to peaceful methods including
collective bargaining, social dialogue, conciliation and mediation.
Indeed, the young trade union movement did not have the time, resources, or willing-
ness to engage in labour dispute and show militancy. Generally, strikes in key sectors
were barely registered since the implementation of the new labour code of 2006 that
allowed for unionisation. Apart from high obstacles to schedule collective action, and
the fact that government personnel was not allowed to organise, the union structures
were still in their infancy. Those union bodies which emerged showed strict loyalty to
the Sultan and its regime, and moreover, supported Omanisation alongside with the
official authorities. Wage adoptions were introduced historically in a top down manner,
like the public sector wage increase by 15 per cent in 2007 and no trade union organ-
isation had ever addressed demands directly and on a large scale to the government.
While Kuwaiti trade unions had a long history reaching back into the 1970s and often
launched strikes despite a ban on strikes, Omani trade unions remained toothless in
their first years after foundation. The Case of Oman is, consequently, coded KEYS =
(0).
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6.7.4 Protests 2011: One Small Step in the Arab Spring - But
one Giant Leap for Oman
January until April 2011 was a caesura for Oman although the protests were barely
covered by Western media. Reliable numbers are difficult to obtain, however, most
likely about 5,000 to 10,000 people were protesting at once at certain points of time in
the country. Protests led to foremost socio-economic concessions of the state leadership,
and to the deployment of the Army at least in the streets of Soha, Salalah, and Seeb.
The demands were heterogeneous and also included issues of Omanisation and labour,
allegations of corruption, and civic rights demands that were already cautiously uttered
about a year before by a group of intellectuals. After some socio-economic concessions
and amendmends to the Basic Law, which strengthened the Madjlis al-Shura, protests
abated by August 2011. The trade union movement was not involved into the struggle
about reform.
A Whiff of a Civil Rights Movement
By 2007, the public space in Oman seemed almost fully under the control of the state
authorities. Journalist criticising the participartory procedures inside the system as
superficial or insufficient were intimidated or declared persona non grata (Valeri, 2007,
2012; Al-Rawi, 2016). In the wake of mass arrests following an Islamist conspiracy
against the regime among university staff and students in 2005, the government had
shown to outsiders and insiders of the country that it was ready to take repressive
action in case of dissent, especially when coming from the strata of political Islam
(Valeri, 2007).
Consequently, political activity outside the established channels of the government
shifted into the virtual space. Sabla al-Arab and after its shutdown in 2006, Sabla
Oman became prominent online forums in which betimes government criticism could
be uttered. While the discontent with the state controlled media landscape grew among
the younger population (Al-Rawi, 2016, p.109), it took a group of Omani intellectuals
until 2010, during the 40th anniversary of Qaboos’s accession to the throne, to present
a document to the sultan urging for further-reaching reforms. The demands included
the formation of a national council in order to draft a new constitution leading to a
parliamentary Monarchy and measures against corruption among top political incum-
bents (Valeri, 2012).
In the meantime, several small-scale civil society groups emerged consisting of well-
educated young Omanis who regarded their human capital as legitimation to partici-
pate to a higher extent in the political process, such as the Omani Society for Writers
and Literati in Oman (chaired by former Omani Ambassador to the United States,
Sadiq Jawad Sulaiman) (Moritz, 2018). Although these developments lacked the ex-
tent of civil society activism witnessed in other countries of the sample, especially
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between 2008 and 2010, these developments were remarkable given the tight grip of
the state on media and civil society.
Just like in most other countries of the sample, the first protests started on January 17
2011, the Friday after Tunisian President Zine ben Ali had fled to Saudi Arabia. About
200 people protested against rising prices of basic goods and on corruption, eventually
gathering outside the housing ministry. A wave of small, however continuous sit ins fol-
lowed that mostly addressed the deteriorating socio-economic situation the protesters
perceived themselves to be affected by, as well as reforms of the political system.
Small Scale Protests, Still Having a Political Impact
Benefiting from online networking in which the platform Sablat al-Arab played a deci-
sive role again, different demands were merged and larger crowds could be mobilised.
Green marches took place on February 8 and February 18, whereas the latter culmi-
nated with a petition delivered to the government on February 23. Besides a number of
socio-economic demands, the petition also contained demands that - at least - scratched
at the political equilibrium of the country, such as (Worrall, 2012, p.104):
- freedom of press and expression
- an independent judiciary, a transfer of legislative powers to the Madjlis Al-Shura,
and the founding of an independent constitutional court
- a strengthened position of the Madjlis Al-Shura vis-á vis the Ministries, particu-
larly the right to vote down or up policies related to education and the economy
- abolishing the exceptional powers enjoyed by many state institutions and limiting
the powers of security institutions
- an increase of government efforts in the fight against discrimination against
women
- compulsory school attendance for all citizens until the age of 16 in order to better
chances on the labour market
- relaxing of the legal stipulations to create trade unions and professional associa-
tions
Also calls for the dismissal of ministers alleged of being corrupt were repeatedly
uttered. This can be read against the background of the aforementioned increased
share of business elite inside the ranks of the Ministers in combination with a gridlock
that was perceived by many Omanis concerning upward mobility of young politicians.
Ministers were alleged of only pursuing their own agenda instead of caring about the
nation’s interest (Valeri, 2012, p.2). Indeed, the same Ministers were in office for 10
or 20 years, often having made their ministries fiefdoms, in a professionally but also in
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commercial manner (Worrall, 2012; Kerr, 2011)35. Besides Maqbul Al-Sultan, Minister
for Commerce and Industry, especially Ahmad bin Abdulnabi Makki, then Omani
Minister of the National Economy, became a mutual target of rent-seeking and also of
civil rights focussed activists (Louër, 2015; Moritz, 2018, p.51).
Spurred by the message of protests in the capital, and also of the ouster of Mubarak in
Egypt, demonstrations and sit-ins increased until the first week of March 2011. New
hot spots were Salalah, Seeb, and the industrial zone in Sohar. Especially events in
Sohar escalated during the following two weeks when protesters set fire to government
buildings and to a supermarket close to the industrial zone. A driving motive behind
the protests here, and to a lesser extent also in other hot spots, was the allegation of
favouritism towards foreign workers at the expense of the Omani workforce in staffing
policies. The Army cleared twice the Globe Roundabout (Kurra Ardiyah) which had
been relabelled "Reform Square" and which became the centre of protests including
daily sit-ins and a protest camp. In the course of the military interventions, depending
on the sources, one to six people died. As a result, the size of the demonstrating
crowds rose up to 10,000 in the hot spots, and central places were also occupied by
protesters in other cities and renamed, such as the Call-To-Good Square in Salalah,
Freedom Square in Sur, or People’s Square in Muscat (Worrall, 2012, p.101).
As most collective action was planned online and repression and censorship would
not have halted the flow of the protests, the government decided to allow a cautious
coverage of the events in Omani media (Al-Rawi, 2016, p.175). At the same time, and
similar to other Gulf countries, the ruler first responded by announcing wide ranging
economic benefits, including 50,000 new jobs, a rise of the private-sector minimum wage
and in unemployment benefits, and increases in the monthly stipend for students. After
cabinet reshuffles which turned to be unsatisfactory for the bulk of the protesters, he
replaced 16 of the 29 members of the Council of Ministers. Royal Decree No 38/2011
even abolished the Ministry of National Economy.
This was, however, only seen as an initial step, especially for the protesters focussed on
civil rights and reform. Consequently, Zakaria al-Mharmi, a doctor at Sultan Qaboos
Hospital in Muscat and a leader of the protests stated: "We see the two royal decrees
as part of the new reforms ... Next we want him to consider an elected government and
a constitution change" (Benham, 2011). Indeed, the reform process that was going on
slowly in the past decades got pushed to a new level by the protests of 2011. Besides
changes in staffing policies, a royal decree issued in mid-March granted legislative and
regulatory powers to the parliament, which had previously only been a consultative
body. Funsch (2015) summarises:
For the first time in the modern history of the state, the Majlis al-Shura has
the prerogative to propose laws on its own initiative. In addition, before being
submitted to the sultan for consideration, the annual budget of the state, as well
35Financial Times journalist Simeon Kerr ascribes this statement to J.E. Peterson, who is a historian
specialised on Oman. Regrettably, Kerr does not give a proper source.
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as development projects, must be submitted by the Council of Ministers first to
the Madjlis al-Shura and then to the Madjlis al-Dawla for review, discussion, and
recommendations. Finally [...], the revision of the Basic Law grants members of
the Madjlis al-Shura the right to challenge any minister suspected of wrongdoing
under the law.
Although representing rather minor shifts in the architecture of power of Oman,
especially compared to the huge cataclysms in Tunisia or Egypt, for many Omanis,
this was a remarkably progressive step. Consequently, after having flared up in May
again, with the begin of Ramadhan in August also the critical juncture in Oman came
to an end.
Trade Unions: No Comment, no Participation
The stance of the young trade union movement towards the protests during the critical
juncture of 2011 in Oman is difficult to assess, as there were no statements, announce-
ments, or participation whatsoever. In a country in which trade unions are regarded
as broker rather than progressive political forces (Louër, 2015), this is little surprising.
Nonetheless, collective labour action could be witnessed also in Oman.
The key group of protesters was the unemployed youth but also industrial workers
(especially in Sohar), public sector clerks in Muscat, and foremost students and teach-
ers demanding educational reform36. At the beginning of February, teachers staged a
protest against higher social increased costs of living and for performance related pay.
In the wake, large number of schools remained closed across the country (Worrall, 2012,
p.99). At the end of April, more than 80 teachers attempted to form an independent
teacher’s association at a conference at the Bosher Club Hall in Muscat (Al-Musha’ir,
2011), however facing difficulties to register their Omani Association of Teachers and
Educators. The relaxing of legal stipulations for forming professional associations as
demanded in the petition of February 23 can be read against that background.
During a phase in March several minor strikes occured, including aviation (Oman Air)
and banking (Oman International Bank) and in the industrial zone of Sohar, where all
150 units in the Rusayl industrial estate north of Muscat were forcedly closed down
by strikers, followed by strikes at the refineries in Muscat and Sohar (Worrall, 2012,
p.102).
During all these events, however, official trade unions were not the trailblazers nor
much engaged in the political arena. This is due to their closeness to the government
as well as the lack of an embedding into a broader coalition of opposition groups. Louër
(2015) pins it down when stating:
Omani unions clearly do not position themselves as a political opposition and
avoid showdowns with the government. This attitude allowed them to benefit
36Education had also become a major aim of the reformist top-down endeavours since the 1970s. It
has also been an admission ticket for the entrance to the higher echelons of power. The Constitution,
for instance, stipulates that only candidates that can prove a level of education that is not less than
the General Education Diploma may run for office in the Madjlis Al-Shura (Art.58(10)
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from a substantial upgrade in the aftermath of the protests. Omani trade unions
are not linked to underground political organizations, nor to informal political
trends, their leaders were not previously known for being civil society activists
and do not put forward an analysis of labor issues very different from that of the
government, which they are careful not to antagonize.
The variable INOPP is, consequently, coded (0) for the case of Oman.
6.8 Mauritania (0)
Although being officially an Islamic Republic, tribal associations were of utmost impor-
tance in the history and present of Mauritania. Eventually helped by a strong Army,
an elite consisting mainly of Moorish Arabs managed to seize control. The conflict
with marginalised and often discriminated black Africans who mostly live in the south
of the country has also been a steady companion of the country’s history - different
to the relatively homogeneous Oman. It also became a driving issue in the course of
the uprisings 2011. While different protest movements struggled for a new constitution
and a cutback of the role of the military, trade unions remained politically silent except
for the Confédération Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (CGTM) which, still,
focussed on socio-economic demands only. The outcome for the country is therefore
coded (0). The truth table reads as follows:
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
0 0 0 1 0 0 MAU(2)
Table 6.10: Truth table row for the case of Mauritania
As will be outlined especially in 6.8.4, this weakness goes hand in hand with the
incapability of mobilising allies in the political system. This holds true, although -
similar to Morocco - political opposition parties and unions were often intertwined.
Forces that attempted to change the institutional equilibrium, however, stood outside
the traditional parliamentary opposition and no alliance between these forces and trade
unions could be proved. The variable INOPP is coded (0). Additionally, the fragmen-
tation of the union movement which derives from a union legislation that allows for
union plurality, as will be shown in part 6.8.3, remained a decisive feature until 2011
and beyond. The variable CEN is thus coded (0). Given this fragmentation, and a low
share of industrial labour in the country, the bargaining power of the unions, as will
be outlined in section 6.8.3 was comparatively low. The variable KEYS is coded (0).
Nonetheless, and especially compared to Tunisia and Oman, the country’s economic
indicators hinted at an economy that was poor, however recovering slightly. Similar to
Morocco, the breach of the authoritarian bargain from an socio-economic perspective
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was not a major issue of the protests, and rather the fight against racial discrimination
and violence were on the focus of the demands. The variable SOEC is hence set to (0).
6.8.1 Tribalism, the Military, and a History of Coups
Mauritania is according to Art.1 of its constitution a social Islamic Republic37 and the
only country in Africa that carries the name Islamic in its official name. The country
achieved independence from France in 1960 who had ruled the country from Senegal
and faced some trouble to administer the region that was and is coined until today by
tribalism and ethnic tensions.
6.8.2 The Dominance of Tribal Affiliations in the Country and
Political System
About one third of the population consists of "black Mauritanians" and is mainly com-
prised of the Halpulaar, the Sonink, the Wolof, and the Bambara. Poular, Soninke,
and Wolof are also "national languages" while the official language is Arabic. The
population of Arab decent that often merged with Berbers are considered Moorish or
Beydane and their tribes dwell mainly in the north, centre, and east of the country
(N’Diayne, 2006, p.423). They make up the majority (about 60-70 per cent, depending
on the source) of the population and by fact more than half of them are Black Moors
(Salem, 2009, p.157). Historically, this group had a predominant position, could en-
force religion and their Hassabian language on other parts of the population, and due
to prejudice and colonial ways of organising the population according to racial category
this position was consolidated under French rule (Cervello, 2006, p.146-148).
The Moorish society is heterogeneous. First it is organised in at least 150 different
tribes with a complex net of interdependencies, alliances and rivalries, and second they
display a horizontal stratification resembling a caste system. The Hassan tribes form
the top of the hierarchy, being descendent from ranks of the Maqil Arabs who gained
fame by their violent conquest of the Maghreb in the thirteenth century. The Zawaya
or Marabouts rank slightly below them, forming a caste influenced by religious life after
they had been defeated by the Banu Hassan in the seventeenth century. The Zanga
form the lowest rank, consisting of defeated Berber and Arab groupings who were
vassals of the Hassan tribes until the mid-twentieth century (Pazzanita, 1999, p.45).
This rough classification, however, should not be seen as inflexible and inescapable, as
groups of different strata, classes and casts have, especially after 1960, often pursued
37The early regime coined the term "Islamic Socialism" that referred foremost to the nationalisation
of key sectors of the economy, the elimination of exploitation of man by man, the systematisation of
punishment and reward, state control of basic public services, and a mixed economic sector in which
the state is associated with international or national private enterprises (Pantara, 2010, p.118, fn.57).
Despite the religious touch of the name, it basically follows the Arab Socialist agenda that also could
be found elsewhere at that time in North Africa.
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common agendas or forged alliances.
After independence in 1960, first president Ould Daddah managed to balance the in-
terests of the diverse ethnic groups, established a single party system with his Parti du
Peuple Mauritanie (PPM), and, arguing that Mauritania was not ready for Western-
style multi-party democracy, consolidated his power in an authoritarian-style system.
However, he lost support during the Western Sahara conflict: After the withdrawal
of the Spaniards, former Rio de Oro was divided between Morocco and Mauritania in
1970, and the Mauritanian Army could not hold sway against the indigenous militia
Polisario in the years to follow, which even attacked the main income source, the iron
mines of Zouerate, on Mauritanian ground. Daddah was eventually forced to resign
by war-weary officers, giving way to the an unstable military rule that lasted until the
coup of 1984 in which Ould Taya ascended to power and remained at the top of the
country until 2005.
With the beginning of the military rule a change in the pattern of influence on the
state politics occurred. The efforts to balance the interests of the different groups of
the country was exchanged by a favouritism towards the Arab tribes. Protests by
Mauritania’s Black Africans against upcoming efforts to "Arabise" educational life and
the civil service already took place in 1966, and their feeling of deprivation was ex-
acerbated in the 1980s. A network of Smassides (Ould Taya’s tribe), Oulad Bousba,
and Idewaali, as well as wealthy families and businessmen who came to monopolise
Mauritania’s economy, including Ould Taya’s close family, formed the backbone of the
presidential party Parti Républicain Démocratique et Social Mauritania (PRDS) and
held key positions within the sate (N’Diayne, 2006, p.42).
An Inauthentic First Hybridisation of the Political System
Under Ould Taya’s rule, the country faced at least three major problems, which even-
tually made the state elite initiate a political hybridisation of the system. First, the
country’s economic performance worsened. The iron production that was nationalised
in 1974 became an important pillar of the national revenues and natural resources ac-
counted for about 20 per cent of GDP in 1976, however, this share decreased constantly
and reached a bottom of 6 per cent 20 years later. More devastating for the economy
were the successive droughts in the 1980s that had reduced the livestock population by
more than a third, and total cereal output had slumped from around 120,000 tonnes a
year to nearer 20,000 tonnes (Seddon, 1996, p.206).
Second, the bias towards Arab-Moorish tribal figures concerning the distribution of
jobs, money, and opportunities triggered discontent in other parts of the population
that betimes turned violent. Grievances led to the establishment of the Forces de
Libération Africaines de Mauritanie (FLAM), a militant group that claimed to repre-
sent black Mauritanians in an Apartheid-like regime. Third, and connected with the
228 CHAPTER 6. MENA LABOUR UNIONS (2010 - 2012)
two former points, violence became a central part of the institutional equilibrium, lead-
ing increasingly to harassment, torture, and other human rights abuses in which also
the Army was heavily involved. A border conflict with Senegal in which the Mauri-
tanian black population in the country’s south suffered ethnic cleansing triggered vast
protests across the country. By 1990, the domestic and also international pressure led
to a change of strategy of Ould Taya, who, in the eyes of many observers, had "over-
played the tribal card" (Pazzanita, 1999, p.50)
The hybridisation of the Mauritanian political system that followed began with a draft
of a new constitution that was accepted in a referendum in 1991 and was also in force
before and during the uprisings of 2011. Although vast liberal rights were granted, the
system had a clear bias towards the office of the president. The president was elected
for six years and infinitely re-electable (Art. 26/28), appointed the Prime Minister
and discharged him from his functions (Art.30), was allowed to dissolve the parliament
(Art.31), had statutory power, and was allowed to appoint candidates to civil and
military positions (Art.32); moreover, he was the supreme chief of the Armed Forces.
The bicameral parliament was dominated since the parliamentary elections of 1992 by
the Parti Républicain Démocratique pour le Renouvellement Mauritania (PRDR), the
successor of the PPM and PRDS.
Opportunities for oppositional elements to influence the regime remained scarce, es-
pecially as after the implementation of the constitution Art.104 was added, stating
that "the legislation and regulations in force in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
shall remain applicable until they have been modified in the manner provided for in
this Constitution". Against the background of the dominance of the old cadres around
Ould Taya in the legislative process, this provision opened the door for a delay of a
reform or the repressive legislation that prevailed under the military rule (N’Diayne,
2006, p.424). Also the role of the Army, which, similar to Algeria, was judged as too
powerful among opposition forces, remained virtually untouched. Many high ranking
officers benefited from the 1993 amnesty law regarding atrocities of the 1980s, as well
as from positions that gave opportunities for self-enrichment in semi-legal dealings with
the private sector (N’Diayne, 2006, p.429).
Consequently, little changed concerning the institutional equilibrium, and the predom-
inance of the PRDS in elections continued nearly uncontested until 2004 (Rebstock,
2007, p.56-57). Apart from fraudulent elections38, this was foremost possible by a harsh
suppression of opposition parties and civil society as such.
38Manipulation of elections was particularly easy for the regime as it could influence the administra-
tion - which was penetrated by loyal clerks and located in the urban centres of the state. As Rebstock
(2007, p.57) points out, local hand-written birth registers were often non-existent or simply too remote
and inaccessible for most of the poor urban population. Additionally, as Rebstock argues, about 30
per cent of the Mauritanian high-school students have a variant of Muhammad in their name, and the
registration of Mohammad-son-of-Mohammad (Mohammad wuld Mohammad) was denied under the
pretext that these names are not clearly attributable to real existing persons.
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Political Violence as Glue of the Institutional Equilibrium
Although the hybridisation of the system was rather superficial, the regime now had to
deal with an official opposition. This opposition, however, was often more interested
in gaining access to rents than the representation of the entire country. The largest
opposition parties Union des Forces Démocratiques-Ère Nouvelle Mauritania (UFD),
led by Moktar Ould Daddah’s half brother Ahmed Ould Daddah, the Union pour la
Démocratie et le Progrès Mauritania (UPD), led by Naha Mint Mouknass who was
member of a family from the economic center of the Dakhlet Nouadhibou, and the
pro-Iraqi Ba’athi Parti d’Avant-Garde Nationale Mauritania (PAGN) fought struggles
inside the political relevant elites, however, they were mostly representing little more
than the Moorish population and views of the heterogeneous country.
This only changed in 1995 when the Haratins of El Hor left the UFD and founded
the Action de Changement Mauritania (AC) in August 1995. The departure of the
Haratins was a turning point, as Haratins, who are normally considered as Moors,
started to broaden their electoral base by also addressing issues the black population
were preoccupied with (Marianne, 2002, p.9).
Members of all these opposition parties were frequently arrested, their meetings dis-
persed by authorities, and they were blamed for upheavals and civil disturbances like
those in January 1995 after price increases (Pazzanita, 1999, p.55). This atmosphere
had three major effects.
First, the civil society remained embryonic, even if after 1991 the country witnessed the
foundation of civil society organisations unmatched in the country’s history before.39
State action also affected the media and in particular newspapers that suffered from
censorship and open interference by the government concerning their news coverage.
Second, voter turnout in the elections remained low, being a symptom of disenchant-
ment with politics especially among the alienated population not reachable by - or
isolated deliberatively from - the networks around the PRDS, or tribal networks with
access to the decision making process (Pazzanita, 1999, p.54). Third, the imbalance of
power in the country and the weak and split opposition led to an undermining of na-
tional identity, a stronger reliance on local and tribal structures and growing grievances
towards the center.
The justification of the iron hand of the regime became easier after the regime rein-
vented itself as a champion of the fight against Islamist terrorism after September 11
2001 (N’Diayne, 2006, p.426). It forged an alliance with the United States and made
the country benefit from foreign assistance policies (Jourde, 2007). Indeed, groups that
avowed themselves to political Islam had gained influence in Mauritania, especially in
39Like in most other countries of the sample, civil society in Mauritania grew in importance already
1980s and a variety of civil society and political groups started to organise more visibly. Among these
groups were players that could be found in other countries of the region as well, such as the Egypt
backed Nasserists, Iraqi backed Ba’athists, Muslim Brothers, and also groups that addressed local
idiosyncrasies such as "the Free" (El Hor) organisation, representing ethnic black Mauritanians and
Moorish ex-slaves (Hlarratin) respectively (Seddon, 1996, p.203)
230 CHAPTER 6. MENA LABOUR UNIONS (2010 - 2012)
the poorer strata of urban regions, in which since the 1980s many former rural dwellers
settled after they fled deteriorating socio-economic circumstances in the countryside.
Players of political Islam, like Salafi groups and the Muslim Brotherhood oriented Ja-
maeea Al-Islamiya, also became more prominent in the political arena. Connections to
militant Islamists, however, were rarely proven, and political leaders of political Islam
openly condemned terrorism and supported the fight against Al-Qaida in Maghreb, ren-
dering Jihadism a radical fringe that mainstream Islamists by fact opposed (Thurston,
2012).
Nonetheless, security forces acted more rigorously against opposition parties with Is-
lamic inclination under the pretext of anti-terror operations. But also former allies of
the President experienced increasing discrimination which led to an attempted coup
led by the Oulad Nacer tribe and parts of their allies like the Ideyboussatt and Laghlal
(N’Diayne, 2006, p.429). After another attempted coup in 2004, eventually the coup
of 2005 ended the rule of Ould Taya. It was carried out by officers around Ely Ould
Mohamed Vall, the director of national security, and the commander of the presidential
guard Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. Both declared the democratisation of the country
their main goal.
In the parliamentary elections that followed 2006, al-Mithaq, a list of independent
candidates with Islamic inclination, became the dominant party in parliament, while
the Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques Mauritania (RFD), a party founded by
putschist Mohamed Vall became the second strongest party, and the PRDS ended up
far behind on the fourth place.
Similar to Algeria, where the Army and the old elite was dissatisfied with the elec-
tion results of 1991, Mauritania’s newly elected president, Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, was
eventually replaced in another coup by Abdel Aziz in 2008. Aziz himself became pres-
ident in 2009 and set up the Union Pour la République Mauritania (UPR) in the same
year in order to consolidate his basis of power (Buehler, 2015a, p.365). The military
had become dissatisfied with Abdellahi and his politics of democratic opening, that
also included the legalisation of the Tawasool party, which became a pool of activist of
political Islam (Cavatorta and Garcia, 2017, p.315).
Similar to Ould Taya, Abdel Aziz searched to co-opt notables from rural areas, espe-
cially those from tribes allied with his Oulad Bou Sbaa clan, to consolidate his power.
He won the elections of 2009 handily with 52.2 per cent in the first round (Antil, 2010).
Frequent protests emerged until the Dakar Accord that was signed in June 2009 be-
tween the three poles of the parliamentary majority.40.
After a rather calm first half of 2010, and heavy rainfalls in the second half, in the
beginning of 2011 the pictures of the uprisings in other countries arrived in Mauritania.
40These three poles were at the time of the signing of the Agreement the UPR supporting General
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, the Front National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FNDD), an anti-
UPR coalition formed in 2009 including PNDD/ADIL, APP, UFP, and Tawasool, and finally the RFD
supporting Ahmed Ould Daddah (Ould Bouboutt, 2014).
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6.8.3 From the National Project to restricted Social Move-
ment Unionism
Different from Oman, the Mauritanian trade union movement has a long history.
Nonetheless, while trade union activities especially in the mining sector contributed
to the struggle of independence, the importance of the union movement decreased over
time. The major trade unions relinquished political issues to the government, and
a labour legislation allowing for union plurality gave way for a fragmentation of the
movement into many competing trade union centres.
From Trade Union Fragmentation to Unity and Back
An embryonic workers’ movement emerged during the 1960s especially in the min-
ing sector. Different from many other countries of the sample, mining and industrial
workers were not necessarily privileged compared to their fellow citizens in the agri-
cultural sector (Bennoune, 1988, p.46). Poor living conditions, including over-crowded
and unhygienic slums without running water or electricity, triggered the first strike
in Zouerate in 1968. Although it was crushed violently by the Army, involved trades
unions gained influence in the political arena. They were also pushing for nationalist
demands and were forming a major factor in the government’s stance on relations with
France, the creation of a national currency, and nationalisation of the iron ore mines
(Seddon, 1996, p.201). Already in 1961 five trade union centres that stemmed from the
time of the French rule merged to the Union des Travailleurs de Mauritanie (UTM),
and at its Congress in February 1969 radical rank and file formed a "progressive UTM"
which was mainly supported by the teachers’ union. Until 1973 a struggle between
the movement and state authorities began and eventually the state managed to gain
control over the movement’s organisations.
During the time of instability in 1981 several unions, which were dissatisfied with the
grip of the regime on the movement, tried to break away from the state (WFTU North
Africa, 2015; Seddon, 1996, p.203). However, significant independent unions emerged
only after the announced democratic opening at the beginning of the 1990s when the
rules of the game for trade unions changed. While the labour code of 1963 severely
restricted union pluralism, the constitution of 1991 explicitly acknowledged the right
of political freedom and freedom of labour unions in its very preamble. By this way,
the regime imitated the strategy of neighbouring Morocco. Still, Art.14 banned strike
for all "vital public services of vital interest to the nation" and in areas of national de-
fence and security. In 1993 the Confédération générale des travailleurs de Mauritanie
(CGTM) formed of which about a year later the Confédération Libre des Travalleurs
de Mauritanie (CLTM) split. The Union Générale des Travailleurs de Mauritanie
(UGTM*) formed in 2002 and held, just like the UTM, close ties to the ruling party
(United States Department of State, 2004).
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Trade Unions Accepting the Leading Role of the Regime in Political Ques-
tions
Compared to the overall population, trade unionism played a limited role in the coun-
try. By 2002, the informal and agricultural sector employed about 75 per cent of the
country’s citizens. However, in the remaining wage sector, nearly 90 percent of in-
dustrial and commercial workers were organised (United States Department of State,
2004). Protests occurred frequently since independence, but these protests did not
aim at changing the equilibrium of power, and unions traditionally accepted and pro-
tected the authoritarian bargain, by that way supporting a social compromise in favour
of Mauritanian nationalisation, and a form of radical, albeit authoritarian, populism
(Seddon, 1996, p.200). Already in 1966, after lengthy negotiations, PPM and UTM
agreed on a protocol in which the UTM accepted the supremacy of the PPM in the
political sphere, while the PPM accepted the UTM as the only representative organi-
sation of the workers.
This attitude started to change slightly in the mid-1990s. Ba’athist and Nasserists
political forces gained some influence within the union movement which was seen as a
threat by state elites and led to repression of collective action (Marianne, 2002, p.11).
The CGTM was not officially affiliated with any party, while the CLTM was associ-
ated with the Action pour le Changement (AC) opposition party that campaigned for
greater rights for Mauritania’s Haratin and black populations (United States Depart-
ment of State, 2004). This mirrored the two hazards the trade union movement could
pose for the regime: First, as the IMF austerity politics, that began to be implemented
since 1992, were a main target of opposition criticism, trade unions, as watchdogs of
the authoritarian bargain, could easily fit into the opposition movements. During the
bread riots of 1995, new and independent unions rallied alongside with opposition fig-
ures like Ahmed ould Daddah (UFD), or Hamdi ould Mouknass (UDP), whose speeches
denounced the "nepotist management of state resources" (Marianne, 2002, p.11). Sec-
ond, human rights groups that were preoccupied with the marginalised parts of society,
marginalised regions of the country, and their deprivation from the centres of power,
also addressing the human rights abuses, found in trade unions valuable allies - as long
as the common denominator were the rights of workers. In the decades that followed,
the networks of the trade union movement increased, and trade unions collaborated
with human rights associations, youth movements, pro-democratic groups, campaigns
against discrimination against black people or against slavery (Bajo, 2013, p.124).
Although new trade unions required a licence from the state authorities, this politics
of selective licensing have not been used to an excessive extent like in Lebanon, and a
heterogeneous union landscape emerged in the country. By 2011 Mauritania counted
19 national trade union centres in addition to a few autonomous professional white
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collar unions with limited influence. Most of these trade union organisations did not
stand out with government criticism in terms of socio-economic demands, nor did they
challenge the institutional equilibrium of the country. Those unions that were active
inside the political arena alleged the regime of taking advantage of this situation of
amalgamation and confusion by instrumentalising workers’ organisations (Le Comitée
Exécutif de la CGTM, 2011).
This strategy could indeed be witnessed after the 2008 coup, which received little ap-
preciation from the union movement. In August of that year, the police in Nouakchott
brutally repressed a demonstration organised by trade unions to protest against the
military coup. Even though the march had been authorised, several trade unionists,
including Samory Ould Beye, General Secretary of the national trade union centre
CLTM, were taken by force to the police station, before being later released (Interna-
tional Trade Union Conference (ITUC), 2009). In a unique move, the UTM, CGTM,
and CLTM together with the smaller union centrers USCM, CNTM, and UNTM send
a letter to the United Nations on August 25 2008 asking for assistance in the restora-
tion of democracy in the country. During the critical juncture 2012 mutual statements
between that Intersyndicale would follow.
A Split Union Movement Lacking Bargaining Power
The foundation of the Intersyndicale , that was undertaken in order to combine the
forces of the different trade union centres, can be read as a move to compensate a
low bargaining power of unions, especially in key sectors of the economy. The afore-
mentioned droughts of the 1980s and economic mismanagement resulted in an increase
of foreign debt in Mauritania. After nearly all of its foreign debt had been forgiven
due to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative at the beginning of the
2000s, the country focussed on the attraction of foreign investments, however, with
little measurable results. Natural resources, especially iron and copper ore, gold, and
crude petroleum accounted for about half of the GDP as well of exports in 2010. Due
to large fishing grounds, also non-fillet fish, molluscs and processed crustaceans con-
stituted about one third of the total export. Employment in agriculture was about 58
per cent and employment in industry about 10.5 per cent, being the highest and lowest
value respectively of the entire sample, and the urbanisation rate is the second lowest
after Yemen.
Strikes at the Société Nationale d’Industrielle Minière Mauritania (SNIM), accounting
for about 15 per cent of the GDP, were almost non-existent in the 2000s, and union-
isation in the fishing industry was virtually absent. The case of Mauritania bears a
certain resemblance to the case of Morocco, as the workers in the key sectors - being
almost exclusively natural resources in Mauritania - were split between the at least
three large union federations according to their networks, identities, or political pref-
erences. The very difference is that the Mauritanian labour movement never managed
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to constitute an anomic threat to the government. The history of workers’ struggle, as
outlined in part 6.8.3, did not enter the collective memory of the country and regime
as the Moroccan protests of the past decades did in Morocco.
While in Morocco the CDT was the most active union, the CLTM was in Mauritania
the most militant organisation. Different from Tunisia, however, in Mauritania, no
harsh harassment of trade union activities in key sectors became public during the
2000s. The importance and strength of the trade union movement was simply not high
enough for the regime to consider concessions. When the Intersyndicale cooperated in
2008 in a dialogue, this cooperation did not last for long. It was not able to threaten
militancy in form of strikes or other collective action, did not affect the key sectors,
and produced, if at all, little results. Apart from that, social dialogue including all
important trade union organisations remained virtually non-existent at all levels. The
only multi-sector collective agreement dates back to 1974 and there were only four
sectoral agreements, the most recent of which (for the mining industry) dates back to
1969. The case of Mauritania is therefore coded KEYS = 0.
6.8.4 Protests 2011-2013: An Alliance without Trade Unions
During the critical juncture that started 2011, trade unionism did play a restricted role
during the process. And if at all, only socio-economic enhancements were demanded,
while the protest movements on the streets struggled for a new constitution and a
cutback of powers of the military in the political arena.
A Protest Movement Focussed on Political Issues and State Violence
Although Mauritania has the lowest rate of internet-coverage per households (0,17 fixed
broadband subscriptions in 2011 compared to 2,2 in Egypt), news about the uprisings in
Egypt and Tunisia triggered protests especially in urban areas. Yacoub Ould Dahoud,
a Mauritanian businessman burned himself on January 17 2011, and on January 20 the
first demonstrators gathered at the May 1 Square in Nouakchott in order to protest
against injustice. The government reacted promptly to the events and lowered prices
for sugar, rice, cooking oil, and flour about 30 per cent. Nonetheless, after a couple of
weeks of organisation, network building, and the agreement on common goals, different
groups launched a mass demonstration on February 25 and presented a catalogue of
7 core demands, that all posed a direct attack on the institutional equilibrium, being
(Lum, 2011):
- the withdrawal of the military from politics
- a firmer separation of powers
- the establishment of a national agency to combat slavery
- constitutional reforms affecting the electoral system
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- the reform of the process by which officials publicly declare their assets
- the reform of local administration and the empowerment of elected mayors
- media law reforms
These major demands, which all tangle the political sphere, can be read against the
background of a poor, however, economically recovering country. Although Maurita-
nia remains one of the poorest countries of the sample, macroeconomic trends were
positive. The general unemployment rate dropped from 12.5 per cent in 2002 to 10.5
per cent in 2010, showing a similar downward trend like Morocco and remaining at
the level of Syria. With about 17 per cent, youth unemployment was high in 2010,
however, this is the lowest number among the non-Gulf countries of the sample. At the
same time, the absolute poverty rate decreased about 10 per cent since 2000, and also
the healthcare-out-of-pocket expenditures decreased constantly since 2000 by about 1.5
per cent per year. The case is coded SOEC = (0).
The Youth Movement, Black Africans, and Opposition Parties Struggling
for Concessions
The then-named February 25 Youth Movement stressed its independence from political
parties. Nonetheless, and similar to Morocco, particularly youth sections of political
parties, like the Regroupement des Forces Démocratiques, Union des Forces du Progrès
(UPR), and Rassemblement pour l’Unité et la Démocratie, had joined early protests
and had helped to set up dozens of Facebook groups. All participants hoped to achieve
mass mobilisation on the symbolic Place d’Bloques, where several buildings had been
sold in intransparent ways to businessmen close to the president, in the years before.
Protest also spread to cities like Aleg, Aoujeft, Atar, and Zouerate, however, the overall
number of protesters did not exceed a few thousands. The potential and real inter-
vention of parties led to splits within the movement. On April 25 2011 foremost black
African organised demonstrations addressing inequality and demanding the resignation
of Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf and a national coalition govern-
ment made up of technocrats. These demands were maintained despite some promised
economic concessions, including job creation and a dialogue offer by authorities (Lum,
2011). Different from other countries of the sample with the exception of Bahrain, parts
of the youth movement also addressed tribalism, and ethnic partisanship as a reason
for the lack of upward mobility. By that point of time, however, leaders underlined
that they did not seek to disrupt the "unity" or call for the resignation of President
Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz (Ghasemilee, 2011).
The grievances of the black Africans mostly stemming from the deprived south were
exacerbated by allegedly fraudulent elections at Nouakchott University that discrim-
inated against the black non-moorish dominated Syndicat National des Étudiants de
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Mauritanie (SNEM). Street riots broke out, paralysing the overall protest movement
for several months. The census that was planned in the same year worsened the situa-
tion, as many activists claimed that the procedures were discriminatory against mostly
black people from the south. Census committees demanded documents regarding the
parents and even the death certificate of the great grandparents,o which were simply
not available for the bulk of the rural population, and registration was a necessary con-
dition to the access of many state services and jobs. Just as seen in the Mauritanian
electoral process, and similar to the cases of Jordan, Bahrain, and Kuwait, nationality
became a highly politicised issue, leading to the foundation of the movement Touche
Pas à Ma Nationalité Mauritania (TPMN) that became active especially in the second
half of 2011.
A main demand of the opposition, especially of the Coordination de l’Opposition
Démocratique Mauritania (COD), that was formed by 14 opposition parties after the
2008 coup, was the institutionalisation of a national dialogue that was stipulated in
the Dakar Accords. However, the government claimed that it was a one-time matter
between the coup and the presidential elections of 2009. Nonetheless, a national po-
litical dialogue between the presidential majority and the part of the Opposition, then
called a "Dialogue" was held in Nouakchott from September 17 to October 19 2011
(Ould Bouboutt, 2014).
Two issues became the main focal point of discontent: The government extended the
parliamentary term until the opening of the May 2012 session, although the constitu-
tion stating that the term has to end exactly after five years - which would have been
in November 2011. Later on, the government postponed the elections of one third of
the second chamber (the second chamber in Mauritania has electoral terms like the
US-Senate) (Nup, 2012a). Furthermore, the opposition and the government strug-
gled over proposed constitutional amendments during the National Dialogue41. The
eventual amendments of March 2012 condemned coups as crimes, fixed a clear equal
ranking of men and women on the labour market and for public offices, strengthened
slightly the position of the Prime Minister vis-á-vis the President, and prohibited any
kind of slavery. At the same time the first chamber was allowed to determine the date
of elections (Ould Bouboutt, 2014), and the pivotal role of the office of the president
remained virtually untouched.
Dissatisfied with much of the amendments, and with regard to the real situation in
Mauritania concerning the role of the Army, discrimination, slavery, and the low liv-
ing conditions, the intensity of opposition protests peaked in 2012. The protesters
41By fact, only four parties of the COD - the Alliance Populaire Progressiste Mauritania (APP) of
Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, and the smaller El Wiam, Hamam and Sawab - have joined the dialogue,
along with about sixty formations close to the majority. The ten other members of the COD have
strongly boycotted the dialogue, believing that their conditions were not respected, including the RFD,
still led by Ahmed Ould Daddah (which is with 16 deputies and 7 senators the main opposition party),
the Union des Forces de Progrés Mauritania (UFP) of Mohamed Ould Maouloud, and Tawassoul led
by Jemil Ould Mansour (Spiegel, 2011).
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radicalised and attacked the president more openly. The banners of the February 25
movement involved slogans like "active until the fall of the regime" and people shouted
"fall, fall military regime!". A rally on March 12 organised by the February 25 move-
ment was themed as "the beginning of the end of despotic power", and demonstrators
vociferously requested the retreat of President Aziz.
Meanwhile, the range of issues addressed by the protest network had broadened. Also
the exclusion of black Africans was criticised on many banners, and after incidents
at the Higher Institute for Islamic Studies and Research, where the police attacked
protesting women, the February 25 Movement organised a "march of victory" at the
end end of March 2012 under the slogan "don’t hit your mother, sister, wife, or daugh-
ter". Also the cooperation with the COD, intensified, which organised a demonstration
under the slogan "ready to impose departure" on April 22 2012. The crowds of the
demonstrations now reached several thousands, peaking on May 9 on Ibn Abbas Sqare,
where according to the opposition about 60.000 protesters gathered - nearly 2 per cent
of the country’s population. Independently from the cooperation between the Febru-
ary 25 Movement, the TPNM, and the COD, also the Islamic party Tawasool became
active during 2011-2012, however, it showed a penchant for selecting protest dates one
or two days ahead of events announced by other groups, and their actions were often
criticised as too radical and violent by other opposition groups (Nup, 2012b).
Although especially the February 25 movement and also the COD remained active in
the years that followed, however, the critical juncture in Mauritania came to an end
by the beginning of 2013.
A Passive Trade Union Movement with only one Exception
During the entire critical juncture, the trade union movement seemed to fight its own
struggle focussed on socio-economic issues and avoided to enter the political struggles
about the constitution. According to the ITUC, by 2011 the CGTM was the most
representative workers’ organisation, however, as the Government provided funds to
the confederations in proportion to their memberships (United States Department of
State, 2004), the UTM was still officially declared the largest trade union centre. The
CGTM, known for its opposition against the 2008 coup, organised several rallies, how-
ever, without demanding changes within the institutional equilibrium. Already before
the protests gained momentum in Mauritania, the CGTM, CLTM, and CNTM pointed
in a mutual statement at an unemployment rate of 33 per cent and demanded of the
state authorities "to take urgent and appropriate measures to stop the state of degra-
dation and impoverishment of thousands of Mauritanian employees" (L’Intersyndicale
de Mauritanie, 2011). Three weeks after the demonstrations of February 25 2011, the
Intersyndicale organised a countrywide action day to protest and discuss matters of
prices, unemployment, and the protection of Mauritanian workers. On April 15 2011
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the CGTM, CLTM and CNMT organised a rally in the capital to pressure the govern-
ment into negotiations. Although CGTM secretary general Abdelahi Ould Mohammad
"Nahah", pointed out that it was "the politics of burying the head in the sand, repres-
sion and restriction of liberties that led to the ouster of Ben Ali and Mubarak" (Adrar
Info, 2011), no concrete threat against the system was uttered.
However, the Intersyndicale started to disintegrate already in mid-2011. A few months
after the beginning of larger protests, the government had managed to jam a wedge
between the UTM, which had been relatively passive anyway, and the other members
of the Intersyndicale. While UTM, CGTM, CLTM, and CNTM had complained mu-
tually about the intransparent allocation of seats for the 99th International Labour
Conference in Géneve in 2010 (L’Intersyndicale de Mauritanie, 2010), on June 3 2011,
the CGTL submitted a complaint to the ILO claiming that UTM representatives were
overrepresented among the delegates to the 100th International Labour Conference -
at the expense of the CGTM (Commission de Vérification des Pouvoirs Mauritanie,
2011). The UTM left the Intersyndicale as - according to the CGTM official statement
- leaders argued that their organisation could only exist within the state framework
and that the front-line industrial union struggles did not suit them (Le Comitée Exé-
cutif de la CGTM, 2011). The second organisation that broke the trade union front
was the CLTM. It was invited to an inaugural ceremony of the opening of negotiations
scheduled by state authorities for April 27 2011, and approved without consulting the
CGTM and the CNTM. At the same time, a dispute about the representation of the
mining workers trade union Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière de Mauritanie
(SNIM), which was conducting an open sit-in and whose groupings were brutally re-
pressed by the police, broke out between the CGTL and the CLMT, setting the seal
on the CLMT’s withdrawal from the Intersyndicale. Single-handedly, the CGTL or-
ganised a general strike for July 26 2011, as the government and the employers did
not open social negotiations with the unions on the basis of the representation criteria
provided by the Labor Code. According to its organisers, the strike was a success and
joined by mining workers most notably of MCM Akjoujt (100 per cent) and the SNIM
in Nouadhibou (40 per cent), telecommunication workers (Mattel 100 per cent), and
workers from the Free Port of Nouakchott, Security Services and Guarding, Roads and
Buildings, Food Industries, Chemical Industries, Central Administration, Road Trans-
port (Le Comitée Exécutif de la CGTM, 2011).
During the two years of the peak of the uprisings, the focus on socio-economic demands
did not change. In a CGTM statement published in August 2011 the union centre criti-
cised the deterioration in the purchasing power of workers, precarious employment, and
the lack of tripartite dialogue. In an interview CGTM leader Nahah already February
2011 set the aims by stating (Boolumbal, 2011):
Nous organisations syndicales réclamons un Etat au service de toutes les popu-
lations. Ainsi nous pensons que l’Etat est tenu de procurer à tous ses citoyens
la couverture sanitaire, l’éducation pour tous et l’emploi pour la composante des
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travailleurs de l’économie informelle. Nous pensons que l’Etat doit avoir une
politique conséquente qui permettra de garantir un minimum nécessaire à tous
ses citoyens.
This attitude ,that aimed at making the state responsible and accountable for the
population’s welfare without trying to change the very nature of the system, was con-
tinuously communicated in speeches and actions during the critical juncture. In an
ordinary session of the CGTM on November 22-24, 2012, the CGTM met with the
representatives of opposition parties like Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, President of the
Alliance Populaire et Progressiste (APP) party, and members of the COD. The CGTM
informed those representatives who presented possible crisis solutions, that although
the union centre was not indifferent to the country’s political future, the CGTM was
and will remain a trade union actor equidistant from all political actors (Le Comitée
Executif de la CGTM, 2012). Also professional white-collar associations stuck to rather
apolitical topics such as the protection of their members and issues directly connected
to their trade. The Journalist Union even downplayed the violations of freedom of
press many journalists suffered according to Reporters Without Borders. During the
beginning of the protests the union was rather preoccupied with the release of Ould
Eddin who was captured in Libya and freed by April 2011. The union’s President Ould
Amadou explicitly thanked President Aziz for his efforts (Mohammad, 2011b), and, in
general, the union’s leadership seemed to have good connections to the regime and
submit to its stipulations.
Also physicians and health care workers remained silent beyond demands that touched
the core of their profession. Mauritanian health workers sought financial compensation
for the risks they ran in their daily job, and a travel allowance for over two years.
They announced a national open strike on April 7 2011 if the government continued to
ignore their demands. Medical workers represented 70 per cent of Mauritania’s public
health sector (Ould Seyid, 2011), however, they did not aim at changing the nature of
the political system. The same is true for the Bar Association, although it struggled
with the regime about single incidents. When in November 2011 a government close
activist, who was accused of drug delicts was absolved in a court trial and the minister
of justice dismissed the leading judge Mohamed El Amine Ould Mokhtar and degraded
four others, the Bar Association complained and stated that this would pose dangerous
messages to all judges that they had to adopt what the executive authorities consider
as right and just - otherwise they were subject to arbitrary dismissal from their jobs
(Mohammad, 2011a). Collective action against the regime failed to appear.
The two teachers’ unions Syndicat Indépendant des Professeurs de l’Enseignement
Secondaire Mauritania (SIPES) and the Syndicat National d’Ensignment Secondaire
Mauritania (SNES) conducted several strikes in April and May 2011 demanding higher
salaries, housing, and a revision of employment contracts (Confédération Générale des
Travailleurs de Mauritanie (CGTM), 2012). The government reacted with stick and
carrot: Several teachers were dismissed and several improvements of working conditions
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announced. There was, however, no confrontation between the regime and teachers
concerning the institutional equilibrium in the country.
Given the hesitance of most of Mauritania’s trade union institutions, and the focus on
socio-economic demands of the Intersyndicale and also among the professional white-
collar associations, the case of Mauritania will be coded (0) concerning the willingness
of trade union organisations to change the institutional equilibrium.
6.9 Yemen (0)
Despite the unification of 1990, Yemen can still be considered societally and culturally
split. The uprisings of 2011 were caused by a steady deterioration of living conditions
and the discrimination of vast parts of the country concerning the distribution of re-
sources, rents, and chances. While professional white collar associations played their
role during the uprisings in certain areas and in a rather discontinuous manner, the
infrastructure of independent workers’ unions had dispersed beyond recognition in the
early 1990s, and their capital was assimilated into newly emerging NGO structures.
As they never recovered, workers’ trade unionism as such did not play a significant role
during the protests. Still, Yemen is in a grey zone between (1) and (0) for the QCA
outcome. However, compared to the other cases of the sample where the outcome is
coded (1), the Yemeni workers’ movement lacked internal structure and coordination,
and even when collective ad hoc actions were launched by workers during the critical
juncture, institutional trade unionism was not the main vehicle for these actions. The
outcome of the case is coded (0). For the sake of higher transparency, section 6.9.4
scrutinises this decision. The truth table row reads as follows:
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
1 0 1 1 0 0 YEM(22)
Table 6.11: Truth table row for the case of Yemen
As will be shown in the analysis of the institutional equilibrium in part 6.9.1, trib-
alism played a pivotal role in the system of Yemen, hence the variable TRI is coded (1).
Also the economic indicators justify setting the variable SOEC to (1), as will be shown
in part 6.9.3. Part 6.9.2 shows that trade unionism alone was not able to interrupt the
economic performance of the country before 2011.
The same section will describe how the regime managed to get control over the trade
union federation merger after unification in 1990, and how it kept a high degree of
centralisation causing progressive activists to drift into the NGO sector. The vari-
able CEN is, consequently, coded (1). Although the welfare oriented Islamic party
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Islah managed to gain palpable influence in some trade union associations, the overall
majority of institutionalised trade unionism was not directly connected to opposition
parties but rather to the ruling party GPC. The last part of section 6.9.4 focusses in
particular on the underlying reasoning for the determination of the variable INOPP as
(0).
6.9.1 Two Countries, Tribalism, and a History of Decentrali-
sation
Before the upheavals of 2011, Yemen was a presidential Republic based on a strong
decentralisation in favour of local tribes and tribal alliances, having clear features of
authoritarianism according to Linz (2000, esp. p.159). The country emerged from
a unification in 1990 of two country parts that differed in their socio-cultural and
economic basis and, foremost, in their history. In the northern, tribal dominated high-
lands, the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was installed by some help of Nasserist Egypt.
The country succeeded the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen that had ascended from
the crushed Ottoman Empire in 1927. In the rather plain south with a large coastal
area, the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) emerged in 1967 after the
collapse of the British Aden Protectorate, and became the only full Soviet style so-
cialist republic of Middle East. Both states were eventually ruled by a single party,
the north by the GPC and the south by the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). In the
north, clearly being a sphere of influence of tribal politics, the GPC was established
in 1982 as broadly parallel organisation of local ’committees’ to provide a coordinated
and unified system of political involvement meant to affect politics on the national level
(Dresch, 1990, p.22). The YSP, following the model of socialist Eastern-European par-
ties, had a tighter grip on the population in the more centralised South Yemen. Its
most prominent figure throughout the 1980s was General Secretary Ali Salem al-Beidh.
A Unification with some Odds
In the heat of the events following 1989, the breakdown of the Soviet Bloc, and a world-
wide hope for a new wave of democracy, the two countries decided to merge in 1990,
in 1991 a new constitution was drafted, and elections followed in 1993. The unity of
the two countries, which both had taken different roads to modernity in the previous
decades, took many observers by surprise. Initially, leached out by dirigiste misman-
agement, the south hoped to benefit from the relative wealth and sturdiness of the
north, even if the price to pay would be an increased influence of the highland tribes.
The discovery of huge oil fields straddling the border of the two countries promised
future wealth and caused excitement among both populations and their leaders. This
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was also a driving force behind the endeavours of Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of the
YAR, who needed to increase his popularity outside the civil service sector and the
Army. The doubts about uniting with a modernist and atheist state uttered by influ-
ential tribal leaders and the clergy, eventually paled away in the light of a promised
bright oil-financed future (Clark, 2010, p.131).
The unification proceeded with some odds. The Ministry of Finance, headed by a north-
erner, blocked many reforms suggested by the YSP. Senior civil servants encountered
newcomers from across the old border with mistrust, unwilling to give up competencies.
No unity was achieved in the field of defence, as no part wanted to give up control over
its military units. Additionally to the disproportional allocation of the population, the
northern territories displayed a higher degree of fighting power, as - in contrast to the
south - the tribes had never been disarmed. When the southern minister of defence
tried to curtail the flow of state money for the highland tribes, he got into rows with
the clan of Saleh, who’s family members occupied high ranking military posts.
The elections of 1993 showed the new balance of power in Yemen. While the GPC
won 123 (41 per cent) of the 301 seats, the Islamic party of al-Islah (al-Tadjammu’
al-Yamani lil-Islah) won 62 seats (21 per cent), and the YSP only got 56 seats (19
per cent). The result is rather unsurprising keeping in mind that the population of
the north was about four times as large as the population of the south (11 versus 2,5
Million). Giving a heavy blow to the YSP, the Islah party, led by the powerful tribal
leader Abdullah al-Ahmar, won also the southern highland area YSP leader al-Beidh
had hoped to win. This was one of many links in a chain of disappointing events
the modernist south, especially in the city of Aden, had to digest. After some mil-
itary incidents in the beginning of May 1994, Southern leaders attempted to secede
and announced the foundation of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). In the
following civil war, the YSP forces were defeated, despite some support from Saudi
Arabia. The position of the separatists was weakened by the fact that many south-
erners sided against al-Beidh and his YSP. These groups followed Saleh’s depiction of
atheist Saudi-backed unity-crashers, and consequently, the final siege of Aden was led
by former PDRY General Abdalrab Mansur al-Hadi, who would become Saleh’s vice
president in the same year (Clark, 2010, p.144).
A Hybrid System with Tribal Dominance
The tribal alliances and patronage networks of the country produced a long-lasting
leader, despite a constitution (2000-2012) that actually fulfilled many requirements
of a "Western-style" democracy. Candidates for the position of the President were
screened jointly by the Praesidium of the House of Representatives and the second
chamber (Madjlis Al-Shura) and had to achieve at least a 5 per cent support in the
former, before they were allowed to compete in direct popular elections (Art.108). The
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President was the supreme leader of the armed forces (Art.111), however, he could not,
directly or indirectly, engage in any private business of any kind whether commercial,
financial, or industrial (Art. 118); he was not allowed dissolve the House of Represen-
tatives (Art. 101) or to rule for more than two seven-year terms (Art.112). Moreover,
the possibility of declaring state of emergency (Art.121) had never been invoked in the
constitution’s history. The system allowed for party plurality, and indeed, after 1990,
many small political parties of different inclinations emerged, many of them not having
more than a telephone, an office, and a newspaper (Canton, 2013, p.97).
Similar to Jordan’s one-man-one-vote system, where the fact that ballot follows blood-
line, and the layout of the voting districts was a pivotal part of the equilibrium, in
Yemen the electoral laws facilitated discrimination. Yemenis were allowed to register
for voting in their place of residence, in their family home town - even if they were not
residents - or in the constituency of their workplace (Art. 3 and 4(a) of the General
Elections and Referendum Law). Critics claim that registration at the main work ad-
dress allowed government employees to be located for partisan reasons, especially in
contested areas of the south, as Art. 105(b) of the election law stipulates a First-Past-
the-Post system. Additionally, independent candidates require endorsement signatures
by an Amin or ’Akel, being local officials appointed by the government (Democracy
at Large, 2005, p.3). The selection of candidates for presidency by the parliament
also caused quarrels when in 1999 the Parliament denied a presidential candidate of
the YSP. Further shortcomings include intimidation at the polling station, violation of
voter secrecy, and under-age voting.
The higher echelons of power, especially in the north, mostly consisted of high ranking
tribal leaders mostly of two federations, al-Hashid and al-Bakil, whereas the implied
opposition between these two dominates much of tribal rhetoric (Dresch, 1990, p.23).
Additionally, Saudi Arabia, although having supported the secession in the south 1994,
also supports tribe branches in the north in a selective way.42 The most decisive feature
of Saleh and his close allies consisted of the ability to arbitrate and mediate between
the tribes and at the same time buying their loyalty with government positions and
remittances. He is quoted to have said once, "ruling Yemen is like dancing on the heads
of snakes" (Clark, 2010).
Observers wrote repeatedly of a triumvirate (Carapico, 2011) that shared power accord-
ing to an ’ahad, implicit contract (Knights, 2013, p.265)43. Three persons and their
42These branches include among the Hashid the Bayt al-Ahmar of the Humran section of the al-
Usaymat tribe, and among the al-Bakil the Bayat Abu Ras of Dhu Muhammad, and Bayt al-Shayef
of Dhu Husayn. Although only representing 2 per cent of the entire population, their influence in the
country is palpable (Fattah, 2011, p.83). The role of Saudi Arabia in Yemen has always been ground for
speculation. Pragmatics seem to prevail over ideology, letting the Kingdom change support according
to the current political circumstances in order to bind as many resources of Yemen in its internal
struggles as possible. The founder of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz Al-Saud, is said to have croaked on
his deathbed "never let Yemen be united" (Clark, 2010, p.133).
43Knight refers to a classified document of US-Security circles that states the contract existed in
written form since 1978, in the foremath of Salih’s ascendency to power.
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networks are included according to that reading. First, Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar,
Skeikh of Sheiks of the Hashid confederation, General Ali Mohsen al-Qadhi al-Ahmar,
commander of Yemen’s armed forces, and finally, Ali Abd’allah Saleh, who was, just
as Mohsen, member of the Sanhan tribe.
The Opposition inside and outside the Legal Framework
In the 2000s, the regime had to deal with major political conflicts that turned violent,
namely the Huthi insurrection, the reawakened secession movement of the south since
2007, and the emergence of radical Jihadi groups that linked themselves to Al-Qa’ida,
especially since 2009.
The Huthi conflict received a military dimension when the regime charged and ulti-
mately killed former MP of the Truth Party Badr Din al-Houthi, in 2004. The Huthi
Family, foremost Imam Hussein Badreddin Al-Houthi, were advocating a Zaidi style
of government with a more important role of the Zaidi ’Ulama. Zaidi Imams played
an important role before the establishment of the YAR in 1962 and lost their influ-
ence to tribal associations that fought on the side of the republicans (Yadav, 2013,
p.270). Consequently, the feeling of deprivation from power was, also due to the fact
that the lion’s share of the tribes in the north-western province of Sa’ada and the city
al-Huth stood outside the patronage networks of the state, in particular as they are
neither Hashidi nor Bakili (Dresch, 1990, p.23). The beginnings of "Ansar Allah", a
religious-political group that built the nucleus of the Huthi movement can be dated
back to the mid-1980s when a group of Zaidi youths formed an intellectual group to
address and encounter the perceived injustices against their sect. Many Zaidi teachings
were not allowed to be taught in public and a ban was imposed on printing its books
(Eissa, 2013, p.45). After the death of Badr Din al-Houthi, his brothers fought an
eight year lasting campaign against the government. By 2009, the conflict occupied
ten Yemeni Army brigades, hence involving around half of the de facto active brigades
in the Yemeni military (Knights, 2013, p.270).
In a similar vein of deprivation from remittances transferring networks, the southern
movement (Hirak al-Djanubi shortly: Hirak) mobilised in 2005 against the slow pace
of reconstruction of many areas hit by the 1994 war (Yadav, 2013, p.272), as well as
against discrimination when searching jobs in public service, the Army, or the oil sec-
tor. The secession movement never completely ceased to exist after the war, and the
movement faced a harassing government on the one hand, and the violence of southern
Yemeni Al-Qa’ida returnees, who dreamt of purging the corridors of power from the
detested YSP Marxists, who were still in control of many local administrations on the
other (Clark, 2010, pp.149-162). The fact that the regime had turned a blind eye on
the Jihadis in the south turned to be problematic for Saleh when Jihadis of the "second
generation" - who were more radical and also targeted westerners and US-Americans -
6.9. YEMEN (0) 245
gained attention of the United States. In the wake of the US-American "war on terror",
Saleh had to mime a convincing fight against the radical Afghanistan veterans for the
sake of not repelling an important international partner, without repelling some of his
domestic allies that showed sympathy for the Jihadi cause in the south.
A further decisive element to understand the situation in the wake and before the
protests of 2011 is the country’s parlamentary opposition dynamics. The Saleh-regime
was challenged by a cross-ideological alliance of officially registered opposition par-
ties named Joint Meeting Parties Yemen (JMP). The alliance consisted of the Islah
Party, the YSP, Zaidist currents such as the Truth Party (Hizb al-Haqq), as well as
left-nationalist parties as the Nasserist Unionist People’s Organisation Yemen (NUPO)
(al-Tanzim al-Wahdawi al-Shaa’bi al-Nasiri). The Islah Party emerged as a new plat-
form for more religious GPC members and managed to marginalise the YSP after
1990 (Durac, 2011, p.352). Despite the deep-rooted ideological differences between
Marxist and Zaidi inclinations, the cooperation grew more professional and effective
since 2002.(Heibach and Transfeld, 2017)44 In the years before the uprisings of 2011,
the Salafi as well as the tribal wing of Islah became more Saleh critical and engaged
in the alliance. The JMP transformed from a issue-based coalition, foremost strug-
gling for reform of the electoral law, to a better coordinated organisation with a more
comprehensive programme (Heibach and Transfeld, 2017, p.602).
6.9.2 Trade Unions: Flashing up but Never Catching Fire
The 1956 established Aden Trade Union Congress Yemen (ATUC) was the first trade
union centre of the country and played an important role in the struggle for inde-
pendence from the British rule. After the revolution of 1962 in northern Yemen, the
movement initially aimed at unification. Abdullah al-Asnaj, chairman of the Socialist
People’s Party and president of the ATUC, declared in front of workers in Aden: "I am
a Yemeni deep down and we did not have the desire to fall under the rule of the Imam.
Now that the Yemen Arab Republic has been declared, we feel that we are one people,
and Sanaa is our capital, and Aden is our main port" (Dabuan, 2012). Early unifica-
tion failed and the trade union organisations of the south became an integral part of
the YSP’s mass organisations. Simultaneously, in the north, twelve unions formed the
General Confederation of Workers’ Trade Unions. on July 17, 1965, having its nuclei in
Taiz, Hodeidah, Mukha, Sana’a, and Al-Rahda (Al-Sama’i, 2019b). After the coup of
1967, the new authorities raided the headquarters of the union, seized all its contents,
and arrested most of its leadership. In the decades to follow, the union struggled with
the regime for the right to organise and self-determination. The 1980s witnessed a
significant decline in the activity of public trade union organisations, many of which
44The roots of the JMP go back to the late 1990s, however cooperation with the influential Islah
was expanded in 2002 when Jarallah ’Umar, the deputy secretary-general of the YSP and the most
important bridge builder between Islah and other opposition parties, had been shot after having
delivered a speech to Islah’s annual congress (Heibach and Transfeld, 2017, p.603).
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turned to clandestine action due to the intensification of authoritarian repression. At
the same time, the regime supported its own trade union networks that would oust
the independent unionists and suppress any attempt to form independent, leftist-style
unions.45 In April 1984, the independent workers’ union in the north was put com-
pletely under the influence of the regime.
With the unification of north and south, trade union structures were planned to be
merged to form the Yemeni Workers Trade Union Federation (YWTUF)46, however,
like in many other fields in the country meant to be unified, differences persisted. The
more militant and privileged trade unionists of the south did not want to lose their
influential positions and also protested against the extension of Islamic law (Schnabel,
2005, p.395).
Unions since the 1990s: Locally Restrained and Lacking National Unity
The weakening of trade union organisations in Yemen since the mid-1990s can be at-
tributed to different reasons: The regime’s strategy to completely control the official
trade union framework, the defeat of the YSP in 1994 with NGOs and the Islah party
filling the void it left. Additionally, serious trade union activities were restricted to the
industrial urban centres of Aden, Ta’iz, and Al-Hodeida.
Trade unions in the south, still serving as the power base for the YSP after unification,
remained first basically autonomous and organisationally resistant to interacting with
new authorities, similar to tribal militias loyal to Saleh and al-Ahmar in the north
(Blumi, 2009, p.9). Between 1991 and 1993, independent trade union structures expe-
rienced a revival in their traditional strongholds Ta’iz and Al-Hodeidah where the first
coordinating council for the union work was founded and headed by Ali Mohammed
Al-Misni, the head of the workers’ union in Ta’iz.47 The council was loosely affiliated
with the YWTUF branch in Aden, attempted to set up nationwide networks, and co-
ordinated and organised several strikes in the pre-1994-war period.
After the defeat of the secessionist movement in 1994, the political and financial fold
of the YSP led to a decline of such networks (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2009, p.13). At
the same time, the government in Sana’a had adopted the same strategy it used to
bring the former trade union federation of the north under its control: Harassment,
45An example of this suppression is the crash of the "Al-Seigel" union. It was was formed by Abdullah
al-Seigal Hodeidah as a "leftist intellectual" and influenced by Abdullah Bazib during the latter’s visit
to Al-Hodeidah. The union included port, electricity, and mill workers (Al-Sama’i, 2019b).
46The national federation is labelled differently in literature, such as General Union of Yemen Work-
ers (GUYW), Yemen Trade Union Confederation (YTUC), or General Federation of Yemeni Workers
(GFYU). The original is Al-Ittihad al-’Aam al-Naqabat al-’Umal al-Yamani and the abbreviation
YWTUF is taken from the federation’s own current (2019) Facebook page.
47The council included several unions, foremost consisting of oil workers, transport workers, elec-
tricity workers, municipal workers, workers and employees of the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, and water corporation employees. Within this structure, also professional unions grew
strong, particularly the Medical Professionals Union, the Educational Professions Union, Engineers
Union, and the Doctors and Pharmacists Union (Al-Sama’i, 2019c).
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interference in staffing policies, strict centralisation48, and, by that way, the purge of
trade union ranks from progressive forces. Official unions became state institutions
and were often chaired by members of the ruling GPC (Yadav, 2013, p.106).
In the wake, trade unionism as a mass mobilising phenomenon muted, and many smaller
trade unions disintegrated and gave way for a generation of NGOs with a broader
agenda than classical trade unionism. By fact, the 1990s witnessed a boom in new
civil society organisations due to a newly relaxed and more pluralist legislation and
political climate. Also the influx of remittances of international donors made the sec-
tor grow fast (Elayah and Verkoren, 2019, p.9). As the grip of the state on the NGO
sector was far less tight than the grip on trade unions, many activists who formerly
supported trade unionism made an evasive manoeuvre into the NGO sector. This,
consequently, led to official trade union institutions that were more loyal to the regime,
less militant, and also less powerful in key sectors of the economy.
Professional Associations between Activity and Split
While this strategy helped the regime to disperse the worker’s union or take control
of its remainders, especially after a tightening of legislation concerning trade unions in
2002, white collar associations where more difficult to control. The Journalists Union
and the Bar Association soon came to terms with the new emerging NGOs, and cooper-
ated in particular in the field of human rights. Both organisations managed to preserve
an intact nationwide basis. Especially the Journalists Union constantly protested the
violation of the freedom of press and harassment of journalists and also threatened to
strike against corruption.
Other projects of cooperation were, if at all, locally restricted. For instants, a coor-
dination council named metin (Arab word for "abstract body") emerged first in 2005
for the coordination of trade unions and civil society organisations led by Ali Mohsen
al-Dumaini, and Abdul Jalil Mohammed Othman Zureiqi from competing unions of
the health sector. Metin managed to attract a number of other unions49 and operated
mostly in the region of Ta’iz (Al-Sama’i, 2019c).
The coordination efforts in Ta’iz where, however, an exception in a union landscape
that was deteriorating and also increasingly split. While the YSP struggled financially
and could not uphold its networks, the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated Islah Party - even
having an own department for labour union affairs - filled that gap. They focussed,
48The labour law of 1995 repealed the monopoly of the YWTUF which was reintroduced in the
labour law of 2002, stipulating that the YWTUF was the sole federation of federations. No alternative
organisation has been formed (Schnabel, 2005, p.395) and no nationwide conference has been held
since (Al-Sama’i, 2019c).
49Most of its members were branches of professional white-collar unions such as the Physicians and
Pharmacists Union, the Medical Professionals Union, the Educational Professions Union, the Union
of workers of the power plant Asifra, the Yemeni Bar Association, the Yemeni Teachers Union, or the
Yemeni Engineers Union. Other groups included the Yemen Women’s Union, the Yemeni Students
Union (Ta’iz University), and the Yemen Youth Union. The Carpenters Association joined in 2014.
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similar to the Islamic Action Party in Jordan, on white collar associations. The small
remainders of progressive and independent forces inside the trade union movement were
now, additionally to the harassment by the regime, riddled by ideological disparities.
In the health sector, the Union of Physicians and Pharmacists broke into the Medical
Professionals Union, the Diagnostic Medicine Union, and the Laboratories Union. The
same happened in the education sector where the the Educational Professions Union,
the Teachers Union and the Educational Professions Union were active (Al-Sama’i,
2019c).
As a consequence, trade union activities became more sparse and also more particular-
istic, focussing on local agendas rather than a national vision. Outside the strongholds
of Ta’iz and Al-Hodeida, unions mostly became visible only when they jumped on the
bandwagon of - or were co-opted by - other political players. When in Amran in 2007
ten thousand members of the Hashid confederation demanded governmental reform,
trade unions foremost of the medical and the educational sector joined the protests.
A Marginalised Role in a Tribal Rentier System
The branches in which activists critical of the regime were still organised did barely
affect the economic performance of the country which was heavily dependent on foreign
remittances and transfer payments of Yemeni guest workers abroad (Colton, 2010).
Apart from that, natural resources contributed 22 per cent to the GDP in 2010, and
crude oil and gold were the most important export goods accounting for more than 70
per cent of all exports. Government revenues stemmed about 70 per cent from the oil
industry. Agriculture and its downstream industries were the main source of income
of the population (about 70 per cent), employing more than half (54 per cent) of the
labour force (The World Bank, 2015, p.77).
The movements’ overall bargaining power and militancy has to be assessed as weak
regarding the entire case. Oil production is barely touched by trade unionists, which
might be due to the remoteness of the aforementioned industrial centres in which trade
union were active. The Yemeni oil fields and production facilities were almost all
located in the rather rural Shabwa, Masila, and Jeza basins in the centre and east
of the country. Besides, the Oil production in Yemen did not account for more than
20,000 employees.
Among the professional white collar organisations, the teacher’s unions managed to
push successfully for a wage increase fixed by Law No.43/2006 which also included a
stepwise salary increase in the following years. Other professional associations, riddled
with splits caused by aforementioned government policies jamming wedges into the
movement, did barely engage in strikes or could force the state into concessions. Due to
their geographical fragmentation and weakness, the few existing trade union initiatives
could not unfold power on the national level. It was furthermore the tight grip of the
state on the official trade union framework, a lack of nationwide solidarity as well as
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internal, historical, ideological, and geographical division that decreased the movements
bargaining power. In the words of (Blumi, 2009, p.22-23):
[...] the plethora of union workers, urban poor and rural voiceless have not been
institutionally or organizationally incorporated; rather they have been left stuck
addressing parochial concerns and often to the state through an intermediary.
In other words, there has been no nation-wide effort to consolidate the politi-
cal forces of society. In many ways, Yemen has remained largely a fragmented
country [...].
The case of Yemen is therefore coded KEYS = (0).
6.9.3 2011: Saleh losing the Youth, the Tribes, the Parties,
and the Clergy
By end of 2010, nerves were already on edge in Yemen. Government employees
protested against wages that had been frozen since 2005, poverty and mismanagement
became more openly addressed, and the authoritarian nature of the regime got under
attack. Disputes escalated also between Marib Refineries Company and its workers
because of workers’ demands to improve their living conditions. Their strikes in Octo-
ber 2010 were put down violently. Young activists in the south, together with some of
the old YSP cadres mobilised and uttered discontent with what they perceived as the
exploitation of the south by the Saleh regime, especially regarding the oil wealth. Also
the imposition of northern "style of life" including Islamic law and tribal customs were
addressed, and by 2010 protests in the south were widespread (Dahlgren, 2010). The
discontent was also an outgrowth of a socio-economic deterioration of living conditions
the country had witnessed for at least two decades (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, p.899).
Consequently, concerning the variable SOEC, the country is the most clear case of the
sample. Since 2000, both, inflation and total unemployment rose constantly, and the
burden of health expenditure out of pocket was the highest in the entire sample. Also
indicators for poverty and transparency are among the lowest in the sample (see table
A.1 in the appendix). These features were openly addressed by the early risers of the
protests and formed the initial incentives for many protesters. The case of Yemen will
be coded SOEC = (1).
Early Protests, high Expectations
Yemen witnessed first mass demonstrations in January 2011 when the GPC-dominated
parliament agreed to constitutional reforms that would allow President Saleh to can-
didate for a further term. Against that background, and spurred by the events in
Tunisia, mobilisation of protesters in 2011 began comparatively early, cumulating in a
first Day of Rage already on February 3, 2011. While the JMP was eager to accept
concessions made by Saleh the day before (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, p.907), about
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20,000 joined a demonstration in Sana’a and several thousands protested across the
country, most palpably in Ta’iz, as well as in many cities in the south. While in the
rallies in the capital remained peaceful, security forces resorted to tear gas to disperse
a gathering in the port city of Aden (Ghobari and Abdullah, 2011). The protests
were mainly announced, organised, and supported by online-activists and university
students. Many youth groups formed these days, such as the February 3 Revolutionary
Youth Movement in Yemen or The Peaceful Yemeni Youth Movement.
February 11, when the fall of Husni Mubarak in Egypt became public, was another cat-
alyst for anti-government resentments. Slogans included "long live the Egyptian people"
and "revolution until victory", as well as "Yesterday Tunisia, today Egypt, tomorrow
Yemen," and "Revolution, oh Yemen, from Sana’a to Aden". Aware of its symbolic
importance, security forces and pro-government supporters occupied the Tahrir Square
in Sana’a. As a reaction, the demonstrators took the University Square50, labelled it
"Taghayr-Square" (Square of Change), and turned it into a place for events like political
festivities, songs, stage plays, poems, exhibitions and dance (Fattah, 2011, p.81). After
clashes with opponents and security forces, the willingness to proceed with the protests
grew even stronger, spreading a spirit of resistance and defiance. Hashem al-Abara,
figure of the February 3 Revolutionary Youth Movement clearly stated: "If the protests
in Egypt continued for 18 days, we are not worried to carry on for a month, or two, or
three" (Al-Watan Oman 12.02.2011).
The next juncture in the sequence of events took place of February 18, when the regime
decided to intervene violently and sent security forces accompanied by roof snipers to
disperse the protest, causing 52 death and several injured. Additionally to the national
outcry from many political sides and regions in the country, the action turned to be a
boomerang for the regime, as the influential member of the triumvirate, and iron fist
of the regime, General Abdullah Muhsin, defected in its aftermath. He turned against
the regime, dispatched military staff and tanks to protect the protesters. On February
25, the day on which many Arab countries witnessed large-scale protests, also in many
Yemenis took the streets. About 20,000 people gathered outside Sana’a University
campus, and about 50,000 took the Tahrir Square in the city center. They shouted
"no dialogue until the fall of the regime!" and "the beginning of the end of the regime",
adhering to the credo of the day which was "the day of the launching" (yaum al-itlaq
(Al-Watan Oman, 2011)). In Aden, several thousands protested against regime vio-
lence, stating "we promise, we promise to the martyrs" and towards the regime "death
and disgrace51 to the cowards". The protest in the capital also comprised a prayer
50To avoid misunderstandings it should be noticed that University Square was not a square that
clearly belongs to a campus of any university. It is a public crossroads in Sana’a where the "Justice
Road" (Shara’ al-’Adal) meets the Ring road. The closest university building is the Computer and
Information Technology College, which is about five minutes by foot away.
51Disgrace is maybe the best translation for the traditional term "’ayb", meaning the loss of honour
(sharaf) of a tribesman. A tribesman can commit an ’ayb by acting in a way demeaning to himself-for
example, by killing a woman or person of inferior standing to his own, or, on the contrary, he can
have an ’ayb inflicted upon him.
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ceremony and preach led by Sheikh ’Abdallah Sa’atar, a leading figure of the Islah
Party, and a prominent chairman of several charity organisations, who stressed the
importance of sticking to the demand of regime change. Also in Ta’iz and Hadramaut
tens of thousands protested.
Three Opposition Camps Riddled with Mutal Mistrust
In the aftermath of these events, Ali Abdullah Saleh ran out of allies. His attempts
in order to contain the protests by offering his retreat in 2013 (which he would have
been obliged to do according to the 2001 constitution anyway), or the offer to set up
a coalition government with the opposition parties were rather perceived as deriding
or blunt attempts to buy time. He experienced a huge setback, when the National
Solidarity Council (NSC), which was founded as first organisation of its kind in order
to coordinate tribal action in 2007, sided with the protesters. Already one day before
February 25 the Al-Hashid dominated NSC signalled clear support for the protesters
in an announcement showing solidarity with the "Yemeni people that is desirous for
reform and change", mentioning explicitly the "Taghyr Square" in front of the Univer-
sity, meanwhile NSC chairman Hussein Al-Ahmar clearly stated addressing the regime
(Tariq Al-Sha’ab, 2011b)
I assure support by the tribes of Yemen for change, and their succour for the
peaceful popular revolution demanding the fall of the regime that broke out in
multiple governorates of the republic. And I assure the capacities of the tribes to
protect the peaceful demonstrators against those who depict them as "thieves"
of state power.
The second member of the triumvirate, Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar had shown grow-
ing discontent with Saleh already in the past years. He blamed him for "wrong headed
policies" and contributing to "Yemen’s myriad problems". The tribal leader had shown
signs of preparing for a post-Saleh era before (Carapico, 2011). Hence, given the shak-
ing balance of power, it was also only consequent for him to side with the protesters. A
further pillar of Saleh’s rule fell when Abdul Majeed al-Zindani, a senior leader of Islah,
the head of Yemen’s largest association of Sunni clerics, and a historical supporter of
Saleh held a speech in front of the young protesters close to the University. He clearly
stated (Filkins, 2011):
Our Prophet predicted that, one day, a ruler will oppress his people, and the
people will take the power from him. We are now living with a leader who rules
by force, and we need to get him out. After we get rid of this oppressor, there
will be justice — and the caliphate!52
52The stance of the Islah party was, although often misunderstood by Western observers, by no
means also the stance of the clergy of the country. In a conference of the Association of Yemeni Ulemas
(Jam‘iyya ‘ulama al-Yaman) initiated by Saleh in September 2011, a final statement declared that the
demonstrators were aggressors who were obliged to repent. Salafis from the self-declared apolitical
current founded by Muqbil al-Wadi’i and connected to Saudi religious networks also confirmed the
illegitimacy of the protest (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, p.907)
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After this incident, three main camps could be identified among the protesters
(Fattah, 2011, p.82). First, a large peaceful youth movement inspired by the Arab
Spring. Most of them stemmed originally from the central and southern governorates,
displaying a higher level of education and political awareness than most citizens in
the rest of the country. Although sharing some common goals, they had discrepancies
with parts of the second group - the official opposition parties - and foremost with
the conservative religious elements of Islah. After Zindani’s speech, youth at Sana’a
University started to chant "No GPC, No Islah". An increasing number of students from
al-Iman University (headed by Zindani) joined the protests, stressing the importance
of religious behaviour and demanding, for instance, segregation of men and women.
The secularists of the movement saw the situation get out of their hands.
The third group, the tribal organisations, proved to be the most powerful in terms
of mobilisation potential and finance, especially in the rural areas and small towns of
the country. Most important, by turning their back to Saleh, also vast parts of the
Army defected, as the military was a means of patronage and thus composed mainly of
tribesmen from the northern highlands (Dresch, 1990; Fattah, 2011, p.23). Meanwhile,
the Huthis also resorted to their ability to mobilise and organised rallies in Sa’ada
(Socialist Net, 2011b). Saleh was left alone. Neither his announcement of 50,000 new,
civil service jobs nor his suggestion for elections monitored by international observers
could change the stance of his former allies nor the youth movement (Carapico, 2011).
The Treaty of Riadh and the Institutional Revolution
The agreement signed by Ali Abdullah Saleh in September gave the conflict, which had
turned violent in many areas, including fighting between tribal militias and loyalist of
the regime, another dimension. Dissatisfied with the outcome, and especially with
the complete immunity the treaty of Riadh would grant the President, and claiming to
"save the revolution", the actions of civil society and especially of the youth movements
entered a new phase which was labelled the revolution of the institutions (thawra al-
muassassat).
A first and decisive step was undertaken by the union of Yemeni Airlines which managed
to overthrow its Chairman Abdul Khaleq Al-Qadi who was President Saleh’s son-in-
law. This opened the way for a wide range of collective actions in military and public
institutions (Abdulla, 2011), including the Department of Political and Moral Guid-
ance of the Ministry of Defence where eventually Brigadier Ali Hassan Al-Shater was
replaced due to internal pressure of the employees.53 All over the southern provinces
and also in al-Hodeidah and Ta’iz high ranking officials who had been placed strategi-
cally by Saleh - or who stood too close to the regime in the eyes of the protesters - were
prompted to leave office. These collective actions benefited betimes from old, atro-
53For a valuable and more comprehensive overview of the dismissals that followed inside the military
and bureaucracy see Gordon (2012).
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phied trade union networks, however, they were mostly ad-hoc endeavours, especially
as the Trade Union law of 2002 excluded members of the armed and security forces
and employees at the level of higher authorities and ministries (Art.4) from forming
unions. There is even no evidence that these actions came along with calls for the right
to organise in general. Hence, in many cases trade union measures like enterprise or
institution connected demands, or work stoppage, were used while trade union struc-
tures as such did not play a major role.
This phenomenon is foremost due to the nature of the protest that emerged especially
after September 2011. The different currents of the revolution, as described above,
did not oppose and block each other only but also cross-fertilised and produced a new
understanding of protest inside the entire opposition camp. The "new language" of
the youth movements which was coined by peaceful action, consultation, and intense
networking, soon spilled over to many other fractions of the opposition and reached out
for many parts of the country (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012). Abdallah (2012) cites an
interviewee from the youth movements, stating that the agreement of Riadh sparked
a state of discontent among many Yemenis workers in government institutions, who,
eventually, transferred the revolution from the street to the institutions. Indeed, the
organisation of strikes and blockades but also the stigmatisation of employees linked to
the regime in administrations or in public companies, such as the airline Yemenia, were
largely inspired by the culture and forms of mobilizations developed on the Taghayr
Square, on which several workshops on civil disobedience and industrial action had
been held (Bonnefoy and Poirier, 2012, 911).
6.9.4 Worker’s Action Without Systematic Trade Unionism
Against that background, commercial stoppage, say, strike, became a widespread means
of protest. On the 17th anniversary of the begin of the war of 1994, April 27, all shops
and government offices were closed in Aden and protesters blocked the main roads.
Also Ta’iz witnessed strikes on a regular basis; about half of the stores remained closed
in April. In Ibb, Mukalla, Ataq and Beidha commercial life was disrupted in protests
on Wednesdays and Saturdays for a few hours in the morning. In Sana’a, still one
of the most outspoken pro-Saleh areas of the country, general strikes were difficult to
organise, however (Kasinov, 2011). Such collective action can, if it occurred, barely
be attributed to trade union activity, especially as about 72 per cent of all Yemeni
employees were self employed, running small stalls or shops. Furthermore, as outlined
in section 6.9.2, trade unionism had lost its sexyness concerning political activism.
On September 9 2011, the local branch of the YWTUF in Aden signalled support for
the revolution of institutions. The branch announced that it affirmed its support for
the youth revolution "in order to reformulate the modern Yemeni state with all its hu-
man, democratic, political and social values in which justice and fairness crystallise and
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the power of the people prevail" (Mareb Press, 2011b), and called on all professional
and geographic trade union bodies in all governorates of the Republic to reappraise the
trade union leaders who had "abused trade union work, froze its activities, and dwin-
dled the rights of workers". This move, however, should not be read as a progressive
step of a progressive union branch pushing for the revolution of institutions, but rather
as an outcome of the latter, especially given the lack of presence of the branch in the
course of the protests.
Other YWTUF branches seemed also to remain silent. The few statements that exist
from the YWTUF headquarters in Sana’a do not aim at changing the logic of power
inside the country and stuck for a long time to rhetoric of unity that had been used
by the regime. On June 3, 2011, the federation condemned the attack on Saleh in a
noticeable harsh tone. The federation pointed at a "terrorist minority that deprived our
people of the blessing of unity, [that was achieved] twenty eight years after the era of
the immortal revolution of September and October", however, also speaking about the
"legitimate demands of the independent and conscious Yemeni youth" (YWTUF, 2011).
Professional Associations between Human Rights and Struggle for Benefits
After the protests gained mass and momentum, also some professional white-collar
associations started to become active, whereas much of its struggle focussed on the
harassment of the free press and human rights issues. Consequently, the Journalists
Union, which had come into rows with the Saleh regime already in the years and
decades before the uprising of 2011, acted most progressively. Led by famous opposi-
tion leader Abdul-Bari Taher, the union demanded the fall of the regime in an early
stage, called the killings of the regime a "stigma on the forehead of the regime", and
sided with the "young people who, through its blessed uprising, decided to put the last
chapter of tyranny in Yemen" (Socialist Net, 2011a). The Journalists Union, albeit not
exceeding a membership of a about two thousand countrywide, organised and led rallies
in order to address harassment of Journalists and violations of freedom of press, and
its members, consequently, increasingly suffered continuous repression by authorities.
In a similar vein, the Bar Association condemned violence, and organised protests and
events that broached the issue of human right violations. Also the Yemeni Doctors and
Pharmacists Union - especially after killings of civilians by security forces became pub-
lic, or when the Army later looted hospitals and used them as military command posts
- condemned violence, or in exceptional cases like in Ta’iz, sided with the protesters.
They had also, together with the Bar Association and 23 other civil society organi-
sations, signed the a statement already on February 23 2011 against the brutality on
the Taghayr square (YCHR, 2011). Although in some cases these organisations joined
anti-regime protests like the Bar association on February 23 2011 in Hodeidah (Al-
Jazeera Studies, 2011), the overall attitude was not focussed on regime change. They
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also lacked a coherent vision on how to change the institutional equilibrium apart from
a higher protection of human rights, and did not visibly appear as change agents during
the critical juncture.
Another leading professional white-collar association was the teacher’s union which
called for a nationwide strike on February 23 where eventually ten thousand employees
stopped working and engaged in sit-ins. In the capital Sana’a, however, their demands
widely remained socio-economic. They included the implementation of the increase of
wages and salaries according to Law No.43/2006 and salary adjustments for all work-
ers in the sector also in remote areas of the country (Mareb Press, 2011a). Again,
even when in some towns the teacher’s protest turned into a clear confrontation of the
regime, like in Beidaa’ where chants like "sit-in sit-in ... until the regime falls" were
sung (Al-Tawil, 2011), the powerful teachers’ unions did not become a significant agent
for change.
The Particular Difficulties in Assessing the case of Yemen
If a tree falls in the forest and no one is there, does it still make a sound? This question
is the start of some highly abstract and theoretical discussions and can also be used
for the trade union movement in Yemen, albeit in a different fashion. If a tree falls in
the forest and no one hears or sees it, did it really fall down? And if it did, does it
really matter, if no one realised it?
The last sections have focussed on some mechanisms, results, and actions concerning
trade unions in Yemen, however, the most striking argument for the weakness of trade
unions in Yemen is maybe also the weakest argument itself: A lack of report of trade
union activities. Indeed, the relevant academic literature, as well as the grey litera-
ture of magazines and newspapers, online and offline, did barely mention trade union
activities as decisive element of the Yemeni upheavals. They were mostly preoccupied
to give a sound picture of what is actually going on in a country that is historically,
ideologically, and geographically split, and in which a diverse number of tribal associa-
tions, NGOs, parties, local networks, and religious groups muscle in the political arena
on different levels. Inside this Yemeni babble of voices, trade unions did not strike
the right notes and were apparently not loud enough to be heard and understood as a
decisive part of the revolutionary ensemble.
The question remains, coming back to the allegory of the tree in the forest, whether
the fact that no one really reported about regime critical trade unionism in Yemen is
enough to state that it did not really happen.
Given that in 2010 there were 29 trade unions (also including professional white-collar
associations) registered in Yemen according to the National Information Center, and
Al-Sama’i (2019c) counts over four thousand councils in the country, it is bewildering
that these institutions did not play a more visible role during the uprisings. Obvi-
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ously they lacked the strength, infrastructure, members, or willingness to do so. Also
the impression that actions of professional associations lacked continuity, coordination,
and an overall goal, runs like a red thread through Yemen’s critical juncture. Classical
trade union activities like demands concerning management of enterprises and insti-
tutions or work stoppage were used frequently during the critical juncture. Different
from Jordan, where independent trade unionism altered the landscape of civil society,
and new emerging unions set up structures and fought for official recognition, it seems
that the collective actions of the institutional revolution in Yemen consisted of ad-hoc
endeavours of workers without aiming at a sustainable and long lasting independent
infrastructure. The trade union resources and activists had, as described in part 6.9.2,
diffused into a network of NGO’s, albeit losing its unique scope of worker’s represen-
tation, or they had just been co-opted by the official trade union framework of the
YWTUF.
True, Al-Sama’i (2019a) reports from a newly established coordinating council for pri-
vate sector workers and self-employed workers in Ta’iz in 201254. But although he gives
valuable information about the very existing of embryonic trade union structures, he
omits the degree of militancy and the impact these structures had during the critical
juncture, and eventually states with a latent tone of disappointment that "[...] the
February 11 revolution removed the objective obstacle and opened the door wide for
the trade union movement to regain its roles and reorganise its ranks, independently
and free, but none of this was achieved".
The outcome for Yemen is hence coded (0). Furthermore, among those workers’ net-
works that did not diffuse beyond recognition into NGO’s and hence lost their insti-
tutional fingerprint as trade unions, the majority was state controlled in 2011. The
YSP, a traditional political partner of trade unions, had lost its influence already at
the end of the 1990s, and the Islah party managed to get its foot into the door of some
professional associations, however, this did never happen to an extent as witnessed in
Jordan or Bahrain. Following that reasoning, the variables INOPP and CEN are set
to (0) and (1) respectively.
6.10 Bahrain (1)
Bahrain has witnessed major upheavals in 2011 which aimed at curtailing the rule of
the Al-Khalifa family to different extents. The official trade union federation supported
a camp of moderate dialogueists and actively attempted to influence the stance of the
regime by threatening and conducting general strikes. In contrast to Yemen, trade
union institutions played a major role during the upheavals of 2011. Bahrain as a case
54The founding members of the council were amongst others the Sponge & Plastic Factory Workers
Union, the Ghee & Soap Factory Workers Union, the Workers Union of Miscellaneous Companies,
the Al-Jund Workers Union, the Union workers Red Sea Company (Hashidi), Hazza Taha Workers
Union, and the Workers union Abdul Jalil Radman. In total it claimed to represent 14,000 workers
in 12 trade unions.
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is coded (1) according to the QCA outcome dichotomisation.
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
0 1 1 1 0 1 BAH(14)
Table 6.12: Truth table row for the case of Bahrain
The traditional tribal element which legitimised the rule of the Al-Khalifa family as
will be outlined in section 6.10.1 had been a contentious issue and historically attracted
criticism from leftists and religious activists inside the country. The variable TRI is
therefore coded (1). The structure of the General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions
(GFBTU) which emerged out of centralised Joint-Management Committee system as
will be outlined in part 6.10.3, became a highly centralised union federation after 2002.
The variable CEN is therefore coded (1). This federation had, as shown in part 6.10.5,
due to legal restrictions and organisational inexperience, no tangible bargaining power
in the country’s key sectors. Consequently, KEYS is coded (0). Still, strong party-union
coordination could be witnessed, especially between the GFBTU bodies and the reform
oriented bloc led by the Al-Wefaq party. As will be argued in part 6.10.7, the GFBTU
joined the moderate opposition camp of the sevenfold Dialogueists, used the threat of
a general strike to move the government to make concessions, provided legal assistance
for dismissed workers, and never took the stance of the radical or theocracy oriented
camp. The politicisation of the union body had already begun in the years before the
2011 uprising, and it was spurred and fostered by political forces from the ideological
orbit of Al-Wefaq. This circumstance was taken as a justification by the government to
implement and support a second trade union federation to counterbalance and contain
the power of the GFBTU from March 2011 onwards. The case of Bahrain is therefore
coded INOPP = (1).
6.10.1 The Equilibrium between the Tribalism and Sectarian-
ism
Bahrain shows clear pattern of tribalism that penetrates society, forms part of the
national narrative, and constitutes a pillar of the legitimacy inside the institutional
equilibrium. This kind of tribalism is a form of organisation and decision making as
well as a form of inclusion and exclusion into circles that have access to power. Different
from Algeria and Tunisia, where upward mobility is possible to a certain extent without
the recurring on family bonds, the ’Al-Khalifa network seemed rather hermetical which
is also due to a instrumentalisation of the sectarian Sunni-Shi’i cleavage as technique
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of power. Harik (1990, p.6;13) labels the country traditional secular system in which
tradition is pre-eminent and decision making processes heavily rely on kinship.
Heterogeneous Tribalism and the Al-Khalifa Family
In 1783 Ahmed bin Muhammad bin Khalifa became Hakim of Bahrain, breaking the
influence of the Persian Empire whose protection the local elite had searched after hav-
ing expelled the Portuguese in 1602. After Bahrain’s independence in 1971 the title of
the ruler was changed to Amir, held by Al-Khalifa family members until today. The
Al-Khalifa family belongs to the same clan as the As-Sabah, the nomadic ’Utub, and
are thus a part of the Annizah. The ’Utub were at no good terms with the Wahabis
who clashed several times with the tribe, and eventually forced them to settle almost
completely in Bahrain.
The tribes that were formally in power back the days, and that were ousted by the
Al-Khalifa clan were foremost Sunni and followed the Shafi’i School of Law (Meinel,
2003, p.146). They tended to shy away from agricultural work55, engaged mostly in
trade, and can be subsumed under the term Huwala. The Huwala would form a diverse
yet politically active and educated middle class working in the private sector, the gov-
ernmental Administration, the oil company, and the educational field of the modern
state of Bahrain.56 Additionally, some Sunni dwellers followed the Hanbali School of
Law. The Al-Khalifa had until today trouble to bond and co-opt these parts of society
that bears some revolutionary potential (Lawson, 1989, p.3-4). Furthermore, a low
double-digit percentage number of merchants were Shi’i emigrants from Persia who
mingled with the Hawula in business and - to a lesser extend - in private affairs. The
populace that was engaged in agriculture and simple labour, and that labelled itself
Bahrana, belonged mostly to Shi’i tribes that, however, did not exceedingly bond with
the Persian merchant class. This Shi’i section is divided religiously as, for instance
some follow the Usuli while others the Akhbari legal tradition (Fearon and Laitin,
2005, p.2). Additionally, there were mostly Sunni individuals, that were not organised
in tribes and that were called Baiseri by the al-Khalifa clan and their tribal allies57.
The upper class around the Al-Khalifa, following the Al-Maliki School, labelled itself
Adjwad, say, pure (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.50;p.62 fn.33), in the tradition of Bedouin who
trace their ancestry to figures of the old testament.
Although the Al-Khalifa family showed some craftiness in surviving inside the net of
55Indeed, Bahrain was not only a center for commerce in the gulf, moreover, many water sources on
its terrain allowed for limited nonetheless notably agriculture. Due to a natural balance that causes a
horizontal barrier (barzakh), sweet fossil water can be found under a salty or brackish layer in wells and
even in coastal areas beneath the sea water. These two qualities of water form in the local vernacular
two kinds of seas which lead to the name Bahrain, the two seas (Cook, 2015, p.72)
56Famous Huwala Families are the Kanoo, the Fakhro, and the Shirawi who all run successful
business and/or have high positions in government (Gillespie, 2009, p.63)
57Allied with the Al-Khalifah and building the upper class are the following tribes: Al-Jalahima,
Al-Fadhl, Al-Bin Ali, Al-Mosalam, Al-Naime, Al-Sadah, Al-Rumahi, Al-Bu Aynain, Al-Manana, and
Sudan(Al-Rumaihi, 1973, p.50)
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interests of the great powers Oman, Persia, the Wahabis, the Ottoman Empire, and
Great Britain, family disputes were quite common and provided a fertile ground for
instability. This was amongst other things due to the lack of a fixed rule concerning
the line of throne succession - as it can be found, for instance, in Kuwait after Moham-
mad the Great. In 1869, Britain, fearing instability in the region, eventually tightened
the grip on Bahrain in the course of a inner-Khalifa crises and managed to install the
Britain-friendly 21-year-old Sheikh Sheikh Isa ibn Ali Al-Khalifa (Al-Rumaihi, 1973,
p.13).
The Historical Instability of a Riven Society
The complicated tribal, religious, and class structure was amended by different Pan-
Arab and Arab Nationalist movements when modern education led to a large educated
middle class. The country witnessed several attempts of reform by local grass root
movements between the 1930s and the 1960s, cumulating most palpably and visibly
in the protests and strikes 1954-1956 and 1965. In the former phase, the al-Ha’yah
organisation (National Union Committee Bahrain (NUC)) managed set up links be-
tween young nationalists, the Hawula, and the popular base in the country. Showing
the potential to paralyse the entire island by general strikes in 1954, and again in 1956,
the NUC demanded political representation, the codification of Bahraini law, the right
to form trade unions, and the implementation of a higher appeal court (Al-Rumaihi,
1973, p.367). Despite some concessions of the government, no path breaking reforms
were really implemented. This period of turmoil, that was mainly led by the middle
class, was followed by a turbulent year 1965, in which more violent and working-class
led political agitation took place.
The discontent about British influence in Bahrain, that already played an important
role in the upheavals 1954-1956, got pushed to a higher level in 1965. After mass dis-
missals from the Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), demonstrations of students
emerged, that were dispersed violently, and Ba’athists, Arab Nationalists, Communists
and other secular groups took also the streets and eventually joined forces to form an
underground organisation which became known as the National Front for Progressive
Force Bahrain (NFPF) (Al-Rumaihi, 1973, 384). The response of the ruling was harsh:
Great Britain sent troops to quell the protests, triggering critique from the local British
press. Bahrain was to become Britain’s main military harbour in the Gulf, so London
was very eager to achieve stability. However, in 1968 the British government announced
to close all bases east of the Suez Canal within three years and eventually withdrew
all military and political presence (Gillespie, 2009, p.49).
The state building process turned to be difficult in the first years after full indepen-
dence in 1971. Heterogeneous ideas of a heterogeneous society combined with the
unconditional will of the Al-Khalifa family to maintain power caused disruptions that
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remained under the surface of the country until 2011, breaking out every now and then
in the decades before. After the first five years began promising with the formation
of an elected National Assembly in 1972, and a constitution drafted and ratified in
1973, the country witnessed an autocratic setback. The 1973 parliament, uttering its
discontent with the security bill issued by the Amir, that would have given state au-
thorities the right to imprison any person on the ground of being a threat to national
security, as well as with the newly established naval base of the US-Navy in Bahrain,
was dissolved in 1975. Additionally Art.65, regulating new elections was suspended
until a new election law was issued. That way, the Amir could rule by decree, due to
his prominent role in the constitution. The 1973 constitution granted vast rights to
the Amir, stating in Art.32 that "Legislative power shall be vested in the Amir and the
National Assembly in accordance with the Constitution; and the Executive power shall
be vested in the Amir, the Cabinet and the Ministers. Judicial decrees shall be passed
in the name of the Amir, all in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution".
The Amir was immune and inviolable, appointed the Prime Minister and could release
him (Art. 33), and the Amir had the right to initiate laws and the sole right to ratify
and promulgate laws (Art.34). Isa ibn Salman al-Khalifa did not allow the Assembly
to meet again or hold elections until his death in 1999.
6.10.2 Shi’ism as Threat and as a Technique for Power Main-
tenance
The 1970s saw a growing influence of Shi’ite religious currents that had their roots in
the decades before. Initially meant as an interconfessional, religious movement against
the perceived leftist and nationalist mainstream, Shi’i influence grew steadily, got a
push with the revolution in Iran 1979, and appealed to many Bahrana. In 1981 the
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) was accused of having sought to
topple the ruling Al Khalifa and replace the tribal system with a religious theocracy
resembling the new system of Iran.
On the one hand, as Alhasan (2011) demonstrates convincingly, the IFLB had access to
Iranian support and recurred to a Shi’i rhetoric and base. The Shi’i consciousness had
grown significantly and had become a force that was able to challenge the Al-Khalifa
rule on sectarian grounds. Indeed, Shi’ism would still remain a powerful category to
mobilise the masses inside Bahrain and impact the political landscape. On the other
hand, as Meinel (2003) states, a tendency can be observed that the ruling family has
since been continuously working on letting appear any opposition against its own rule
as an exclusively Shi’ite issue. The spectrum of Iranian influence and Shi’ite fanati-
cism is easy to be used as a smokescreen to disguise what the Bahraini regime may be
afraid of the most: a universal and cross-sectarian call for cutbacks of the powers of
the family. This view was reinforced by the fact that among the many political and
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societal activists who were tortured to death, deported, or intimidated in the 1980s
and 1990s, there were disproportionally many Shi’ite activists, even when the protests
were jointly Shi’i and Sunni (Amnesty International, 1995; Fearon and Laitin, 2005).
Simultaneously, these narratives are used and embellished on the other side of the Gulf
by the Iranian government to fuel anti-Sunni and anti-Saudi resentments to consolidate
its own base of power. Hence, acknowledging Shi’ite identity and groups as playing
a prominent and significant role in the Bahraini institutional equilibrium, it has also
to be acknowledged the function of the Shi’a threat as a main pillar for justification
of repressive measures by the ruling family. Furthermore, the summoning of the Shi’a
threat rendered a broad coalition of those Sunni forces possible that were normally
fragmented, including the Hannbali elements of the populace, the Shafi’i Huwala, and
the Maliki Al-Khalifa clan and its tribal allies.
The vicious circle (Bayat, 2009, p.11) of exclusion due to mistrust, the feeling of de-
privation, and resistance provides the background for the emergence of unrest in the
1980s. Following the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon in 1982 several political mo-
tivated physical attacks took place that can be traced back to Shi’i groups. The aim to
overthrow the Al-Khalifa regime was uttered more visibly in clandestine media, fore-
most recurring on the fact that a tribal society would be un-Islamic, depicting Shi’ism
as democratic and just, and Sunnism as authoritarian and hereditary (Louër, 2008,
27-29). This current continued playing an important part in the democratic movement
that emerged during the wave of democratization in the early 1990s. The movement,
which was calling for the re-establishment of the parliament, embraced different polit-
ical currents from the far left to political Islam.
The year 1994 saw protests that ended violently in the course of a Marathon of the
Rotary Club that included also lightly dressed woman passing conservative Shi’ite
neighbourhoods58. In its aftermath, a wave of incidents was unchained that haunted
the country for the next four years. The swing-swing of government criticism, violent
demonstrations, and bomb attacks on the one side, and repression, banishment, tor-
ture, and executions on the other formed background and atmosphere of the country
when Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa succeeded his father in 1999.
Reformism and Hybridisation under Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa
The new Amir that declared himself King in 2002 influenced the pre-2011 era massively
by his reforms. He submitted his reform programme to a popular referendum in Febru-
ary 2001 when it was approved by enthusiasm and a majority of 98.4 per cent. The
58The nature and sequence of events in this episode is contested. Allegations reach from an aggres-
sive Shi’i mob attacking participants of the Marathon to violent riot police that provoked peaceful
protesters to deliberately cause a religious incident and thus justify drastic measures against the
Shi’i community of the past years retroactively. The most reasonable and elaborate description can
probably be found in the Amnesty International report of 1995 (Amnesty International, 1995)
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implementation turned to be sobering. A kind of two chamber system was introduced
in which the consultative council - a committee consisting of members appointed exclu-
sively by the King - was the dominant institution. Additionally, similar to Jordan and
other hybrid systems coined by a high degree of tribalism, the electoral constituencies
were redrawn, benefiting the allies of the Al-Khalifa. Moreover, citizens of the Gulf
Cooperation Council and other foreigners, working in the security forces and being
loyal to the orbit of the al-Khalifa family, were naturalised in order to broaden the
Al-Kalifa’s support in elections (Louër, 2008). The political associations in Bahrain
that dominated the political landscape in the pre-2011 era, mirror the diverse history
of struggle inside the country. The following players were active in 2010-2012, being
the most visible advocates of their currents during the critical juncture:59.
Al-Wifaq Wifaq demands a Westminster-style constitutional Monarchy and agi-
tates openly against Shi’a discrimination. The party was regarded as strongest opposi-
tion against the government. Ties to the Iranian government have never been proven,
although often alleged by Al-Khalifa and its allies. Al-Wifaq boycotted the 2002 elec-
tions querying the incomplete reform process. It had a broad base among the Bahrana
and is the most powerful Shi’i inclined association.
Al-Haq Al-Haq was a split off consisting of Al-Wifaq’s hard-liners who were dis-
satisfied with the participation of Al-Wifaq in the 2006 elections. In their opinion, no
real progress had been achieved on the reform front and, hence, the system should not
be supported. Consequently, Al-Haq has never applied to become an officially recog-
nised political association according to the laws. The group competed with Al-Wifaq
for the same Shi’a supporters and gets support whenever Al-Wifaq was perceived as
unsuccessful, while losing popularity when Wifaq appears stronger.60
National Brotherhood Society (Al-Ikha’a) Al-Ikha’a represents Shi’ites of
Persian descent (Ajmis) who ascended socially and belong to the upper strata of society.
Being reform willing, progressive, and religious, they avoided contact to Iran and stress
loyalty towards the Bahraini nation. It is also focussed on Ajmi’s specific concerns,
and an end to sectarian discrimination.
Islamic Action Society (Amal) IAS leader Shaykh Muhammad ’Ali Mahfudh
was the head of the IFLB - the Islamist Shi’i group that was accused of having planned
a coup d’etat in 1981. Amal was founded by members of the Shirazi movement61
59The description is a short version of the more elaborate enumeration of Peterson (2009, p.164-166),
amended by (International Crisis Group, 2011)
60Another party with a similar inclination is Al-Wafa’a. Some go as far as to argue that al-Wafa’a
essentially was founded in order to have a second militant organisation that could then ally itself with
al-Haq and create the impression of additional support (International Crisis Group, 2011, p.19).
61After the death of Muhammad Mahdi al-Shirazi in 2001, the Shirazi movement split into followers
of his brother, Sadiq al-Shirazi, and followers of his nephew Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi. Sadiq
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in 2002. The 1981 alleged coup was accused of attempting to install Iraqi Ayatollah
Hadi al-Modarresi as the spiritual leader of a new theocratic state. The association
remains critical towards the government, holds ties to Tehran, however, it is not the
most powerful Shi’i association and has had little electoral success. This might be due
to the historically bloody appearance in the memories of many Bahrainis.
Wa’ad Wa’ad or the National Democratic Action Society (NDAS) was a broad
alliance that aimed at unifying secular and leftist groups. It was founded by former
leaders of the NFPF - the clandestine organisation that played a major role in the
uprisings of 1965 - who were allowed to return to Bahrain after the amnesty of 2002.
The Communists left after some month, and the party did win seats in the national
assembly in the election of 2006. The party boycotted the election of 2002 and can
be regarded as cross-sectarian opposition. The association was supported by Huwala
families, amongst others of parts of the Fakhro clan.
Progressive Democratic Tribune The PDT is dominated by Communist forces
and its roots can be traced back to the National Progressive Front (NFP), which was
one of the first leftist groups of the 1950s. As it did not boycott the 2002 elections,
the association won 3 seats in Parliament in 2002, but lost these seats to Wifaq four
years later. The association was supported by an elder generation of leftists and openly
criticised the government.
Al-Aslah Al-Aslah held ties to the Salafi Movement although the leadership,
foremost Adel Al-Ma’awida, seeks to give the impression of a rather moderate Sunni
Muslim inclination. Political competitors allege an undue preference by state authori-
ties and even direct support by the ruling family. Criticism of the government or the
political system of Bahrain is sparse among its rank and files. The association is one
of the most successful political groups in the country and won six seats in the 2006
elections.
The Islamic Platform or Al-Minbar, was the second most successful association
with Sunni inclination and is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is also assumed
to benefit from governmental support and the blessing of the ruling family. It was
supposedly influenced by Shaykh ‘Isa bin Muhammad Al Khalifa, a former Minister of
Labour and Social Affairs and uncle of the King.
The Islamic League The Islamic League is supported by Shi’i individuals of
the society that are satisfied with the performance of the system or hold ties to the
al-Shirazi adopted an increasingly non-confrontational approach toward the Gulf governments, while
Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi and his brother Hadi al-Mudarrisi had a more radical stance. The
latter current would be called the mudarrisiyya by its followers (Matthiesen, 2013, p.39).
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centres of power. The association is competing with Al-Wifaq about the moderate and
wealthier Shi’i voters.
6.10.3 The long Fight for Trade Unionism
Different from many other Gulf Countries, trade unionism did play a role at an early
stage in the country. Meant as a compromise, Joint-Management-Committees were
implemented at the beginning of the 1980s in order to address workers’ demands.
These apolitical committees served later as a blueprint for other countries in the region
such as Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Eventually in 2002, a labour law was introduced that
allowed for trade unions (naqabat) in its actual sense.
Bahrain’s Worker as Trailblazers of Organised Labour in the Gulf
The fight for workers rights and trade unionism in Bahrain has a long history and is
an indelible part of the country’s history. The discovery of oil changed the structure
of the labour market. The Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) and also the gov-
ernment demanded high skilled workers in the 1930s and 1940s. As a result, in 1938
the first labour strike in the Gulf area was conducted. Strikers demanded apart from
higher wages, less working hours, and fringe benefits also the prioritization of Bahraini
Workers in employment. Under the auspices of al-Ha’yah, the first federation of labour
unions was established in 1955 (Fuccaro, 2009, p.180), even before the legal status
of unions as such was recognised. In fact, as Beling (1959) states, the labour move-
ment became an inherit part of al-Ha’yah’s total strategy to force concessions from the
government. The newly established Bahrain Labour Federation (BLF) mobilised and
took also actively part in the popular uprisings of 1954-1956 before it was dissolved
in 1956 and some of its leaders were exiled or imprisoned. Nonetheless, in 1957 the
Bahrain Labour Ordinance was issued, being one of the earliest documents in the Gulf
that allowed for trade unions. To keep some manoeuvring space for interference, the
law did not allow explicitly for federations, and embraced a proviso that made unions
accountable for any kind of tortuous acts, unless it was proved that they had been
committed without its knowledge, participation or approval (Beling, 1959, p.167).
Compared to other Gulf states, three observations about Bahrain help to clarify the
differences in the economy and thus the basis trade unions could latch onto. First, the
Bahraini economy has been more diverse. The oil industry has since been important,
however is has never been the main pillar of the GDP. The private sector played a
greater role and has been also a fertile ground for trade unions. Second, in fact almost
half of the total workforce was employed in only seven establishments, all somewhat
connected to the construction sector and BAPCO (Beling, 1959, p.160). This allowed
for economies of scale concerning trade union endeavours. Third, there has been an
influx of foreign workers, however, it was lower than in other oil producing Gulf coun-
tries. This was due to the less important role the oil sector played, but also due to
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the lower wages BAPCO paid compared with other oil companies of the region (Al-
Rumaihi, 1973, p.154). The lesser influx of foreign workers combined with a higher
quality of the latter led to a stratification of the labour market especially in the larger
establishments. Westerners prevailed in management positions, Indians and Pakistanis
in intermediate positions and Bahraini workers at the bottom in lower administrative
and labour jobs (Beling, 1959, p.159).
Consequently, the official recognition of trade unions had been a predominant demand
of the nationalist movement, and was finally acknowledged in article 21 of the consti-
tution of 1973. A wave of mass protests followed after the withdrawal of the British in
1971 due to the struggle between civil society and the al-Khalifa clan for the corridors
of power. In that struggle, new emerging trade unions played a crucial role, foremost
in professions in the aluminium smelter, the electricity department, the Ministry of
Health and the construction industry (Khalaf, 1985). The state reacted harshly, put
down the strikes with the "Decree Concerning Matters of State Security" of October
22 1974. The decree was issued when it became clear that the State Security Law
would be rejected as a bill by the National Assembly (see above). It gave authorities
means to suppress the labour movement and its activists more easily, and paved the
ground for the human rights violations by the state authorities in the decades to follow.
A System of Labour-Management Committees as Trade Union Substitute
As a substitute for the purpose of collective bargaining and basic worker representation
a system of Joint Labour-Management Committees Bahrain (JLC) was established by
the state authorities since 1981, consisting half of employers and half of employees.
Committees were already mentioned in the Labour Law of the Private Sector (Amiri
Decree Law No. 23 of 1976). This step aimed at easing the tensions of working struggles
and appeasing the lower strata of society with the possibility of influencing working
conditions at least in a narrow frame. In 1983 the General Committee of Bahraini
Workers (GCBW) was established by law, being a central committee consisting of of
workers only, and which was controlled closely by the ministry of labour to monitor
and coordinate the work of the JLCs. By 1995, the JLC-GCBW system represented
nearly 70 percent of the island’s indigenous industrial workers, while non-industrial
and foreign workers were clearly under-represented. The frequent elections appeared
to be fair, transparent, and non-manipulated (Amnesty International, 1995). However,
the committees restricted their work to socio-economic issues and refrained from min-
gling in politics, despite the turbulent years of the 1990s. Sectarian strife or broad
macro-political reforms did not play a major role in the committees. Nonetheless, sin-
gle currents and groups lobbied subtly and peacefully for a reform of the legislative
framework for organised labour and submitted a first memorandum in 1996 that de-
manded deep reforms (General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions (GFBTU), 2012)
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and that was a blueprint for the implementation of the new labour code under Sheikh
Hamad Al-Khalifa in 2002.
Similar to Jordan and Egypt, professional white-collar associations were subject to a
different legislation (Amiri Decree Law No.21/1989). Hence, they did not count as
trade union bodies, and, consequently did not have the right to strike. The Ministry
of Social Development was responsible for licensing and regulation and was allowed to
check the protocols of all meetings and to dismiss the board of any such organisation.
Additionally, they had a particular difficult standing, as the law technically did not
allow for associations based on class, sect, religion, or profession. Nonetheless, as the
example of the Bar Association shows, there were loopholes by which professional asso-
ciations had been able to form even before the issuance of the law, as long as they could
prove a charity based inclination (Radhi, 2003). The Law No.21 formed a framework
many associations could agitate within, such as the Bahrain Society of Engineers that
was already established and officially incorporated by the Ministry of Labour and So-
cial Affairs in 1972, and also other important professional associations as the Bahrain
Teachers’ Association (BTA), that struggled for better education and conditions in
schools, the Bahrain Nursing Society (BNS), and the Bahraini Journalists Association,
which provided training courses for journalists and that struggled for a new media law.
Similar to the JLC-GCWB bodies, associations refrained from positioning themselves
or mingle in political struggles.
6.10.4 The Harmonious and Apolitical Beginning of Trade
Union Institutions
The legal framework, that eventually was implemented in 2002 seemed a success of the
progressive forces inside the contained labour movement. Art.27 of the new constitution
granted explicitly the right to form unions, and by Decree No.33 (2002) chapter 17 of
the Labour Law for the Private Sector of 1976 (Decree No.23) - being the chapter that
formed the basis for the JLC-GCBW system - has been revoked for the sake of allowing
the establishment of trade unions. The establishment of unions in the public sector
was initially contested between public sector workers and government officials as the
law of 2002 Art.2 explicitly included public sector workers, and Art.10 granted them
the right to join unions. As unions began to form in governmental institutions, the
government clarified in its Circular No.(1/2003) that these workers would only have
the right to join unions of the private sector with a similar profession and that they
had no right to form unions of their own. This is an important restraint, as the share
of Bahraini Workers inside the private sector had become relatively low (18.5 per cent
in 2017) and particularly high inside the public sector (84.5 per cent in 2017) (Salibi,
2018, p.12).
Despite these contested issues, the atmosphere in the years to follow was positive. In
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2004 the General Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions (GFBTU) was founded. It
benefited from the efforts of former JLC-GCBW members, the legal support of the Bar
Association, and consulting services from the Kuwaiti Trade Union Federation (KTUF),
and even was supported by the government and the ruling family. It received real estate
from the King personally as a gift to set up the headquarters of the association (General
Federation of Bahraini Trade Unions (GFBTU), 2012, p.95). Consequently, at that
particular time, the GFBTU stressed its political independence and unwillingness to
mingle with national politics as such, following the tradition of the JLC-GCBW bodies.
In 2004, Abdul Ghaffar Abdul Hussain, chairman of the GFBTU clearly stated about
the relation to other associations and the political strata in general (Abu Safi, 2004):
We, as a general union of Bahrain trade unions, respect and appreciate all civil
society institutions, including political associations, and we have an exceedingly
good acquaintance and relationship with them. There is a right for every worker
to belong to any political association according to his aspirations or vision, but
not to enforce or to realise the politicisation of trade union work. We respect
the admission of individuals to political associations, but we do not accept that
they come with ideas of the political association they belong to and impose them
upon the union, and this is something we have not seen in the general secretariat
so far.
From Bander-Gate to the Pearl Roundabout: The Politicisation of Trade
Unions
This attitude seemed to have changed slowly already after 2005 when the disappoint-
ment began to grow noticeably among the population about the reforms of the new
ruler. Increasing popular protests and demonstrations since the summer of 2006 were
accompanied by a return to violent suppression tactics by the security forces. The
discontent embraced the feeling of being betrayed, as the opposition insisted that the
referendum had implied a return to the 1973 constitution at a minimum (Peterson,
2009, p.170). Additionally, the audience of trade unions became increasingly Shi’i due
to the factual proportions of the communities on the island. This became a visible
political issue in 2006 when the so called "Bander-Gate" scandal haunted the country:
A paper published by the Gulf Centre for Democratic Development (GCDD) revealed
activities and intentions of high ranking government officials to deprive the Shi’i pop-
ulation by demographic engineering and penetration of civil society organisations. As
Busfan and Rosiny (2016, p.15) summarise, these secret actions aimed at:
[...] undermining the influence of Shi’ia forces and containment of the opposition
by an increase of naturalisation of Sunni foreigners and a penetration of non-
governmental organisations and trade unions that mostly were subject of Shi’i as
well as to a lesser extent of leftist and liberal Sunni influence, and the intention
of the establishment of parallel civil society organisations [...]
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The Bandar Report, being technically an agglomeration of private memos, private
correspondence, receipts, and bills of high ranking government officials, steered atten-
tion to a different reading of the reform process in general and the overtures of the
regime concerning the trade union movement in particular. This included the changes
that were implemented by Law No.49/2006 allowing for plurality of unions and unions
associations, and Law No.62/2006 establishing strike bans in 12 sectors, including in
the oil and gas, healthcare, education, pharmaceutical and bakery sectors.
The Bander Report claimed a willingness of the regime to deprive Shi’i forces from
the trade union movement and against that background it reported about the inten-
tion to activate the role of the Bahrain Institute for Political Development in order to
create trade union awareness among members of the Sunni community, encouraging
members to engage in various trade unions. In contrast to Yemen, where the state
controlled the trade union institutions, however, kept them on low gear, the Bahraini
elites actively attempted to use trade union activities to secure their power. The Ban-
dar report clearly produced mistrust among the trade unionists, while at the same
time, the charity-oriented wing of the Islamic political strata began to show interest
in the trade union movement as a means to mobilise. As a consequence, the PDT -
which had been a driving force behind the trade union movement after 2002 - finally
lost its influence inside the general assembly of trade unions to the al-Wifaq party in
2008. This also mirrored the tendency of many voters to shift from classical leftism
to the welfare-oriented wing of political Islam, as already witnessed in the national
parliamentary elections of 2006.
6.10.5 The Relative Weakness of the Union Movement con-
cerning its Bargaining Power
Bahrain is the Gulf country which depends the least on natural resources, however,
their contribution to the GDP of 2010 was still 6 per cent. Concerning government
inflows, oil revenues still accounted for about 80 per cent of the total state revenues in
2010 (Financial Stability Directorate, Central Bank of Bahrain, 2010, p.57), whereas
Bahrain’s only oil field, Awali, is constantly depleting and most of the revenues stem
from refining crude oil imported from Saudi Arabia. Being aware of the fact that
Bahrain will probably be the first Gulf state to run out of oil, the government already
started to diversify the economy in the late 1970s. Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA) runs
one of the largest Aluminium smelter of the world and contributed between 10 and
12 per cent of the national GDP in 2010. The company employed more than 3,000
workers, of which more than 80 per cent are Bahraini nationals. About 12,000 workers
(about 1.5 per cent of the total workforce) work in the entire Aluminium industry
including ALBA’s downstream industries. Since the outbreak of the Lebanese civil
war in 1975, the country became a hub for Islamic Banking in the region. Being the
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holiday destination of many Arabs and beyond, tourism is another important pillar of
the economy, contributing about 4.5 per cent of the GDP in 2010.
The mobilisation potential of trade unions in Bahrain is heavily hampered due to
the exclusion of guest workers from the right to unionise. In 2010, foreign residents
accounted for up to 54 per cent of the total population and foreign workers for about
75 per cent of the workforce. Also the denial of the right to organise in the public
sector hampers unionisation. Given these facts, and given the relative youth of the
trade union movement especially compared with its republican counterparts in Algeria
or Tunisia, but also in the linchpin monarchies of Morocco and Jordan, it is little
surprising that observers assume that the trade union density did not exceed four per
cent in 2007 (Saleh, 2007).
Strike activities in significant key sectors started nonetheless in 2006, when Sheikh
Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa issued a decree banning the dismissal of workers because of
trade union activities. The ALBA trade union, being the largest union of the country
and covering about 80 per cent of the company’s employees, achieved a 20 per cent
wage increase in the same year (Khaleej Times Business, 2006). Copycat strikes broke
out at BAPCO, Batelco and other companies. As a reaction, aforementioned Decree
62 actively prohibited union activities and punished strike activities that jeopardise
the economic performance in vital sectors. This legislative change had an impact on
the willingness of workers to strike, as could be witnessed at BAPCO in 2010: When
the union staged a protest over pay and working conditions on February 10 2010, only
several hundreds of workers showed up instead of the thousands that were anticipated
by union officials.
Frequent dismissals for union activities and breaches of agreements with the union had
also contributed to increased scepticism among workers about the bargaining power
if their new federation. The lack of a mutual strategy, cohesion and solidarity among
workers were another severe obstacle to develop this bargaining power. The move closer
to the al-Wifaq party (see part 6.10.7) that already started in 2008 did not better that
situation, especially against the background of a highly fragmented society as outlined
in part 6.10.1. Consequently, GFBTU official spokesman Jaffar Khalil Ibrahim stated
in 2007 when asked about the bargaining power of the trade unions (Saleh, 2007):
One of the most important things here is that unions closely stick to their rules,
which we still miss in Bahrain. In the United States, for example, when a union
like the Truckers Union declares a strike, this means a major paralysis in a part
of the American economy, which gives the strike and union movements quick
fruits caused by the strong connection62 between the union and its workers base,
and such connection is not possessed by our union movement [...]
The low density, the discrepancies within the young union movement, the abatement
of strike activities between 2006 and 2010, and the little negotiation successes in that
62Khalil uses here the word tarabit which also means coherence, interrelationship, cohesion, or
linkage.
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period mirror the comparatively weak bargaining power vis-a-vis employers and the
state. The case of Bahrain is thus coded KEYS = (0).
6.10.6 From Calls for Political Freedoms to Foreign Interven-
tion
In the shadow of the turmoil in the Arab world that started in December 2010, a youth
movement formed by the help of social media that called itself 14th February Revolu-
tion Bahrain, calling for a "Day of Rage" on 14th February of 2011. Its aims targeted
clearly at a change of the institutional equilibrium of power inside the country. Besides
the demands for basic freedoms and the release of political prisoners, the movement
called for the disbandment of the National Assembly and the implementation of a Con-
stituent Assembly to draft a new constitution that should also embrace an independent
judiciary, a freely elected parliament that elects the Prime Minister, and the abolition
of the second chamber. Maybe most threatening to the regime, the activists also urged
for a debarment of access to top positions in the three branches of government for
members of the Royal Family. Similar to Jordan where protesters called for a "King
that reigns but does not rule, Bahrain should stay a constitutional Monarchy ruled by
the al-Khalifa family.(Bassiouni et al., 2011, p.66)63 The activists - who in the early
phase clearly distanced themselves from any political or religious inclination - received
the support of al-Haq until February 13, and maybe more important, of the officially
recognised Wa’ad party. Al-Wifaq, back then the largest fraction in parliament, merely
stressed the right of citizens to protest peacefully.
6.10.7 A Fragmented Opposition with Diverging Demands
Events on the 14th of February 2011 escalated quickly. Emphasizing the argument
that the demonstrations were not registered in advance as required by Amiri Decree
No.18/1973, the police tried to disperse the demonstrations that erupted throughout
Bahrain. This turned to be more difficult as expected as single demonstrations did
not exceed more than 800 participants and the hot spots of action of the in total 6000
participants were sparkled all over the island and constantly moving. After the death of
one participant, more protests followed the next day, and clashes with the police in the
course of the funeral rally. The demonstrators took the CGG (Pearl) Roundabout, al-
Wifaq members of Parliament threatened to resign, and on the same day, the GFBTU
63The source of the informations of the following passages - the Report of the Bahraini Independent
Commission of Inquiry (BICI) - was firstly initiated by King Hamad by Royal Order No. 28 to evaluate
the protests and the reaction of the security forces in 2011. Although criticised by the opposition in
the course of the investigation as biased, and as not holding anyone in particular accountable for
the misconduct of the security forces, the result published in November 2011 was "perhaps the most
self-critical analysis of repression against an ongoing struggle ever published by an Arab government"
(Zunes, 2013, p.156)
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announced a general strike for February 17. The strike was postponed by three days
as the island was under lock-down after the Pearl Roundabout was cleared violently
at 3am on February 17, causing 4 deaths and over 300 injured.
After criticism from inside and outside the country, the regime allowed the protesters
to reoccupy the Pearl Roundabout on February 19. The next day, about 80 per cent of
the Bahraini workforce (nationals) followed the call of the Teachers’ Society, and the
Bar society and went on strike.
The slogans shouted during the demonstrations and the demands and desires of the
protesting crowd varied in their content and radicalism. The most palpable currents
of the fragmented movement are the following (Abdulla, 2011; Matthiesen, 2013):
Groups who demanded reform without the regime (Radical Reformists)
embraced the majority of the initial 14th February Movement, as well as their early sup-
porters among the unlicensed opposition including Al-Haq, Al-Wafa’a, and Al-Ahrar.
They refused a dialogue with the ruling family without far reaching concessions and a
large number of protesters called for the fall of the Al-Khalifa rule. This attitude was
hardened in the course of the weeks to come, following the line of Hasan Mushayma,
al-Haq’s leader, who said he could basically accept a European-style constitutional
Monarchy (which he described as not very different from a republic), however, as the
regime would never accept such a reform, it might be necessary to topple it (Interna-
tional Crisis Group, 2011, p.18). Their struggle focussed on the implementation of the
rights granted by the 1973 constitution.
Groups who demanded reform within the regime (Dialogueists) included
the licensed political societies of the parliamentary opposition that jumped on the
bandwagon with the protest of the 14th February Movement. Leading parties were
Al-Wifaq, Wa’ad, the Islamic Action Society, Al-Ikha’a National Society and the Al-
Menbar. On 19th February, amongst others the al-Wifaq, Wa’ad, the Islamic Action
Society, the PDT, and the al-Minbar Society issued a mutual statement reaffirming
their support for the protests, demanding an end of sectarian hatred in the state and the
media, and political reforms that would lead to a constitutional Monarchy. This cross-
sectarian alliance uttered clear demands such as the formation of a national coalition
interim government, release of political prisoners, and the security of the protesters
(Abdulla, 2011) while also clearly urging the government to engage in dialogue.
Groups who advocated for a religious (Shi’i) form of government (Theocrats
and Semi-Theocrats) were relatively small in number, however, strongly visible
during the protests and on the Pearl Roundabout. The most palpable group was a
Shirazi movement, say, the Islamic Action Front (Amal) that did not dissimulate its
inclination towards an Iranian model of government. The movement as such was rather
peripheral to the wider world of Shi’a political movements, however, they were well or-
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ganised and benefited from their own media. While al-Wifaq rejected all accusations
of foreign links and tried not to be instrumentalised by foreign Shi’a actors, the Shi-
razis had put a screen up on the Pearl Roundabout on which several of their political
figures spoke out in the harshest ways against the Al Khalifa ruling family and later
also against the Saudi ruling family (Matthiesen, 2013).
The first days of the protests, the regime seemed to be unprepared. Especially the
pace and impact of the ongoing events made it struggle for the best answer. Eventu-
ally, it resorted to three strategies. First, it tried to calm the masses by socio-economic
benefits while more or less ignoring the political demands. King Hamad promised a
gift of 1,000 Bahraini Dinars (approx. 2,900 Euro) for each Bahraini family, the cre-
ation of 20,000 jobs, and announced 50,000 new housing units (Abdulla, 2011, p.166).
Second, members of the regime and loyalist organised a counter-mobilisation. The Na-
tional Unity Bloc Bahrain (NUB) was formed, a loyal political bloc, consisting mainly
of wealthy Sunni citizens (Lulu, 2011). And while the anti-government protest camp
was located at the Pearl Roundabout, the pro-government demonstrators gathered in
front of the al-Fateh Mosque already on February 21, using the hash tag #fateh in
social media as a response to #lulu (Arabic: pearl), which had become the hash tag
of the anti-government camp. The pro-government rallies and the NUB got also sup-
port by prominent Sunni clerics. Sheikh Abdulatif al-Mahmud was appointed as NUB
head, benefiting from all state support and patronage networks (Abdulla, 2011, p.166).
His attitude was also part of the third strategy used by the regime to encounter the
protests. Al-Mahmud publicly denounced the anti-government movement as a "threat
to the very existence of Sunnis" a reading that became more and more prominent
among state authorities and that also became more viral in the state-controlled media.
It was a consequent continuation of the rhetoric that could be witnessed in Bahrain
since the 1980s.
The Political Nature of the Protests
In the weeks to follow, the situation in Bahrain got stuck in a gridlock. Each of
the aforementioned currents tried to advocate for their future vision of the country.
Marches with 100,000 anti-government protesters on February 22, and with 200,000 on
February 23 followed. The government, being keen to lose its suboptimal reputation
it earned inside and outside the country because of its hard line stance, allowed the
demonstrators to march. Smaller protests with different extent of radicalism continued
in February and March, mounting in a small group of demonstrators attempting to
blockade the state television headquarters and the parliament building (Zunes, 2013,
p.155). Although making some smaller political concessions and promises, the regime’s
keenness to implement change seemed to have been limited. In the words of Abdulla
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(2011, p.167) about King Hamad:
He refused the demand to dismiss the government and to form a coalition gov-
ernment, and he opposed demonstrations outside the Pearl circle. Instead, he
stressed the need to satisfy the demands for jobs, housing and other socio-
economic needs, which could be met with the GCC Marshall Plan – a plan
which is underway to support Oman and Bahrain to overcome the roots of un-
rest, through the improvement of living conditions, job opportunities and housing
schemes. What he [...] did not realize, was that the root of the protests is a po-
litical one and a quest for dignity across all the GCC states.
A look at the economic data of the country before 2011 supports the thesis that
the protests were mainly political and to a lower extend socio-economical. Unemploy-
ment remained under 1.2 per cent since the 1990s, and youth unemployment remained
between 4 and 5 per cent during that period. Although the inflation rates increased by
trend since 2000, they never surpassed 3.5 per cent, while purchasing power of the min-
imum wage increased by 120 per cent between 2000 and 2010. Even if socio-economic
demands may have played a role among particular strata of society, the leading fractions
of the upheavals all uttered political demands first and foremost, as shown previously
(6.10.7). Because of that, and especially in comparison with the other countries of the
sample, the variable SOEC is coded (0) for the case of Bahrain.
The GFBTU as Reform Oriented Player
Eventually, the regime started to use violence against anti-government protesters, and
on March 17 it received military support from the Gulf Cooperation Council. Arguing
with regional stability, pointing at vast pro-government marches, and also pointing at
a possible Shi’i threat the Shirazi movement had given good footage for, the regime
pulled the emergency brake. Protests were quelled and the country was brought vio-
lently under control again. The date of the intervention of about 5000 foreign troops
from Saudi Arabia and the UAE was not a mere coincidence. For that date, the GF-
BTU had announced another general strike and was supported by the radical reformist
(see above) groups. This "precarious unity" (Holmes, 2015, p.111) posed a thread to
the ruling family, as the Radical Reform groupings had announced to march towards
the presidential palace.
During all the turmoil, the GFBTU can be classified as belonging to the Dialogueists,
forming thus a part of the "sevenfold" together with most parliamentary opposition
groups. This meant clear political demands for reform and tries to reinforce dialogue
with the regime. The GFBTU never adopted the radical slogans of the March 14 Move-
ment. In fact, the general strike that took place on February 20 was carried out by the
local populace despite its call off by the GFBTU, after security forces had withdrawn
from the Pearl Roundabout. Following this strategy of dialogue, and acting often in a
similar manner as al-Wifaq, the general strike was technically not announced. It was
rather a threat in case tanks would not be removed from the streets and people were
not allowed to protest freely. When foreign troops set boots on Bahraini ground, the
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federation upheld their call for a general strike. Then, just as the GFBTU withdrew the
announcement of the general strike on February 20 in a last-minute decision, it did so
also with the extension of the general strike on March 23. GFBTU Chairman Salman
Mahfoudh announced this latter decision after a meeting with Shura Council chairman
Ali Saleh As-Saleh and Labour Ministry officials, stating "we discussed several key
issues workers were facing for the past few weeks, with their safety on top priority"
(CW-Staff, 2011). What made the trade union association nonetheless an inconvenient
opponent of the ruling regime was the fact that the GFBTU started to campaign for
workers that were dismissed due to their participation in the protests. Thousands of
workers and dozens of high union officials were dismissed and banned from work as part
of the confrontations. The GFBTU estimated the total number of dismissed workers
and arrests to be over 4.000. The association filed a complaint against the Bahrain
government at the ILO for violating Convention 111 (discrimination in employment).
In the aftermath of the protests, union leaders faced fierce discrimination and pun-
ishment. Fifteen members of the executive board and more than forty union leaders,
including the heads of the Teachers Union, the Nurses Association and the Bahrain
Petroleum Company Union, were sacked. Moreover, leaders of the most active unions
were sentenced to prison, such as the leaders of the Teachers Union: Abu Dheeb went
to prison for some 18 months and Al-Salman was held in custody five and a half months
before being released on bail (Beinin, 2011a).
The role of the professional associations can be exemplified by the Teacher’s Society
(BTA) which had been the most active of the professional unions. In April 2011,
the Ministry of Social Development dissolved the Union as its leaders took part in
the February-March 2011 pro-democracy protests. Indeed, teachers protesting at their
school gates starting at 7.30 am were the first strikers recorded, and the BTA mem-
bers went on strike even after the call off of the general strike by the GFBTU - with
an estimated 80 percent of the schools and 6500 teachers taking part (Holmes, 2015,
p.109). In fact, teachers were demanding for the investigation of the death of the
protesters among which were also students, and later, according to a statement, they
supported the demonstrators who were protesting the "barbaric practices of the au-
thorities" (Bassiouni et al., 2011, p.92). Other demands included the deteriorating
standards of education in Bahrain and the resignation of the Minister of Education.64.
This attitude, which was less focussed on political issues, could also be found among
other professional associations 65. The Physicians and Nurses Society, that had set up a
64However, the BTA’s activities were seen critically by many Dialogueists. A joint statement of
the seven largest Dialogueist opposition groups on March 2 called on teachers and students to carry
on with normal school schedules and pledged for schools free of politicisation (Bassiouni et al., 2011,
p.102)
65The Bahrain Journalist Association is an exemption. Being quiet during the entire protests, the
association did not even raise voice - neither in favour nor against the regime measures - when Mansoor
al-Jamri, editor in chief of al-Wasat newspaper was put under pressure because of "unethical" media
coverage of the uprisings. The entire newspaper was shut down for a day. Al-Jamri was considered as
moderate mediator and was also critical of protesters for blocking a main highway. Also the lawyers
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tent on the Pearl Roundabout to give medical supply to the protesters had a similar less
political stance. And after facing harassments and blockade of medical supply by gov-
ernment authorities, issued a statement condemning the attack on peaceful protesters
as well as the withholding of medical aid, and demanded the resignation of the Min-
ister of Health, Faisal Al-Hammar. Although at SMC members of the medical staff
participated in demonstrations demanding for constitutional reform, social justice and
economic equality, and expressions of support for the demands of the February 14
movement(Bassiouni et al., 2011, p.85), the organisation itself refrained from making
statements with a radical political wording.
The Politically Jogged Split of the Union Movement
Another sign that the regime perceived the GFBTU as a threat becomes evident when
in July 2011 the trade union movement split. The newly issued Law No.35 of 2011
allowed for multiple trade unions on enterprise levels and for multiplicity of federations
by the end of March 2011. As a consequence, a new federation was formed, mostly
of unions in state owned enterprises. The official reason for the foundation of the
Bahrain Free Labour Union Federation (BFLUF), initially called BLUF, was the high
politicisation of the GFBTU. In a slightly encrypted manner the growing dominance
of al-Wifaq and an alleged Shi’i predominance since the transition of the JLC-GCBW
system into the GFBTU was addressed and criticised in the chapter "Who We Are" at
its official website (Bahrain Free Labour Unions Federation, 2019), yielding valuable
insights into its narrative:
[...] the trade union formation in the dominant institutions was limited to a polit-
ical current with unilateral tendencies and political and sectarian representation,
which were reflected in the Secretariat of the General Union of Bahrain Trade
Unions. Thereby, the turn of the General Committees into the General Union
turned into an irrational and suspicious transformation having the purpose to
continue politicising, controlling and directing union work and to make workers
one of the tools of the political associations.
The text proceeds with criticism of the GFBTU, making it responsible for the mass
dismissals and being a threat to the national unity. Especially its role in the general
strike in March is attacked, claiming that the leadership of the federation did not act
unanimously with its affiliated unions, and even against the free will of the Bahraini
workers. It can not completely be determined to which extend the government has
been involved into the foundation of the BLUF, as, on the one hand, there has indeed
been dissatisfaction with the role of the GFBTU among many workers. By end of
March 2011 more than 400 BAPCO Trade Union members have threatened to quit
after the enterprise union supported another nationwide strike without their consent
association remained relatively silent, as they were still riddled with a conflict with the government
about lawyers that refused to defend Bahraini citizens in trails that dated from 2010. Additionally,
the association had a rather government-friendly board.
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(Trade Arabia Online, 2011). On the other hand, the ILO doubted the independence
of the new Bahrain Free Labour Federation BFLUF and points to irregularities in the
founding and accession procedure (Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 2012). Addi-
tionally, suppression of BFLUF alternative unions in state enterprises, harassment and
dismissals of GFBTU affiliated trade union leaders, or the pressuring of migrant work-
ers into the newly established BFLUF framework have been reported in several state
owned enterprises66.Nonetheless, given the politically active role of the GFBTU, espe-
cially compared with other states of the sample, the outcome for the case of Bahrain
is coded (1).
6.11 Egypt (1)
As will be shown in section 6.11.3, trade unions clearly attempted at interfering in
the institutional equilibrium in Egypt, justifying the coding of the outcome (1) for the
country. As explained in section 6.11.3, two truth table rows will be used for the case
of Egypt, one for the time before the Muslim Brotherhood became active in the reform
process and after:
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
1 0 1 0 1 1 EGY(21)
Table 6.13: Truth table row for the case of Egypt(23)
SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
1 1 1 0 0 1 EGY(29)
Table 6.14: Truth table row for the case of Egypt(29)
Egypt’s hybrid system, as described in section 6.11.1 does not necessarily rely on
family or tribal bonds. Family does surely play a role in the patrimonial capitalist
system, however, it is not as pivotal as in the systems of Jordan or Libya. The variable
TRI is therefore coded (0). Section 6.11.2 shows how the trade union organisations were
66These enterprises include Aluminium Bahrain (ALBA), the Bahrain Airport Services (BAS),
Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard (ASRY), Aluminium Rolling Mill, Bahrain Telecommunications
Company (BATELCO), Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO), Yokogawa Middle East, and the
Bahrain Aviation Fuelling Company (BAFCO)(Bahrain Mirror, 2015)
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historically centralised, leading to the coding of the variable CEN as (1). Especially
part 6.11.3 demonstrates that the breach of the authoritarian bargain was a crucial
issue among the population; hence, SOEC is coded (1), and the same part gives an
insight into the strength of clandestine worker’s organisations in economic key sectors,
especially inside the textile industry.
6.11.1 From Nasserism to Patrimonial Capitalism
By 2010, Egypt was officially a single-party presidential republic that showed clear fea-
tures of authoritarianism of a mass mobilising party regime according to Linz (2000).
Due to the emergence of a caste of businessmen and military that benefited from
privatisation policies especially in the 1990s, the regime has also been labelled Patri-
monial Capitalism (Schlumberger, 2008) or Patrimonial Authoritarianism (Albrecht,
2012) respectively. The logic of power maintenance rests on the strong role of the
Army, personalised politics and liberalisation as means to maintain power, the elec-
toral framework, as well as the emergency law and the fight against terror to suppress
and sue political opponents.
The Army as Important Pillar of Power
Gamal Abd Al-Nasser was the first military leader that relied on the Army to gain
and secure power. He shaped an entire Arab generation by his political views that
would go down in history as "Nasserism", which is a rather Arab nationalistic than
leftist inclination. He gained recognition by achieving the nationalisation of the Suez
Channel and won over the masses with his charismatic appearance. At the same time
the Free Officers, who had formed their Revolutionary Command Council Libya (RCC)
began to secure their power against other important political players: A large strike in
the textile sector that was, at least, inspired by the Communist Party in 1952, was put
down violently and the leaders were hung in public; the land owning Bourgeoisie was
weakened by land reforms; and the influential nationalist party Wafd could be crushed
after the new Law of Political Parties (1952) came to force. It forced parties to reveal
their programme, internal organisation, and funding sources, plunging the Wafd into
into internal struggle (Mansfield, 1973, pp.672-673). Nasser also moved against the
Muslim Brotherhood that reached a peak of radicalism with the writings and preaches
of Sayyid Qutub, who was executed in 1965.
The authoritative control of the military proved to be crucial for regime survival ever
since 1952, even when Nassers successor, al-Sadat, tried to curtail military influence
(Karawan, 2011, p.45). Mubarak, being also an Army officer, brought the Army back
in, and especially since the 2000s an increasing number of retired officers entered the
public administration. Furthermore, the Army holds economic power, in particular as
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three bodies intervene into civil markets: The Ministry of Military Production Egypt
(MOMP), founded in 1951, the Arab organisation for Industrialization (AOI, which
was actually meant to coordinate economic activities between members of the Arab
league - Egypt became sole owner of AOI in 1993), and the National Service Products
Organisation (NSPO, which was set up under the auspices of the Ministry of Defence
after Egypt signed the Camp David treaty with Israel in 1979). These bodies con-
tribute to public infrastructure projects and the production of cheap civil goods for
the lower strata of society (Abul-Magd, 2013, p.1)67, and many infrastructural projects
of security relevance - from airports to long distance roads - could only be build by
enterprises owned by the military. As the military benefited from connections into the
administration, understandably, it turned down economic reform aiming at higher do-
mestic competitiveness and became an adversary of the liberalisation project. Mubarak
had to balance international reform demands and internal interests of his power base.
However, before 2011, the Army was too big to be a hazard for the president’s circle:
A coup d’etat by a small group of officers was always at risk to be countered and
neutralised by another group of officers. The required amount of generals that had to
be involved to ensure success would be too large, making this possible endeavour too
dangerous and cumbersome to plan. Nonetheless, a residual risk always remained.
Hybridisation of the System by the Infitah
Politics of liberalisation entered the political strata of Egypt when Al-Sadat initiated
the policy of opening (Infitah). Economically, the concept included a strengthening of
the private sector and attracting Arab and foreign investment capital, while politically
controlled pluralism was introduced (Aoudé, 1994). The economic opening followed a
fiscal crisis that clearly marked the end of expropriation policies the Nasserist State
had relied on, and that would not cede after the end of the oil boom in the late
1970s. The political opening helped to cast a positive light on Egypt, meanwhile the
constitution of 1971, which was still in force in 2011, contained increased presidential
powers among other things vis-á-vis the Prime Minister (Art. 142), the the civil and
military officials and the diplomatic representatives (Art.143), the police (Art.145),
and the armed forces (Art.150). The powers reached an extent that gave president
Sadat the power to reverse any kind of political development he considered to get out
of hand. In this context, the Arab Socialist Union Egypt (ASU*)68 broke up into a
centrist, rightist, and a leftist wing, building the core blocks of a multi-party system.
67Their most important products include steel, cement, chemicals, luxury Jeeps, butane gas, cylin-
ders, kitchen stoves, home appliances, gas pipelines, infant incubators, mineral water, pasta, olive oil,
and other foodstuffs. Furthermore, their real estate properties include gas stations, hotels, wedding
halls, supermarkets, parking lots, domestic cleaning offices, transportation and shipping companies
across the country (Abul-Magd, 2013, p.2).
68The Arab Socialist Union was founded in Egypt in December 1962 as the country’s sole political
party. It served as a role model for the ASU in Libya.
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The strategy of Sadat to transform the Egyptian economy into a more straightforward
model of capitalism while giving the impression of democratic opening was followed up
by Husni Mubarak who became president in 1982. He also bundled many powers in the
office of the president, and, due to Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak instituted a state
of emergency (Law 162/1981), that would still be in force in the beginning of 2011.
Economically, the country was still suffering from under-performance, high inflation
rates, unemployment, and a level of government liabilities that jeopardised its capacity
to act. When the IMF tied new loans on governance, imposing a structural adjustment
programme (SAP), the Egyptian government held the wolf by the ears, as a main pillar
of its legitimacy since Nasser was a bargain rule, as Abdallah (2017, p.11) observes:
During the post-colonial era, Nasser built a populist authoritarian political for-
mula based on what Schmitter calls "State Corporatism": a representation system
so as to link the associative interests of the civil society with the governmental
structure of the State [...] The intention was to provide the workers (or those
social sectors) supporting the regime with certain benefits, such as job security,
better working conditions, and free education and health. The distribution of
these goods and services was through an expanded public sector, as mentioned
earlier. In return, workers had to give up their political freedoms.
Against this background, Sadat and later Mubarak adopted a posture that osten-
sibly rejected some or all of the recommended reforms, while quietly pursuing their
implementation (Richards and Waterbury, 2014, p.221), risking charges of hypocrisy
and subterfuge in case the masquerade was revealed. This development was bearing
ever stranger fruit especially in the 1990s, when an economic model developed in Egypt
that Schlumberger (2008) labelled Patrimonial Capitalism. Stressing the predominance
of informal rules, the polit-economical order was characterised by rent-based economies,
patrimonial socio-political structures on the one hand and the ability of incumbents
to politically instrumentalise structural reform on the other (p.633). According to this
reading, the absence of the rule of law in the face of prevailing informal rules was
an integral feature to maintain power, and formal rules are used to oust competitors
in an atmosphere of highly personalised politics. When the IMF tied the issuance of
new loans to measures of privatisation, members of the tight network around Mubarak
profited despite their economical inexperience. The effect was that soon public enter-
prises performed better, compared with private enterprises, and the letter were more
frequently responsible for non-performing loans (Schlumberger, 2008, p.631). Business-
men of the country who managed to maintain enterprises and who knew how to use
the support of the ruling elite benefited from liberalisation and joined the core elite of
the country. Most members of this group were advocates of privatisation and more or
less close associates of Gamal Mubarak, the second son of President Hosni Mubarak
(Demmelhuber, 2011, p.145). This became especially true after the government had
announced a new wave of economic liberalisation after 2004.
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Egypt’s Electoral Authoritarianism
Additionally to strengthening the role of the military and using economic opening
as means to forge loyalties, Mubarak managed to contain the plurality of parties that
emerged after the controlled opening under Al-Sadat. The 1978 set up National Demo-
cratic Party Egypt (NDP), the centrist successor of the ASU, dominated politics until
2011 and gained over 80 per cent of the parliamentary seats in the parliamentary elec-
tion of 2010. The leftist remainder of the ASU, the National Progressive Unionist Party
(Hizb al-Tagammu’ al-Watani al-Taqadomi al-Wahdawi, short: Tagammu), led by the
last survivor of the coup of 1952, Khaled Mohieddin, received 5 seats. The Muslim
Brotherhood - which could only send "independent" candidates anyway due to its ban
in 1954 - and the New Wafd boycotted the second round of the elections in protest of
irregularities.
Different from countries like Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait, the success of the forces
favoured by the ruling elite was not mainly assured by electoral by-laws. It rested
on control over the electoral process including the counting procedures - especially
since 2007, when a constitutional amendment removed full judicial supervision of the
elections, and international observers were almost completely excluded in 2010. The
control is an important pillar for the institutional equilibrium, as according to Art. 76
of the constitution the nomination of a presidential candidate must be supported by
a fixed number of representatives of the People’s Assembly, the Shura Council69 and
the elected regional assemblies. The same article also states that only political parties,
first, with more than 3 per cent in the parliament, second, that have been established
at least five years before the announcement of the candidacy, and third, that have
been operating without interruption during this period may nominate for President a
member of their leadership council.
Basically, Law No. 40/1977 prevented the foundation of parties that could possibly
appeal to a widespread regional, religious or working-class constituency. In order to
inhibit the emergence of potential counter-candidates against Mubarak, the govern-
ment also repeatedly interfered in the party spectre. Let alone between 1998 and 2004,
seven of Egypt’s sixteen legalised opposition parties were de-facto paralysed (Stacher,
2004, p.220). The Political Parties Committee Egypt (PPC), a subunit of the Shura
Council and controlled by NDP members, rejected nearly all party applications, how-
ever, many got legal status due to rulings of State Council courts, starting from the
1990s (Moustafa, 2007, p.154). The judiciary, although having an impressive record of
decisions that contradict the will of the ruling elite, remained toothless whenever an
election was annulled due to irregularities, the People’s Assembly can invoke Art. 93 of
the Constitution that states that "the People’s Assembly shall be competent to decide
upon the validity of the membership of its members. [...] Membership shall not be
69The Shura Council was created as second chamber in 1980. Two thirds of its members are elected
directly while one third was appointed by the President of the Republic.
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deemed invalid except by a decision taken by a majority of two-thirds of the Assembly
members."
Intimidation of Civil Society and Opposition Groups
These mechanisms to prevent the opposition from jeopardising the networks of the
higher echelons of power were reinforced by violence and repression. It was a main fea-
ture of the the country in which a well developed secret service operated that closely
monitored dissent. Uttering criticism of the regime or the social, economic, or political
circumstances in public often led to harassment and trial which was particularly mir-
rored in how the authorities handled the free press. ‘Adel Hamuda, editor-in-chief of
Rose al-Yusuf, an influential newspaper whose leadership was appointed by the Shura
Council clearly states in 1995 (Moustafa, 2007, p.144 fn.86):
When we discuss the issues of the poor who live in graveyards, or the feigned
oversight of the National Democratic Party to include Copts in nominations for
the Shura Council elections, or issues of social justice, we may be taken to court
for ’undermining public peace’. When we discuss rotten meat, contaminated
water, buildings on the verge of collapse, quack medicine, or hormone injected
chickens, we will be put in jail on the charge of ’spreading panic among the
people.’ Each and every news story [...] may be considered as a crime.
Against that background, the authorities often used the emergency laws or anti-
terrorism laws to intimidate opposition activities. In the 1990s, the Gama’a Islamiyya
seized control of parts of the country and suburbs of Cairo. It was an organisation ini-
tially supported by the Egyptian state under Sadat as a political counterweight to the
Arab socialist who posed a threat to his centrist ideology and the politics of Infitah. In
the light of Sadat’s assassination in 1981 by a radical Islamist, Mubarak tightened the
grip on the Islamist movement again. As a consequence, while in the 1970s and 1980s
mostly "soft" targets like leftist students, Copts, or "places of sin" were attacked by
radical Islamists, in the 1990s the state and its institutions including policemen, secu-
rity forces, and prominent government officials were targeted (Hafez and Wiktorowicz,
2004). These military struggles served as reasons to maintain the state of emergency,
also after the leadership of the Gama’a had renounced violence in the 2000s (Hamzawy
and Grebowski, 2010). The Egyptian constitution dedicates the entire Chapter (VI)
to the fight against terrorism, granting the security forces special rights to fulfil their
duties. Terrorism accusations were often launched against inconvenient Islamic candi-
dates before elections (Moustafa, 2007, p.195).
Also Islamic organisations suffered much discrimination, especially as they were capa-
ble of undermining the legitimacy of the regime. Especially the relationship between
the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood with its charity programmes, medical care,
schooling and safe spaces for people persecuted by the state authorities was complex.
Actually banned since the 1950s, the Brotherhood could expand its influence in civil
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society and the party system in the 1980s by combining its Islamic agenda with crit-
icism of internal security measures, economic planning, foreign relations, the use of
torture, and the lack of democracy and human rights in Egypt (Hafez and Wiktorow-
icz, 2004). In the tradition of balancing between the attempted impression of a liberal
state on the road to democracy on the one hand and power maintenance on the other,
these critics were tolerated, and, rewarded with political access to counterbalance more
militant groups. After the Cairo earthquake of 1992 that made more than 50.000 peo-
ple homeless, the regime faced much criticism from welfare oriented Islamic currents.
In order to undermine the financial base of these organisations, Presidential Decree
4/1992 stipulates that accepting foreign funds without permission is punished with a
sentence of seven to fifteen years without the option of an appeal. The law became
another tool for opposition repression, and was used against the secretary general of
the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights (EOHR) Hafiz Abu Sa’da in December
1998, and against the Egyptian-American intellectual Saad Eddin Ibrahim in 2000
(Stacher, 2004, p.217). Compared to Jordan, in which the Royal House can resort to
legitimacy that goes beyond the authoritarian bargain and where discontent could be
steered away from the King, Egyptian rulers were more dependent on the perception
that the authoritarian bargain was held.
6.11.2 Trade Unions: The Boiler under Pressure
The inter-war period in Egypt witnessed a strong labour movement and several hun-
dreds of unions that were mostly dominated and supported by the Wafd party. They
formed an important part of Wafd’s struggle against the British rule and later against
authoritarian tendencies of the palace. With the disperse of the Wafd in 1952 the
labour movement lost an important ally, as, demonstrated by Deeb (1979), in the
long run, "whenever the Wafd was driven out of power the activities of trade unions
were curbed and their power curtailed". The new regime led by the Free Officers soon
discovered the workers fate as a base of legitimacy for the government and unions as
mass mobilising organisations worthwhile to be controlled. At the same time they were
aware of the dangers an independent trade union movement could bear. Consequently,
the RCC turned down the attempt to form a nationwide trade union federation by the
Foundation Committee for a General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (FCGF) in
1952, although the FCGF uttered its support for the Free Officers already a few weeks
after the coup (Posusney, 1997, p.44). Instead, the newly founded ASU fixed in its
founding charter that fifty seats in "all elected ASU structures at all levels shall be filled
by ’farmers and workers’" and established elected ASU committees in factories, agri-
cultural cooperatives, business firms, professional associations, and ministries (Aoudé,
1994, p.10). In the 1957 founded Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions (ETUF), ASU
membership was mandatory to run for any official union office, and the union leadership
was expected to refrain form independent protest and to support the President.
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Economic Liberalisation and the ETUF’s Credibility Problem
The ETUF became an integral part of the state, membership for workers was manda-
tory in almost all sectors, and high ranking staff of the federation played an important
role in administration and politics of the country. Until 1986, the president of the
ETUF, Sa’ad Mohammad Ahmad from the food workers union, was at the same time
the Minister of Manpower and Migration, just like Ahmad Ahmad Al-’Umawi from the
chemical workers union who was ETUF President from 1987-1992. Assayid Moham-
mad Rashid from the textile workers union, ETUF president from 1992-2006, who was
also deputy speaker of parliament. Hussein Qasim ’Ali Mugawar from the construction
union, ETUF president from 2006-2011, suffered from corruption allegations targeting
him and his family since 2000 and became only the chairman of the board of directors
in the Suez Cement Company. These leaders, however, all started as simple workers
in their teenage years and made a career through the bureaucratic apparatus of the
ETUF. The organisation built a pool of loyalists who could make a career and freshen
up the ranks of the ruling elite. This was particularly possible and also a part of the
system-logic, as, according to the constitution, 50 per cent of the parliament had to
consist of farmers and workers.
With the incumbency of Al-’Umawi, who supported state privatisation, patrimonial
capitalist ideas began to trickle also into the ETUF, leading to a significant blow to its
credibility (Buaba Al-Ahram, 2015). In 1995, the leadership of the federation endorsed
Law 203 which paved the way for widespread privatisation politics on the expense of
the public sector. This was a major shift, as the federation had spearheaded the cam-
paign against privatization in the late 1970s and 1980s (Posusney, 1997, Chap. 4), and
still a vast part of its rank and file and also some high ranking officers opposed the
new relations between state and labour. The question of economic opening jammed a
wedge into the ETUF which was additionally weakened by internal power struggles and
struggles with the Ministry of Manpower. As soon as the federation was weakened and
controlled by loyalists, the regime was quick off the mark to keep the staffing. Act No.
12 of 1995 made ascendency of opposition forces - or elements who simply wished for a
more trenchant watchdog of the old authoritarian bargain - inside the union apparatus
more difficult. The term in office of high ranking union officials was extended to five
years, and ,thus, making it possible to maintain union offices even after retirement
(Taha, 2014, p.183). Also new blood was disciplined quickly, however, as Salibi (2017,
p.11) puts it, while the Jordanian Trade Union Federation was held together by the
"stick", the Egyptian regime rather used "carrots" to facilitate loyalty among the union
representatives especially on the lower levels. Whenever a worker was elected for the
first time into an official post of a company union, an immediate job-promotion would
follow, increasing his wages and privileges. These benefits were threatened to be with-
drawn whenever the new unionist showed discontent, and in case of collective action he
would risk to be transferred or even fired (Shehata, 2009). This system remained until
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2011 when the federation comprised 25 single workers unions, a cultural committee, a
social committee, a state owned workers’ university, and a workers’ emergency benefit
fund to cushion liberalisation by paying "benefits to workers whose wages are stopped
due to the orders determined by the executive administration" (Law No. 156/2002
Art.2(4)).
From 1993 until 2003 the government, the unions, and business organisations strug-
gled for a new labour legislation that should give way for a more rigorous level of
liberalisation. In 1995, the labour draft also called the attention of the ETUF, as
it aimed at reorganising the national labour federation, softening up job security of
public-sector workers, and setting even more stringent conditions for legal strikes. In
1999, several members of the Tagamu‘ party who encouraged workers to oppose the
new labour law draft also outside the ETUF framework, were jailed and charged with
"threatening national security" (Shehata, 2009, p.104, en.40). This shows the strategy
of the regime concerning the ETUF. While on the one hand, the government aimed at
reducing the influence of the EFTU over policy making with regard to privatisation by
including private business people in the official consultations (Pratt, 2001, p.117). On
the other hand, similar to the regime in Jordan, it protected the ETUF’s monopoly
of worker’s representations. Egyptian Law 153/1999, which was later declared uncon-
stitutional, even stipulated that NGO’s were not allowed to engage in "any political
or unionist activity, the exercise of which is restricted to political parties and trade
unions," and those organisations that threatened "national unity" or violated "public
order or morals" could be dissolved by the Ministry of Social Affairs (Moustafa, 2007,
p.187). The ultimate labour law of 2003 eventually permitted strikes - if approved by a
two-thirds majority of the responsible branch federation - in exchange for the removal
of job security provisions (Taha, 2014, p.182).
Clandestine Worker’s Action in Key Sectors
Egypt had witnessed a decline of rent incomes since the 1980s. In the course of the
privatisation policies, the state attempted to compensate its losses with the establish-
ment of a profitable tourism-industry (Richter and Steiner, 2008), textile industry, and
manufacturing of electronics. Nonetheless, the state’s dependence on natural resources
was still comparatively high, contributing about 15 per cent to the GDP of 2008, while
oil exports still constituted about 60 per cent of the total exports in that year. Other
important export goods were gold, nitrogenous fertilizers,and insulated wire, whereas
the textile industry was the second most important export sector, accounting for 3 per
cent of the GDP, 27 per cent of industrial production, 10 per cent of the country’s
exports and 15 per cent of the non-petroleum Egyptian exports in 2008. It was home
to a fifth of all industrial sector firms and was the largest single employer with over
400,000 workers - which was almost a quarter of the industrial labour force (for all
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numbers see: El-Haddad (2012)).
Strikes and collective action of the official unions in the key sectors of the economy were
absent before 2011. This included the General Union for Tourism and Hotels Workers,
the General Union for Mines and Quarry Workers, the General Union of Petroleum
Workers, and the The General Trade Union of Metal, Engineering and Electrical Work-
ers, which all were part or the ETUF framework. The oil sector was characterised by
subcontracting and outsourcing to subcontracted firms that were founded especially to
dump wages and working conditions. Dismissal was a common punishment for showing
discontent, as happened with many of the workers that organised a sit-in in front of the
Ministry of Petroleum in 2010, and the official petrol union denied workers to address
violations of workers’ rights (Ramadhi, 2010).
The situation became, however, different in other sectors of the economy, in which
protests started to become significant in the mid 2000s. Although the ETUF remained
its hands-off approach concerning the workers grievances, and the foundation of inde-
pendent unions was restricted, union-like organisations with a non-bureaucratic, demo-
cratic leadership approach (Alexander, 2010a) were formed by the workforce. These
loose organisations soon began to target the neuralgic points of the Egyptian economy
and state system. Protests started in the textile sector in 2006, when more than 25,000
workers were mobilised and frequent protests continued until 2010. Most noteworthy
- besides the sheer number of protesters which reached a critical mass that impeded a
harsh response by the security forces - many of the protests also enjoyed the support
of local committees of the official General Union for Spinning and Weaving Workers.
During the protests in the Tanta Linen Company, for instants, the union paid strike
money to striking workers (Omar et al., 2010), and in Mahalla al-Kubra local union
officials took part in formulating and submitting the workers’ demands to the company
administration (Hussein, 2010).
Since 2008 protests also emerged in the public sector70. The bargaining power of the
protesters was high enough to force the government to make concessions, and con-
sequently, the independent trade union organisations. This stands in sharp contrast
to Jordan and Libya where workers did not have a strong leverage against the regime
due to their weakness in key sectors. The case of Egypt is therefore coded KEYS = (1).
70Kahlid Ali (2011a) provides the most comprehensive enumeration of sectors involved between 2009
and 2010, including teachers, educational administrators and university professors in the education
sector, doctors, nurses, paramedics and health insurance employees in the health sector, rail-road and
metro-workers in the transportation sector and property-tax collectors in the financial sector. He
also mentions servants of al-Azhar, the waqf administration, data collectors at the Central Account-
ing Agency, as well as workers with the revenue department in Alexandria, revenue collectors and
cashiers in Asyut, civil servants with the Ministry of Manpower, workers with the Forensic Medicine
Department and prosecutor’s offices and workers and navigators of the Suez Canal Authority.
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Professional Associations and the Democratic Opening
Similar to Jordan, and in sharp contrast to Libya, the history, stance, and environ-
ment of professional associations in Egypt was different from the fate of the worker’s
unions. Professional associations have a comparatively long history in Egypt and the
politically most active were founded during the 1940s and 1950s. The Lawyers Union
pioneered in 1912 and was followed by the Medical Union (1940), the Press Union
(1941), the Engineering Union (1946), and finally the Teacher’s Union (1954) (Reid,
1974, p.24). Twenty one other professional white-collar associations were formed until
1994 according to official Egyptian numbers (SIS Egypt, 2009). From 1958 onwards,
similar to government positions and trade union positions, membership in the union
councils was tied to ASU membership and, after 1977, to a permission by the General
Attorney (Fahmy, 1998, p.555). Additionally, Army officers from the engineering units
and the medical corps took charge of high ranking posts in the respective associations,
and also the newly established Teacher’s Union was set up and heavily influenced by
a number of Army officers. This happened with the help of repeated crackdowns on
the associations councils under Nasser and Sadat, as many professional associations,
especially lawyers and journalists, repeatedly pushed for a curtail of Army influence
and an independent party system (Fahmy, 1998, p.555).
With the (restricted) political liberalisation of the 1980s, the manning of the asso-
ciation’s councils changed, as opposition parties like the liberal New Wafd or smaller
socialist parties managed to send representatives into the councils. Additionally, the in-
creased legitimacy of the Muslim Brotherhood in parliament and in civil society spilled
over into the associations, especially into the professional associations of engineers,
lawyers, journalists, and doctors. These organisation became a major platform for
criticism of the government and mobilisation (Hafez and Wiktorowicz, 2004, p.74).71
The 1987 parliamentary elections which allowed for independent candidates led to the
relative success (60/346 seats) of a leftist-Islamist coalition of the Islamist Labour
Party, the Liberal Socialists Party (another remainder of the ASU), and the Muslim
Brotherhood. Trying to benefit from this upwind, the Brotherhood participated - al-
beit with limited success - for the first time in the ETUF trade union elections that
followed (Beinin, 2011c, p.158). Despite this limited success in workers’ unions, the
Islamic current managed to gain a foothold in the professional white-collar unions,
although its members rarely ran for the office of the council president. They rather
supported the governmental candidate instead - in return for the candidate’s mediation
with the regime on the Brotherhood’s behalf (Fahmy, 1998, p.553).
71This has to be put into the context of the authoritarian environment the unions operated in.
Professional association also suffered from fraud in elections, corruption scandals, government inter-
vention, and so forth. Still, especially due to the weakness of political parties, although to a lesser
extent than in Jordan, the associations functioned as a limited substitute for political participation
and a platform for political discussions (Fahmy, 1998, p.556).
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6.11.3 Trade Unions and Regime Change: The Hesitating
Change Agent
The activity of the Egyptian worker’s movement during the protests 2012 - 2013 has at-
tracted much attention among scholars and policymakers. The following section argues,
that trade union organisations indeed attempted to alter the institutional equilibrium
inside the country. Moreover, the relation to opposition forces will be discussed in order
to find a reasonable coding for the variable INOPP. As will be shown, the relationship
is difficult to assess and eventually two periods of time will be identified. Before the
emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood as dominant player on the political stage and
after.
The Foremath of the Protests of 2011: People in Motion
By tracing the history of Egypt before the 2011, one quickly discovers that Egypt was
already characterised by instability and politicised civil society activity before the pic-
tures of the successful mass protests from Tunisia arrived on the mobile phones of its
population. Beyond the institutionalised frameworks of ETUF and professional asso-
ciations, independent labour action grew steadily. During 1971-1972 workers struck at
numerous large public-sector enterprises in the textile, iron, and port sector. Those
union leaders that were involved were mostly fired and the ETUF condemned the col-
lective actions. Food riots in 1977 due to suspended subsidies on flour, sugar, rice and
cooking oil caused Sadat to purge the union ranks from leftists (Aoudé, 1994, p.13).
Nonetheless, major strikes followed in 1985, 1986, and 1989 (Beinin, 2011c, p.128;158).
The workers received moral and legal support from opposition parties and also from the
courts. After the 1986 train driver’s strike, Tagammu’ Party lawyers argued success-
fully that international human rights agreements could override domestic legislation.
This would also include a legalisation of the right to strike that had not been granted
before (Taha, 2014; Posusney, 1997).
Also political discontent grew continuously in Egypt since the 2000s and several pil-
lars of the institutional equilibrium were targeted. First, the electoral process got into
the focus of reformist endeavours of parts of the judiciary, the New Wafd, the Islamic
Labour Party, the Nasserist Party, Tagammu’, and different NGO’s. Their agenda
for reform also called for a lifting of the state of emergency, the freedom to operate
independent media, and guarantees for the independence of civil society (Moustafa,
2007, p.188). Second, after Bashar Al-Assad’s ascendency to power in Syria in 2000,
rumours emerged about the willingness of Husni Mubarak to position his son Gamal as
his successor in a similar manner. Additionally, the announcement of Husni Mubarak
to candidate again in 2005, although the constitution had to be changed, caused re-
sistance. In 2004, a loose alliance of Egyptian intellectuals set the cornerstones for a
movement called "enough" (Arabic: Kefaya) that became a coalition of political parties
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united by their demand for a shift in the balance of power (Oweidat, 2008, p.11). Roots
of the movement can be found already at the beginning of the solidarity committees
that spread throughout Egypt following the start of the Second Intifada in October
2000. Their demands, which were unprecedented since 1952, included a call for a par-
liamentary republic with real separation of power, an independent judicial system, and
free elections (Oweidat, 2008; Al-Din Sha’ban, 2006, p.11). Their main slogans - and
at the same time the mutual base the heterogeneous movement could agree on - was
"no inheritance, no extension!". Their call to boycott the referendum, which was held
in 2005 to empower Mubarak to run for a further term, was joined by the New Wafd
Party, the Nasserist Party, the Tagammu‘ Party, Ayman Nur’s al-Ghad Party, and the
Muslim Brotherhood. Despite this broad alliance and regular street protests erupting
throughout the country, the referendum was accepted on May 25 2005. Kefaya became
weaker in the following years, however, reappeared during the protests of 2011.
Third, in addition to the challenge of the electoral system and the rule of Mubarak
from new emerging youth movements without explicit ideology, activists of the Revo-
lutionary Socialists Egypt (RS), a Trotzkist group, that was founded in the 1980s, grew
in numbers since the second Intifada (2000-2005), and developed a network of online
and offline publications (Alexander and Auragh, 2014, p.903). Anti-Israeli protests as
well as protests against the Iraq war 2003 served as rehearsals for the upheavals that
would take place in 2011.
Fourth, the patrimonial capitalist structure of the country and its implications with
regard to the disparities between the rich and the poor became more obvious. Nader
Fergany, responsible author for the UNDP Arab Human Development Report 2002
describes the situation of Egypt as (King, 2009, p.9):
a very sinister cohabitation of power and capital. [...] The middle class has been
shrinking while there has been an enlargement of the super-rich. State owned
enterprises have been sold to a minority of rich people. The record of private
sector enterprises creating jobs is very poor. We are not reaping the benefits of
an energetic bourgeoisie, what we have is a parasitical, comprador class.[...] The
consequences will be no less than catastrophic. This society is a candidate for a
difficult period of intense, violent social conflict, and the kind of government we
have will not do.
A Young Trade Union Movement Stressing its Political Independence
As shown above, similar to Jordan, and in sharp contrast to Libya, the late 2000s wit-
nessed a palpable growth of civil society activities also connected to collective labour
action. Especially in the context of the eroding authoritarian bargain rule, the number
of socio-economic protests and strikes increased. Taking a look at the economic figures
of Egypt, this endeavour seems understandable. Egypt had, with about 24 per cent,
the fourth highest degree of youth unemployment in the region in 2010, excluding the
Gulf Region. The total unemployment rate of about 9 per cent had not decreased
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significantly, but had been stagnating since 2000. Inflation took an average of 9 per
cent per year since 2000, and peaked in a hyperinflation of 18 per cent in 2008 and 11
per cent in 2009 and 2010 respectively. These are the highest inflation values in the
entire sample. The purchasing power of the minimum wage has dropped about one
third since 2000. As a breach of the authoritarian bargain can be assumed - that also
had been addressed by multiple voices - the variable SOEC is coded (1) for Egypt.
The handling of the variable INOPP is rather difficult. The connection of the socio-
economic centred labour unrest to the more political Kefaya movement or to young
online activists is contested. Oweidat (2008) states that these protests were indepen-
dent of Kefaya but inspired by it, others like Taha (2014) or Beinin (2015) stress that
the trajectory of labour unrest was detached from it and yet older than the politicised
groups of the 2000s. Indeed, the demands of the Mahalla Al-Kubra textile workers,
of which between 2006 and 2008 up to 25.000 went on strike, aimed mostly at short
term socio-economic enhancement. At this stage, institutionalisation, both of the po-
litical and the workers movement, was still underdeveloped (Oweidat, 2008, p.39), but
the question of the separation of economic and political demands already riddled the
activists of all camps. A group of activists that aimed at enhancing communication
and networking among the new emerging movements, called Tadamun split over the
issue of the workers struggles, some calling the workers politically immature, others
pushing for a broader alliance (Abdelrahman, 2014). The emerging February 6 Youth
Movement set up an influential Facebook page in order to support the striking workers
of Mahalla al-Kubra. They also called - albeit without explicit agreement of the local
workers’ leaders - for a general strike on that date in 2008, on which a large strike in
Mahalla Al-Kubra had already been scheduled.
Other post-Kifaya youth movements like the Youth for Justice and Freedom (Arab.:
Hanghiar), or the RS-offshoot Popular Democratic Movement for Change (Arab.: Hashd)
perceived and criticised the separation between political-intellectual demands of change
and socio-economic workers’ struggles (Abdelrahman, 2014). An unofficial draft of a
new alternative labour law, that was supported by a broad alliance 25 organisations
comprising the Tagammu Party, the Nasserists, the Ghad Party, the Kefaya Move-
ment, and the Muslim Brotherhood, was published a year after the Mahalla-incident
(’Ali, 2009, p.73-74). Slowly more and more ties were established between political ac-
tivists and leaders of the workers’ struggle. However, the advances made by the Youth
movements towards the labour movement were often regarded with discontent among
workers, especially as Mubarak intensified harassment on workers’ organisations after
the April 6 strike (Abdallah, 2017, p.17).
Workers organisation got pushed to a higher level when in April 2009 the Union of
Real Estate Tax Authority Employees Egypt (URETAE) was set up ignoring the legal
prohibition for free unions in Egypt, that was in force since 1957. In 2007, already
5000 members of the official ETUF bodies in Mahalla Al-Kubra resigned and formed
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workers’ committees, however, they had not tried the official path to be recognised as
trade union. The tax collectors union was, after a successful struggle about benefits,
officially acknowledged and even supported by the Minister of Finance and the Minister
of Manpower. Only the ETUF leadership and the official union of bank and finance
employees refused to accept an independent union in their realms of influence (Al-Misri
Al-Yaum, 2009). The same was true for the Independent Teachers’ Syndicate Egypt
(ITS), that was founded in July 2010. The first step into more political waters was
undertaken by a group called "Democratic Engineers", who stated that "unionisation is
a major arm of achieving democracy" and struggled in the entire country for achieving
the independence of the Engineers Union from state intervention (Abdelrahman, 2014,
p.616). In the same year, politicised protests became slightly more common also among
workers, however, remained exceptional. On May 1 2010 some hundred workers and
other protesters demanding the implementation of a minimum wage chanted "a fair
minimum wage, or let this government go home," and "down with Mubarak and all
those who raise prices" in front of the Peoples’ Assembly in Cairo (Beinin, 2015).
Trade Union Activities During the Protests
During this atmosphere of alliance forging, disobedience, and discontent, the news
about the ouster of Ben Ali arrived in Egypt. Various youth organisations72 scheduled
protests on January 25 2011, coinciding with the annual "Police Holiday". The protests
took place in front of the Ministry of Interior and criticised foremost police brutality,
the emergency law, and demanded the resign of the Ministry of the Interior. About
15,000 moved further and occupied the Tahrir-Square. Among the first to utter the
clear will to remove Mubarak from office was the RS, in public often represented by fa-
mous opposition journalist Hossam El-Hamalawy. Also Asmaa Mahfouz, leading figure
of the 6 April Youth Movement demanded on behalf of the movement the immediate
resign of Mubarak and the dissolution of the national assembly and senate. Fuelled by
police violence the demonstrators faced at the Tahrir square, and characterised by a
higher degree of organisation, the "Friday of Rage" followed on January 28. Also an in-
creased number of members of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tagammu’ Party, who
now supported the protests unanimously, joined the rallies of hundreds of thousands
of protesters. The protests that proceeded for many weeks were eventually protected
by the Army, that on February 13 technically overtook the country, and that became
the most powerful player in the transition process.
At the beginning of the uprisings, organised labour did not play a major role, as workers
rather participated as individuals than as representatives of a particular craft (Beinin,
72The number of youth organisations and ad-hoc networks before, during, and after the revolution-
ary period of January 25 until March 11 is multitudinous and only few scholars bothered to disentangle
the various alliances when making conclusions about the course of the revolution. An approximately
comprehensive overview can be found in Joya (2011, p.368-370).
6.11. EGYPT (1) 291
2015). However, two days after the Friday of Rage, the Egyptian Federation of Inde-
pendent Trade Unions (EFITU) emerged directly from Tahrir Square. It was mainly
initiated by the clandestine and independent unions of Real Estate Tax Authority work-
ers, healthcare technicians, and teachers, and was joined by the 8.5 million-member
retirees association. Also representatives of the economically important textile sector,
as well as pharmaceutical, chemical, iron and steel, and automotive workers from the
industrial zones in Cairo, Helwan, Mahalla Al-Kubra, Tenth of Ramadan, and Sadat
City joined (Beinin, 2011b, p.189). Fearing that the protests might enter the enterprises
and shop floors, the government had already ordered a closure of all public business
enterprises from January 28 until February 5 2011. After that period, fifty to sixty
thousand workers started strikes at dozens of workplaces (Beinin, 2015).
On March 2 2011 leaders of the new federation gathered and set up a number of de-
mands in their statement "What Workers Want from the Revolution" which included
mainly socio-economic calls for social justice, but also demanded the dismantling of
the old regime, including the ETUF structure. The new organisational platform eased
and accelerated collective, collusive, and coordinated action. The EFITU called for a
general strike on March 9 demanding the ouster of Hosni Mubarak. Tens of thousands
of workers joined all over the country, including those employed at large and strategic
workplaces like the Cairo Public Transport Authority, Egyptian State Railways, the
subsidiary companies of the Suez Canal Authority, the state electrical company, and
Ghazl al-Mahalla — answered the call, engaging in some 60 strikes and protests in
the final days before Mubarak’s fall on February 11 (Beinin, 2012). On May 1, 2011,
protesters on the Tahrir Square distributed a signed statement from 49 trade union
organisations, political parties and non-governmental organisations calling for a min-
imum wage of 1,500 pounds (about 250 dollars) a month and a maximum wage to
ensure a "fair distribution of wealth" in the country. They also demanded to freeze the
union assets of the ETUF (AFP, 2011).
By demanding the fall of the regime and deep economic changes that jeopardised the
crowny elite (Abdelrahman, 2014, p.614), the majority of the about 400 unions that
emerged after the foundations of the EFITU, clearly uttered demands that went beyond
socio-economic particular enhancement and that targeted the institutional equilibrium
of the country. The outcome of the case of Egypt is therefore (1).
The New Trade Union’s Movement Difficult Relation to Opposition Groups
The relationship to the democracy movement and the political sphere as such remained
complicated though. ETIUF founder Kamal Abu Eita, founder of the Union of Inde-
pendent Real Estate Tax Officers, became a leader of the National Dignity Party and
a member of the post-revolution parliament until it was dissolved in June 2012. He
was one of the few bridges between the workers movement and political parties. The
ETIFU structure was weak from the beginning, top-down driven, and often lacking
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contact to the workers’ bases. Leading figure of the RS, Sameh Naguib, had already
uttered on January 23 2011 his hopes to build a workers party with the help of in-
dependent trade unions (Ali, 2011b), but there were still concerns. Abdallah (2017,
p.16-17) pins it down stating:
The experience of Mahalla Al-Kubra intensified the split between worker issues
and the political issues and it ingrained workers’ scepticism about everything
that is political. Despite the relative openness of the political sphere in the
aftermath of the January Revolution, the leadership of the new unions insisted
on the separation of workers and politicians while rejecting the union movement’s
affiliation with any of the political parties.
The turmoil disbanded by the uprisings 2011 did not cease for many years, while
the newly established trade union organisations struggled for a mutual strategy. One
of the results was the departure of the Pensioners Association from the EFITU for
the sake of the foundation of a new federation called Egyptian Democratic Labour
Congress (EDLC) that followed a series of intestine strife among other things about
the degree of international intervention into the trade union organisations.73 The two
federations announced an alliance in October 2012. Trade unions also participated in
the push towards the June 30, 2013 elections, and the EFITU and EDLC collected to-
gether with the Permanent Congress of Alexandria Workers (PCAW) signatures against
Muhammad Morsi and hosted events of Tamarrod, the most important alliance aiming
at toppling the newly elected president (Beinin, 2013a).
Indeed, with the growing dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the poltical stage,
the attitudes of the bulk of independent union leaders changed. Prominent union lead-
ers encouraged in popular television talk shows workers to join the Tamarrod campaign
and to strengthen their presence on the political scene (Selim, 2015, p.72). When the
Muslim Brotherhood eventually ascended to power, the Brotherhood’s loose support
for the union movement ceased, especially many white-collar unions pulled out of the
political arena, and workers’ unions became more politicised and close to the leftist
parties (later "Labour Bloc") (Abdallah, 2017, p.18). The refusal of the Brotherhood’s
Labour Minister, Khaled al-Azhari, to pass a law drafted by Ahmed al-Borai in favour
of trade union freedoms has made the EITUF and the EDLC form an alliance together
with the National Salvation Front74. The polarisation between the Brotherhood and
the unions was exacerbated by the attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to increase its
influence in the old union Structure of the ETUF. After the fraudulent union elections
73The problems caused by international grants, training courses, workshops, and other incentives is
rarely discussed in anglophone literature. Abdallah (2017) gives valuable insights, for a more rigorous
and well-researched statement about the problems faced by the newly established unions that includes
the harmfulness of foreign influence causing scandals, struggles, and corruption see ’Uz (2019).
74The NSF Egypt was an alliance of secular parties chaired by Al-Baradei and aiming at making
Mursi annul his constitutional declaration of November, to cancel the referendum on the new con-
stitution scheduled for late December, and the formation of a new constitutional assembly. Most
prominent parts were Nasserist parties, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, Free Egypt Party, the
Wafd Party, the Free Egyptians Party and even the General Farmers Association, a body that had
been highly co-opted into the pre-2011 system.
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of 2006 were annulled on August 2011, the cabinet had appointed a committee includ-
ing members of the Muslim Brothers to run the federation on an interim basis until the
next elections (Beinin, 2012, p.10). A decree also authorised Muslim Brother Khalid
al-Azhari, the new minister for manpower, to appoint functionaries for vacant union
posts, leading to some 150 Brotherhood-affiliated appointees at the helm of important
ETUF unions (Beinin, 2013b).
Trade Union Strategies before and after the the Muslim Brotherhood came
to the Fore
As seen in the previous section, concerning the variable INOPP, Egypt is the case which
is the most difficult to assess. The largest opposition block, the Muslim Brotherhood
participated in Egypt’s ETUF trade union elections of 2001 and 2006. Already since
the late 1980s, members of the organisation were successfully participating in elections
of the boards of the lawyers’, engineers’ and the physicians’ associations. This mirrors
their strategy to start their march through the institutions instead of relying on revo-
lutionary rhetoric. It has also be seen as a rehearsal for future parliamentary elections
(Al-Taweel, 1994, p.17). This strategy did not remain unnoticed inside the Islamic
Camp and was heavily criticised by Salafi leader Hazem Salah Abu Ismail stating that
the Muslim Brotherhood would only sham silence while trying to get control of the
Egyptian economy, trade unions, student organisations, and the media (Al-Taweel,
1994, p.104). However, the influence on professional associations did not reach the
extent as witnessed in Jordan.
In 2009, Muslim Brotherhood member of parliament Yosri Mohamed Bayoumi openly
criticised the trade unions law No. 12 of 1995, as well as the government interference in
the ETUF trade union elections of 2006 (Gilal, 2009). The interference that included
harassment and exclusion of candidates of the Muslim Brotherhood was officially jus-
tified by state authorities as step to contain Islamism. Given the very limited chances
of Muslim Brotherhood candidates in the elections anyway, the complains can be read
as strategy to discredit the government instead of a true avowal to workers unionism.
Indeed, despite the apparent emergence of Islamic forces in professional white-collar
associations, political Islam did not manage to constitute an effective force within the
workers unions. First, the grip of the state and, also different from Jordan, secular
currents inside these organisations still seemed to be too strong. Second, the Mahalla
Al-Kubra experience as outlined in section 6.11.3 made most workers avoid political
involvement. Third, similar to chambers of commerce and industry, workers unions
were traditionally perceived by leading Islamists as strongly connected with the West-
ern world, especially the United States of America, and the basic strategy became to
isolate rather than to integrate them into a future Islamic project (Al-Sayid, 1988,
p.426). By fact, in the years before the Uprising of 2011, the Egyptian NGO sector
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was flooded with foreign donors often linked to the US-backed "democracy agenda"
supporting the work of campaigners, human rights organisations, and labour rights
initiatives (Blackburn, 2018). The Muslim Brotherhood did not gain much influence
among the emerging government critical organisations, and consequently, attempted
to take over the old ETUF structure after the fall of Mubarak faced fierce resistance
of the workers movement that had gained self-confidence and still feared political co-
optation.
In contrast to Jordan, Egyptian professional associations remained, just like the Mus-
lim Brotherhood itself, relatively silent during the peak of the upheavals, the political
left tried to take advantage and mobilise the workers for their purposes. The politi-
cisation of the trade union movement advanced glacially, and despite of being pushed
forward by youth movements, Nasserists, or the RS, first mutual mistrust prevailed.
Kamal Abu Eita, founder of URETAE in 2009, activist during the 25th January Rev-
olution, and co-founder and General Secretary of the first independent trade union
federation EFITU was a high member of the Nasserist Dignity Party. But he largely
remained an exception at the higher levels of politics. The alliance forging with the
National Salvation Front and the Labour Block, however, indicate strong ties to oppo-
sition movements, especially in the years 2012-2013. Cooperations for instance with the
Tagammu’ Party and Tadamoon were intensified during that period of time. There-
fore the case of Egypt will be coded INOPP = (0) for the time before 2012 in a first
minimisation and INOPP = (1) in a second one for the time after 2012. By that way
the results can be compared and interpreted on a qualitative basis.
6.12 Syria (0)
Syria is a mixture of a mobilising party system with official mass organisations and
tribal policies that are a decisive element of the composition in the ruling elite. Ad-
ditionally, the regime resorted to violence and repression to an extraordinary extent
in order to maintain the status quo. It is a system where the ruling class regards the
maintenance of the monopoly of government as the most important factor to secure
its survival, so its basic interest is tied directly to its domination of the state (Marks,
1992, p.403). The case of Syria is coded (0), according to the QCA codification. This
is due to the lack of independent grass-root unions supporting protests, and a clear
pro government stance of the state controlled unions - which form a part of the logic
of legitimacy of the regime itself.
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SOEC INOPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Decimal
0 0 1 1 0 1 SYR(6)
Table 6.15: Truth table row for the case of Syria
As will be depicted in part 6.12.1, tribalism played a pivotal role in the system,
although the official rhetoric of the regime is coined by Arab Socialist and nationalist
slogans. Also the initial uprising of 2011 was mainly conducted by tribal networks.
The variable TRI is hence coded (1). The economic indicators introduced in part
6.12.4 justify the coding of SOEC as (0), as Syria was, especially when compared
with the other countries of the sample, economically relatively stable. Part 6.12.3 will
show that trade unions were heavily controlled and centralised by the regime from its
very beginning, and, similarly to Yemen, it put substantial effort in maintaining this
centralisation; hence CEN is set to (1). Part 6.12.5 will show that the opposition was
fragmented and too weak to build alliances with a hypothetical independent workers
movement. Moreover, the extraordinary extent of violence that is used to repress
discontent plays a role in this context, leading to the coding of INOPP as (0). The
totalitarian nature of the regime did not allow for manoeuvring space for bargaining
outside arranged and pre-decided paths, as will be shown in part 6.12.3. The unions’
bargaining power was not built upon worker’s militancy but was, if at all, clearly
delimited in advance by the regime. KEYS is hence set to (0).
6.12.1 The Equilibrium: The Party, the Army, and Mass Mo-
bilisation
In the constitution of 1973, the president was the pivotal element of the state. He was
elected directly by the people, appointed the Prime Minister, the ministers, and their
deputies (Art. 95), was allowed veto the laws issued by the Assembly (Art.98) and to
issues decrees, decisions, orders (Art.99) and laws (Art.111), declare and terminate a
state of emergency (Art.100), and he was allowed to dissolve the People’s Assembly
(Art.107). The People’s Assembly or Syrian People’s Council, which resembles the
parliament, played a limited role, was convened in three ordinary sessions yearly only
(Art.61), and could overrule the decisions of the President with a two-third majority.
In the elections that were held every four years, the Ba’ath Party - labelled by the
constitution the "leading party in the society and the state" (Art.8) - gained between
half and two thirds of the seats between 1973 and 2007, and saw its share of deputies
increased every term.
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The Army as Stepping Stone for a Tribal Regime
The Army proved to be a non-circumventable power with the coup of February 23,
1966, that split the Ba’ath party in two. Military circles of the Ba’ath could oust
the rather civil wing of Michel ’Aflaq, and, in 1970 Defence Minister Hafiz Al-Assad
overtook the government in a bloodless coup. He had been informed in November
1970 that a party congress had voted to remove him from his party and government
posts, so he decided to initiate a "correction" inside the party and the country (Devlin,
1991, p.1403-1404). Assad was of the heterodox Shi’i sect of the ’Allawis, likely the
historically least-favoured rural community in Syria at that time. ’Alawis have been
prominent in the military and security services since the mid-1960s, as the military
provided a chance for upward mobility. Additionally, between 1965 and 1968, a power
struggle inside the militant Ba’ath wing rendered an ’Allawi group around Salah Jadid
supreme against a group of rural Sunni officers who were loyal to Sunni General Amin
al-Hafiz. In the decades that followed, Assad would improve the standard of living
of rural areas, and, first and foremost, select trusted men such as brothers, cousins,
or clansmen for sensitive posts, of which especially his ’Allawi Qalbiyya clan and the
Al-Matawira tribe would benefit.
To consolidate power, the regime resorted to two major strategies. First, the state
supplied its citizens with social security benefits and job opportunities in exchange for
political quiescence - accordingly to the often aforementioned authoritarian bargain.
To that end, it interfered heavily in the economy through regulations, nationalisations,
the establishment of state-owned industry and job opportunities in the public sector
Conduit (2016, p.76). By fact, Article 36 of the Syrian constitution states that "[w]ork
is a right, as well as a duty, to every citizen, that the state shall provide for all citi-
zens".
Second, since the 1970s, the regime co-opted local leaders into the state apparatus.
Strategic official appointments of sheikhs and subsidies for loyalty became a major
strategy to keep vast parts of the society in check. Standing in contrast to the offi-
cial national slogans of "no sectarianism" and "no tribalism", such flexibility broadened
the power base of Hafez Al-Assad (Dukhan, 2014; Chatty, 2013). The reliance on
kinship and the party became a main pillar of power, together with pro-Palestinian
and Pan-Arab rhetoric, secularism, and the protection of religious minorities - espe-
cially Christians - against discrimination. Moreover, domestic security, increased social
justice often tied to hints at the land reforms were stressed(Wieland, 2012, p.80-92).
Opposing the Middle Class and Poltitical Islam
About five years after its seizure of power, the regime had to face its first radical threat
from the inside, jeopardizing the regime’s pillars. It is often associated with the Mus-
lim Brotherhood that had grown in importance since the 1950s. It was probably the
most visible part of the population that criticised economic and social performance of
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the regime - hinting at many empty promises, mismanagement, and corruption. Af-
ter the nationalisation of vast parts of the economy, Syria’s small merchant class was
especially prone to making such a criticism. (Conduit, 2016, p.74). The Brotherhood
and left wing parties also criticised the role of Syria in the Lebanese war in 1976,
whilst many also questioned the imbalance of distribution of posts favouring ’Allawis.
The Brotherhood, for instance, claimed that a country run by less than 10 per cent
of the population would be against the "logic of things" (Batatu, 1982). In 1976, a
wave of violence broke out when radicals of the Brotherhood attacked ’Allawi func-
tionaries in hit-and-run killings, as well as security agents and professionals, and also
targeted government buildings, police stations, Ba’ath party institutions, and Army
units. Moreover, in June 1979, 83 ’Allawi cadets of the Artillery Academy at Aleppo
were killed in a spectacular assault, and, in 1980 Hafiz Al-Assad escaped an assassina-
tion attempt.
The actions of the Brotherhood were conducted in a time of discontent, and were par-
ticularly a threat to the regime as they were technically part of a wider, yet peaceful
protest movement that was backed by a secular opposition including lawyers, mer-
chants, professional unions, Nasserites, Communists and dissident Ba’athists (Con-
duit, 2016, p.75). They were able to organise large demonstrations and large-scale
shut-downs of shops and schools notably as at Hama and Aleppo in 1980. At the same
time, the militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood conducted hit and run attacks on
officials and worsened the security situation in the country.
The response on the part of the government was ferocious. As early as June 1980,
security forces killed over 400 men in Palmyra, most of them radical Islamists, in a
alleged escape attempt from a prison in Palmyra. The membership of the Muslim
Brotherhood was put under death penalty by Decree 49 of 1980. In February 1982,
so as to suppress an expected rising by the Muslim Brotherhood, government forces
erased in an air-strike supported offensive up to 20,000 people in three weeks. In many
cities, armed clashes broke out, in which about 1,000 government troops are said to
have died, and in which Al-Assad also resorted to militias of loyal tribes (Rae, 1999;
Dukhan, 2014). The brutal crackdown in Hama, Homs, Aleppo and elsewhere in the
country was followed by years of stability by suppression. This also led Syria to remain
paralysed in shock when the third wave of democratisation rolled over many parts of
the world after 1989.
6.12.2 An Authoritarian Hybridisation of the System
Secret service structures were extended, penetrating the lives of Syrian citizens in
all possible strata of life. Although the regime never reached a status of rigorous
totalitarianism and personal cult, like Iraq under Saddam Hussein, the state that Hafiz
Al-Assad left behind in 2000 had clear authoritarian characteristics. Opposition in civil
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society was minimised or co-opted, and all official political parties had to be members
of the National Progressive Front, which consisted, by 2011, of nine member parties,
including the ruling Ba’ath Party. By law, the president of the republic is also the head
of the National Progressive Front and Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party. Political
parties are required to support the principles of the revolution, which include socialism
and Arab nationalism.
As the successor, the hopes that were put into Bashar Al-Assad would vanish some
years after the beginning of his incumbency. True, he showed signs of loosening the
grip of the security apparatus on the country, such as the closing down of the notorious
Mezzah political prison which had become a symbol of the regime’s brutality (Landis
and Pace, 2007, p.47). However, the short flaring-up of civil society and intellectuals
demanding reform of the regime in the so-called "Damascus Spring" between 2000 and
2001 was followed by a new wave of incarceration, police violence, and repression. In the
"Damascus Declaration" of 2005, the opposition could wrest off a number of concessions
from the government in a time of strategic shifts in the region and government strategies
(Landis and Pace, 2007, p.46-48). The assassination of the former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri of which individuals close to the Assad clan were accused of
being involved, polluted the relationship with the US significantly. Additionally, it
triggered a popular upheaval in Lebanon that forced the Syrian troops out of the
country, ending a 30-year military presence. Opposition movements can often achieve
their goals in times of government weakness, however, in 2007 another crackdown on
the opposition followed. By 2010, the system of Syria seemed extraordinarily stable,
prompting many observers to speak of "The Syrian Exception" (Donati, 2011).
6.12.3 Trade Unions as a Regime’s Pillar
Syrian trade unionism had to emancipate from feudal structures and family bonds,
whilst facing difficulties to set up unions independent of the petit bourgeoisie, the
craft masters, and against the efforts of the French authorities to prevent them. The
watersheds of Syrian labour history occurred in the 1930s, and, in 1938 three unions
representing the working classes of Damascus, Aleppo and Homs set up the first na-
tionwide general Federation of Trade Unions (Hanna, 1973).
The Ba’ath and the Unions: Cooperation turning Domination
The program and strategy of the newly emerged Ba’ath party provided a fertile ground
for trade unionism, with the calls for social justice of the 1947 program coinciding with
many workers demands. It included the limitation of agricultural holdings, worker
participation in management as well as state ownership of heavy industry, natural re-
sources, and public utilities (Devlin, 1991, p.1398). The existing trade unions were
dominated by the Communists and Nasserists, but came under greater control of the
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Ba’ath in the course of its consolidation of power (Perthes, 1995, p.38-39). Eventually,
unions became a regime supporting part of the institutional equilibrium themselves
when the Ba’ath set up their popular organisations (munazzamat sha’biyya). The
Syrian regime had, in contrast to other governments of that time, highly subsidised
the emergence and organisation of unions as early as the 1950s in order to "provide
social and industrial peace" (Halpern, 1963, p.319). Peasants, youth, and women were
- partly by force, partly willingly - incorporated, as well as many trade unions, in
which party cadres happened to dominate the leadership after some time (Hinnebusch,
1993, p.247). In 1968, the regime cemented through Decree No.84 a rigid trade union
structure with a single national federation: the General Federation of Trade Unions
Syria (GFTU). This legal framework allowed practically allowed no union plurality in
the trades, and implemented a system of local and regional branches that were obliged
to report to the higher level. These organisations are supported to this day by the
government and serve also as a recruitment basis for posts.
Dissimilar to Yemen, and resembling the logic of the Egyptian ETUF, the official trade
union structure was an inherent part of the logic of power whereby the composition of
the parliament was tied to quotas, and according to the constitution, at least half of
the deputies have to be workers and peasants (Art. 53). First, however, the law does
not stipulate from which part of the country, sect, or tribe the delegates have to be,
creating the possibility to place ’Allawi allies in high ranking positions. Second, the
formation of the trade union officials was at least as professional and straightforward
as in Egypt; Decree No.16 of 1972 established special trade union schools for the for-
mation of junior party members.
Concerning the political role of unions, the regime implemented the ideas from the 10th
Congress of the Russian Communist Party that had declared to make trade unions
schools for the sustaining of the ideology in the long run. The 1972 Conference of the
GFTU thus defined the role of trade unions as less "political" and rather "demanding"
or "postulative" (Perthes, 1995, p.174), resembling the role that was ascribed to trade
unions by the Gaddafi regime in Libya.
Indeed, the union structures - especially the Women’s Union and the Peasant’s Union
- showed little opposition to the regime, perhaps due to a broader lack of support from
other regimes to this part of society. This is mirrored in the extent to which mem-
bership numbers grew between 1975 and 1990: the number of trade union members
tripled, the members of the Engineers Union sextupled, and the number of members
of the Agricultural Union even increased twelve-fold (Hinnebusch, 1993, p.247). These
numbers have to be read with care, as union membership is generally not compulsory
by law, however, to a certain extent, it could prevent being regarded as suspicious by
the security apparatus. Moreover, union membership gave access to fringe benefits,
such as pensions and public healthcare (Perthes, 1995, p.176), following the logic of
the "Ghent System" of Scandinavian countries that also display high union density.
300 CHAPTER 6. MENA LABOUR UNIONS (2010 - 2012)
The Watershed of Hama
For the Syrian trade union movement as a whole, the uprisings between 1978-1982 were
also decisive. The prominence of the Muslim Brotherhood at this time, according to
the lion’s share of the literature - and the propaganda of the regime - often distracts
from other pivotal forces and groups (Seale, 1992, p.321-322). Indeed, the Brotherhood
was one of the most visible players during the waves of discontent that had already
started in the 1960s and peaked in the 1980s. However, already in 1965, professional
associations conducted vast demonstrations which criticised the lack of democracy in
the country (Meininghaus, 2016, p.76). In order to restrict brain drain, the regime
had granted professional white-collar associations more rights of self-administration,
so they could act more independently. The rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood had
quite some appeal for parts the working class and, especially, of the well-educated strata
of society in socially and economically weak peripheries of the country. Similarly to
many other parts of civil society, the organisation labelled freedom as a basic need, and
strongly condemned martial law, arbitrary decrees and inhuman police practices. The
freedom of the citizens would include to think, publish, assemble, protest, oppose and
form political parties and even independent trade unions (Batatu, 1982). With this
attitude, it not only delimited itself from the dominant Muslim Brotherhood wing in
Egypt, but also actively started to promote unionism and use workplace organisation
as a means to mobilise. This fitted into their programme, as the Brotherhood opposed
state ownership and suggested to give workers more responsibility. They advocated for
ownership of the land by the farmers and the abolishment of middlemen, guardians and
officials who would "suck blood in the name of the state, party and socialism" (Batatu,
1982).
When the first Muslim Brothers were elected into parliament in 1947, they soon at-
tempted to set up ties with the trade union movement and advocated in the favour
of the latter. In return, when a nationwide general strike was called on March 31
1980, branches of the bar associations, teachers, dentists, pharmacists, agricultural
engineers, and physicians professional associations in the strongholds of the uprisings
supported the call and demands of the Brotherhood. Already in early 1980, a coalition
of several trade unionists close to the Islamic spectre and clerics issued a manifesto
in Hama which called for the regime to honour the Human Rights Charter, abolish
the state of emergency, and hold free elections (Friedman, 2012, p.77). However, the
Brotherhood also resorted to intimidation of shopkeepers to force them to join the
strike (Seale, 1992, p.325), meanwhile, on the other side, the official trade union bodies
of the GFTU formed armed militias that helped to put a stopper on the uprisings in
Hama (Perthes, 1995, p.176). Eventually, after the military campaign, the government
dissolved all hostile unions, including their councils and branches, and a large number
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of university professors, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, teachers and religious scholars
were arrested (Ikhwan-Wiki, 2012).
After the uprising abated, not only the professional associations were purged of regime
critics. The workers unions suffered repression as well, foremost because of anti-
government statements during the campaign against the uprisings. Although they
did not show solidarity with the protesters and their demands, they condemned the
violence used against the Syrian working class. After the following crackdown of gov-
ernment sceptic unions and the replacement of their leadership with Ba’ath appointees,
the union movement would never recover its old grit.
The Ministry, the Union, and the Absence of Strikes
The General Federation for Trade Unions consists of 13 branch federations in each
governorate, amounting to 202 unions in the entire country. This net reaches out to
almost all branches of the country. However, the bargaining power of the union, espe-
cially from the rank and file members on the lower levels, is heavily restricted. While
the union enjoys some independence in its self-organisation, it is still bound to, and in
many aspects intertwined with, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour. The Central
Department of Labour inside the ministry contains the Department of Labour Inspec-
tion, the Department of Trade Unions, the Department of Working Conditions, and the
Department of Wages. In this light, the relationship between the state - represented
by the ministry - and the union resembles a well studied play where everyone knows
his place, text, and time to speak. There is little to no maneuvering space in which
bargaining power could play a role.
This is also true for the key sectors of the economy. Rents from natural resources
contributed about 21 per cent to Syria’s GDP (2007), and half of the products were
designated for exports. Moreover, agriculture is also an important part of Syria’s
economy, accounting for 22.9 of all exports in 2010. Besides crude oil, minerals, and
petroleum products, top exports included spice seeds, pure olive oil, fruits, nuts and
non-retail pure cotton yarn. Therefore, the economy, although relatively diversified,
is the least complex one of the entire sample and in the ECI ranking (2008 -2012) on
the penultimate rank of all its 121 countries. 75. The grip of the Syrian regime on the
economy and its population was comparatively strong. The share of tax revenues of
the state incomes nearly doubled between 1993 and 2004 (Schwartz, 2008, 606).
In none of these sectors did strikes take place. Due to the emergency legislation since
75The assessment of the case of Syria is a particularly thankless task, as official numbers, numbers
from the CIA Factbook, and numbers of the World Bank often contradict one another. Even the share
of GDP of the oil exports varies. According to some calculations, oil revenues never exceeded a lower
double digit of the share of total exports, while many scientists still consider oil revenues the most
important income source of the regime. Given its totalitarian-like nature, and the uncontested control
of the official trade union bodies by the state, the assessment of key sectors in order to determine
union strength loses its necessity.
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1963, harsh repression of the population, and given the potential heavy penalties and
the repression of any activity deemed to be critical of the government, workers dared
not to exercise the right to strike (ITUC 2009). Whoever searches the internet for key
terms such as "Syrian oil workers strike" is redirected to an article of the New York
Times from 1965. Nothing left to say: the case of Syria is coded KEYS = (0).
6.12.4 2011: From Protest to Civil War
Focussing on 2011, two major phases can be determined. First, peaceful, civil, and
unarmed protests between February and April and, second, militarisation of the oppo-
sition and the mingling of militant groups into the struggle against the government in
the time that followed.
Dissimilar from Yemen, economic indicators were relatively stable in Syria. Youth un-
employment had dropped from its peak of 28 per cent in 2001 to 20 per cent in 2010,
and general unemployment dropped from about 11 per cent in 2000 to about 8.5 per
cent in 2010 - which is the lowest value of the sample excluding the Gulf countries.
Moreover, inflation rate recovered and remained between 3 and 4 per cent in 2009 and
2010 after having reached a peak of 15 per cent during the financial crisis of 2008. Fi-
nally, between 2000 and 2010, the purchasing power of the minimum wage increased by
almost 70 per cent. The variable SOEC is therefore coded (0) for Syria. Consequenly,
the protests did not focus on socio-economic demands but on political freedom and
condemning the violence of the regime.
6.12.5 An Uprisings Starting in the Peripheries
Although a Facebook page named "The Syrian Revolution against Bashar Al-Assad"
was set up on January 18 2011 which called for a "Day of Rage" on February, 5, that
particular date only witnessed small scale protests that were dispersed and suppressed
quickly by security forces (Hinnebusch et al., 2016, p.226). Intellectual figures well-
known from the Damascus Accord of 2005 participated in different small-scale demon-
strations in February in front of symbolic buildings like the Ministry of Interior or the
Egyptian and Libyan Embassies. However, according to the main opposition narrative,
the key root of grievance emerged in the southern city of Dar’a. Schoolchildren had
sprayed anti-Assad slogans on walls, were arrested and tortured. The children’s action
mirrored discontent of many citizens with the business dealings of Rami Makhlouf,
a cousin of the President. When a delegation of notables trying to free the children
laid down their headbands on the table of local head of the secret service Atef Najib
- which is a sign of submission in local tribal culture - they received a humiliating
response: Najib took the headbands from the table and threw them into the rubbish
bin. This triggered the first demonstration in Dar’a which was organised by networks
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of tribesmen from al-Zu’bi and al-Masalmeh tribes (Dukhan, 2014, p.8).76
Protests emerged quickly across the region and spread over the country (Hinnebusch
et al., 2016, p.226). Dissimilar to Libya, where protests turned quickly violent, several
peaceful protests followed in the entire country and eventually peaked in March. Harsh
reactions of security forces gave material for footage, which enraged the masses and
led to even larger demonstrations, causing a vicious circle of action and reaction. At
the same time, protests had also begun to sprout in Damascus where online activists
declared Friday March, 18 a "Day of Dignity".
On March 23, security forces attacked a mosque of Dara’a which had been the head-
quarters of the activists. According to locals, at least 60 people were killed, security
forces entered hospitals in order to torture and kill those who were hospitalised, whilst
also targeting ambulances. As a reaction, thousands of protesters took to the streets,
especially from 25 March 2011 onwards, generally expressing solidarity with Dara’a and
fury against the regime (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012). Slogans against violence like
"Who kills his own people is a traitor!" were more and more amended by concrete ac-
tion, Ba’ath party headquarters were set on fire, and statues were torn down. The well
known slogan "With heart, with blood, we will sacrifice us for you, oh Bashar!" was
altered to "[...] we will sacrifice us for you, oh martyr" on funeral marches.
Protests did not concentrate in single hot-spots like in Tunisia or in Egypt, as the
reaction of the security forces was mostly harsh and often lethal. They became more
decentralised and clandestine whilst taking place in peripheral areas and provincial
towns such as Idlib, Deir-a-Zoor, Homs or Hama, which also have strong tribal or
clan-like forms of organisation. The extraordinary violence of the regime is repeatedly
mentioned in order to explain the quick escalation of the conflict. Leenders and Hey-
demann (2012, p.142) depicts the situations vividly:
All accounts of the events suggest a level of coercion in Dar’a in early 2011 that
was only to be seen elsewhere in the country much later in the uprising, including
mass arrests, torture, the use of live rounds against crowds and targeted indi-
viduals suggesting a ’shoot-to- kill’ policy, the deployment of snipers on rooftops
and the prevention of medical treatment for the injured. Regime violence peaked
between the end of April and mid- May when, during a siege of Dar’a, tanks were
deployed and entire neighbourhoods were shelled. The number of detainees was
so large they could barely be contained in Dar’a’s municipal stadium where they
were rounded up and, according to several accounts, sometimes shot.
76The local intelligence chief of Dar’a who has earned a reputation of ruthlessly even before, and
who is also a relative of Assad, responded to earlier efforts to free the children with contempt: he
extended an insulting invitation to send Dar’a’s women to his office so "I can make them conceive
some new children" (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012, p.147-148). This also triggered the wrath of
many tribe leaders, in a region that actually was pro-Assad with many high ranking co-opted local
leaders.
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From Civil Protest to Armed Fragmentation
By mid June, the strategy of peaceful protests seemed to have failed in the eyes of
many participants. The number of dead approached the mark of two thousands, and
there was no change of regime strategy in sight. Additionally, the reaction of the
international community failed to appear. The video footage that was meant to trigger
a concrete diplomatic reaction, or even a humanitarian military intervention, missed
that purpose. At that moment, many protesters retreated or began to arm, leading
to the beginning of clashes in several cities. While in December 2011 rallies could
attract about 70.000 peaceful protesters, this kind of protests vanished - especially
after the militarisation of the Syrian opposition in the aftermath of the regime’s brutal
crackdown against Homs and others cities from early 201277 (Lefevre, 2013, p.186).
During the protest, grass-root workplace organisation did not play a role, as labour
related action would have required a nucleus inside the enterprises which the regime
could easily access and suppress. Moreover, three reasons can be mentioned as being all
related to the aforementioned split, weakness and decentralisation of the opposition.
First, the initial online mobilisation fanned out into coordination committees that
managed to bridged divides of sect, religion and class to try to formulate a leadership,
However, the de-central character of the movements turned to be a weakness in the
end. As Fares (2015) observes:
Confusion and lack of clarity were reflected in the formation of different organiza-
tions and committees which emerged during the second month of the revolution.
However, the establishment of such organizations and committees increased con-
siderably in the fifth month of the revolution. It even became difficult for those
following the revolution to tell the difference between the different groups and
committees that emerged. [...] A database documenting of the names all coordi-
nation committees and / or the FSA brigades remains non-existent.
Groups like the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change Syria
(NCC), the Syrian Nonviolence Movement, Building the Syrian State, Nabd for Syrian
Civil Youth, Syrian Leftist Coalition, the Syrian Secular Bloc, the April 17 Youth Move-
ment, or the Popular Front for Change and Liberation were all organising secretly and
had no chance for workplace mobilisation. Residues of human rights associations, civil
77For many observers, it remains a puzzle how the country could have been militarised so quickly
after the peaceful protests failed. Without going too much into detail, three components hint at an
answer. First, and less controversial, the number of Army defectors grew, eventually forming the Free
Syrian Army (FSA) that helped to arm the opposition and to form local militias. By 2013, about
2000 Brigades, split due to different ideologies, tribal connections, and funding sources, controlled
vast parts of Syria. Second, however less easy to grasp and to prove, human rights organisations
report that the regime began to saturate certain areas with arms, to push protesters into becoming
the "armed gangs" - which it claimed to be fighting from the outset (Kahf and Bartkowski, 2013).
Third, according to several reports, Islamist fighters had used East Syria as a space for retreat during
the Sunni uprising in Iraq. Some Iraqi politicians even claimed that the Assad regime had tolerated,
if not stimulated, militant Islamist networks inside the country to interfere into the newly established
Iraqi order (Al-Malaf, 2013, p.166). Indeed, Syria was charged with sanctions by the United States
already in 2004, as the regime was accused of supporting terrorism in Iraq (Landis and Pace, 2007,
p.46). By mid-2012 peaceful protests had vanished and the country found itself inside a bloody civil
war.
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society forums and committees that had emerged especially after 2000 were split and
penetrated by regime stoolies (Landis and Pace, 2007). The official parties remained
silent, including the communists who had split into three fractions. The Faisal fraction
of the Syrian Communist Party, which had faced censorship in 2001, remained silent,
just as the Bakdash wing did. The People’s Will Party Syria (PWP), which ran inde-
pendent candidates in the 2003 and 2007 elections, joined the protests (People’s Will
Party, 2012) and suffered repression of its leadership, especially as the party was small,
unregistered as a party, and thus technically clandestine. Furthermore, the organi-
sation of protests was conducted by living-room gatherings by tribal clan structures;
their importance becomes clear when taking into account, for instance, that protesters
across the country dubbed 20 June the "Friday of the Tribes" in appreciation for their
role in the uprising (Leenders and Heydemann, 2012). Again, open working place net-
works did not play a role in this context. An exile opposition group, that met for the
first time on May 31 2011 in Antalya, formed on September 15 the Syrian National
Council, which was recognised by several states as opposition to the Assad regime.
Due to different visions, the contested role of the Muslim Brotherhood, its dependence
on Turkey, and a lack of connection into the domestic opposition groups, this group
failed too often to speak with one voice.
The clandestine and weak nature of the organisation does not mean that there were
no attempts to mobilise at a greater scale. From March 2011, strikes were, besides
demonstrations, also part of the repertoire of collective action. Opposition committees
called for general strikes for May 18 May, June 23 and December 11, the latter being
announced as "Dignity Strike". Not many citizens followed the calls (Radio France
International, 2011), but shopkeepers and artisans that closed their shops were often
forced violently by security forces to reopen. Similarly to Yemen, however, these strikes
were not organised or planned by trade union organisations.
During the time of the uprisings, the regime could count on large parts of the popula-
tion, having maintained support amongst minority groups and the, the urban middle
class of the bigger cities Damascus and Aleppo. Concerning the upper echelons of
power, even the defections of high ranking officers did not affect the actual power base
of the country (Hinnebusch et al., 2016, p.232). In a speech in Parliament on March 30,
Assad dismissed the importance of the protests and blamed them on foreign conspir-
ators, moreover, the professional associations backed the strategy of the regime that
was presenting itself continuously as the only real grant for stability, while accusing
foreign players and Islamists of bringing chaos into the country. No opposition to As-
sad has been reported in the higher ranks of these organisations. The vast pro Assad
rallies that were mainly held close to Ministry of Defence and the Syrian TV station
in Damascus, mobilised many workers from the public sector, as well as teachers and
official trade unionists, by top-down order (Wieland, 2012, p.79).
Chapter 7
Minimisation and Interpretation of
the Results
Following the qualitative assessment of the cases and their relations to the variables,
the truth table 7.1 mirrors the basic findings. Table 7.2 gives an overview of the min-
imisations, the exact minimisations can be traced in annex B.
SOEC INTEROPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Dec-Nr.
Mauritania 0 0 0 1 0 0 (2)
Morocco 0 0 0 1 1 0 (3)
Algeria 0 0 1 0 1 0 (5)
Syria 0 0 1 1 0 0 (6)
Oman 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Yemen 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Libya 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Tunisia 1 0 1 0 0 1 (20)
Bahrain 0 1 1 1 0 1 (14)
Kuwait 0 1 1 1 1 1 (15)
Egypt 1 0 1 0 1 1 (21)
Egypt 1 1 1 0 1 1 (29)
Jordan 1 1 1 1 0 1 (30)
Table 7.1: Truth Table for Activity / non-Activity against the Institutional Equilibrium in
MENA 2010 -2013
In addition to the three basic minimisations for each outcome, being the conserva-
tive, theory guided, and negative / positive outcome assumption for all logical remain-
ders, the different cases for Egypt have been considered. EGY(21) stands for the case
in which Egypt is coded 10101 and EGY(29) stands for the case in which the country
is coded 11101. Together with the de Morgan calculations, a total of 16 final equations
stands to disposition for interpretation.
As shown in the calculations, centralisation (CEN) and intertwinedness with opposition
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parties (INOPP) are the most important factors for the explanation of transformative
political trade union activities. (CEN) was the major asset of unions in Bahrain,
Kuwait and Tunisia. In Egypt and Jordan, the fight against the old union structures
became a mutual project that welded together activists, and the perception of economic
crisis (SOEC) gave rise to new independent unions. The presence of (INOPP) is of
importance only on the one side which covers the Monarchies, while the second term
indicates that centralisation of trade union structures in combination with the absence
of strong tribalism in a country is a sufficient condition, whereas there is no need for
an alliance with opposition forces. This covers the Republics Tunisia and Egypt(29).
Concerning the outcome (0), the minimisations are more difficult to interpret. They
show the absence of bonds between opposition forces and trade unions (inopp) as nec-
essary condition for passivity or weakness of trade unions during the critical juncture
2011 - 2012/13. Besides that, different combination of tribalism and centralisation play
a role.
For the sake of parsimony and in order to make the results more clearly laid out,
the variables in the equations are abbreviated with their first letter only (SOEC = S,
INOPP = I, CEN = C, T = TRI, and KEYS = K).
Type of Minimisation Outcome = (1) Assumptions ⇓
Conservative, EGY(21) C(sIT + Itk + Sit) none
Conservative, EGY(29) C(IT + SIK + Sitk) none
Theory Guided, EGY(21) C(IT + Sit) LogRem(31) = 1, LogRem(29) = null
Theory Guided, EGY(29) C(IT + SIK + Sitk) LogRem(31) = 1, LogRem(21) = null
Abs. Pos. Outcome Ass. St + I ∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 1
De Morgan of T(0): Conservative I + S(c + t + K) + t(c + k) + CKT none
De Morgan of T(0): Theory Guided I + S(c + t + K) + t(c + k) LogRem(7) = 0
De Morgan of T(0): Abs. Neg. Outc. Ass. I + St ∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 0
Type of Minimisation Outcome = (0) Assumptions ⇓
Conservative i(scT + sTk + sCtK + CTk) none
Theory Guided i(sT + sCK + CTk) LogRem(7) = 0
Abs. Neg. Outc. Ass i(s + T) ∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 0
De Morgan of T(1): Conservative, EGY(21) i(s + T) + SK(I + c + T) + c + t(s + I) none
De Morgan of T(1): Conservative, EGY(29) i(s + T + K) + c + t(s + k) none
De Morgan of T(1): Theory Guided, EGY(21) i(s + c + T) + c + t(s + I) LogRem(31) = 1, LogRem(29) = null
De Morgan of T(1): Theory Guided, EGY(29) i(s + T + K) + c + t(s + kI) LogRem(31), LogRem(21) = null
De Morgan of T(1): Abs. Pos. Outc. Ass. i(s + T) ∀ x ∈ N : LogRem(x) => 1
Table 7.2: Types of final expressions according to assumptions about logical remainders. T(1)
/ T(0) refers to the outcome aiming at transformation
7.1 Evaluating Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
for the Outcome (1)
The variable INOPP plays a crucial role throughout almost all final equations for the
outcome (1) and is identified as sufficient condition when the minimisation has been
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conducted with absolute positive or negative outcome assumptions for the logical re-
mainders. Still, what is striking about the results of the conservative and theory guided
minimisations is that all equations contain the presence of a centralised trade union
body (CEN). That fact renders it a necessary condition and, consequently, in the de
Morgan calculations it becomes a sufficient condition for the outcome (0).
However, two limitations have to be made. First, the final result of the minimisation
with the help of the absolute positive outcome assumption does not include CEN and
is more focussed, as mentioned above, on INOPP. This might be due to the low case
coverage of N which is de facto only 10 cases out of 32 possible configurations, hence
the absolute positive and negative outcome assumptions for the logical remainders are
likely to blur and distort the results. Second, CEN is not a necessary nor sufficient con-
dition in any of the basic minimisation equations of the result (0), whereas it appears
as a sufficient condition in all de Morgan calculations for the conservative and theory
guided outcome of (1). In the conservative minimisation for (0), because of Algeria,
cen is even an INUS condition that builds a part of a path that leads to the absence
of transformative union activity. A possible explanation for these results is that CEN
is never a sufficient condition that leads to the outcome (1) alone and so it has al-
ways to appear in combination with other variables. In the conservative and theory
guided minimisations for the outcome (1) these variables are INOPP, or SOEC, or both.
7.1.1 The Connection between Oppositional Support and Cen-
tralisation
Configurations that include the combination of a nationwide centralised trade union
structure (CEN) and strong ties between oppositional players and trade unions (IN-
OPP) cover the cases of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. For both Gulf countries we
can assume a strong influence of oppositional forces on the trade union institutions. In
the case of Kuwait semi-loyalists dominated the councils of the unions and used them
as a platform to organise the middle class that was willing to protect the country’s
young and still fragile democratic achievements against authoritarian tendencies of the
royal family. In the case of Bahrain, unions held strong ties to, and were influenced
and supported by the moderate Islamic bloc led by al-Wifaq during the uprisings and
before. The proximity to this political current which turned to be a thorn in many
workers’ sides, and the successful exploit of this alliance in order to establish an own,
more regime friendly second trade union center by the regime, lead eventually to a split
and weakening of the entire movement. Comparing the case of Bahrain to the case of
Oman support this thesis. In both countries official and legal trade unions emerged
comparatively late in history. While since at least 2008 the GFTBU and the mod-
erate Islamist camp converged increasingly, the official trade unions in Oman rather
remained apolitical and did not interfere into the conflict between generations around
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which the protests of 2011 evolved.
The case of Jordan is slightly different. While in Bahrain and Kuwait political forces
could take advantage of the existing centralised trade union structure, in Jordan trade
unions became an important player during the protests not because but despite the
union centralisation. Parallel structures, supported or set up by local communities and
the Muslim Brotherhood became a harbour for regime critics. Nonetheless, a com-
mon denominator of all unions, no matter if white or blue collar, was the fight for
the right to organise outside the centralised official union infrastructure. In this sense,
the nationwide centralised narrow union corset became a mutual and unifying enemy.
Comparing the case of Jordan to the case of Syria, unearths additional aspects. The
attempt by the Muslim Brotherhood and parts of the middle classes to undermine the
nationwide centralised union structure was brutally put down in the 1980s and led to a
lack of ties between opposition movements of any kind and trade unionism. In Jordan,
in turn, especially white collar unions and political Islam grew more and more together
since the 1990s.
7.1.2 The Connection between a Broken Social Contract and
Centralisation
Combinations that include a nationwide centralised trade union structure (CEN) and
the perception of a non-fulfilment of the authoritarian bargain on the part of the regime
(SOEC) cover the cases of Tunisia and Egypt. The evolution of the protests seem to
be different at first glance, as - after some hesitation and internal struggles - vast parts
of the UGTT turned against the regime, while in Egypt alternative union structures
became a nucleus of the revolution - while the ETUF leadership stuck almost entirely
to the regime. At least one aspects renders both cases very similar, however.
First, in both cases, a long socio-economic struggle preceded the uprisings of 2011. The
UGTT remained rather passive or hostile and only local leaders supported the early
protests starting from 2006. Also in Egypt, the ETUF remained close to the regime
and only few unions like the spinning an weaving union supported the protests be-
tween 2006 and 2010 in a rather hidden manner. During that time, networks emerged
that would become main pillars of the revolutions that shook the countries in 2011.
In Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan, formal trade unions were apparently regarded as a
proper platform for discontent. Their long lasting role of guardians of the authoritar-
ian bargain had entered the collective memory of many workers and had led in Egypt
and Jordan to the perception of a necessity to form independent unions. According
to this reading, especially the Egyptian ETFU was unable to cope with the hybridi-
sation of the regime in a manner that satisfied the Egyptian workers who were used
to a more militant union movement, at least in socio-economic questions. The moves
of the regime freezing the status quo of the manning of the trade union leadership,
and the overall domestication of the federation was too bold, blunt, and obvious to be
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neglected by local trade unionists. The result was the foundation of a union federation
outside the established state-driven structure. In the sample, this is best contrasted by
Morocco where the youth movements explicitly distanced themselves from the official
trade unions while not spurring new union structures, or in comparison with Yemen,
where trade unionism lost much of its appeal and many former unionists focussed on
activism in NGOs.
In Tunisia, the course of event was different. The UGTT was characterised by many
internal divisions like the split between loyalists close to the regime and a more pro-
gressive wing, as well as regional divisions, most prominent between the north, the
peripheries in the west and south, and the area around the region of Sfax. Eventually,
the progressive forces gained upper hand and, eventually supported the protesters and
organised general strikes. The framework of the Tunisian UGTT was not yet as in-
cluded into the state apparatus and paralysed as the GFJTU in Jordan or the ETUF
in Egypt - although the UGTT showed a similar unwillingness to support protesters
before 2011 as the ETUF.
A turn of the ETUF against the Egyptian regime was no option during the entire
protests. It has to remain unsolved here if the symbolic capital which the UGTT still
had due to its role in the independence war protected the confederation from serious
splinter organisations, while in Egypt the ETUF lacked such a traditional bonus. In
any case, both organisations fulfilled their task as guardians of the authoritarian bar-
gain until the 1990s.
The minimisation with Egypt(21) shows most clearly the pivotal role of tribalism, or,
in turn, of upward mobility fostering bureaucracies. The variable (tri) on the right side
of the equation indicates that tribalism has to be relatively weak so that bureaucracies
and self-conscious trade unions could emerge. Bureaucracies in state corporatist sys-
tems gave rise to opportunities of upward mobility regardless of family affiliation, and
trade unions careers have often been a very important path for such upward mobility.
The relatively limited role of tribalism in the political system sets Egypt and Tunisia
apart from the other two examples with a deteriorated authoritarian bargain: Yemen
and Libya. In both cases, the dominance of tribal and family affiliations which, as
has been proved in the case studies, prevailed despite Panrabist and Arab Socialist
rhetoric, hampered the emergence of strong trade unionism.
A QCA theory test supports the importance of (tri) and (TRI) as variables. Assum-
ing that the final equation CI + CS seems a reasonable combination to explain the
outcome, the intersection between the most parsimonious theory guided minimisation
result, EGY(21), and the configuration to test renders:
T (1)t · T (1)(EGY (21)) = CI + CS · CsIT + CItk + CSit
T (1)t · T (1)(EGY (21)) = CIT + CSit (7.1)
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The equation supports the thesis of two groups of cases and also confirms that (CI
+ CS) does matter for the result, however, not as standalone terms. The additional
variables allow for a more elaborate thesis: In cases in which tribal structures dominate
the institutional equilibrium, trade unions need a strong partner to become active. In
countries in which tribalism is of less importance, trade unions did not need a partner
and reacted because the social contract with the rulers had been violated. It is also
permissible to assume that the combination (it) is no coincidence. For Egypt and
Tunisia it can be said that the environment was free of interference from opposition or
other interest groups, and trade unionism could develop as guardians of welfare. When
this role was not accomplished any more by the official union federation in Egypt, it
was reclaimed by the people and led to independent trade union structures.
7.2 Evaluating Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
for the Outcome (0)
Concerning the minimisation equations of the outcome (0), the conservative variant
gives little insights. Only the absence of INOPP is a necessary condition for the failure
of trade unions to attack the institutional equilibrium in MENA countries 2010 -2013.
If the set is divided into three subgroups, the interpretation is more clear: First, the
Maghreb states Morocco and Mauritania with their pluralist union strategy, second
Libya, Yemen, Oman and Syria with their strict corporatist and state driven arrange-
ments, and third Algeria as a special case.
7.2.1 Tribal Bonds, Violence and Hybridisation
In the case of Algeria, no variable could be eliminated in the conservative minimisation
process. As tribalism did not play an as outstanding role in the country compared
to the other cases, also the explanation differs: despite some bargaining power in key
sectors, in the period between 2010 -2013 the authoritarian bargain was perceived as
relatively intact. This can be read against the background of the traumatising civil
war and corresponding economic crisis of which the country was still recovering. The
economic key data were also more advantageous than those of most cases in the sample.
Similar to Tunisia, trade unions could set up an elaborated infrastructure, probably
due to the fact that bureaucracy is a crucial pillar of the institutional equilibrium.
Workers solidarity, especially in urban areas, also ousted tribal and family bonds more
frequently than in other countries. In this environment, the UGTA managed to re-
main an important player inside the political system. This assessment coincides with
observations of Valenzuela (1992, p.462-463), stating that in corporatist arrangements,
the labour movement leadership but also many rank-and-file workers would generally
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view any possible political change with suspicion, since they might lose their connec-
tions into the echelons of power. This interpretation, as a reminder, holds true for
2010 -2013. When Algeria faced another crisis in 2019, the stance of the trade unions
turned to be more transformative and the UGTA openly demanded the retreat of the
President. This is another indicator, that, by fact, during the critical juncture of 2010
- 2013, Algerian trade unions would possibly have been able - but yet not willing - to
become a player who challenges the institutional equilibrium.
Cases with Procyclical Protests of Trade Unions
If Algeria was taken out of the sample, the final equation would be iT (sc + sk + Ck)
for the conservative minimisation and iT (s + Ck) for the theory guided minimisation
respectively. In this equation, the importance of tribalism inside the political system
and the absence of strong allies of trade unions among the critical interference factors
are necessary conditions. The subterms indicate some differences:
The left subterm covers Morocco and Mauritania where the socio-economic conditions
were comparatively advantageous or in a state of recovery, and people trusted that
the current institutional equilibrium was capable of fulfilling the authoritarian bar-
gain. While the variable remains in the configuration of the conservative minimisation
that covers Morocco, in Mauritania (cen) is eliminated due to the comparison with
the highly centralised union structure of Syria. Violence and tribalism are an impor-
tant pillar in both countries to maintaining the institutional equilibrium, however, it
seems that the highly indebted state of Mauritania never had the resources to set up
a corporatist arrangement able to domesticates trade unions. Moreover, although the
Mauritanian Intersyndicale issued political statements in 2008, trade unions remained
quiet during the critical juncture of 2011 - 2012. The feeling that the socio-economic
situation was improving, indicated by the variable (soec), seemed to have hampered
attacks on the institutional equilibrium and, additionally, made the CGTM utter pro-
cyclical demands.
Morocco, against that background, bears different premisses:
The assumption of LogRem(7) = 0 eliminates the variable (cen) in the theory guided
outcome assumption. As the variable (cen) is a necessary condition in all results of
the de Morgan calculations for the outcome (1), this theoretical assumption has to be
read with care. Hybridisation of the political and economic system, and the split of
the opposition and also of the trade union movement were parts of the major strategy
of power holders to secure power. A major pillar of this strategy was the strengthening
of a new class of entrepreneurs during the hybridisation of the system. If this class
is strong and well organised, organised labour faces strong opponents often willing to
split and hamper workers organisation after hybridisation of the system (Valenzuela,
1989, p.454). This strategy also worked for the most part in Jordan, however, eco-
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nomic crisis and a strong opposition of the IAF turned trade unionism into a tool to
attack the ruling elite and the institutional equilibrium it was protected by. Similar
to Algeria, and excluding the youth movements, Moroccan workers protests can also
be regarded as rather procyclical, aiming at the redistribution of resources in times of
perceived economic betterment.
Countries with a Adamant Top-Down Grip on Trade Union Structures
On the right side of the subterm a combination of centralisation and low bargaining
power of trade unions in key sectors appears, covering Libya, Syria, and Oman. These
variables can be regarded as interrelated.
First, an active and dominant role of the state managed to put trade unions under its
control. The strategies were heterogeneous including the out-crowding of critical union
activists who started to engage in NGOs instead (Yemen), the marginalisation through
strong tribalism and the civil society hostile system of the Jamhiriya (Libya), and
the state driven top-down implementation of loyalist trade union institutions (Oman).
These regimes, which were not characterised by a independent bureaucracy - as trib-
alism posed a more important pillar of the institutional equilibria - were able to treat
trade unions more ruthlessly and achieved a high degree of centralisation and control.
This caused weakness of unions in key sectors (keys), and as the state was not willing
to allow other political forces to diffuse into the union movement, it also caused missing
bonds between unions and opposition movements.
A similar logic can be applied to Syria, where the degree of state repression was prob-
ably the highest of the entire sample. The socio-economic situation was relatively
advantageous compared to other countries of the sample and, by fact, socio-economic
questions played, similar to Kuwait, a subordinate role. The regime managed to have
a lock on trade union organisations, shielded them from oppositional influence, and
suppressed any kind of workers movement outside the official trade union framework.
Protests in 2011 were organised by local and tribal networks and no workers organi-
sation played a crucial role during the uprisings or the war that would follow. In this
case, the importance of tribalism inside the inner logic of power of the regime can be
taken as an explanation for trade union weakness - if the national trade union structure
is seen as an important ally and tool of the ruling Allawi minority. The extent of this
tight grip is, however, only possible due to the extraordinary brutality of the regime.
This coincides with observations of Valenzuela (1992, p.462-463): if a rupture occurs
in a highly repressive regime, social groups, including the labour movement, will be
less organised at the moment the change begins. And as none of the Syrian progres-
sive opposition forces managed to bond with trade unions like in Kuwait or Bahrain,
there was, consequently, no trade union activity in order to change the institutional
equilibrium.
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The comparison of the case of Syria with the other countries displaying an adamant
grip on the opposition movement (Libya, Oman, Yemen) suggests that the deteriora-
tion of living standards in the latter was not enough to trigger union activity critical
of the system. Indeed, the variable does barely play a role in the minimisations for the
outcome (0) as well as in the de Morgan calculations for the outcome (1)1.
7.2.2 The Ambivalence of Bargaining Power in Key Sectors
Throughout all minimisation results, the role of bargaining power in economic key
sectors is ambivalent. In the cases of Algeria and Morocco, unions did show some
bargaining power in the years before, however, they did not use it during the critical
juncture in order to attack the institutional equilibrium. While in Morocco the variable
is eliminated in all minimisations due to a very similar configuration to Mauritania,
it remains in the conservative and theory guided minimisations because of Algeria. It
could be speculated that because unions were strong in key sectors, union demands
were more frequently met than in other cases of the sample and, hence, there was little
need to attack the basic rules of the political system and its distribution mechanisms.
To fully prove this assumption, however, more research had to be conducted, for in-
stance about the role of Algerian trade unions during the protests of 2019.
In the cases with high centralisation of trade union frameworks, as has been stated
above, the weakness of trade unions concerning bargaining power can be traced back
to the strong grip of state authorities on the union movement. The threat of repression
that union leaders had to fear if they deviated from the narratives of state propaganda
- which often tries to draw a much more favourable picture of the popularity of regime
measures - is a clear incentive to refrain from criticism.
Concerning the outcome (1), the sample shows greater variety, still, no clear pattern
can be identified. In Egypt, it can be assumed that the strength in the textile sector
gave trade unions self-confidence and prominence and raised attention of the media
and also of other opposition players like bloggers and leftist parties. It is also rea-
sonable to assume that the broad alliance of unions that also included the important
petrochemical sector in Kuwait gave self-confidence to the union movement to protect
the constitution and turn against the royal family in 2012. Beyond that, however, it
remains questionable if union strength in key sectors leads trade unions to attack the
institutional equilibrium. Bargaining power in key sectors appears in the conservative
and theory guided final equations of both outcomes, (1) and (0), in different kind of
specifications, whereas it does not appear in the final equations with absolute positive
/ negative remainder assumptions. This is no proof and the QCA analysis does not
falsify the assumption that bargaining power leads to politically transformative trade
1The only exception is the conservative de Morgan calculation (SKI + SKc + SKT + si + iT +
c + ts + tI). Theoretically, the combination SK could indicate that the bargaining power of trade
unions is so high that they receive a privileged treatment by the authorities. Algeria comes close to
this hypothetical case, however, further research would be necessary to prove this hypothesis.
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The thesis at hand aimed at analysing the heterogeneous role of trade unions in twelve
MENA countries during the "Arab uprisings" of 2011-2013. By implementing a fairly
new approach from political science in the field of Middle Eastern Studies, unique in-
sights could be generated of which other studies will be able to benefit.
These results, however, are not a deterministic, all encompassing truth but rather a
careful approach in order to bring light into the grey zones of a field in which still re-
liable data is more than often unattainable. Against that background, QCA has been
understood and used as an extension of Comparative Historical Analysis. Moreover,
it has been shown why small and very small n studies allow for a qualitative focus
when using QCA. This framework is not meant to produce general laws about cases
not involved into the sample, however, the results helped to clarify the nature of the
cases, revealed parallels and differences, and rendered the internal functioning of the
regimes more comprehensible. Moreover, it gave an insight of the embedding of trade
unions in the political systems of the sample.
8.1 Remarks Regarding the Methodology
Four methodological remarks can be made. First, this study is easily replicable and
aimed at making sources and conclusions as transparent as possible. The credo to hold
the case studies as thick as possible and as parsimonious as necessary helped to give a
meaningful overview about the empirical and conceptual data that has been used. The
level of replicability is also enhanced by an easy introduction to QCA as an approach
that gives a comprehensible understanding of what QCA actually is, what it does, and
which pitfalls researchers have to be aware of. The approach is comparatively unknown
to Middle Eastern Studies, yet bears much value for this discipline. This study also
carries an implicit hope that QCA might someday become more widespread among
scholars dealing with the MENA region.
Second, the concept of change and non-change of institutional equilibria as level for
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comparison was an important assumption for a meaningful comparison to be possi-
ble. This was only possible by separating economic demands on the one side, and
political demands on the other, whereas the latter aim to alter the institutional equi-
librium. Applying a constructivist view on the term trade union helped to understand
that trade unions in MENA may combine socio-economic demands with pushes for
systemic change in the political architecture of their countries; however, they do not
necessarily have to, and, in fact, they barely did in the past. The protests for individual
socio-economic betterment represent rather an integral part of the game than an effort
to challenge its rules, and consequently, trade unions struggling for the compliance of
the authoritarian bargain are rather upholder of the status quo than change agents.
Third, concerning the QCA minimisation process of this study, minimisations with
standardised assumptions (either (0) or (1) across the board) about all logical remain-
ders have been useful to a marginal extent only. They neglect and conceal too many
important interconnections. This supports the claim that QCA applications in small
and very small n needs careful, elaborate, and deep qualitative interpretation in order
to gain appropriate results.
8.2 Remarks Regarding the Content
Concerning the concrete results of the analysis, the research question Under which
circumstances did trade unions adopt a transformative stance during the protests of
2011-2013 in the MENA Region? can be answered by pointing at different parallels
and interconnections.
A high degree of centralisation (CEN) of trade union structures has been an asset when
it came to transformative trade union activity. It is a necessary condition of the out-
come (1), albeit only the cases of Mauritania and Morocco - in which the trade union
movement is heavily politically split - lack such a centralisation. Nonetheless, there is
no path dependency, as highly centralised trade union institutions may also be a sign
of strict and steadfast state control.
In the Gulf countries with a positive outcome (1), Bahrain and Kuwait, in which trib-
alism plays an important role in the institutional equilibrium, transformative trade
union activities went along with strong ties into the opposition camps. In Tunisia and
Egypt it was rather the loss of trust into the ruling elite concerning its willingness and
ability to fulfil the authoritarian bargain that caused trade unions to advocate for a
change of power structures. The fact that bureaucratic institutions and civil society
provided possibilities for upward mobility beyond family ties traditionally gave trade
union organisations a strong role within these latter two countries. A tradition of
workers’ struggle became part of the collective memory, and in times of crisis, people
remembered and turned to trade unionism in order to make their claims.
In relation to these two prototypes, Jordan is a remarkable hybrid. On the one hand,
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the socio-economic situation of many citizens was constantly deteriorating, leading
workers to set up independent trade unions in order to challenge the state controlled
national federation. On the other hand, the biggest opposition party (Islamic Action
Front) managed to use its networks inside the white-collar associations in order to push
for reform of the political system. Both currents eventually merged their demands and
the borders started to blur during the critical juncture.
Concerning the cases with a negative outcome (0), the absence of partners among the
oppositional interference factors is a necessary condition. The missing link between
trade union organisations and youth movements is an important part of that observa-
tion. In Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria, trade unions were not a part of oppositional
alliances that attempted to change the power structures and legal frameworks of the
countries. Trade unions that became active did not contest state structures but rather
attempted to enhance the socio-economic well-being of their members within these
structures. According to this reading, the protests, especially of Morocco and Algeria
in 2011, were procyclical. The socio-economic conditions were, at least in the percep-
tion of the populace, not reason enough to jeopardise stability, yet, the atmosphere
of the Arab uprisings in the entire region provided trade union organisations with a
better bargaining position to push for demands.
In Yemen and Libya, the countries that displayed the worst socio-economic condi-
tions in the sample, things were slightly different. The state managed to control or
marginalise trade union activities to an extent that trade unionism ceased to be the
first choice for workers to utter their demands. These countries have the importance
of tribalism and, interconnected, the secondary role of bureaucracies that allow for
upward mobility beyond family ties in common. Indeed, a major finding of the study
is that tribalism as an important part of the political system hampers the emergence
of a transformative stance of trade unions, unless there is a strong political force in
the opposition that actively searches to bond with trade unions or even fosters the
emergence of new unions more critical of the regime. Although having been influenced
by Arab Socialist thought throughout their history, the strategy of the ruling elites in
Yemen and Libya shifted towards reliance on tribal associations. This went along with
a complete synchronisation of trade unions within the system of the Jamhiriya and
state support for (tribal) notables on the local level in Libya, and through an evasive
movement of progressive activists from trade unions into the NGO sector after the
state had tightened the grip on trade union institutions in Yemen. In Syria, tribalism
also played an important role although the state was officially a republic ruled by the
Ba’ath party; here, the extraordinary degree of intimidation and violence towards op-
positional activities exacerbated the difficulties to engage in independent trade union
action that was critical of the state.
Among the negative cases, Oman stands out, as the trade union movement was par-
ticularly young and was foremost implemented in a top-down manner. The country
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lacked a deep rooted trade union tradition and followed a path that can be observed
widespreadly among other Gulf monarchies: As a first step, an apolitical framework of
working councils had been implemented, which eventually became the basis for proper
trade union institutions. Compared to Bahrain, however, where the trade union move-
ment emancipated from state control, and where the Al-Wifaq Party managed to gain
palpable influence within the trade union institutions, trade unions in Oman are still
too embryonic and close to the state to cause political controversies. It remains to be
seen which route the young Omani democratic institutions as well as the young trade
unions will take in the future.
Beyond these interpretations for the cases, some conclusions on the macro level con-
cerning Middle Eastern Studies can be drawn. First, the cases of Tunisia and especially
Egypt, which are often taken as an entry point and example for further inferences con-
cerning the entire region, are able to fulfil this particular task to a limited extent only.
As the descriptions of the institutional equilibria of the countries have shown, and also
as the stance, activities, and self-consciousness of civil society indicates, these countries
are rather exceptional to the region. Basic concepts such as patrimonial capitalism and
the authoritarian bargain hold across the cases, however, researchers should be more
careful when claiming to speak and do research for the entire MENA region when scru-
tinising Egypt or Tunisia.
8.3 Limitations and Prospects of Future Research
As it is the case with every research scrutinising deeply its cases and using a wide
range of material, this study raises at least as many new questions as it answers old
ones. From a historical point of view, much has been written about the Arab Uprisings
2011-2013, however, in depth analysis of youth movements, parties, and other civil
society organisations is still rare. It is time for the discipline to overcome the misery of
indeterminacy as mentioned in the introduction and to, in the words of Catlin (1956),
"go out and look at what actually happens". Social Movement Theory seems an ap-
propriate approach to scrutinise players in the political arena in order to disaggregate
the internal structures of power of MENA states. A comparative perspective would be
fruitful, but also case studies of single institutional equilibria, formal institutions, or
social movements could be beneficial in order to gain a better understanding of internal
affairs in MENA states.
Having said this, foreign influence in the form of aid to set up institutions could also
have be included into this study. Was the highly funded NGO sector, of which also
the trade unions benefited, a decisive factor for the rise of independent trade union-
ism in Egypt? What about the role of international organisations and other donors
supporting civil society in Tunisia? Especially, a comparison with other countries of
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the MENA region could produce valuable insights, although the conceptualisation and
collection of data may be particularly difficult.
Another point which also may bear some problems of measurement and conceptuali-
sation is the very self-perception of trade unions in the region. Qualitative interviews
could shed a brighter light on what trade union members expect from a trade union,
and these insights could clarify the differences to OECD countries. The study at hand
has made a first step into this direction, however, particular comparisons among MENA
states could help to round out the picture.
Concerning more recent and future prospects, the subject of trade unions in MENA is
a field in constant motion. Much research has been conducted about the pivotal role of
the Tunisian UGTT in the transition process after 2011 while other topics still require
more inquiry. What made the Algerian UGTA turn against the president of the re-
public in 2019? How will Egypt develop after the regime has tightened the grip on the
opposition and in particular the independent trade union movement since 2014? And
how will the systems of workers councils in the Gulf region develop, given the Bahraini
experience? All these questions deserve an answer that goes beyond superficiality.
Last but not least, special attention should be given to the Kuwaiti KTUF. The
national federation enjoys a surprising amount of independence - measured by the
semi-authoritarian environment of the country. It comprises, for instance, prominent
committees dealing with women rights or with the situation of guest workers. The
federation also gave support in the form of workshops and consulting for the young
trade union institutions in Bahrain and Oman. This example of the often neglected
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324 APPENDIX A. FIGURES AND TABLES OF THE PREWORK
A.2 Truth Table and Distance Matrix
A.3 Truth Table
SOEC INTEROPP CEN TRI KEYS Outcome Dec-Nr.
Mauritania 0 0 0 1 0 0 (2)
Morocco 0 0 0 1 1 0 (3)
Algeria 0 0 1 0 1 0 (5)
Syria 0 0 1 1 0 0 (6)
Oman 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Yemen 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Libya 1 0 1 1 0 0 (22)
Tunisia 1 0 1 0 0 1 (20)
Bahrain 0 1 1 1 0 1 (14)
Kuwait 0 1 1 1 1 1 (15)
Egypt 1 0 1 0 1 1 (21)
Jordan 1 1 1 1 0 1 (30)
Table A.2: Truth table for QCA minimisation
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A.4 Distance Matrix for the Chain of Comparison





































































































































































































































































B.0.1 Minimisatons for the Outcome (1)
Following the truth table, the following equation can be set up for the outcome (1):
(soec ∗ interopp ∗ CEN ∗ tri ∗ keys)
+(SOEC ∗ interopp ∗ CEN ∗ tri ∗ KEY S)
+(SOEC ∗ INT EROP P ∗ CEN ∗ T RI ∗ keys)
+(soec ∗ INT EROP P ∗ CEN ∗ T RI ∗ keys)
+(soec ∗ INT EROP P ∗ CEN ∗ T RI ∗ KEY S)
= 1
(B.1)
For the outcome (1), the minimisation process shows the following results:
⇒
 14; 15 0111-14; 30 -111020; 21 1010-
 prime implicants
To minimise the equation further, the combination 11111 (31) will be included. It
presumes a hypothetical environment in which the social contract had been perceived
as broken by the populace, trade unions and opposition parties were intertwined and
possibly allied, the trade union structure centralised, tribalism an important pillar of
the institutional equilibrium, and trade unions present and strong in key sectors of
economy. Given the cases and minimisations so far, we can safely assume that this
combination might have produced a trade union movement that had resources and












leading to the following prime implicant chart:
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Case (dec.) 14 15 20 21 30 31 Expression
X X X X INOPP * CEN * TRI
X X SOEC * inopp * CEN * tri
Case (conf.) sICTk sICTK SiCtk SiCtK SICTk SICTK
Table B.1: Prime Implicant Table for the Outcome "Transformative Trade Unions"
The table identifies the essential prime implicants, being:
(INOP P ∗ CEN ∗ T RI) + (SOEC ∗ inopp ∗ CEN ∗ tri) = 1 (B.2)
At this point of the minimisation process we can also already identify a necessary
condition that leads to the outcome (1), being the centralisation of the trade union
bodies, as the following equation indicates:
CEN ∗ (INOP P ∗ T RI) + (SOEC ∗ inopp ∗ tri ∗ keys)) = 1 (B.3)
A similar result is produced when Egypt is not coded 10101 (21) but instead 11101
(29), taking into account that the trade union movement had been reluctant to bond
with opposition forces at the beginning of the juncture, however, third party backed
institutions like the Center for Workers and Trade Union Services (CWTUS) might










 14; 15; 30; 31 -111-20 1010029; 31 111-1
 prime implicants
The configuration can, again, be transformed to show that the centralisation of the
trade union structures remains a necessary condition:
(INOP P ∗ CEN ∗ T RI) + (SOEC ∗ inopp ∗ CEN ∗ tri ∗ keys) + (SOEC ∗ INOP P ∗ CEN ∗ KEY S)
= CEN((T RI ∗ INOP P ) + (SOEC ∗ INOP P ∗ KEY S) + (SOEC ∗ inopp ∗ tri ∗ keys))
= 1
(B.4)
B.0.2 Minimisations for the Outcome (0)
Following the truth table, the following equation can be set up for the conservative
outcome (0):
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(soec ∗ interopp ∗ cen ∗ T RI ∗ keys)
+(soec ∗ interopp ∗ cen ∗ T RI ∗ KEY S)
+(soec ∗ interopp ∗ CEN ∗ tri ∗ KEY S)
+(SOEC ∗ interopp ∗ CEN ∗ T RI ∗ keys)
+(soec ∗ interopp ∗ CEN ∗ T RI ∗ keys)
= 0
(B.5)






The minimisation is rather unsatisfactory as it gets stuck in the first step without
rendering a more parsimonious result. Even with the inclusion of the most reasonable
assumptions, being LogRem(0) with the configuration 00000 and with LogRem(1) with
the configuration 00001 based on the assumption that bargaining strength in key sectors
alone would not be enough for unions to challenge the institutional equilibrium, no
further parsimony can be achieved. A reasonable assumption would be to include
LogRem(7) with the configuration 00111. The basic assumption is that in the case of
Morocco(3), the centralisation of the union framework would not have led to a different









 2; 3; 6; 7; 00-1-5; 7 001-16; 22 -0110
 prime implicants
The resulting prime implicant chart:
Case (dec.) 2 3 5 6 22 Expression
X X x soec * inopp * TRI
X soec * inopp * CEN * KEYS
x X inopp * CEN * TRI * keys
Case (conf.) sicTk sicTK siCtK siCTk SiCTk
Table B.2: Prime Implicant Table for the Outcome "Non-Transformative Trade Unions"
rendering the following final equation after transformation to identify necessary
conditions:
soec ∗ inopp ∗ T RI + soec ∗ inopp ∗ CEN ∗ KEY S + inopp ∗ CEN ∗ T RI ∗ keys = 0
inopp(soec ∗ T RI + soec ∗ CEN ∗ KEY S + CEN ∗ T RI ∗ keys) (B.6)
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B.1 De Morgan Calculations
B.1.1 De Morgan Calculation with Intial Outcome = (1)
The de Morgan calculation for the conservative minimisation for the outcome (1) with
EGY(21) renders the following equation:
1 = sICT + ICT k + SiCt 7−→ (S + i + c + t) · (i + c + t + K) · (s + I + c + T ) = 0
(Si + Sc + St + SK + i + ic + it + iK + ic + c + ct + cK + it + ct + t + tK) · (s + I + c + T ) = 0
(SK + i + c + t) · (s + I + c + T ) = 0
0 + SKI + SKc + SKT + si + 0 + ic + iT + cs + cI + c + cT + ts + tI + tc + 0 = 0
SKI + SKc + SKT + si + iT + c + ts + tI = 0
SK(I + c + T ) + i(s + T ) + c + t(s + I) = 0
(B.7)
The de Morgan caluculation for the conservative minimisation for the outcome (1)
with EGY(29) renders the following equation:
1 = ICT + SiCtk + SICK 7−→ (i + c + t) · (s + I + c + T + K) · (s + i + c + k) = 0
(is + 0 + ic + iT + iK + cs + cI + c + cT + cK + ts + tI + tc + 0 + tk) · (s + i + c + k) = 0
(is + iT + iK + c + ts + tI + tk) · (s + i + c + k) = 0
(is + is + isc + isk + iT s + iT + iT c + iT k + iKs + iK + iKc + 0 + cs + ci + c + ck + ts + tsi
+tsc + tsk + tIs + 0 + tIc + tIk + tks + tki + tkc + tk = 0
is + iT + iK + c + ts + tk = 0
i(s + T + K) + c + t(s + k) = 0
(B.8)
For the theory guided outcome assumption including Egypt coded as (21), the fol-
lowing de Morgan transformation can be made:
1 = ICT + SiCt 7−→ (i + c + t) · (s + I + c + T ) = 0
is + 0 + ic + iT + cs + cI + c + cT + ts + tI + tc + 0 = 0
is + ic + iT + c + ts + tI = 0
i(s + c + T ) + c + t(s + I) = 0
(B.9)
For Egypt coded (29) the de Morgan calculation for the theory guided outcome (1):
1 = ICT + SICK + SiCtk 7−→ (i + c + t) · (s + i + c + k) · (s + I + c + T + K) = 0
(si + i + ic + ik + sc + ic + c + ck + st + it + ct + tk) · (s + I + c + T + K) = 0
(i + c + st + tk) · (s + I + c + T + K) = 0
si + 0 + ic + iT + iK + cs + cI + c + cT + cK + st + stI
+stc + 0 + stK + tks + tkI + tkc + 0 + 0 = 0
si + c + iT + iK + st + tkI = 0
i(s + T + K) + c + t(s + kI) = 0
(B.10)
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B.1.2 De Morgan Calculation with Intial Outcome = (0)
De Morgen calculation for the conservative minimisation of the outcome (0):
0 = iscT + isT k + isCtK + iCT k 7−→
(I + S + C + t) · (I + S + t + K) · (I + S + c + T + k) · (I + c + t + K) = 1
(I + IS + It + IK + SI + S + St + SK + CI + CS + Ct + CK + tI + tS + t + tK)
·(I + S + c + T + k) · (I + c + t + K) = 1
(I + S + t + CK) ∗ (I + S + c + T + k) ∗ (I + c + t + K) = 1
(I + IS + Ic + IT + Ik + SI + S + Sc + ST + Sk
+tI + tS + tc + 0 + tk + CKI + CKS + 0 + CKT + 0) · (I + c + t + K) = 1
(I + S + tc + tk + CKT ) · (I + c + t + K) = 1
I + Ic + It + IK + SI + Sc + St + SK + tcI + tc + tc + tcK + tkI
+tkc + tk + 0 + CKT I + 0 + 0 + CKT = 1
I + Sc + St + SK + tc + tk + CKT = 1
I + S(c + t + K) + t(c + k) + CKT = 1
(B.11)
The de Morgan calculation for the theory guided outcome assumption of the out-
come (0):
0 = siT + siCK + iCT k 7−→ (S + I + t) · (S + I + c + k) · (I + c + t + K) = 1
(S + SI + Sc + Sk + IS + I + Ic + Ik + tS + tI + tc + tk) ∗ (I + c + t + K) = 1
(S + I + tc + tk) · (I + c + t + K) = 1
SI + Sc + St + SK + I + Ic + It + IK + tc + tc + tcK + tkI + tkc + tk + 0 = 1
Sc + St + SK + I + tc + tk = 1
S(c + t + K) + I + t(c + k) = 1
(B.12)
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